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
Special Operations
Foreign Area
Data System (SOFADS)

K-121

PROJECT STAR (U)

A PSYCHO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF IRAN

OCTOBER 1980



Special Operations Division
Operations Directorate
Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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




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INTRODUCTION (U)

The following special project was done by the Behavioral Sciences Department at CACI, for the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - J3 (OJCS-J3) and reflects data collected up to September 5, 1980. The methodology utilized for the remote psycho-political assessments was developed in 1980 for the Special Operations Foreign Area Data System (SOFADS) (CACI, 1980). SOFADS has demonstrated a marked utility for computerized assistance in:

- Rapidly skimming incoming data for information pertinent to analysis of social instability,
- Organizing information into an easily comprehensible format that lends itself to advanced psychological and sociological analysis,
- Supporting psychological operations,
- Assisting in the identification of an adversary's weaknesses and vulnerabilities to PSYOPS, and
- Facilitating development of target specific PSYOPS campaigns tailored to the adversary's identified vulnerabilities.

Designed to analyze complex intergroup and interpersonal relationships, in support of special operations roles, SOFADS is currently being developed under the direction of the OJCS for use by special operations elements supporting unified and specified commands.

The violent seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the resulting protracted hostage crisis immensely complicate diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran. Iranian leaders' active support of the militant students embitters the U.S.-Iran relationship. The raid on Iranian

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territory last April aimed at freeing the American hostages exemplifies the low state to which traditional diplomatic efforts have fallen.

Since April, intense efforts have focused upon examining the structure of the Iranian nation and the psychology of its people and leaders in an effort to assess the most promising options open to American policy-makers. Among the key questions addressed are:

- What is or are Iran's true source(s) of political power?
- What historical, religious, demographic, and cultural factors animate the Iranian nation?
- What are the most promising potential diplomatic avenues for approaching Iran's leaders?
- What are the world views of Iran's leaders?
- What would be the probable result of differing U.S. policy choices?

This document results from an intensive political, demographic, and psychological study of these questions. It proceeds from general cultural and historical observations to highly specific discussions of powerful groups and individuals. Both quantitative political analysis for target identification and extensive remote psychological assessment of key figures have been employed.

This report presupposes familiarity with the general landscape of Iranian politics and culture. Readers lacking that background will find some of the more general volumes listed in the bibliography helpful in establishing perspective.

Chapter One will review Iranian political history placing the roots of the current Islamic Republic in the perspective of Persian and Iranian history but concentrating on the brief period that has followed the fall of the shah. Demographic and economic factors that influence national

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life are considered, the major population blocs identified, and the primary religious beliefs explored.

(U) Chapter Two focuses on the primary political groups found in Iran identifying their politics, strength, level of unity, and possible influence in a struggle for nationwide power.

(U) Chapter Three presents a psychological assessment of the Iranian national character including response to power and authority and assessments of potential sources of resistance to the Khomeini regime.

(U) Chapter Four presents a remote psychological assessment of key Iranian leaders emphasizing personality points that could be exploited in a negotiating session. Chapter Five applies the same sort of analysis in greater depth to Iran's preeminent leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

(U) Chapter Six focuses upon developing strategies for perception management within Iran through exploitation of the known weaknesses of Iranian leaders. It offers insights gleaned from remote assessment of these figures.

(U) Chapter Seven addresses key leaders' reactions to a U.S. military assault and again views the leaders considered in Chapter Four from the perspective of this specific sort of event.

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CHAPTER 1. HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND (U)

The national character of Iran is rooted in its struggle since the dawn of recorded history to achieve self-rule. From the earliest times, foreign powers and alien religions have dominated a culture that has proven amazingly resistant to assimilation. Consequently, the struggle for religious expression and national independence have become inextricably interwoven in the Iranian national character. In many ways, this intense preoccupation with religious and national goals overshadows other cultural and economic problems that would otherwise occupy the nation's energies.

HISTORY

The close of the Achaeminid period and the fall of the dynasty of Cyrus the Great marks the beginning of a long period of Iranian domination by outside powers and religions. Figure 1 presents a time line of major Iranian regimes from that period to the present. Successive empires have ruled the region permitting only occasional moments of self-rule until this century.

During this long period, the most significant event for national life was the Islamic conquest stretching from 642 to 1050 A.D. The creation of the Shiite sect of Islam merged devout Muslimism with national self-expression in a way that animates the population to this day.

During the Iranian peoples' long wait for the return of Persian supremacy, secular shahs have been, from the point of view of the religious community, caretaker leaders of the country. Secular leadership is thought a stopgap exigency while waiting for the prophesied appearance of the Great Imam who will restore a wholly religious state.

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


Figure 1. Iran's National, Historical, and Religious Heritage

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DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS


Figure 2 offers cross-sectional views of the Iranian population: by degree of urbanization, by educational level, and by ethnic and religious background. Iran is drawn from an extraordinarily diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural mix and is primarily unified by its religious heritage. Less than one third of the country is literate. The urban, educated segment of the population is concentrated in Tehran (with a population of four million) and five other important cities. Tehran alone boasts 74 percent of all university students, 79 percent of all college educated persons, and 34 percent of Iran's literate population. The cities of Isfahan, Meshed, Tabriz, and Abadan, with a combined population of two million, contain most of the rest of the educated elite.

Like many societies attempting to accomodate severe internal extremes, ignorance, poverty, and economic backwardness pervade the Iranian economy. The large, illiterate rural and suburban population is politically inactive. Life expectancies are short -- between 48 and 51 years on the average -- and the mean age in 1971 was only 16.5 years. Less than three percent of the population live to the age of 65.


Shia Muslimism is the only unifying element among the population. Its strong nationalistic content takes the place of political beliefs, particularly among the undereducated. Between 90 and 93 percent of Iran's population is Shiite, representing almost 50 percent of the sect's adherents worldwide. Iran is the only country on earth in which Shiite Muslims constitute a majority of the population.

The late shah drew heavily upon the urban, educated sector for administrative talent and technological growth. He deliberately compartmentalized the leadership elements attempting to develop a system of personal rather than national loyalties. Thus, the former leadership sector constituted no more than one percent of the population. Most of these

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Urbanization Pattern



Education Level




Figure 2. Cross-Sections of the Iranian Population

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leaders are now exiled, executed, or otherwise purged from their positions. At this time, political and governmental systems are unorganized or nonexistent. The development of an efficient infrastructure capable of cooperation, group effort, or external loyalties is a pressing economic need.

The only central unifying authority is the Ayatollah Khomeini. Insofar as he permits and encourages identification between himself and the prophesied Great Imam, he personifies unity and infallible authority combining the roles played by kings, popes, Mohammad, and John the Baptist in other cultures. In him, Iranians identify authority, continuity, history, independence, salvation, truth, superiority, and God. Tapping these feelings gives Khomeini and the Iranian clergy a formidable power base.

Other senior clergy can share in Khomeini's aura of authority, and many do. During his lifetime, however, none can eclipse him as "the Imam." It does not appear that many of the top clergy desire such a role. Shiite clergy have a centuries old tradition of accommodation with secular leadership that many prefer. Khomeini's doctrine of political as well as social and spiritual domination of Iranian society is not widely shared by his peers. In addition, the clergy are not well organized to exercise political authority. They lack a structure or even a history of cooperation among themselves. Shia leaders achieve status and acquire followers based on their personal scholarship and good work rather than via a formal structure of elevation such as is found in most Western churches. They coalesce as a class only in defense of their traditional prestige and historic role.

Secular domination, however, is seen as a great evil and has been largely stamped out. Nonclerical leaders such as Bani-Sadr, Ghotbzadeh, and Bazargan cannot aspire to the prestige and reverence accorded the ayatollahs. In the present climate, their authority is entirely circumscribed by the clergy. Actions taken without the express support of the

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Imam are promptly repudiated. The opportunities for secular leaders to take "realistic" or pragmatic initiatives do not exist. Opposing the clergy risks reprisals ranging from public reversal and discipline to dismissal, condemnation, or even death.

The implementation of pragmatic political, educational, or economic policies is further complicated by a conditioned preference on the part of the clergy for martyrdom. The Imam is, by definition, infallible. Consequently, policies are largely determined by his preferences. If these policies do not lead to growth, a number of religious tenets assist the Imam in maintaining power:

- The Imam's infallibility is above question,
- The greatest reverence, worship, and celebration among Shiites is centered around the exploits of heroic martyrs who put their religious and nationalistic cause above practical considerations.
- The greatest and most revered religious leaders were assassinated including the first three Imams: Mohammad's son-in-law Ali, and Ali's two sons. What may appear to be mortal failure, thus, is seen as a path to historical greatness.
- Whenever Muslim institutions or values are attacked by either external or internal forces, Shiite leaders must declare holy war and the masses must respond.

These cultural beliefs place the Ayatollah in a nearly unassailable position as the leader of a nation for whom economic and political dynamics are largely unknown. Practically any external U.S. initiative to alter Iran's strongly held positions can be interpreted as an assault on Moslem virtue and strengthen the Ayatollah Khomeini's hold on his followers.

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CHAPTER 2. INTERNAL GROUPS (U)

The ethnic and cultural diversity embraced by Iran inevitably is reflected in a wide range of groups with varying philosophical and political preferences. The same diversity that gives rise to such groups, however, serves to shield the Shiite clergy from organized opposition. Frequently a given group represents a relatively small proportion of the population. Opposition groups are too divided among themselves to coalesce and achieve power at this time. Nevertheless, the potential for broad-based opposition to the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini in particular and the Shiite clergy in general exists.

Figure 1 divides identifiable groups within the Iranian society according to their actual or potential position as opposition. These groups mirror religious, ethnic, political, and linguistic differences within the Iranian nation. They include reactionary elements seeking a return to the Pahlavi monarchy, political moderates hoping to achieve some sort of democracy, confederationists seeking greater self-determination within the Islamic Republic, and radicals seeking to replace the current regime with socialism or Communism. This chapter categorizes the groups into absolute opponents, limited or conditional opposition, and potential opposition.

ABSOLUTE OPPOSITION

At this time, the extent of absolute and open opposition to the Khomeini regime is negligible. Most outspoken opposition exists outside of the country where, even so, it is vulnerable to armed reprisal from Iran's Revolutionary Guards. The frequent, well publicized executions of dissidents clearly muffles the voice of opposition elements.

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


Figure 1. Opposition to the Khomeini Regime

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Absolute opponents of the Khomeini regime can be divided into two opposing camps: the reactionaries who support a return of the Pahlavis and the radicals who favor a socialist or Communist revolution. It is extremely unlikely at this time that these two sides would work together to accomplish even the limited objective of replacing the existing regime.

The reactionaries include exile or expatriate groups such as IRANSAHR headed by Ahmad Shamloo in London and the Iran Freedom Foundation headed until recently by the assassinated Tabatabai in the U.S. This organization was recently merged with the Iranian Democratic Party headed by Ferydoon Khoee. In addition, individual exiled members of the Pahlavi family or the ruling class exist in less organized but nonetheless bitter opposition.

Radical groups exist in relative obscurity in Iran. Among the most significant of these is Fadaye-khalq (Peoples' Sacrifice Guerrillas). The Fedayeen are a Marxist-Leninist group seeking to establish socialism. They oppose Khomeini for revolutionary timidity and "selling out to the West." The Fedayeen have been driven underground by clashes with Islamic and rightist elements. Currently, they claim 20,000 members and 10,000 automatic weapons, heavy machine guns, mortars, and flame throwers. The party is active among soldiers and oil workers. The Fedayeen oppose the Tudeh Party, Iran's official Communist party as too passive. Trained by the PFLP and with ties to Oman's PFLO, the Fedayeen carry out a terrorist campaign against police and military personnel.

A second leftist terrorist group, the Mujahidin (Iranian Peoples' Strugglers), seek "Islamic socialism." Well trained and heavily armed, the Mujahidin are attempting to obliterate any trace of Western influence in Iran. They are alleged to have pipelines to the KGB for arms, tactics, training, and funds. Their leader, Mohammad Reza Sاداتi, was arrested by Khomeini forces on charges of spying for the Soviet Union. Mujahidin have provided training in tactics and the use of automatic weapons to

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Tehran University students. They are known to have ties to the more moderate National Front. Leadership reportedly has continued under Mughannad Taqi Sjahram who espouses ties between his group and the Fedayeen.

Between the revolutionaries and the reactionaries are supporters of the former Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar who is currently an expatriate in Paris but may be more attractive to the moderately dissident elements within Iran than either extreme.

LIMITED OR CONDITIONAL OPPOSITION

Limited opposition is provided to a great extent by Iran's extensive non-Persian minority groups who often have their own language and religious beliefs and consequently resent the elitist orientation of Khomeini's Shiite government. Figure 2 plots the locations of the most significant minority groups on a map of Iran.

The Azerbaijanis and the Moslem People's Republican Party

The largest and best educated among the minority groups are the Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijanis are a distinct ethnic group in the northern border area of Iran with their own language. They represent a third of Iran's population and are led by the Shiite Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari whose officially disbanded Moslem People's Republican Party is the second largest in Iran behind the Iran Republican Party (IRP).

The Azerbaijanis played an early and key role in the overthrow of the shah. Riots beginning in Azerbaijan territory in February 1978 sparked the 1979 revolution. A commonly held feeling in the territory is that the Azerbaijanis could do it again if called upon to overthrow the Ayatollah's regime.

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


Figure 2. Iran's Ethnic Cultures.

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Shariatmadari does not favor greater regional autonomy at this time. He may be inhibited from inciting clear resistance by the proximity of the Soviet Union and the obvious temptation to the Soviets to intervene in internal Iranian difficulties to annex Azerbaijan. Shariatmadari, thus, has been a consistent voice for restraint urging the maintenance of Iranian strength vis-a-vis Iraq and the USSR.

The Kurds

The most militant opponents of the Ayatollah are the Kurds, a minority of 4 million centered in Kurdistan. The Kurds, ethnically and linguistically distinct from the Farsi-Persian Iranians, are Sunni Moslems with no religious commitment to Khomeini or his doctrine of Shia supremacy.

The Kurds have long exerted a determined opposition in both Iran and Iraq. Their major political organ is the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) headed by Abdul Raman Qassemlu, an independent Marxist economist. The KDP has historically been moderate in political activities and philosophy. More militant is the Revolutionary Organization of Toilers of Kurdistan (KUMOLEH or KOMALA). The Marxist Fedayeen guerrillas support both the KDP and KUMOLEH.

The major Kurdish groups fight one another as frequently as they do the Iranians. Sheik Ezzedine Hosseini has been a negotiator acceptable to the three groups who has been important in keeping their hostilities channeled outward.

Kurdish resistance has repeatedly humiliated the Army and the Revolutionary Guards. In 1979 the Kurds elicited an apology from Khomeini who had called them "corrupt of the earth" and ordered the Army to annihilate them. The Kurds' stiff resistance to subjugation highlights the limits of Khomeini's authority and the weaknesses of the Army. The depletion of the officer corps, desertion, illiteracy, political activism,

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poor maintenance, and shortages of parts have stalled Army offensives against the Kurds.

The Kurds have a tolerant contempt for the Army but reserve their deepest hatred for the Revolutionary Guards. The Kurds are probably the most troublesome minority group from the government's perspective. Khomeini fears that a successful Kurdish autonomy drive would fuel similar efforts in Khuzestan, Baluchistan, Azerbaijan, and among the Turkomans who, combined, comprise nearly half of Iran's population.

Other Ethnic Minorities

The oil rich province of Khuzistan bordering the Persian gulf houses the other primary concentration of Sunni Arabs in Iran. The major political party in this region is the Arab People's Organization led by the Ayatollah Taher Shobeir Khaqani. Although resistance in this region has been muted compared to that in Azerbaijan or Kurdistan, Arab terrorists calling themselves Black Wednesday blew up eight pipelines serving the refinery at Abadan in July 1979. The action was in retaliation for a battle with Khomeini's forces that took 200 Arab lives.

Baluchistan is a Sunni province on the Pakistani-Afghan border that was the scene of uprisings in December 1979. The Baluchis have historical feuds with Shiite Seistanis with whom they share the region. The Baluchi boycott of Khomeini's constitutional elections continues that fued on the grounds that the constitution lacks guarantees of minority rights.

After the Azerbaijanis, the second largest Turkish group in Iran are the Qashqai numbering about 500,000. The Qashqai are fiercely independent nomads in southern Iran with a long and rebellious history. They clashed violently with Revolutionary Guards as recently as June 1980 following the arrest of their leader, Khasrow Qashqai, on suspicion of

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being an American agent. He was subsequently released on order of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in order to restore order.

Other Political Parties

Two secular political parties within the Persian Farsi speaking majority have been pressed into a moderate opposition stance by clerical intransigence. The National Front, led by Kareen Sanjabi, is a movement of middle class intellectuals and conservative merchants. Although the National Front was prominent in the struggle against the shah, it has fallen into disfavor with Khomeini for its links to the U.S. and Western sympathies. Immediately following the revolution, it had three members in the cabinet. All three resigned before July 1979.

The National Democratic Front, led by Hedayatollah Matin-Deftar, is a liberal to leftist party that has aroused Khomeini's ire with its outspoken championship of the freedom of the press.

POTENTIAL OPPOSITION

A number of significant groups currently supporting the Khomeini regime could move into positions of hardened opposition given the right combination of circumstances. In many cases, groups that allied with the clergy to overthrow the Pahlavi regime have found their interests no better served by the narrow concerns of the ayatollahs than they were by the shah's elite.

Professional military officers have fared poorly under the new regime. Officer ranks have been purged of individuals associated with the shah. Others have been arrested and executed in connection with purported coups, deserted, been denounced in political actions by the rank and file, or quit in the face of insoluble problems of maintenance and supply. The Army has found itself fighting the Revolutionary Guards as well as opposition forces and has been badly defeated by the Kurds. If

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deterioration continues, even pro-Khomeini officers may find themselves pushed into an opposition role to defend their professionalism and sense of duty if not to save the Army as an effective military force.

The upper classes, many of whom are Western educated or oriented, progressive, and secular have suffered most acutely from the revolution. Their personal life styles have been subject to legislative assault and many members of this class have been executed for failure to follow the new reactionary fundamentalist line. Resentment and disaffection are widespread among the former elite.

Middle class merchants, although deeply involved in funding and pressing the revolution, have found themselves poorly served by the resultant ascendancy of the clergy. As a group, the middle class are keenly aware of the cynicism and opportunism of the "clerical fascists." Inflation and sluggish economic performance have reduced their standard of living while unrealistic economic planning and bureaucratic chaos promise that no improvement is in sight.

The lower classes, who have been Khomeini's vocal "soldiers of the revolution," carried perhaps the greatest expectations into the struggle. Overwhelmingly uneducated and illiterate, they are the least equipped to understand why a revolution does not pay off immediately in terms of increased wealth and leisure. With inflation mounting, production down 50 percent, and unemployment at 35 percent, disillusionment and impatience is growing quickly.

Ironically, an area of potentially strong and authoritative resistance to Khomeini's rule is among other Shiite scholars and authorities. Many of Khomeini's positions are offensive to traditional Shiite scholars who are used to the long history of accommodation with secular rulers. More suggestively, Khomeini's insinuation into the role of Imam is viewed as a high order heresy by many of his peers. Regardless of their views regarding the content of his revolutionary program, many Shiite leaders

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feel that Khomeini should be challenged for misrepresenting his role as a religious leader.

On the other hand, Arab and Sunni leaders are apprehensive of Khomeini's grass roots, populist, fundamentalist appeal and fear the spread of such a movement into their own territories. Potential Khomeini enemies, thus, can be found among the powerful in almost every other Muslim state.

The Tudeh Party, the traditional Communist party of Iran, is treading a carefully neutral line. Even though the relationship between Tehran and Moscow is troubled, the Tudeh Party has been careful to support Khomeini on all points. Most observers feel that Tudeh support is purely tactical and the party could shift from support to opposition at any time that it would appear advantageous to do so.

Even Khomeini's clerical followers, the Ayatollahs Beheshti, Rafsanjani, Khalkhali, and their allies, could possibly move into opposition to Khomeini. The Islamic Republican Party (IRP) leadership is widely regarded as opportunistic, rapacious, and dishonest. Their purpose has been to personally profit from the revolution, not to follow Khomeini into the glorious martyrdom of a Shia hero. If the regime's policies point clearly to disaster and retribution from the masses, the IRP would be likely to attempt to wrest leadership from Khomeini or, failing that, desert him.

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CHAPTER 3. THE IRANIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER AND LEADERSHIP (U)

NATIONAL CHARACTER

Iran's disorganized, ignorant, and diverse populace is primarily united by its overwhelming religious solidarity evolved during the thousands of years of struggle to assert national independence. Khomeini's victory over the shah's secular rule symbolizes and legitimizes the primary driving forces of centuries of tradition, religious teaching, and superstition.

These facts have their reflections in the Iranian national character -- a combination of impracticality, independence, and self-assertiveness. The primary national character trait is a militant aggressiveness. Iran's indigenous culture could hardly have survived so long a period of oppression and foreign domination without a nearly fanatic devotion to its preservation. This ingrained preoccupation with the self and self-interest produces:

- An overriding egoism,
- Preoccupation with self-preservation and expectation of martyrdom,
- Aggressive pursuit of "influence" translated into an exaggerated reverence for dominance and power,
- Hostility or lack of sympathy for the views of other cultures, and
- Intolerance of restrictions on one's movements, particularly in the case of restrictions imposed by outsiders.

In some ways, the long suffering of the Shia Muslims at the hands of foreigners has produced a national paranoia in which Iranians see

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themselves as surrounded by hostile forces, both internal and external. To assuage such fears, Iranians adopt a constant alertness against forces of evil and personal harm. All foreign influences are suspected of being a source of such harm and Iranians fully expect to be persecuted or martyred by the evil forces some day as they have been in the past. Seeing the world from that perspective, it is natural that Iranians tend to take short term advantages where they find them even if it means sacrificing long term goals.

The struggle against outside evil forces also conspires with Iran's long history of outside dominance to create a people with no sense of personal responsibility for their actions. Bloodthirsty and murderous acts can be countenanced in terms of striking a blow against evil. Similarly, the long national history of powerlessness in the face of outside force has led to a tradition of rhetoric. The Iranian respect for rhetoric in and of itself is a serious stumbling block to the development of real solutions. Bruce Laingen, U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Tehran and a hostage of the militant students has noted that, "one should never assume his side of the issue will be recognized, let alone that it will be considered to have merits."¹ More cynically, Michael Fischer states that, "the task they [Iranians] have set themselves was rarely understanding, but only finding the error of non-Muslims."²

AUTHORITY CHANNELS

The Ayatollah Khomeini embodies all of the traditional elements of leadership, religious heritage, and supreme and infallible authority that have been passed down in Shia teachings. He holds an unchallengeable position in Iran as the living symbol of the truth and fulfillment of the nation's heritage and purpose. Unfortunately, despite his political

¹ LAINGEN, B. (1979) Interview.

² FISCHER, M.J. (1980).

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triumph over the late shah, he has no experience and little interest in government. Further, he does little to designate authority or to groom a successor. The current lines of Iranian power are diagrammed in Figure 1. Most of the clergy who surround Khomeini and assume legislative posts of one sort or another have no more administrative flair than the Ayatollah. This is not surprising given the lack of hierarchy or organizational experience within the Shiite clergy and their long tradition of rancor and divisiveness, however, it is of little comfort to the nation.

Beneath the Ayatollah sit the two most significant exceptions to the general rule of indifference to administration and hierarchy: Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the President and chief secular leader in the government and the Ayatollah Beheshti, Chief Justice and leader of the legislature. Of these two, Beheshti is clearly now in the ascendancy. He has amassed control of two areas of government and has the ear and confidence of Khomeini whose patronage is the source and prop of his power. Beheshti is systematically placing his lieutenants and supporters in present and potential positions of power clearly anticipating the day when the aging Khomeini dies or abdicates power. At the same time, he successfully frustrates the initiatives of the embattled Bani-Sadr.

Beheshti, who leads the Islamic Republic Party (IRP), recently successfully placed his party's candidate, Ali Rajai, in the Prime Ministership. This should assure his continued domination for the foreseeable future. A second valuable ally has been the Ayatollah Khalkhali, Iran's "hanging judge," who has stage managed the arrests and hangings of the revolution's enemies. Khalkhali gives Beheshti easy and direct access to the street level mullahs who, by coercion if not moral leadership, influence the political behavior of the urban poor and rural peasantry. Thus, Beheshti has a crude but highly effective line to the vast majority of illiterate, unemployed, idle, and impoverished Iranians who make up Khomeini's main base of support.

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National, historical, and religious heritage




Figure 1. Power and Authority in Iran

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Bani-Sadr is in a measurably weaker position. The constitution, which legitimizes the overall authority now invested in Khomeini, offers no such support to the President who serves at the Ayatollah's whim and is subject to veto in all of his actions. Khomeini is known to be impatient with Bani-Sadr's repeated (but essential) requests for authority. Beheshti compounds Bani-Sadr's woes by mousetrapping him whenever possible. Beheshti's ally Khalkhali has also successfully overridden Bani-Sadr's attempts to limit his authority or temper the activities of the Revolutionary Guards.

Lacking independent authority, isolated from Khomeini, and frustrated by Beheshti's ambitions, Bani-Sadr presides over a shaky bureaucracy with little tradition of competence or cooperation in its best of days. The shah organized the administration of Iran with an eye to both control and survival. Ministries and agencies were kept compartmented and competitive. Senior leaders were compelled to deal with or through the shah in any cooperative venture. Even these leaders, blessed at least with experience, have been largely removed, exiled, or executed. What remains are some lower level functionaries with little inclination for cooperation and no administrative experience.

The clergy, despite Bani-Sadr's impeccable revolutionary credentials, see him or any secular leader as an enemy. "Waves of ideological strife" -- mass demonstrations fomented by the clergy -- threaten to obliterate even a vestige of secular administration.

Opposition Power Structures

Out of the mainstream are a few shadow administrative structures that individually would have difficulty mounting a plausible threat to the Ayatollah's regime. On the right are remnants of the shah's imperial court and the survivors of the old administrative elite. On the left are a number of overt and covert groups that allied with the religious fundamentalists in the overthrow of the monarchy but are strongly

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opposed to the conservative and charismatic regime of the Ayatollah. Independent of both of these are the nationalist movements that for religious, linguistic, or cultural reasons seek independence or significant national autonomy from the central regime. None but the last of these stands a chance of countering Khomeini's nationalistic, xenophobic control of the Iranian masses.

Although secessionist groups are well organized and, in many cases, well armed, they are reluctant to mount a direct challenge to the Ayatollah unless accommodation with the government in terms of autonomy within the federal system cannot be reached. The Ayatollah Shariatmadari, for instance, does not approve of clerical political leadership thus dampening the Azarbaijan secessionist movement. The dangers of Soviet interference in nationalist movements is another inhibiting factor.

Foreign governments have a stake in several internal movements. Libya provided substantial support to Khomeini during his exile days using Bani-Sadr as the conduit for financial aid. It would be disappointed to lose its spokesman and ally within the Khomeini regime. The PLO reportedly provided expert technical assistance to the student militants during the early days of the Embassy hostage and barricade incident.

Among the dissidents, Iraq provides media support to the exiled General Oveisi, one of the most prominent survivors of the shah's era. The Soviet Union directly supports the Tudeh Party whose unflinching support of Khomeini is considered to be primarily opportunistic while waiting for passions to cool and loyalties to shift. At the same time, the USSR has been at least partially bankrolling leftist terrorist groups such as the Mujahidin and the Fedayeen in their low level strikes against the Khomeini regime. Both Iraq and the Soviet Union have ties to the Kurds and Azerbaijanis. At this time, their efforts have been restricted to "pot boiling" while waiting for more advantageous times and opportunities to mount a direct challenge to the religious fundamentalists.

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CHAPTER 4. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (PAS) PROFILES OF KEY LEADERS (U)

In his wake, the shah left his bickering, compartmented, inefficient civil bureaucracy and military structures. They have disintegrated further as the few trained administrators have resigned, been removed, or faced execution. The religious leaders who have taken over many high positions of power have neither experience and interest in management nor a clear idea of the services rendered by government. The secular leaders, although in most cases more worldly than their religious counterparts, have typically spent most of their adult lives in exile. They have no clearer managerial strategies than their clerical bretheren.

Thus, there is no government of Iran, in a viable, twentieth century sense of that term. The ruling structure more closely resembles a Byzantine or medieval European court with Khomeini at the center of power surrounded by like minded, fawning, self-seeking courtiers.

The initial goal of Khomeini and his followers has been achieved -- they have displaced the shah, a secular usurper of power, and returned Iran's rule to the religious elite. They now await the return of the Twelfth Imam who legend says has been "in hiding" since the tenth century. This figure, in turn, will lead them back to the glories of the Persia of a millenium ago. Should they succeed, they will have achieved Iran's historical destiny. Should they fail, they will have brought glory upon their memories and supplied the Shia faith with a new generation of heroes. "We have a population of 35 million," Khomeini has stated, "all of whom wish to be martyred. When all of us are martyred, then you can do whatever you want to do with Iran. We are not afraid."

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CHAPTER 5. PAS PROFILE OF THE AYATOLLAH RUHOLLA KHOMEINI (U)

This chapter examines in depth the personal characteristics, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the preeminent figure in Iran's present government -- the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini. Since all authority flows from him and his voice is the only unchallengeable guide for his followers, such an understanding is necessary in order to plot an effective diplomatic course.

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS

Khomeini is autocratic, dictatorial, isolated, and insular. His entire life has been spent in a struggle, frequently in the face of severe persecution, to reestablish clerical preeminence in Iranian political life. Achieving that goal has convinced him of his own infallibility and the righteousness of his cause. Paranoid, suspicious, independent, and combative, he has spent most of his life thinking and acting on his own. For him, all aspects of daily life can be seen as the struggle between good and evil, right and wrong, purity and sin.

Khomeini is, in Muslim terms, a fundamentalist fixated on questions of morality. Ironically, his interpretation of Islam can be highly personal and iconoclastic. As he sees himself increasingly as the ultimate authority and embodiment of Islamic law, his interpretations have become less predictable and more reflective of his personal biases. His determination to involve himself and the rest of the Shiite clergy in political roles leave him vulnerable to criticism for heresy, usurpation of power, and abuse of his authority and responsibility.

Khomeini is narcissistic, aloof, and uncompromising. Everyone is expendable in the pursuit of his goals including people who have served him closely and well. He has a charismatic appeal, especially among the

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(U) poorly educated and impressionable masses. He exploits this appeal with his sense of special mission -- his conviction that he has been divinely appointed to the Iranian people. His belief in his personal uniqueness leaves him unwilling to share power or authority with others lacking divine inspiration. All of his feelings of grandeur have been validated in recent years by his overwhelming victory over the Pahlavi dynasty and his successes in manipulating the world's major religious and political powers.

(U) PERSONAL BACKGROUND

(S) Khomeini's entire adult life has been spent in the position of an underdog fighter beset by superior and unsympathetic forces. He has perfected that attitude and is more comfortable in combat than in victory. In this respect, the hostage crisis, most specifically the U.S. rescue effort, has placed him in his familiar role. His success in that conflict reinforces his intransigence, confirms his resolve, and assures him of his ultimate victory against threats, confrontation, and superior strength.

(S) Khomeini's view of failure is conditioned by Shia religious tradition. Consequently, he enthusiastically courts martyrdom for himself and his people. In his role as a national leader, he is not in charge of events or circumstances that surround him. He did not calculate the consequences of inciting students or ratifying their seizure of the American Embassy. He was not prepared for the wave of anarchy unleashed by his revolution. He cannot be construed to be troubled by the consequences however.

(S) A life spent in opposition has the advantage that one need never take responsibility for personal actions or exhortations. Khomeini is only now faced with the direct responsibilities of a national leader. He has no training, experience, temperamental suitability, or interest in the task.

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(U) LEADERSHIP AND DECISION-MAKING STYLE

(U) Khomeini is overly trustful and uncritical of a few colleagues who understand how to manipulate his weaknesses. Most prominent among these are the Ayatollahs Beheshti and Khalkhali. He is suspicious and mistrustful of most others. He surrounds himself with like minded sycophants and is insensitive to opinions differing from his own. He will not delegate authority or responsibility and is cautious to keep others from achieving sufficient power or strength to threaten his preeminence. Similarly, he will not groom a successor nor give others the authority necessary to administer a modern and complex government.

(U) Khomeini sits at the center of a highly personalized, individualized, unorganized, patriarchal, tribal court. All appeals are direct. His responses are spontaneous, with little sense of priority or precedent. Governance in the Khomeini regime is whimsical, inconsistent, and unpredictable.

(U) KHOMEINI'S FOLLOWING

(U) Khomeini's strong appeal is to the poorly educated, fundamentalist, lower class, urban masses. He is uncritically revered by the lower order religious functionaries who provide the social, moral, and judicial guidance to these people.

(U) Khomeini is also attractive to opportunists, especially among the mid-level clergy, who wish to attach themselves to power and authority and have determined how to flatter him and gain his favor. At the same time, his aggressive political orientation and his personal, innovative interpretations of Islamic theology have caused apprehension among the high level, traditional Shia scholars and leaders.

(U) Khomeini's appeal in the smaller cities, villages, and rural areas less affected by the shah's rule is not fervant. His theocratic, dictatorial

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(U) style has diminished his standing among the more modern and progressive middle and upper urban classes.

(U) RESPONSE TO THREATS AND OPPOSITION

- (P) Khomeini is not responsive to threats and challenges in the usual sense. Having lived with continuous opposition and succeeded against overwhelming odds, he is convinced that he exists under God's protection to do His work. World opinion is meaningless. Because he is a Shia and Islam is overwhelmingly Sunni, he is not overly sensitive to the leaders of the rest of the Moslem world. Because of his attraction to martyrdom, he has a conditioned tolerance for failure by which victory is victory but martyrdom is even better. In Khomeini's value system, concessions by others are a sign of weakness. Confrontation validates his sense of importance and helps him to coalesce his otherwise diverse followers.
- (P) Khomeini has no history of compromise. Escalating confrontation with him risks a violent and vengeful response delivered under the mantle of the wrath of God. His reaction to challenge can be precipitous and impulsive. In August 1979, for instance, he gave the Army 24 hours to subdue the Kurds.
- (P) The Ayatollah dismisses most threats as inconsequential. Genuine threats such as military assault or economic sanctions are welcome because they thrust him back into his familiar and effective role of underdog, unite his following, and distract attention from mundane problems. Threat of total failure or death are welcomed as martyrdom which ensures historical stature.
- (P) The only threat Khomeini perceives as serious and potentially disabling is a challenge to the validity of his role by respected, unimpeachable leaders of the Shia faith. Thus, he has already preempted the Ayatollah Shariatmadari with the traditional tyrant's maneuver of imprisonment.

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CHAPTER 6. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND THE IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (U)

(5) In assessing the political leadership of Iran from the vantagepoint of U.S. diplomatic and military interests, it is vital to bear in mind the essential distrust of foreign influence fundamental to the Iranian world view. This distrust is distilled in a passionate hatred of U.S. influence as the hallmark of the late shah's power under which Iranian cultural and religious traditions have been most recently repressed. Consequently, overt U.S. actions of hostility toward perceived enemies could strengthen their standing within Iran. Conversely, overt expressions of support for perceived allies could undermine their stature among the revolutionary leadership and possibly precipitate their downfall. In this situation, it is important to approach all actions from a position of Machiavellian detachment and self-interest both to assure that policy actions do not actually impede the achievement of the goals they are designed to support and to forestall the purging and possible execution of those least inclined to be our enemies in a dynamic and hostile environment.

(U) KHOMEINI

(5) Since Khomeini's leadership is seemingly sanctified by God and man, there appear to be few direct routes to its destabilization. Nevertheless, he is vulnerable in many ways:

- (5) • Although he has installed the practical Bazargan and later Bani-Sadr in the Presidency, he has shown little stomach for supporting his secular leaders in any showdown with religious forces. The practical details of government neither concern nor interest him, lowering in his eyes the value of people who the rest of the world could deal with.

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- (7) • Although his magnetism combined with his great age may shield him personally from the consequences of his mismanagement, dissatisfaction is certain to grow and threaten the downfall of the regime. At that time, his tolerance of leftwing political groups may leave the Communist Party the only viable administrative alternative.
- (8) • His sponsorship and apparent preference for the religious fascists of the Islamic Republican Party place him daily in a more threatening position regarding general American interests and the specific safety of the U.S. hostages.
- (6) In one significant way, Khomeini appears vulnerable. His highly political activities are not looked on with favor by many high ranking Shiite clergy. Shariatmadari and other senior, traditional religious leaders may go along with Khomeini as long as he does not threaten the prestige of the clergy or the integrity of the mosques. If his political actions should appear to discredit these institutions, however, his fellow elders might be persuaded to turn their moral influence against him.
- (4) A significant, unevaluated source of threat in this regard is the Ayatollah Abol Qassam Khoi; at 81 the "Head of the Shiites" in residence at the center of Shia scholarship in An Najaf, Iraq. He is the supreme worldwide theoretical authority for the faith and any criticism of Khomeini emanating from his office would exert a powerful brake on the Ayatollah's authority. The potential source for such a rebuke would be Khomeini's drive to secularize the clergy through the assumption of political power. An Najaf is the center of Shia's historical struggle against such secularization through accomodation of nonclerical political administrators. The proper role of a Shia leader, by this way of thinking, is to be a spiritual, ethical, and social leader and mentor. Unquestionably, this represents the majority belief of Khomeini's clerical peers. If stated from a sufficiently authoritative source, it could seriously erode Khomeini's political and spiritual leadership.

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(U) THE CLERICAL FASCISTS

- (S) The secondary ayatollahs who make up the leadership of the Islamic Republican Party are far more vulnerable to attack as Muslim Babbits than the relatively ascetic Khomeini himself. Known to be opportunists, they are open to charges of corruption, self-service, embezzlement, malfeasance, and murder. If the Ayatollah Khomeini's crusade for political leadership is already viewed with alarm in many quarters, the frankly worldly nature of many of the clerical fascists is likely to provoke outrage among traditional religious leaders.
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(S)

(U) THE SECULAR LEADERS

- (U) At this time, Khomeini's policy of nonsupport is destabilizing Iran's secular leaders without any U.S. intervention. Technocrats cannot now achieve any sort of bureaucratic or personal effectiveness. Further, as Bazargan learned at the end of his tenure, traditional or normal efforts to exercise power such as his meeting with U.S. officials in Europe, can be perceived as the work of the devil by the fundamentalist clergy. Efforts to deal with Iranian secular leaders on conventional diplomatic terms, thus, can undermine them. A forthright U.S. endorsement of their positions or efforts could prove fatal.
- (U) Without Khomeini's interference, the secular leaders would exercise much more personal initiative in dealing with the West on objective and pragmatic terms. They would not be compliant in all likelihood, but they would be businesslike and predictable in the manner of many moderate, Eastern-bloc leaders. That would be an immense improvement over current conditions. It would be desirable to try to keep them viable while waiting for better conditions.

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(U) [REDACTED]

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(U) STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS


(U) While it is clear that any overt U.S. effort to affect Iranian public opinion would be counterproductive, the U.S. and the West is not entirely without assets in the region. Perhaps the most effective way to destabilize present authority while maximizing the prospect for an outcome positive to U.S. interests would be to develop a campaign from something such as the "Voice of An Najaf." This station, originating from the center of Shia learning, regularly castigates Khomeini for heresy in his role, politicizing the clergy, and violating Shiite and Islamic principles. Among its most frequent complaints are:

- (U) ● Summary executions without due process,
- (U) ● Incarceration of hostages, and
- (U) ● Secularization of the role of the mosque.

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APPENDIX A. LINK ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN LEADERSHIP



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- (b) A campaign calling upon the elder Iranian clergy to isolate the usurpers and return the clergy to its proper role could bear fruit. It would stand a chance of provoking tension and conflict within the leadership of the Shia faith at a time when that leadership is the country's sole unifying element. It could provide the rationale for shifting much of the present administration onto secular and moderate leaders and permit the development of a workable governmental infrastructure. At the same time, it is a transition process that offers no added danger to the U.S. hostages and does not further jeopardize U.S. and Western interests.
- (b) Once begun, such a campaign would provide a vehicle for the existing exile and opposition groups to contact, encourage, and support their own followings in Iran. In this respect it is worth noting that on August 10, Egypt's grand mufti, Sheik Gad Hak, severely criticized Khomeini's Islamic theories claiming that they contradict the Koran. Since the grand mufti is both Sunni and Egyptian, Khomeini will almost certainly dismiss the attack as inconsequential and irrelevant. Nevertheless, few Muslim leaders outside Iran are comfortable with Khomeini or the implications of his grassroots fundamentalism. A growing tide of Muslim criticism would be difficult to ignore. The grand mufti's remarks could signal the opening of an opportunity to isolate Khomeini from the spiritual world he claims to lead.

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CHAPTER 7. POLITICAL RESPONSES TO U.S. RESCUE OPERATIONS (U)

- (3) The special case of a U.S. military intervention to free the hostages deserves individual attention. On the surface, the option of employing the United States' significant military superiority to rescue the diplomats now held by Iranian students appears attractive. If a method were to be found to surgically remove the hostages at a minimum cost to U.S. and Iranian lives, the most troublesome stumbling block to U.S.-Iranian relations could be removed and the path cleared for a more "rational" relationship.
- (7) The character of the Iranian mind and the constitute supporting most Iranian leaders (both the good and the bad from a U.S. perspective) argue against taking military action. Iranians, whose views have been focused inwards upon their own problems and feelings of persecution, feel no sympathy for U.S. outrage over the propriety or legality of holding hostages. They are fixated instead on the injury and loss of prestige they suffered under the shah who they perceive to have been an American puppet. His death has merely cleared the way to concentrate all of their anger on the "demon U.S." Through repetition and exaggeration, the U.S. has become responsible for all the excesses suffered by the Iranian people over the last 30 years. The hostages, as agents of the U.S., are, therefore, symbols upon which to focus the rage of the masses.
- (7) Under these conditions, ~~an assault could prove suicidal. The more powerful or successful the assault, the greater would be the danger of terrorist reprisals against American interests, persons, facilities, and institutions in Iran and abroad. The only way to achieve the partial success or abortion of an assault is in that case, the clear danger to any serviceman or hostage if he alive would be torture and execution. An American assault would clearly be interpreted by the Ayatollah Khomeini as an~~

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- (S) attack upon the sanctity or prestige of the religious state. His call for Holy War (Jihad) would almost certainly undermine rational or progressive leadership in Iran, threaten many American citizens and institutions, and lead to the persecution of America's friends in the Iranian community.

(U) IMPLICATIONS TO POLITICAL FACTIONS

(U) Khomeini, Khalkhali, and the Fundamentalist Clergy

- (S) ~~An American military assault would affirm the U.S.'s role as "Great Satan."~~ It would serve the unhelpful task of validating the fundamentalists' intransigent opposition to the U.S., ~~prove their allegations that the U.S. is entirely insensitive to Iran's persecution by the late shah, and crystalize their sense of attack on the Shia faith.~~ Shia Islam teaches that any retribution for such an attack ~~would be justified.~~ In addition, ~~an assault would strengthen Khomeini's hand by stirring nationalistic popular support and distracting attention from unresolved internal economic and political problems.~~ A call for Jihad against the U.S. could be expected to emanate from this group. ~~Khal-khali's international terrorist links and demonstrated ability to project his power beyond Iran's borders into the West would be particularly dangerous in such a condition.~~

(U) The Clerical Fascists

- (S) The Ayatollah Beheshti and the clerical fascists of the Iranian Republican Party have no power and authority save that which derives from Khomeini. Lacking strong ties to anything but the winning faction, their first response would be to support Khomeini and his embattled system. In their own interests, however, they would be likely to keep open other options and communications links with the West. If it appears that Khomeini is traveling the road to martyrdom, they will not be likely to volunteer to accompany him.

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(U) The Traditional Clergy

(6) The Ayatollah Shariatmadari and other traditional clergymen would be likely to lose prestige and influence in the event of a U.S. assault. They would most probably express their dismay and retreat into further political isolation.

(9) Traditionally, the Shia clergy have sought nonconfrontational strategies for problem solving. They view force as nothing more than a public acknowledgement of futility. U.S. employment of military power would only reduce America's image in their eyes as a responsible and just world power. It is not likely that they have the political sophistication to see a U.S. assault as motivated by the hostage issue nor would they derive from it the "lesson" to be more accommodating to world opinion. Such considerations are irrelevant to their world.

(U) The Secular Leaders

(9) Possibly worst damaged by a U.S. assault would be Iran's already shaky secular elite. Bani-Sadr, Bazargan, and other Western educated leaders, have already expressed their sense of impropriety in holding hostages to no further effect than to jeopardize their own careers and influence. Left to their own resources, they would doubtless have resolved the situation long ago to rid themselves of a national embarrassment and clear attention for more substantive economic and political issues. With Iran under assault, however, it could be risky for a secular leader to fail to rally behind the religious fundamentalists. Even should they promptly and enthusiastically fall into line, a heightened paranoia among the clergy could be the catalyst to subordinate secular political power altogether. Any domination along those lines would be grave for the hostages, U.S. interests, and innocent Iranians.

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(U) THE PROSPECT OF A JIHAD

(S) The least attractive prospect in the hostage crisis would be the inadvertent unleashing of a Holy War -- never far from reality under current conditions. The Jihad is a tenet unique to the Shia faction of Islam.

(U) In addition to belief in the [traditional Muslim] five principles of faith, Shias have seven major pillars of faith (as opposed to the five of the Sunnis). . . . The sixth is jihad or holy war, in which a Muslim must engage if Islamic lands or institutions are under attack.

(S) At a time of rampant fundamentalism, the Ayatollah commands formidable power. When Khomeini alleged that the U.S. was responsible for the assault on the Grand Mosque in Mecca in December 1979, mobs burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad within hours. Spontaneous attacks against the U.S. followed elsewhere in Pakistan, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, and Libya.

(S) A Holy War would place raw power in the hands of the most unscrupulous of the clergy. The masses would be mobilized through the local mullahs and Revolutionary Guards. Within Iran, the consequences would be grievous:

- (S) • All rabid elements would be unleashed,
- (S) • An umbrella excuse would be ready made for the prosecution of all manner of personal excesses including settling personal grievances, neighborhood jealousies, and family feuds.
- (S) • Secular government would be nearly cut out of the picture by the shadow government of local clergy and mullahs. Political assassinations would be likely in the event of protests, and

(U) ¹ NYROP, R.F. (1978) pp. 123-126.

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- All foreigners, but especially all Americans, would be at high risk.

- (5) Abroad, conditions would probably not disintegrate into quite the free-for-all likely within Iran. Other Muslim states, however, would clearly face difficulties. Conflicts between traditional religious obligations and secular pragmatic rule, already stirred by Khomeini's revolution, would certainly be exacerbated. In a nation where high illiteracy and unsophistication is common, reason would be in conflict with religious obligation. The outcome of such a contest is unpredictable.
- (5) The schism between Shia and Sunni Islam would also be heightened. A serious debate regarding Khomeini's legitimacy and leadership of the Muslim world could escalate into battles between vested Sunni authority and militant Shia minorities worldwide. Such battles would mimic Iran's already sporadic bloodletting along these lines. ~~A Shia-Sunni civil war, would serve as an excuse for excesses by Arab and Muslim radical extremists or terrorist elements including Palestinians. It could be used by radical elements as an excuse to hammer down moderate governments.~~ Further, it could isolate moderate and pro-Western regimes such as Sadat's in Egypt or Hussein's in Jordan from the mainstream of the Muslim world provoking fundamentalist challenges to moderate or secular rulers and institutions.
- (5) ~~Outside of the Muslim world, radical Muslim and pseudo-Muslim groups in the West could be recruited in the Holy War. Within the U.S., groups such as the Black Muslims and others affiliates receive training and assistance. In 1980, Iranian funding of U.S. terrorist groups is estimated at \$5 million. Terrorist groups beholden to these sources could selectively target Iranian "enemies" with considerable effect.~~

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(U) CONCLUSION

(S) As attractive as the temptation appears for a direct and forceful conclusion to the hostage crisis, research conducted in support of this project suggests that conditions do not favor such an approach at this time. Failure offers a strong probability of death for both hostages and rescuers. Success could only be purchased at a high diplomatic cost, probably including:

- (U) • Alienation of those forces within Iran that, even if not friendly to the U.S., are practical and predictable.
- (U) • Strengthening of Khomeini's stature at the price of secular leaders and clerical moderates to the eventual probable benefit of the Soviet Union.
- (U) • Destabilization of moderate and allied Muslim regimes and heightened Shia-Sunni conflict in the Arab world.
- (U) • "Justification" of Iranian and radical Arab terrorist strikes against U.S. and friendly Iranian interests within and outside of the country.

(S) Long term activities such as perceptual management campaigns, however, seem to offer promise. Undermining Khomeini's stature as the preeminent leader of Shia Islam and the destabilization of the most unpredictable or hostile of his entourage could eventually restore some measure of U.S. influence in the area. Such a campaign requires restraint. The forces in Iran most favorable to the U.S. are least powerful and any overt act in their support could bring them down.

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Washington Post (various issues).

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REVIEW ON OADR

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side One

Jones: This is INSULATOR...over.

Voice A: Ah...yes...this is maintenance making comms check...how do you copy?

Jones: Ah...standby...say again...over.

Voice B: [Can't hear?] very well...not hearing it over here.

Voice A: Yes...I repeat...this is maintenance...we're making a comms check...how do you copy?

Jones: Read you loud and clear, maintenance...over.

Voice A: Thank you very much...[words indistinct] for your patience.

Doubleday: This General Doubleday. How do you hear me? Over.

Just fine, sir. This is Colonel [redacted] here.

Doubleday: Colonel [redacted]...this is General Doubleday...General Jones is on the line too...could you say enough for us to get a feeling of the quality of the voice circuit? Over.

Yes sir. I'm hearing you pretty good, sir. Report a slight [warble] to your voice.

Jones: I didn't quite understand that. We were having a little communications difficulty early and we were checking on it. I didn't understand your last point there. Over.

I'm hearing you clear sir...on about a four by.

Jones: OK. I read you that time...and...we're just making a comm check...and got [bus?]. And everything...everything going well there?

Yes sir. We just got eight helicopters off the deck, sir. They're on their way.

Jones: Oh!

101506.

Jones: Eight are off and...and also the 130s on their way?

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[REDACTED] We have one 130 sir [words indistinct] 14 minute intervals on their way.

Jones: OK.

[REDACTED] The others should be launching here shortly, sir.

Jones: OK. And...ah...well, we're here. We won't bother you. God bless. Anything further for us?

[electronic click]

Jones: I'm not reading you too well. This is INSULATOR. Go ahead. This is Jones.

[REDACTED] This is Colonel [REDACTED] sir. All birds off the ground 1527...all birds off the ground 1527. How copy? Over.

Jones: OK. I copy you loud and clear. All birds off the ground...and off the deck with the last ones off the ground at 1527. Over.

[REDACTED] Good copy. That is a good copy. Make birds off the deck at 1506. Last fixed wing off the deck at 1527.

Jones: Very good! Very good. Thank you. Do you have any other traffic for us? Over.

[REDACTED] [unintelligible]

Jones: Hello? Out.

[REDACTED] [electronic click]

[REDACTED] Two four zero six one five zulu. End of message. How copy? Over.

Jones: I got the time, I did not get the word...the key word. Over.

Voice C: What was it? NEWSPRINT?

[REDACTED] Sir, I did not get the key word from this. NEWSPRINT is the call sign of the individual. All he gave me was 240615 and he said that was the end of the message.

Jones: Uh huh.

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side One

[REDACTED]: I do not have the access for the rest. Let me speak to FOREMAN whom I think...

Jones: OK...hold...hold just a...hold a minute. [scrambled transmission and other electronic noise] OK. I got it. NEWSPRINT and all he said was NEWSPRINT 240615 zulu. That is the total message? Over.

Voice C: NEWSPRINT is supposed to be Commander JTF.

[REDACTED]: He said [he'll look?] and he'll get back with you if I may...see if I can find a better word preceding that.

Jones: OK. All right. We'll wait for your call. Thank you.

[electronic click]

[new call]

Jones: Hello?

Voice D: Yes...ah...how do you copy?

Jones: Loud and clear.

Voice D: Yeah...OK...thank you very much...stand by one.

Jones: Who is this? Yeah, all right.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Is INSULATOR near you? Over.

Jones: This is INSULATOR, FOREMAN. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. POSTMASTER 6, HORSE RACE 8. All goes well. We achieved those earlier. Over.

Jones: Roger. I got POSTMASTER 6, HORSE RACE 8. I received earlier. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. All goes well. We'll keep you informed. Anything further? Over.

Jones: We have nothing further for you...ah...except all the best from all of us. Over.

FOREMAN: Very well. Roger. Out.

Jones: Thank you. Out.

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side One

[electronic click]

[new call]

Jones: Hello. Hello.

Voice E: [electronic garble] copy me [electronic garble]

Jones: I'm copying you. Who is this? Over.

Voice E: [garble] OK. Let me reinitiate this call, OK? When you hang up I'll call you back.

Jones: I don't understand you. Who is this? Over. This is Jones. Over. You might want to tell our communications people we aren't doing very well. Hello. Nobody at the other end. I heard that one thing and nobody there. Can you get somebody? Hello. Get one of our people to be in here. Hello. Hello.

Voice F: Hello?

Jones: Hello.

Voice F: Going secure.

Jones: Hello. Hello.

Voice G: [words garbled] how do you read me?

Jones: A little bit garbled. Over.

Voice G: OK. [words garbled]

Jones: Ah...yeah...I'm reading you better. Over. Go ahead. Go ahead, I read you now. Over.

Voice G: Say again please?

Jones: Go ahead. I can read you now. Go ahead. Over.

Voice G: OK. Hold on.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Jones: Roger, FOREMAN. This is INSULATOR. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Do you have query? Over.

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side One

Jones: Roger. We wanted...first I wanted to make sure the communications lines were OK. We were having difficulty at the end. And since we were making a comm check also wanted to see if you had any traffic for us. Over.

FOREMAN: I...This is FOREMAN. I read you garbled. Say again and try a little more slowly. Over.

Jones: All right. We had earlier had some communications trouble and wanted to make sure line was OK. While we're talking, though, do you have anything for us? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. I believe we still have 3 HORSE RACE...I say again we have 6 HORSE RACE items still moving. Two may be down for mechanical problems. POSTMASTER items are beginning to move into place on time. Will continue monitoring. All looks good. Over.

Jones: Roger. Do you have any indication on HORSE RACE whether two have trouble or one was down mechanical and the other followed down. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Four went on. Two stopped to pick up crew. Two have continued on. making 6...making 6 HORSE RACE items. Over.

Jones: Roger. Were two HORSE RACERS abandoned? Were two HORSE RACES abandoned? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I believe that is correct. I do not have enough information. We are also having some comm difficulties. Will ascertain when we have better commo via POSTMASTER items. Estimate one to two hours before we have clear picture. Based on what we have though, we feel have a positive operation. We'll advise. Over.

Jones: OK. I understand. I understand. We will standby for information as soon as you get it. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Wilco. Out.

Jones: INSULATOR out. Thank you.

[electronic click]

COMJTF Tape #1 Side One

[new call]

Jones: Hello.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. May I speak to INSULATOR? Over.

Jones: FOREMAN this is INSULATOR. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. We have accomplished MERMAID. WHISTLER is on ground. Operation is going alright. A message is coming your way with other details. Over.

Jones: Roger. I got that. WHISTLER is on ground. You have MERMAID. We received message on three trucks...include bus and one escaped. Do you have anything further on that? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That's my understanding. Will continue to pursue. All else looks well. Over.

Jones: Yeah. We have all alerted... If I understand correctly, WHISTLER...it's a little confusing...is... is it the number 6 on WHISTLER on the chart... is that which it is? Over.

Voice H: (in background) He said WHISTLER...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is MERMAID 6...WHISTLER had just begun his [words indistinct] at current location...

Jones: OK. If I...

FOREMAN: HORSE RACE items have not yet joined there.

Jones: Oh. Others have not joined...

FOREMAN: [words indistinct] information you hold is correct. Over.

Jones: OK. The first group is there. The second group has not joined as yet, but should do so shortly. Correct? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Over.

Jones: OK. I assume...we will get word when they land. Appreciate the call. We are both concerned about the vehicle that escaped...may or may not be problem. Over.

COMJTF Tape #1 Side One

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I concur, but recommend we proceed. That is remote area...Saturday night...very unlikely to cause major trouble in time to cause mission difficulty. Will closely monitor. Please keep all sensors up and give us earliest warning. Will advise soonest of other achievements. Over.

Jones: Roger. We concur with keep going and we will have all sensors up and make sure all pass to you. Am waiting for further report on second group. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger Wilco. Out.

[electronic click]
[new call]

Jones: Hello. (I can't get it to ring now...get a dial tone).

Voice I: This is LIMA CHARLIE. How do you copy me, sir?

Jones: Ah...LIMA CHARLIE also. Is FOREMAN there please?

Voice I: Say again please?

Jones: Is FOREMAN there please?

Voice I: Yes, he will be here in one minute. Hold one please.

Jones: Roger. Standing by. [pause] Hello. [background voices indistinct] Yeah, I'll hold on.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Jones: FOREMAN, this is INSULATOR. Do you have anything for us on refueling? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Four HORSE RACE have been refueled and are loaded with element and ready to proceed. Two others are now refueling. We have six good HORSE RACE items. I just told senior person to proceed. All looks manageable. We are proceeding. Over.

Jones: OK. We concur with that. I received that. Do you have anything further on the trucks that were stopped, the trucks that escaped, and the passengers, to include which way were the vehicles going so we can get some indication how soon we may get a tip off? Over,

COMJTF Tape #1 Side One

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. BREAK...There were no wounded other than moving...wait...BREAK...I just received additional intel...wait...out. BREAK I continue...the situation on the ground there under control. NO persons have been eliminated. The vehicle went south...west towards a significant city which is a long distance away.

C
My elements should be out of that area in less than one hour. Recommend we continue. BREAK BREAK. Just received information from ultimate location, All there is Green. Our transportation is situated. We have an ideal situation. We will advise as we obtain additional information. They are very busy at this time. I am reluctant to ask additional questions. Will pass more info to you soonest. Over.

Jones: OK. Fine, and I agree with you that we won't bug them and we won't bug you...Only one question...you say that all will be off and gone within one hour. According to our schedule all should have been off...refueled and off one hour ago. That would mean they would be two hours behind. Do you...is that correct? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Negative. That was [word indistinct] time. I am watching daylight and computing my time distance factors. We are in an acceptable profile. We will complete the refuel operation, move to our next location, [with plenty?] of security. I am watching close. Our transportation is largely already spotted there. The area is secure. I foresee little or no difficulty. Will advise. Over.

Jones: OK, fine. My only question had been...and it isn't critical...but that our chart showed they would...the takeoff would be 2010 at the desert site and that what you're saying... that's 2010 zulu...what you're saying is it maybe 2200 which is an hour fifty behind, which will give us time, but there was a question of why an hour to hour fifty late. It is not critical for us to know, but if you do happen to know we would be interested. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I can't advise you...two different ...HORSE RACE items...had to drop out. Two other HORSE

COMJTF Tape #1 Side One

RACE items had to pick up the crew from those items and proceed. That was according to plan. They had some difficulty with unanticipated visibility, however unconfirmed, but I believe visibility is all right at this time for remainder of mission. Will check and be back in about three zero. Over.

Jones: OK, fine. We received a report that chopper number five was returning to the Nimitz. Over.

Voice J: [in background] How old is that?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I received the same report. Cannot now confirm. Do not want to extend my energy doing that. We will check later and advise. Over.

Jones: OK. All right. We...ah...we concur, and will let you do your work there. Could be...we will await your call in about 30 minutes...hopefully refueling completed at that time, but take whatever...the key thing is that you be able to make decisions and to work downward. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Thank you. Will continue. If I need to consult I'll get to you soonest. Thank you for your confidence. Out.

Jones: OK. If you are busy, someone else could call in the 30 minutes with the HORSE RACE status. Over.

Voice K: [electronically garbled] Out.

[End Side One]

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

Jones: Hello.

Voice L: [garbled]...remain on the net?

Jones: I don't know...I just got a ring here.

Voice L: OK...good enough now...

Jones: Who is this?

Voice L: [garbled]

Jones: Who?

Voice L: This is [garbled]. We're back in the net north. OK?

Voice M: Let me copy this, sir.

Jones: OK.

Voice M: This is [garbled].

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Jones: FOREMAN this is INSULATOR.. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. We only have five good birds now. They are all refueled. However, helicopter leader recommends we abort and return to base. There are no casualties. We could continue at great risk. Request your advice. Over.

Jones: [speaking in background] Get me the President and Secretary Brown on the phone right away. [speaking to FOREMAN] The...ah...

Voice N: Over here, can you get this right now, sir? Well, it's Secretary Brown...it's Secretary Brown.

Jones: [speaking in background] I've got to talk to him. [speaking to FOREMAN] Let me get the Secretary in. Do you have any word on the sixth bird? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. We have six there. It has hydraulics problems. One bird is unaccounted for between the launch point and the refuel point. Over.

Jones: One...what is unaccounted for?

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

FOREMAN: One helicopter. Over.

Jones: It...it cleared the launch point, and what did it do with regard to the ...[speaking in background] he ought to come down immediately.

Voice O: [in background] Mr Secretary, this is General [word indistinct], the Chairman would like for you to come down [words indistinct]...

Jones: Immediately!

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Jones: OK. On the helicopter...one, you say, is missing. You have any idea where it is? Over.

FOREMAN: Negative. I will attempt to find out. He is unaccounted for.

Voice P: [in background] Ask him where the other helicopter is. [remaining words indistinct]

Voice Q: [in background] There is one we don't know where it is.

FOREMAN: I'll recapitulate the information we hold.

Jones: OK.

FOREMAN: Eight helicopters launched. One supposedly returned to Nimitz. We do not have confirmation that he arrived at the Nimitz. One is unaccounted for. Six are at the refuel site. Five of those six are refueled and are prepared to return to [rock? base?]. Delta Force has loaded aboard 130s and is prepared to extract. [word indistinct] at refuel site recommends we extract the force. Request your decision urgently. Over.

Jones: OK. I...we...just a sec...just a second. [speaking in background] Get the President too...get him...get the President [words indistinct] immediately if you can. If you can't get the President, get Brezewzinski. [speaking to FOREMAN] I will have in 30 seconds...ROCK CASTLE will be here...and we will...we will end up making our determination...if all people would be aboard you would leave the trucks and that there. Is that correct? Over. [speaking in background] See if

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

you can get Brezezinski down...

FOREMAN: That is a Roger. We have contact with task force and the advance word is we would attempt to return them to their original locations and extract. Over.

Jones: Ah...OK. ROCK CASTLE is here now. Let me give quick recap and...ah...do it. [speaking in background] [words indistinct]..President or Brzezinski, one or the other. Let me give you a recap. Eight helicopters launched. One...we haven't got confirmation on the two yet at all...one we can report was returning to Nimitz, but no confirmation, and one is unaccounted for so far. That six are at the refueling site, but one of them has hydraulic problems and cannot go. They recommend Delta is aboard the 130s and everyone at the site recommends we extract.

Brown: All right.

Jones: [speaking to FOREMAN] We concur with your recommendation, but hold one before executing to see if we can get a call through across the river, but we will concur with that. You would leave the six chopper there. Would you destroy it or what? Over.

FOREMAN: Yes. We will attempt to destroy it. Over.

Jones: OK. [speaking in background] see if [word indistinct] got anything on this [more words indistinct] two of them. [words indistinct] [speaking to FOREMAN] OK. If we go out with those choppers, if they can be alert to any signals or anything from helicopters who might be down, our efforts then will be to get those choppers back on the Nimitz and recycle them for rescue. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger Wilco. Anything further?

Jones: Well hold...if you can hold for just a minute, ROCK CASTLE is on and trying to get MOMENTUM. We will...should have momentarily.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Waiting. Out.

OK...[pause] [voice in background, indistinct] He is talking across and I should have it in...in 15 seconds here.

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

FOREMAN: Roger. Waiting.

Jones: I assume the... the people that are in the bus and that know that it's U.S. I would assume.

FOREMAN: We are not certain that they do. We will do everything to preclude their learning that. Over.

Jones: OK. Yup. In... in... we concur that going ahead with five that our previous determination that that was an abort is a sound decision. Right?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Plus the helicopter commander has no confidence or low confidence that he can complete the mission. Over.

Jones: Yeah. And in a second... speaking in background... then... yeah... continuous indistinct conversation with voice in background, possibly SACOM Brown, speaking to FOREMAN on helicopter... how long... how long do you think for a decision? If we have a few minutes? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Very slow. Some birds are already getting under their lowest and possible. I will advise longest waiting period. Not more than one zero in my opinion. Am checking. Over.

Jones: OK. Speaking in background. He says his guess is less than ten minutes before they start getting very low and fast. Speaking to FOREMAN: We got a report there are one helicopter 80 miles out... 80 miles out... good enough that no problems. We do not know whether or not it has the second crew aboard. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Most likely it does. We will attempt to learn that soonest. Over.

Jones: Yeah. OK. We get a report from the... ah... they said in five minutes we would have... they are getting MOMENTUM... the... ah... and therefore we should have it within five minutes. We will try to determine whether there is one or two crews aboard that one that is 80 miles out of the Nimitz... [speaking in background] Did you find out if there is one or two crews aboard? [voice responding in background is indistinct]

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. I have rechecked. Maximum of 15 minutes with repositioning tankers. Action is being taken. Waiting your additional instructions. Over.

Jones: OK. Well...[speaking to background] He said 15 is the maximum. [speaking to FOREMAN] OK. We should have it less than that time period. It's just to confirm what we believe would be the decision to agree with you...the risk of doing it with less than 5 is very high because of the cycle time and there is... there is no way I assume to repair the one with the hydraulic problem. Over.

FOREMAN: Negative. I understand it is a major leak.

Jones: Major leak.

FOREMAN: You will recall we started with 8 as compared with 7 as was the original plan. We have lost 3 helicopters out of 8, now the fourth one, which is left...it would be of 50 percent of what we started.

Jones: Yeah...I agree...I...

FOREMAN: The commander had low confidence in ultimate success. Over.

Jones: Yeah. OK. I'll repeat that...having already lost 3 out of 8 with the most demanding part ahead, the chances of losing one more very high. So...ah...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger.

Jones: ...we...[speaking in background] make sure we get the phones backed up...did you get the right number?...[various indistinct voices in background]... [speaking to FOREMAN] We're querying the ship right now to see if...on those two crews on board that one helicopter.

FOREMAN: Roger. Waiting.

Jones: [speaking in background] One helicopter is 80 miles out with 2 hours fuel. Everything is OK.

FOREMAN: While we are waiting I believe the returning helicopters will be able to find him. They should know his location. By then it will be daylight. They

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

should be able to find him if he has not been recovered. Over.

Jones: Yeah...if he has any communications at all, and thinks they are coming back through there...the...and hopefully they can find if the crew is not aboard the other chopper.

FOREMAN: Did not pick up. Over.

Jones: Yeah. OK. We still don't know whether two helicopters had mechanical difficulties to start with, do we, or one just buddied down? Over. Or two buddied down?

FOREMAN: Negative. Not fully clear. All launched. All crossed the start. All got an hour into the mission, and then we began to have problems...in about one hour with one bird, later with another. Over.

Jones: Uh huh. OK. I had thought that you indicated that two helicopters had landed of the six and picked up people, but now that is erroneous. Right?

FOREMAN: I am not certain. We have no conversation... confirmation that was the plan. I believe that occurred...

Jones: Yeah.

FOREMAN: We concentrated on the mission end and not on the rescue or recovery part...ah...we have two different stories. I'm trying to clear it up. Over.

Jones: Yeah. So...you do not...do not know how many helicopter crews are at Desert One? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Six. Over.

Jones: Uh huh. It would be important to find that out...if there's six or seven. If there's seven we do not have a rescue mission. If there's only six then we have the one unaccounted for. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. I will recheck. Wait. Out. [pause] We have only about zero five minutes...

Jones: OK... I think...

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

FOREMAN: ...recommend we make extraction decision at that time.
Worked out details of rescue and route...

Jones: I agree...

FOREMAN: We should have first column with two 130s to [learn
whereabouts of downed?] helicopter crews.

Jones: OK. We are...we have MOMENTUM on the line now. I
would expect momentarily a
confirmation...and...the...in just a matter of seconds.

FOREMAN: While you are waiting we will repeat the reports from
Desert One soonest to ascertain whether or not they
believe our identity was discovered. Until we do so
recommend denial of any assertions. Over.

Jones: OK. We will try that. It will be well after daylight
as they cross the coast down there I assume. We will
want to ...we will work other problems such
as...ah...CAP from E-2 and that sort of thing, but
that...we have a little time on it.

FOREMAN: Ah...Roger. Yes. That's a very [sparse?] area...very
little danger. Minimal danger. Over.

Jones: Yeah...what the plan would be is to fly the five
helicopters back to the carrier, probably
destroy...destroy the sixth one, and the MC...the 130s
would all return to [redacted] Is that the
plan? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Over.

[several indistinct voices in background]

Jones: OK...Will you...OK...you...we concur with your decision
to abort. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Will abort. Will keep you informed progress.
Out.

Jones: Key is...on the rescue info whenever we can get it...
to see whether we have to mount something for a
helicopter. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Will keep you informed. Over.

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

Jones: OK, Good...and when everybody gets off Desert One let us know. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger Wilco.

Jones: OK. Bye.

[electronic click]

[new call]

Jones: Hello. [speaking in background] I keep getting this...to get a ring...and then it just keeps [dial tone] [electronic click]

Voice Q: [words indistinct]

Jones: Copy you loud and clear. How me? Hello?

FOREMAN: INSULATOR this is FOREMAN. Request for guidance re: prisoners. There are 45 people...many of the people from the bus are aged and young. We could bring them out or leave them there. Am checking to be sure we could bring them out. Over.

Jones: [speaking in background]...people should stay, don't you agree...45...[speaking to FOREMAN] Yes...leave them there... leave all there...only take out our people. Leave the people from the bus and all others there, even if they...even if they know. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Will extract task force only. Over.

Jones: Yeah...Extract task force and leave other people there, hopefully as confused as possible, but do not bring out. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Wilco. Out.

Jones: Right. Out.

[new call]

[indistinct voices in background]

(phonetic)

[REDACTED] Yes. You won't have to worry about other thing, we're

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

going to lose the circuit. I don't think it's going to set up...It's not setting up.
[dial tone]

[new call]
[indistinct voices in background]
[redacted]: This is Colonel [redacted] (phonetic). Standby one.
[indistinct voices in background]. Hello, how do you copy? Hello?

FOREMAN: INSULATOR, This is FOREMAN...

[redacted]: Standby one, FOREMAN...
(phonetic)

FOREMAN: They have received through other channels BREAK...

[redacted]: [speaking in background, words indistinct]

FOREMAN: ...there has been an accident at the Desert Tracks. Initial report indicates helicopter has run into C-130. 130 is on fire. Do not have details but believe people are getting out all right. We still have capability to extract, and are continuing to attempt to do so. Over.

JULIET: This is JULIET. Roger. Understand. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. We are also having difficulty communicating via this method. The accident occurred about 25 minutes ago. Over.

JULIET: Roger. Understood. Incident occurred about 25 minutes ago. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is Roger. We are beginning to prepare plans here for extracting the force. [voice electronically garbled]...others...[voice electronically garbled]...

JULIET: Ah...

FOREMAN: ...have any additional...[voice electronically garbled]...discovery...of towns...through... We still cannot account for one crew, but believe the helicopters can find them enroute to their point of origin. Over.

Jones: Ah...This...this is INSULATOR. We received word from [CURTSY] (phonetic) on the Nimitz that five helicopters

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

were enroute with seven crews...with seven crews. Are you reporting that you are sure there are only six helicopter crews at Desert One? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I believe we had anticipated [words indistinct] planning action, not executed airborne endeavor. Over.

Jones: OK, but he reported seven crews coming. I do not know how he got that information of seven crews coming. We need to confirm as to whether or not there are six or seven crews at Desert One. If there are seven crews there then we do not have a crew accountability problem. If there are six then we have to make sure the helicopters coming out are alert for any downed helicopter. We...ah...move the R-53s...and we look at the whole business of it. If we could confirm that it would be very important. One other thing...is...do we...have we got any word of any casualties at all, either American or Iranian? Over.

FOREMAN: Thus far, zero, unless there are some from this now reported encounter. BREAK Regarding accounting for helicopter crew. I specifically spoke with on scene commander. He consulted with leader of helicopter force and was told only six were at Desert One. Will continue to work the problem and advise you of details soonest. Over.

Jones: OK. Very good...and...I assume...the one thing that we will want to do...well...as soon as everything is off, let us know. We are working with the carrier on making sure there is protection coming out. If we can avoid casualties on both sides that is desirable because it will not jeopardize our hostages. If we have casualties on the Iranian side it is likely to jeopardize our hostages. Obviously protection of our American lives and our crew overriding. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I believe there are no casualties on either side. BREAK BREAK The bus was left disabled. BREAK One gas truck burned BREAK BREAK Possibly one car disabled and left...or it might have left on its own power. That point unclear. Over.

Jones: OK. What do you...what do you consider...

[End Side Two]

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

[End COMJTF Tape #1]

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COMJTF Tape #2 Side One

Jones: ...we concur with what I think was your...your recommendation. It is because by the time we got there there may be Iranians around. If we end up killing Iranians it...it ups the probability that our hostages would be in danger. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I thoroughly agree. That was my recommendation. That was my rationale. Although we have no reason to believe they are there, but by the time the crews [of?] destruction arrive, they more likely would be in view of the fact that one vehicle had escaped...ah BREAK see no reason to extend additional [life?] in that direction. Our effort to this point has been totally humanitarian. We have killed no Iranians. Over.

Jones: Roger. And I concur. That is all I have. Best wishes and we'll be waiting for that call. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Out.

Jones: Ah...this...

FOREMAN: The last three aircraft have cleared Iran 0100 approximate time. Continuing to prepare with original ETA or better. Over.

Jones: OK. I got that. Over.

E FOREMAN: BREAK first MEDEVAC bird has been launched from [REDACTED] Is now airborne with authority to go direct to [REDACTED] Estimate arrival [REDACTED] Over.

Jones: OK. That's just about the same time as the 130s. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Essentially the same. Should be very helpful that way to transfer from one to the other. Our plan is to bring the injured/wounded etc. here and begin to treat them here. I have a facility here which I believe may be adequate. Over.

Jones: [speaking in background] Just hold it one second...one second [conversation indistinct] [speaking to FOREMAN] OK

~~TOP SECRET~~

F

E

Jones:

FOREMAN:

Jones:

FOREMAN:

[REDACTED]

FOREMAN:

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Jones: Roger. Thank you. INSULATOR over and out.

FOREMAN: ...To insulator OVER.

Jones: FOREMAN this is INSULATOR. Over. Go ahead.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. All five mission 130s have now safely recovered at [REDACTED] Sorting operation in progress. BREAK we have learned from initial debrief that when accident occurred at Desert One that all of the helicopter crews immediately abandoned their [electronic garble] and went to the remaining C130s which were about to take off. BREAK Crew members now at [REDACTED] report that considerable amount of mission essential classified material was left on those helicopters. BREAK Not withstanding that I recommend no COMJTF Tape #2 Side One

other action, but would leave that to you. Over.

Jones: Roger. We concur no action against those helicopters. Any word yet on confirmation whether or not all helicopter crews are accounted for? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Negative. Should know momentarily. Will be back to you. Will go back to the location where I can learn that unless you have something further. Over.

Jones: OK. I do not have anything further at this moment. The... there's great interest if we can find the...just...the seven... or one was probably a fatality at Desert One...six...first pilots on helicopters and just have them tell us or something...but great interest here in whether or not we have a rescue that's needed, or whether or not we have accounted for all helicopter crews. So if you will get that information as a matter of urgency and then pass it back, then later on anything to do with the number of casualties/missing and so forth. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Wilco. This is our plan. This is our highest priority. I should have that momentarily from the senior person present, whom you know. Over.

Jones: Roger. Well, if we can get that right away, and then as we can get the other... So we will be standing by for

[REDACTED]

that. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. This is FOREMAN. You know that those who came out was a mixture of the entire force. It will take us a while to sort what we know now. We'll be back to you soonest. If nothing further out here. Over.

Jones: Roger. I assume they are passing from the carrier all the information on who as aboard the helicopters so that they can do that. But we will leave that to you all. We are standing by to hear. Over and out.

FOREMAN: One last word. This is FOREMAN. We have very good records of whom was on what. We'll get back to you. Out.

Jones: OK. Out.
[electronic click]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I have data. Senior person on scene has informed that he has all remaining elements of seven helicopter crews. The eighth crew is on the Nimitz. BREAK Only three personnel who were in the helicopter which crashed perished at the scene. The aircraft COMJTF Tape #2 Side One

commander has survived. BREAK Five members of the 130 crew perished at the scene which gives a total of eight people lost. BREAK There were only three personnel burned to any extent. Two with second degree burns, and others with lesser spotty burns. It appears that members of the strike element all survived. BREAK There are apparently absolutely no Americans left at the site, other than those who perished. Over.

Jones: OK. I got that. Let me confirm. It is been assured that all the remaining people of the seven crews are aboard the MC-130s or have arrived. The eighth crew on the Nimitz. That three personnel in the RH-53 perished. The aircraft commander survived. Five members...crew members of the 130 perished at the scene for a total of eight people lost. There are only three personnel that have burns. Two for second degree. One for lesser degree. All the strike people survived. There are no Americans left except those who perished. Is that correct?

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FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. That is correct. BREAK Other details. The first aircraft with those who were injured are...is enroute here. It departed [REDACTED] 0315. The second aircraft with most of the remaining mission personnel departed 0335. Over.

E Jones: Roger. I got that. Do you have ETA [REDACTED] Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Negative. Now being computed. Just received data I passed to you. We are capable of handling situation. Doctor on scene reports minor miracle. All is great. Over.

Jones: Ah...minor miracle...all...I didn't get that last point. Over.

FOREMAN: From a medical standpoint, in sum we are in great shape. We can take care of everything here with my temporary facility until the evacuation aircraft arrives from Europe. Over.

E Jones: Ah...OK...at [REDACTED] so we won't have to go to [REDACTED] We would evacuate them to [REDACTED] Are there any injured other than the three burned? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. There are cuts, bruises, and a few minor broken bones per initial report. We will have better data after they arrive here, and after [computation?] is completed at first stop. Over.

COMJTF Tape #2 Side One

Jones: OK. I...I received that information. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I have nothing further at this time. Will continue to work the problem. BREAK We are sanitizing our area and will be prepared to move out of this area as aircraft become available, with your concurrence. Over.

Jones: OK. I'm sure we will...you can plan on moving out...in...with reference to compromise, we need best information and we are trying to get part of it from the one helicopter crew aboard the Nimitz...but best information on total compromise...and...to include were

[REDACTED]

there maps or photos specifically drawn on the warehouse. We are worried about our people in Tehran being compromised. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. We queried Colonel Pitman who was the senior person on the helicopter which returned to the Nimitz. It is his belief that he had the only complete CEOI. All others only held fragmentary extracts. It is entirely possible, however, that certain maps were left there, to include the coordinates of the warehouse. Over.

Jones: Let me see. Pitman...I had not heard this. Pitman is back on the Nimitz? Is that correct? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Over.

Jones: So we may have had fragmentary extracts...and so it might be much less than reported in the CEOI. How fast can we tell whether or not they had other data and what was left. It is important to the compromise at...uh...the warehouse. [speaking in background]...[words indistinct]...get me Secretary Brown...unless...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Understand. We are working that problem. We are having some difficulty contacting our representative in that area. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Those who were in the most forward location are working their way away and out. The persons who were observing the scene do not yet know that mission was canceled, in my judgment. BREAK Because we received a report about 20 minutes ago that everything was green green green. Keep coming. Over.

Jones: Who...who sent that report, do you know?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. The person whom you spoke with in my office who went there from time to time. Over.

COMJTF Tape #2 Side One

Jones: Ah...OK...and that was 20 minutes ago. We will pass that on to see what the problem is. And what we are interested in now is best information as to what was aboard the helicopters...was...did they just have fragmentary extracts. Or do we think...are we sure the

[REDACTED]

whole CEOI was or was not compromised. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. We do not believe it was compromised. Colonel Pitman talked with the communications staff officer who is on the Nimitz who is the dedicated task force staff officer and he is familiar with what occurred. I believe the helicopter air crew is also there, and may be able to provide additional details since he conducted the final brief. Based on guidance I had originally given I believe they would have only fragmentary information, but cannot confirm positively until I talk to more people precisely what they did have. I would estimate we would know in 2 to 3 hours after we talk to them when we arrive here. BREAK I will place highest priority on that requirement and to [words indistinct] answers ASAP. Over.

Jones: OK...and of course we will want the details on the names of the casualties so that we can report those as soon as possible of the eight fatalities. Over. End of this...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Understand. Wilco. Over.

Jones: OK. That is very important. There is some concern about [REDACTED] because it is likely that Delta and Rangers will be compromised [REDACTED]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I would recommend if there is to be a public release that you say Rangers conducted the mission. They did not injure. They are still here. They are all healthy. It was our plan to say that with your consent after the mission anyway. BREAK They had planned to go to Hulbert Field and then infiltrate back to home base in a relatively short period of time. However Delta very sensitive to public exposure. Recommend strong action be taken to keep them covered. Do not believe there is much change of compromise by Delta. Over.

Jones: Ah...it depends on the CEOI. The full CEOI has extensive discussion on the entire mission, to include many

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references to Delta. So it is critical we find out
COMJTF Tape #2 Side One

whether or not the full CEOI compromised, because if it is...then...we...anything we say the credibility will go because they will be able to demonstrate that what we said was inaccurate, if we say the Rangers went. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Understand. Merely suggesting that is possibility. Will confirm soonest whether or not we have...whether or not complete CEOI might have been left. Nothing further unless you have further query. Over.

Jones: No, I have nothing further. It is good news that the ...that it is confirmed that the helicopter crew is out. We are going to not launch the RH-53s from MAC. They were just getting ready to go. We will cancel that here. I see no reason for those. Over.

FOREMAN: This FOREMAN. Concur. There is no reason known to me to conduct any [word indistinct] whatsoever. Over.

Jones: OK. Well, we'll be here to get any...to get the casualty information...fatalities and injured...and we will also in particular wait for the CEOI information which will be very critical to our people in Tehran and to the whole determination whether or not the major mission is compromised, plus what sort of maps they had...really what was compromised. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Understand. Will try to provide urgent answer. Over.

Jones: Roger. That is all I have.

FOREMAN: FOREMAN. Roger out. Will continue to work. Out.

Jones: Roger. Over and out.

[electronic click]

[End Side One]

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMJTF Tape #2 (cont'd) Side Two

FOREMAN: ...in near term would be to debrief thoroughly the helicopter crew aboard Nimitz as their (N2?) and communicator are there along with one full typical well-briefed crew. Over.

Jones: Ah...Roger, this is INSULATOR. Problem has been that the...CINCPAC is having communications problems with the Nimitz...and they've been having problems passing information. They are going to do that as soon as they can get through. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. BREAK This is FOREMAN. Five minutes ago we had good comms with them. We had talked to the ship through here. We can relay. Over.

Jones: OK. Why don't you get a hold of them and tell them we need much more information...and particularly what was left aboard those helicopters...what was aboard. They won't know what was left aboard, but what was aboard. Number one, were there any of the full CEOI's aboard, or was that just on Pittman's airplane. He may have had a back up. They normally have a backup. We need as much in...and would be better if you asked because of the difficulties in communications from PAC to Nimitz. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Wilco. In interim suggest someone initiate hardcopy [word indistinct] in that direction...or communications [words indistinct]. I will take actions to comply with your request ASAP. Anything further? Over.

Jones: Roger. They are...been working...they've been working hardcopy out of CINCPAC and CINCPAC is sending them hardcopy...but even on hardcopy they've had bad message...they will do it their way and you do it your way and whoever gets it first we will look at. A question. I assume from the comments that you made to me a while back that no bodies were recovered and taken back to [redacted] that no bodies of those who perished were taken back. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is my belief. They were all [impaled?] and immolated. The 130 crew compartment was struck rather head on and before they could get out

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[REDACTED]

of...the galley area immediately behind it burst into flames and they could not extract themselves from the crew compartment because of the burning of the helicopter impact. The helicopter apparently rolled over to one side or another and the pilot was thrown clear...and one other person escaped from the rear of the helicopter...[netting?] their loss three...but perhaps one person out of the crew compartment of the 130 did

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

escape but all others perished in the immolation. Over.

Jones:

OK...one other thing... [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Do we have any word as to the bus, whether it was disabled or drove off...I have been reporting your point earlier that there were no Iranian casualties at all...I assume our evaluation is still the same that there were no Iranian casualties. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That's my current belief. I will affirm that soonest. Still do not have absolute certain information there. BREAK The bus was left...I believe we had already disabled it but do not know. Will affirm to best extent possible what situation was. BREAK We hold same report you [words indistinct] and are working the problem. Over.

Jones: OK. That's all I have. As soon as you get anything...particularly on the...any confirmation on Iranian casualties and the bus and that let us know. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Wilco. Out.

Jones: And the CEOI. Thank you. Out. [speaking in background] Right.

[electronic click]

Jones: This is INSULATOR. Is FOREMAN there? Over. Hello?... Hello?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

E Jones: FOREMAN this is INSULATOR. You can go ahead and plan on the redeployment of all elements. We will want to work with you... We would like to get out of [REDACTED] at an early time. That is...I think...particularly important...but we can start retrograde...still to be decided where Delta will go upon return but we can get started. Over.

E FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. BREAK We are largely out of [REDACTED] now except the aircrews which came from the Pacific. We kept a airfield control group...a small number of people there with...[fill gas?]. I'll get the exact number. BREAK We will initiate. I would estimate I can begin to move out most of Delta and others within a matter of hours. I would recommend I stay here a while for debriefing, perhaps leave later today or

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

early tomorrow. Would accept your recommendation and guidance. Phil or I would stay behind a bit longer. Over.

Jones: OK. I think we do need one of you back here with as full of information as can be gained early...and the other one stay behind. I will leave the judgment to you as to which one stays behind, but I think one...as soon as...get a good debrief to head back. Is Phil coming up on one of those airplanes? Over.

FOREMAN: BREAK. I do not know now. I had asked him to continue debriefing there. [words indistinct] matter. Have not talked with him in about two hours. I will affirm that...shortly and get back to you. BREAK Perhaps you already know [voice electronically garbled]...that they...people there...have found the aircraft. They are there now investigating the scene. They report initially there are 17 aircraft...I say again one seven aircraft. BREAK Reference your query about whether any Iranians killed, we still believe no but [voice electronically garbled] will be...[voice electronically garbled] questions are asked. We have debriefing [voice electronically garbled] staff...[voice electronically garbled]...each helicopter crew that arrived here regarding the extent of possible compromise. BREAK I will do a hot wash up with the commanders personally and advise you of relevant information, but do not intend to

[REDACTED]

T [REDACTED]

go into any kind of investigation or inquiry beyond that which I deem appropriate to ascertain [word indistinct] initial facts. Would recommend detailed inquiry your location by those whom you select when we return. I have collected all of my operational notes and logs. Some are sketchy, some are in reasonable detail. We have good copy of most decisions made with exception of those which you and I have discussed here. Those were not recorded per our previous agreement and only known to you and I [as to] their total content. Over.

Jones: OK. We recorded most here, but I think we have all of the data in the replay. Some of the things that we will be particularly interested in having at an early time period are of course...on the helicopter...the difficulties they had, not only the mechanical difficulty, but the landing, what happened on Pitman's airplane and repair, what happened on the other one, that sort of information. Two, the compromised data we just talked about. Another one [loud electronic click]...another one is really what happened at Desert One, sequence of landing, the tricks, the casual...how the Iranians were handled; how the accident occurred, these are the things we will I'm sure be interrogated on

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starting tomorrow. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Understand. Will begin to collect all that, as much as possible, and pass it to you by record copy, and if I find something unusually significant I will call via this method. Over.

Jones: Yeah I think that...that's clear...anything that's significant, confirmation that no Iranians were hurt. They may claim something. We've got to be sure we have cold hard facts. Compromise, particularly with regard to threat to our people who are still in Teheran, and the difficulties to the helicopter. Whatever we can get on that I know you will pass. Over.

C FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Wilco. BREAK I would strongly urge that [REDACTED]

Roger. Many hours ago sometime after the abort we gave instructions [REDACTED]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That was my understanding. I wanted to affirm that to you very early after the problem. We...I asked the senior staff person [REDACTED]

He was assured. "I'm
Have no progress to
report, however. Over.

Jones: OK. Well, [REDACTED] We'll keep track of it and call upon you for any help. But you've got enough other things to work right now. [speaks in background, words indistinct].

FOREMAN: Roger. Thank you for your help. We'll be in touch. Unless there's something further out. I'll stand by until you [words indistinct]...stay same. Over.

Jones: Roger. That's all I had. Out. Thank you.
[electronic click] [new call]

Voice A: Sir, we have two 141's coming into this location. The first arriving at my location, sir, at 0645Z. The second

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

C-141 arriving here at 0655Z, sir.

Jones: OK. We really need a good debrief. Boy, we need...I talked with General Vaught but...a real debrief on what happened to the helicopters, what is aboard from a compromise of data standpoint, what...the whole details of it, what happened to the Iranians, I mean...all of that business.

FOREMAN: Well...we are prepared to start those debriefings as soon

[REDACTED]

as the people arrive at this location, especially the helo pilots to follow through on the events of their evening...plus the CEOI. Also we'll be talking to the individual who is in charge of security at Desert [Track?] to ascertain the sequence of events there and specifically the impact on the Iranians themselves...foreign nationals.

Jones: Yeah. OK. We need whatever you've got, even if you've got an incomplete message or something...if you could send it out and then we'll pick it up later, but we're just trying to get bits and pieces now to develop a briefing for tomorrow morning. Here's Colonel...here's General [DIKE?] (phonetic).

[DIKE]: Hey Jerry?

FOREMAN: Yes sir.

[DIKE]: The Chairman's pretty well said exactly what I was calling for. I was just trying to get from you any feel that you can on when we will get that message that gives us the chronological list that...understand you might have given to General Vaught earlier.

FOREMAN: Yes sir. I thought that message had been released [words indistinct]...in advance if it hadn't. We'll check on it right now, sir, if you want [words indistinct] message.

[DIKE]: Yeah, we need that and Jerry, we don't want to bug you, but we're really under a lot of pressure to get it pulled together here.

FOREMAN: I can [words indistinct], sir.

[DIKE]: We can best support you with good information. That's the best way we can support you.

FOREMAN: All right, sir.

[DIKE]: Now the next thing, Jerry...

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

FOREMAN: ...redeployment...

[DIKE]: Yeah...

FOREMAN: We had tentatively planned on start to move Delta this morning, about two to four hours after their arrival at this location, then follow that with movement of helo pilots back to the states, sir.

[DIKE]: Yes...

A FOREMAN: And then later today to move the Rangers back to [REDACTED]. Do you foresee any problem with that movement sir, or shall we hold it up?

[DIKE]: See no problem with the movement. There's some discussion about actual destinations at this point, but you should continue you planning just like you've got it going now.

FOREMAN: Sir, I have the planes on the ground, or inbound, which would permit us to initiate that.

[DIKE]: OK, how much time do you have before you would have to give the pilots a destination? How much time do I have to work that?

FOREMAN: Well, our initial plan, sir, was to start moving within two to four hours after the forces arrival at this location. That would give us sufficient time, for initial hot washup with the commanders.

[DIKE]: Yup...

FOREMAN: ...and then start moving them. The helicopter pilots would be moved at a later time, simply because we have a more extensive debriefing for them.

[DIKE]: OK, now look Jerry, that means you have about two hours before your first plane arrives, is that correct?

FOREMAN: I have...before my first plane arrives, in, approximately 40 minutes.

[DIKE]: 40 minutes, and, so what that means is I have about two hours and a half...

FOREMAN: or five...

[DIKE]: ...to get to you with a firm destination.

FOREMAN: From [REDACTED] sir.

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

[DIKE]: Yeah. OK. All right.

FOREMAN: I have other birds that are prepared with crews, sir, that we can start moving if permitted.

[DIKE]: OK, now we need the names of the Air Force KIA. The five people aboard the EC-130.

FOREMAN: Say again please, sir.

[DIKE]: The Air Force KIA the five names.

FOREMAN: Yes sir.

[DIKE]: ...aboard the EC-130. We need that as soon as we can and top priority on debrief from the Halo crews.

FOREMAN: Yes sir. Those individuals are scheduled for a more detailed brief, sir, and we'll move them out later today if given permission.

[DIKE]: OK, and I'll get to you with information on destinations of Ranger and Delta.

FOREMAN: Yes sir. Without personal inquiries, have not been involved up to this point.

[DIKE]: Understand.

A FOREMAN: Commander and so forth we feel that probably [REDACTED] will be the best place to go.

[DIKE]: Yeah.

A FOREMAN: We have arranged, sir, for the remainder of the companies which is here, join them as they arrive back at [REDACTED]. The remainder of Charlie company is at [REDACTED] camp, sir.

[DIKE]: Yeah. Understand.

[REDACTED]

FOREMAN: And I have made arrangements for an aircraft to land about the same time they did, so it will look like they were coming in together.

[DIKE]: OK. And get that message on the wire.

FOREMAN: Yes sir.

[DIKE]: Right. OK. Thank you.

FOREMAN: Yes sir, bye.

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

[DIKE]: Bye.

[electronic click] [new call]

Voice B: ...actual, as given. Over.

[DIKE]: Ah...say again, please.

Voice B: FOREMAN wanted...wanted me to find out if you were aware of an alleged White House press release on this morning's crashes. Specifically that the facts in this alleged article were not correct. Over.

[DIKE]: This is General [DIKE]. We have just seen a news bulletin on television and heard one on radio here. What portion of the news release that you have do you believe to be incorrect? Over.

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED] (phonetic). In fact the release that we have stated that one aircraft was gliding over the desert and crashed, and another one crashed in a remote area of the desert of Iran. In fact, both aircraft collided as we understand it. Over.

[DIKE]: This is General [DIKE]. Your comment about gliding over the desert and crashing has not been seen here by me, and I know no one that has heard or seen that terminology used. What press release are you referring to? Do you know its origin? Is it UPI, AP, Reuters? Over.

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED]. Wait.
(indistinct voices in background)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[DIKE]: (speaking in background). I think we can now. (speaking to [REDACTED]/FOREMAN). Hello?

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED]. It's an AP quote, New York, NBC news. Over.

[DIKE]: Roger...ah...we have not seen that, but in any event the news...does carry stories of the operation and the decision by the President to undertake the operation solely for the purpose of the release of U.S. hostages. What we need right now is the names of the Air Force casualties and the message that provides the chronology. The press report you have seen is indicative of the kind of pressure we are getting for information and we don't have very much. Over.

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

[REDACTED]: Roger. BREAK (electronic garble). This is Major [REDACTED]. We are gathering and reconfirming the data on the casualties. It must be accurate. We will provide it as soon as we are certain that it is factual. Over.

[DIKE]: Roger. Understand that we have the two services involved here and now with their casualty people. After this has gone public, to include an announcement of the number of casualties, the pressure to provide data is obvious...and I know that you are working it...and that you understand the need to get it in soonest. Thank you for your assistance. Over.

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED]. Roger. Do you have anything further? Over.

[DIKE]: Roger. Affirmative. There is a message that we were told would be coming to us very shortly providing sequence of events and chronology. We have been waiting for over three hours now for that message. Is that message to be released or not? Over.

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED]. Roger. It's on the typewriter right now. Over.

[DIKE]: This is [DIKE]. Roger. Thank you. Out.
[electronic click] [new call]

FOREMAN: ...[contradains?] the necessity for most rigid OPSEC. Will control and remind all personnel this location, and then await your instructions to withdraw. We have a number of aircraft here, which you are aware of, and will provide exact numbers in a later report. Will suggest, however, that consideration be given to moving Delta plus others out soonest. We can continue to work from this end. Will give recommended departure times, but are open to any suggestions from you end. Arrangements already have been made for them [REDACTED] Over.

Jones: OK. We will address that issue. I think there are some aircraft that are excess to the needs...you could have people not working the primary problem...start moving them out. For example, that gaggle of 135s you've got at [REDACTED] I think there are 11 of them...those could go out...but we will make determination on Delta and the Rangers as to...as to their withdrawal. You all can keep working some plans on it and we will make an overall judgment back here. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. If you concur I will ask my [FAC] (phonetic) tanker manager to begin working up the COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

problem...a plan for that. Recommend they be phased out much like they were phased in, but a little more rapidly. We should hold some people going through here until we are more certain of our situation. Over.

Jones: I agree. No, we shouldn't send them all out, it's just that there's more than conceivably needed for other operations, since we're not going two way. I wouldn't be in any great rush, but we're develop a plan and then address it, probably tomorrow. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I will devise a two phase plan and send it to you for your approval. Over.

Jones: OK. Very good. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I must get back to other things, unless

[REDACTED]

you have something further. Over.

Jones: Negative. I have nothing further. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Everyone here is working the problem rigorously and with great efficiency. I'm proud of them.

Jones: Well, we are proud and it's just unfortunate that mechanical failure made us turn around, deviate from plan...having to withdraw and evacuate under that circumstance...increase the probability of an accident. It looked like we were going to have it made, but fate intervened and that reliability, but we'll all...you all have done well.

FOREMAN: Roger. We understand. We will concentrate all our energies on extricating the force in a secure manner, and doing our utmost to conserve our force and its members, and will follow normal procedures and notification to you. All will be kept with standard task force classifications. All release of anything will be at your discretion. Over.

Jones: OK. We will do that. The most important thing that we need right now is whether or not there are seven crew...helicopter crews or six helicopter crews aboard those 130s.

FOREMAN: Roger...

[end Side Two]

[END COMJTF Tape #2]

COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

NOTE: Tape Quality Very Poor

E Jones: ...must remain at [REDACTED] through tomorrow for maintenance. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. They would be ready to move possibly by early tomorrow. They...we have very limited maintenance capability there. We are now attempting to determine whether or not they can be repaired within capability. BREAK If not we will attempt to do so from here...attempt to do it from here...or make additional recommendations [Our?] scheduling requirement is that relative to what we should say to host country officials at that location [remaining words indistinct].

Voice A: Ah...FOREMAN. Roger, General [name indistinct] here, we'll work the problem and get an answer. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. BREAK First aircraft about to land here at 11 [rest of phrase garbled]. All [words indistinct]

[Quality of Tape Improves]
and all is going OK: If you have no further questions over and out.

C Johnson: [REDACTED], General Johnson. Hello? Can you hear me? [REDACTED], this is General Johnson. Over. [REDACTED], can you hear me [speaking offline] He's checking it.

Voice B: Hello. Testing. Can you hear me? 1-2-3-4-5.

Johnson: [REDACTED], General Johnson here. Over.

Voice C: Hello?

Johnson: Yes. [REDACTED], can you hear me? Over.

Voice C: Hello?

Johnson: Hello, [REDACTED], this is General Johnson. How do you read? Over.

Voice C: Hello?

Johnson: I read you loud and clear. How do you read me? Over. Hello? [REDACTED] [speaking in background] I can hear him.

COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

Voice B: Hello, testing, 1-2-3-4-5, 5-4-3-2-1. Do you copy?
Over.

Voice C: Good copy, go ahead.

Johnson: [REDACTED] can you hear me now?

[REDACTED] Yes sir, I can now.

Johnson: FOREMAN called with a request as to what we should tell
the host country at [REDACTED]. The guidance is to
[REDACTED] Over.

[REDACTED]: Ah, yes sir, good copy.

Johnson: This is General Johnson. That's all I have. Do you
have anything else for me? Over.

[REDACTED]: No sir, not right now. We just got one of the birds
in. I think this one has the MEDEVAC people on, it
just landed and is unloading now, so I don't have any
information on it... other than that at this time here.

Johnson: OK. Fine. Anything we can do to help you we'll be
here. General Johnson out.

[REDACTED]: Yes sir. Thank you.

[electronic click] [new call]

Voice D: ...four and one half miles out at the desert. BREAK
No other vehicle came along. Over.

Voice E: Understand. Absolutely certain no casualties at the
bus and that the Iranians were treated with great
courtesy. That the gas truck driver jumped out of the
truck and ran to a following vehicle in a smugglers
pattern. And understand that we have... [REDACTED] has an item
here for you also.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Voice E: Yes, the question was about casualties and I'll relay
it here in just a second.

FOREMAN: OK. I will be in the vicinity of this phone if
anything comes up until the time I depart. I do not




COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

know when that time is yet. BREAK My plan is to travel with the first or second aircraft moving Charlie's element. Over.

Voice E: Understand your plan to travel with first or second element with Delta.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. General Gast will remain here for one or more days. BREAK Has someone given instructions as to the disposition of aircraft at his location? He is at [words indistinct]. He and three operable aircraft out of six. Over.

Voice E: Yes. Our instructions to him were to gradually draw down from the sea surveillance forces and activities, and to coordinate with CINCEUR. If that's not possible with his communications, we will do the coordination here to the extent that we can. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I expect we will need your assistance. I have no communication to him, but do not believe that communications from EUCOM to that particular location are very good. We will as you recall...we did have difficulty communicating with our advance party  by name at that location. Hence, I believe some additional effort will have to be made, perhaps personal liaison of some form or another, or possibly hard copy passed to him as instructions from your headquarters. Over.

Voice E: Understand that communications there can be difficult, and we will continue...we will continue to use relay through your headquarters if it's necessary.

FOREMAN: BREAK. This is FOREMAN. That is a Roger and we will pass any instructions that EUCOM worked out. We will keep the commo in position until such time as your employer directs us to take it down. Over.

Voice E: Yes. Appreciate that and understand the necessity and we will keep in mind to have it taken down as rapidly as we can, but appreciate having it stay in position until we ask for it to be taken down.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Unless you have additional that is all from here. Over.

Voice E: Let me look around the room, just a second. [speaking

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~~TOP SECRET~~

COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

in background] Anything for FOREMAN?

Voice F: [in background] We understand that he's coming in with his casualties [remaining words indistinct].

Voice E: Yes, we sent a message to you on casualties...probably crossed yours on the way in...and we're looking for your FLASH message coming in at this time.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. I'll go across and check if it in fact left. I was told it had. Normally they go very quickly, however. I will follow up. I will also observe the commo arrangements. Will get back to you. Over.

Voice E: All right. Right. Thank you. Over.

Johnson: From the crew of the first helicopter...

FOREMAN: [unintelligible]

Johnson: FOREMAN, General Johnson, sir... The Chairman urgently needs information from the crew of the first helicopter which went down as to whether mechanical problems and how many other choppers landed to assist him. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Wait. This is FOREMAN. I can provide the information. I must look in my briefcase momentarily. I will be back to you. Wait. Over.

Johnson: Roger. We're waiting. [speaking in background] See what else we need. How about handing me my full briefcase, will you please?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. The helicopter which first went down was number 6. It had to make a forced landing just north of a dry lake. BREAK The personnel on that helicopter were picked up by helicopter number 8 which was the planned pick up bird for the mission. BREAK Our plan is that the 6 lead birds would always be the task birds and number 7 and 8 would be the replacement birds if there was any difficulty. BREAK The SOP for doing so was followed. Number 8 picked up the crew of number 6 and proceeded on through the desert onto its planned destination. Over.

Jones: Roger, FOREMAN. This is INSULATOR on now. Do you have report on what the difficulty was with number 6? Over.

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COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

FOREMAN: Negative. I will go get the people who interviewed the crew and get it for you. Over.

Jones: Roger. And the other thing is...I understand that number 5 became disoriented in a sand storm, lost contact, and returned to the Nimitz. I had also indicated that there were other helicopters who became disoriented in the sand storm and landed and then proceeded, but it's a little confusing. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is correct. I interviewed the helicopter commander and have the details on cards which I am looking at. I could provide you with scenario if you are interested. It is a bit mixed up but I can read it to you. It is how he relayed it to me when he got off the aircraft here. BREAK We had him write up a much detailed report which is for better. In preparation now. If you desire I can have that put on line later today. Over.

Jones: I think we need it on the wire, but I need as much as...you can give me to sort of clarify a little bit to what happened. The way I understand it right now is that number 6 had mechanical difficulty, type unknown. Would like to know what it is. Landed, number 8 picked them up, they proceeded north. Number 5 became disoriented...returned to the Nimitz. Can you fill in any other than that? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. I'll read it to you as he gave it to me as I asked him questions. All got off at the planned hour. All crossed the coastline at dark as planned. The...number 6 was the first one down. I did not note the reason why he did not get it and I did not go back and ask him. Will find that out. Basically, let me continue. Eight picked up the crew from 6. Their plan [words indistinct]..dry lake. There was a dust storm over the dry lake. After going into the dust a ways the leader elected to make a 180 and come back out. When he landed he had number 1 which he was flying and 2 only. He had lost 3, 4, 5 and 8. He then elected to proceed on toward Desert Track. BREAK Without his knowing their whereabouts, numbers 3, 4 and 5 got together and were within 40 minutes of Desert Track when number 5 was discovered missing by 3 and 4. BREAK 3 and 4 believed just prior to that [electronic garble] point that 5 had been...elected to turn back to the ship. They heard nothing further from him until they

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COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

returned here. BREAK Number 3 and 4 went on and were the first to reach Desert Track. Number 7 and 8 came in together shortly thereafter. This made then a total of four at Desert Track. Within about 30 minutes later...it ranged about 20 to 30 minutes...both 1 and 2 reached Desert Track. He was flying number 1. This then made a total of 6 helicopters at Desert Track. At that point numbers 3 and 4 had already been refueled. Also, 7 and 8. They were ready to continue. However, when he landed with 1 and 2 and began to check the status of the aircrews, he had agreed with ground commander that they could go on with 6. Shortly thereafter, one helicopter called in and said he was having difficulty with his hydraulic system. BREAK

Jones: OK

FOREMAN: That was bird number 2. As he canvassed the others, number 3 reported a fluctuating first stage problem in the automatic control...flight control system. He was getting hydraulic feedback but was willing of continue the mission. Number 8 had a slight tail rotor gearbox problem and a [TRIP] (phonetic) light had come on, but had gone off. Number 8 felt he could continue. Five birds were good at that point for mission continuance, only number 2 would have had to drop out. That is the maintenance status, with the exception of number 6 which I can try and find out and let you know. Over.

Jones: Roger. I think I got the complete story with the exception of what happened to number 6 to go down. The only other part of it is...and we'll have to get this from PAC...is a better feel of what happened to number 5 and why it elected to turn back to the ship.

FOREMAN: Roger. And we will attempt to call and get that from here. You should also be able to get it from CINCPAC. BREAK I believe it was strictly disorientation. Obviously the helicopter was still good because he was well past the turn back point. In fact others believe he was within 40 minutes of the Desert Track, if he had plenty of fuel and a good bird. I do not know the answer to that. Had he arrived we would have been in a go mission profile. BREAK Information from the other commanders suggests the pilots were very nervous when they arrived. BREAK but they were still within and did agree prior to the accident that they could have continued the mission and accomplished it just prior to

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

the planned arrival time, which would have been entirely successful. We were within mission profile and all had agreed to that. Over.

Jones: [speaking in background] Uh huh...Yeah..[speaking to FOREMAN] From CINCPAC we get a report that number 5 lost all contact and lost altitude and directional gyros. Severe pilot and copilot vertigo...and I'm seeing...anything else on that.

FOREMAN: [electronic garble]...the reasons. Under those circumstances do not know why they did not climb to altitude, but if they lost gyros I could understand. They should of had [TO or TWO] (cannot determine context, ie.. to climb ..or two gyros...) Over.

Jones: Yeah. It's an unknown. We still have to sort it out. Number 6...[speaking in background] what did 6 have [reply indistinct], [speaking to FOREMAN] Number 6 had some altitude gyro and flight control instrument problem.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I do not know what 6's problems was. I'll have to ask them. BREAK I had each crew interviewed and a record made. I can ascertain that...what their answer was within a few minutes. Over.

Jones: OK. We need...whenever they get it what happened to number 6. I think I got a pretty good chronology on everything else. There's still an uncertainty on number 5. Over. We will have...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Colonel Pitman was aboard that as an observer and overall coordinator for the mission into the other objective. BREAK The pilot of that was Navy Commander [REDACTED] (phonetic) one of our more experienced pilots from the very outset. I do not know why he would have had this difficulty. Over.

Jones: OK. Well, we'll try to work through CINCPAC at getting further clarification. The Rangers and Delta and helo crews will leave [REDACTED] today I understand. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That was our plan. We are loaded and ready to move. BREAK I just learned when I came to the phone to initiate this call that we are having diplomatic problems with the countries where we are.

COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

BREAK Can anyone help from there? As you know it is very [word indistinct] here. We may have problems. Over.

E Jones: Yeah. Diplomatic clearance problems from [redacted] getting out of [redacted]. I will have somebody contact [redacted] to get it expedited. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. I just was informed of that when I initiated this call and we have six [LOADS] (phonetic). Would appreciate that. We will run into crew rest problems if we do not start departure soon. Over.

E Jones: OK. We'll have someone get [redacted] (phonetic) on the phone and see what we can do about it. The...I understand now there were five people that were injured, one fairly severe burns...what about the other four that went up to [LAND STOOD] (phonetic)? Over.

FOREMAN: Fairly light. All stable. The extent of their injuries was in the message, the same one giving the casualty list. It should be in your vicinity now. Over.

E Jones: OK. I can get it. Can you think of any other... comments? What about difficulties on the... of the various types on those helicopters? Was that a much worse situation even the major and minor problems... much more serious in total than the exercises you have been running? Over.

FOREMAN: I would say that we have between 10 and 20 percent negative degradation in maintenance readiness below what we had experienced in my last four exercises. Over.

Jones: Uh huh...OK ...all right...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. But in the net, had that one...number 5 not gone back we would have been in outstanding condition to go with five strong birds and one other that could have followed. In the net we would have had six going forward with one limping along and only one lost. Over.

Jones: OK. All right...

COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

FOREMAN: It was a maintenance problem with helicopters. I do not know...I never did visit the Nimitz... who made many visits there, you would have seen message traffic that assured they were improving. BREAK The team from the detachment that went out thought they were improving and doing about as well as they had done at their training location. BREAK But that is the only component of the task force I never personally checked and approved. This was the piece of machinery that the mission would ultimately require. Over.

Jones: OK. Yeah. All right. Can you think of any other information I'll need for this morning? I'm leaving in just a few minutes. Over.

FOREMAN: I would summarize by saying that the activities at Desert Track... the actions taken by the Delta force and others there were very heroic. They were in a plane that was literally on fire. They all got out. They quickly got onto other aircraft. Aircraft were heavily overloaded, but the pilots did a super job and got them all the way back to their launch place with no difficulties...with acceptable difficulty and no further accidents. BREAK On the way in the [word indistinct] and the fuel birds... super super job says all commanders. Right on time, right to the right place. Desert Track was an outstanding airfield, both sides of the road no problems. BREAK BREAK They... the difficulty or the encounter with the vehicles occurred within a minute or so after the first helicopter landed...I mean airplane landed. BREAK Our [words indistinct] was to control the roads immediately jumped out and stopped the bus and got the people off. They were treated very courteously. Our people even carried their bags to the assembly area, kept them there under supervision. No one was pushed around, shoved around, there was no necessity to restrain anybody. And prior to leaving they took them all down the road out of the danger area and released them. So there was absolutely no Iranians killed. They were handled with the utmost of courtesy. BREAK With regard to the fuel truck. It had followed shortly behind the bus. When it was signaled to stop, it disregarded the signal and attempted to proceed. Whereupon they fired into the truck...into the engine compartment and it burst into flames. It stopped, the driver jumped out, ran to the rear, and got into the sedan which was following it. BREAK It is believed by people who are familiar with

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COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

that section that it was some kind of a contraband or smuggling activity. That is the normal pattern, a truck with a car closely behind it. BREAK Other than that, they then remained in the desert for more than four hours and no other vehicles of any kind made any approach. Over.

Jones: OK. I got that. And if we'd just been five minutes later we guess those vehicles would have gone...we'd have seen nobody.

FOREMAN: That is right. There would have been no encounter whatsoever for a four hour period in the desert. We thought we had to be there then in order to get the fuel supply out. That was the time we picked. Just a misfortune. But BREAK ah

C
[REDACTED] is all in the record. BREAK Had we elected to go on with the mission as we'd planned and had we [words indistinct] all those people we'd encountered it is highly likely no discovery would have been made and the mission could have continued. BREAK Reports from the [REDACTED] (phonetic) radio were made. Contact had been established in [REDACTED] and they were ready to proceed.

A, C
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] everything was lined up. Only difficulties that caused mission failure was helicopter maintenance. That is the final opinion of all my subordinate commanders. Over.

Jones: OK. I think I got that. I've got to run to a meeting. Later today we will have congressional discussions and...answering all the press queries. We are doing our best as to handle those. Appreciate this info and any flow of info you get from here on in. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. With regard to the cause of the accident. The leader of the helicopters observing the take off...the person piloting the helicopter

COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

[electronic garble] who is a instructor pilot with four years experience. He is a member of the staff faculty out there where they teach people how. He simply lifted the helicopter off to go to another place to top off his fuel and picked it up and flew right over the airplane, a violation of every procedure known to anyone who flies. We do not know why. He was one of the burn victims and I elected not to question him until he was more stable. However, he is up and about, walking when he came here. He is in evacuation channels and could be interviewed by someone to learn why BREAK I would suggest formal flight evaluation board in his instance. Over.

Jones: OK. We will see. All right. Anything else for us and keep the info flowing after I leave and we'll come back and get it for the other meetings. Have any other critical issues? Over.

FOREMAN: Nothing further. I had planned to leave on number Delta Bird. BREAK. Colonel Gast will remain here as well. Over.

Jones: OK. All right. That's fine. and we will see what we can do about getting the diplomatic clearance. Thank you. Over and out. We look forward to seeing you when you get back. It's extremely unfortunate we had a mechanical difficulty. You and the whole JTF did a magnificent job. Over.

[electronic click] [new call]

Johnson: FOREMAN, General Johnson here. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. REGULATOR has asked me to ascertain reason why helicopter number 6 had to abort and abandon. BREAK The answer is they had a BIM indicator.

Johnson: Roger.

FOREMAN: The abbreviation...all in blocks... Bravo... Item... Mike... I am sure your leader can tell you what the details of that problem are. BREAK Basically, the indicator light comes on and says you have lost gas in the blade, which means the blade is bad. That is a master caution and one should immediately land and change the blade. BREAK That rarely happens, but it happened once in

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COMJTF Tape #3 Side One

training last December. BREAK That was the problem. In addition, that same helicopter was experiencing internal tank transfer problems. In other words, fuel was not moving as it should have from one tank to the other. It might have made it to the mission area. In any event, it would have proceeded had it not had the BAH problem. How copy? Over

Johnson: FOREMAN, have good copy. Over

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. REGULATOR has indicated he would like to have that information urgently. You shall try and pass it to him where he is now. That was his request to me. Can you carry that out? Over

Johnson: Ah, REGULATOR. That's affirmative. We will forward it. Over

FOREMAN: BREAK. He said he needed it for an important meeting. ASAP. It looks like the clearance problem may be beginning to break. Would suggest the following from that and our commo to [redacted] from this location is [redacted] but through the local system and the word does not pass very fast. BREAK. There is also a word incident to you. Over

Johnson: This is General Johnson. Roger. Understand. We have people working that problem now. Also I will get this information to REGULATOR. Over

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Out

[electronic click]

[End Side One]

[Side Two Is Blank]

[End COMJTF Tape #3]

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EDITED COMJTF TAPE #1

CONDUCTED ON 18 NOV 92

REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC

☐ DECL ☐ DOWNLOADED TO

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

Jones: This is INSULATOR...over.

Voice A: Ah...yes...this is maintenance making comms check...now do you copy?

Jones: Ah...standby...say again...over.

Voice B: [Can't hear?] very well...not hearing it over here.

Voice A: Yes...I repeat...this is maintenance...we're making a comms check...how do you copy?

Jones: Read you loud and clear, maintenance...over.

Voice A: Thank you very much...[words indistinct] for your patience.

Doubleday This General Doubleday. How do you hear me? Over.

Just fine, sir. This is Colonel [redacted] here.

Doubleday Colonel [redacted] this General Doubleday...General Jones is on the line too...could you say enough for us to get a feeling of the quality of the voice circuit? Over.

Yes sir. I'm hearing you pretty good, sir. Report a slight [warble] to your voice.

Jones: I didn't quite understand that. We were having a little communications difficulty early and we were checking on it. I didn't understand your last point there. Over.

I'm hearing you clear sir...on about a four by.

Jones: OK. I read you that time...and...we're just making a comm check...and got [bus?...]...and everything...everything going well there?

Yes sir. We just got eight helicopters off the deck, sir. They're on their way.

Jones: Oh!

101506.

Jones: Eight are off and...and also the 130s on their way?

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EDITED COMJTF TAPE #1

[REDACTED] We have one 130 sir [DELETED] intervals on their way.

Jones: OK.

[REDACTED] The others should be launching here shortly, sir.

Jones: OK. And...ah...well, we're here. We won't bother you. God bless. Anything further for us?

[electronic click]

Jones: I'm not reading you too well. This is INSULATOR. Go ahead. This is Jones.

[REDACTED] This is Colonel [REDACTED] sir. All birds off the ground [DELETED]...all birds off the ground [DELETED]. How copy? Over.

Jones: OK. I copy you loud and clear. All birds off the ground...and off the deck with the last ones off the ground at [DELETED].

[REDACTED] Good copy. That is a good copy. Make birds off the deck at 1506. Last fixed wing off the deck at [DELETED].

Jones: Very good! Very good. Thank you. Do you have any other traffic for us? Over.

[REDACTED] [unintelligible]

Jones: Pardon?

[REDACTED] [unintelligible]

Jones: Hello? Out.

[electronic click]

[REDACTED] Two four zero six one five zulu. End of message. How copy? Over.

Jones: I got the time, I did not get the word...the key word. Over.

Voice C: What was it? NEWSPRINT?

[REDACTED] Sir, I did not get the key word from this. NEWSPRINT

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EDITED COMJTF TAPE #1

is the call sign of the individual. All he gave me was 240615 and he said that was the end of the message.

Jones: Uh huh.

King: I do not have the access for the rest. Let me speak to FOREMAN whom I think...

Jones: OK...hold...hold just a...hold a minute. [scrambled transmission and other electronic noise] OK. I got it. NEWSPRINT and all he said was NEWSPRINT 240615 Zulu. That is the total message? Over.

Voice C: [DELETED]

King: He said [he'll look?] and he'll get back with you if I may...see if I can find a better word preceding that.

Jones: OK. All right. We'll wait for your call. Thank you.
[electronic click]

[new call]

Jones: Hello?

Voice D: Yes...ah...how do you copy?

Jones: Loud and clear.

Voice D: Yeah...OK...thank you very much...stand by one.

Jones: Who is this? Yeah, all right.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Is INSULATOR near you? Over.

Jones: This is INSULATOR, FOREMAN. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. POSTMASTER 6, HORSE RACE 8. All goes well. We achieved those earlier. Over.

Jones: Roger. I got POSTMASTER 6, HORSE RACE 8. I received earlier. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. All goes well. We'll keep you informed. Anything further? Over.

Jones: We have nothing further for you...ah...except all the

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EDITED COMJTF TAPE #1

best from all of us. Over.

FOREMAN: Very well. Roger. Out.

Jones: Thank you. Out.

[electronic click]

[new call]

Jones: Hello. Hello.

Voice E: [electronic garble] copy me [electronic garble]

Jones: I'm copying you. Who is this? Over.

Voice E: [garble] OK. Let me reinitiate this call, OK? When you hang up I'll call you back.

Jones: I don't understand you. Who is this? [DELETED]

Voice F: Hello?

Jones: Hello.

Voice F: Going secure.

Jones: Hello. Hello.

Voice G: [words garbled] how do you read me?

Jones: A little bit garbled. Over.

Voice G: OK. [words garbled]

Jones: Ah...yeah...I'm reading you better. Over. Go ahead.
Go ahead, I read you now. Over.

Voice G: Say again please?

Jones: Go ahead. I can read you now. Go ahead. Over.

Voice G: OK. Hold on.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Jones: Roger, FOREMAN. This is INSULATOR. Over.

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EDITED COMJTF TAPE #1

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Do you have query? Over.

Jones Roger. We wanted...first I wanted to make sure the communications lines were OK. We were having difficulty at the end. And since we were making a comm check also wanted to see if you had any traffic for us. Over.

FOREMAN: I...This is FOREMAN. I read you garbled. Say again and try a little more slowly. Over.

Jones: All right. We had earlier had some communications trouble and wanted to make sure line was OK. While we're talking, though, do you have anything for us? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. I believe we still have 3 HORSE RACE...I say again we have 6 HORSE RACE items still moving. Two may be down for mechanical problems. POSTMASTER items are beginning to move into place on time. Will continue monitoring. All looks good. Over.

Jones: Roger. Do you have any indication on HORSE RACE whether two have trouble or one was down mechanical and the other followed down. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Four went on. Two stopped to pick up crew. Two have continued on..making 6...making 6 HORSE RACE items. Over.

Jones: Roger. Were two HORSE RACERS abandoned? Were two HORSE RACES abandoned? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I believe that is correct. I do not have enough information. We are also having some comm difficulties. Will ascertain when we have better commo via POSTMASTER items. Estimate one to two hours before we have clear picture. Based on what we have though, we feel have a positive operation. We'll advise. Over.

Jones: OK. I understand. I understand. We will standby for information as soon as you get it. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Wilco. Out.

Jones: INSULATOR out. Thank you.

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EDITED COMJTF TAPE #1

[electronic click]

[new call]

Jones: Hello.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. May I speak to INSULATOR? Over.

Jones: FOREMAN this is INSULATOR. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. We have accomplished MERMAID. WHISTLER is on ground. Operation is going alright. A message is coming your way with other details. Over.

Jones: Roger. I got that. WHISTLER is on ground. You have MERMAID. We received message on three trucks...include bus and one escaped. Do you have anything further on that? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That's my understanding. Will continue to pursue. All else looks well. Over.

Jones: Yeah. We have all alerted...[DELETED] all alerted. If I understand correctly, WHISTLER...it's a little confusing...is... is it the number 6 on WHISTLER on the chart...is that which it is? Over.

Voice H: [DELETED]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is MERMAID 6...WHISTLER had just begun his [words indistinct] at current location...

Jones: OK. If I...

FOREMAN: HORSE RACE items have not yet joined there.

Jones: Oh. Others have not joined...

FOREMAN: [words indistinct] information you hold is correct. Over.

Jones: OK. The first group is there. The second group has not joined as yet, but should do so shortly. Correct? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Over.

Jones: OK. I assume...we will get word when they land.

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EDITED COMJTF TAPE #1

Appreciate the call. We are both concerned about the vehicle that escaped...may or may not be problem. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I concur, but recommend we proceed. That is remote area...Saturday night...very unlikely to cause major trouble in time to cause mission difficulty. Will closely monitor. Please [DELETED] give us earliest warning. Will advise soonest of other achievements. Over.

Jones: Roger. We concur with keep going and we will have all [DELETED] make sure all pass to you. Am waiting for further report on second group. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger Wilco. Out.
[electronic click]
[new call]

Jones: Hello. (I can't get it to ring now...get a dial tone).

Voice I: This is LIMA CHARLIE. How do you copy me, sir?

Jones: Ah...LIMA CHARLIE also. Is FOREMAN there please?

Voice I: Say again please?

Jones: Is FOREMAN there please?

Voice I: Yes, he will be here in one minute. Hold one please.

Jones: Roger. Standing by. [pause] Hello. [background voices indistinct] Yeah, I'll hold on.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Jones: FOREMAN, this is INSULATOR. Do you have anything for us on refueling? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Four HORSE RACE have been refueled and are loaded with element and ready to proceed. Two others are now refueling. We have six good HORSE RACE items. I just told senior person to proceed. All looks manageable. We are proceeding. Over.

Jones: OK. We concur with that. I received that. Do you have anything further on the trucks that were stopped,

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EDITED COMJTF TAPE #1

the trucks that escaped, and the passengers, to include which way were the vehicles going so we can get some indication how soon we may get a tip off? Over,

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. BREAK...There were no wounded other than moving...wait...BREAK...I just received additional intel...wait...out. BREAK I continue...the situation on the ground there under control. No persons have been eliminated. The vehicle went south...west towards a significant city which is a long distance away. [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED] [DELETED] My elements should be out of that area in less than one hour. Recommend we continue. BREAK BREAK Just received information from ultimate location, All there is Green. Our transportation is situated. We have an ideal situation. We will advise as we obtain additional information. They are very busy at this time. I am reluctant to ask additional questions. Will pass more info to you soonest. Over.

Jones: OK. Fine, and I agree with you that we won't bug them and we won't bug you...Only one question...you say that all will be off and gone within one hour. According to our schedule all should have been off...refueled and off one hour ago. That would mean they would be two hours behind. Do you...is that correct? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Negative. That was [word indistinct] time. I am watching daylight and computing my time distance factors. We are in an acceptable profile. We will complete the refuel operation, move to our next location, [with plenty?] of security. I am watching close. Our transportation is largely already spotted there. The area is secure. I foresee little or no difficulty. Will advise. Over.

Jones: OK, fine. My only question had been...and it isn't critical...but that our chart showed they would...the takeoff would be 2010 at the desert site and that what you're saying... that's 2010 zulu...what you're saying is it maybe 2200 which is an hour fifty behind, which will give us time, but there was a question of why an hour to hour fifty late. It is not critical for us to know, but if you do happen to know we would be interested. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I can't advise you...two different

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...HORSE RACE items...had to drop out. Two other HORSE RACE items had to pick up the crew from those items and proceed. That was according to plan. They had some difficulty with unanticipated visibility, however unconfirmed, but I believe visibility is all right at this time for remainder of mission. Will check and be back in about three zero. Over.

Jones: OK, fine. We received a report that chopper number five was returning to the Nimitz. Over.

Voice J: [in background] How old is that?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I received the same report. Cannot now confirm. Do not want to extend my energy doing that. We will check later and advise. Over.

Jones: OK. All right. We...ah...we concur, and will let you do your work there. Could be...we will await your call in about 30 minutes...hopefully refueling completed at that time, but take whatever...the key thing is that you be able to make decisions and to work downward. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Thank you. Will continue. If I need to consult I'll get to you soonest. Thank you for your confidence. Out.

Jones: OK. If you are busy, someone else could call in the 30 minutes with the HORSE RACE status. Over.

Voice K: [electronically garbled] Out.

[End Side One]

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

Jones: Hello.

Voice L: [garbled]...remain on the net?

Jones: I don't know...I just got a ring here.

Voice L: OK...good enough now...

Jones: Who is this?

Voice L: [garbled]

Jones: Who?

Voice L: This is [garbled]. We're back in the net north. OK?

Voice M: [DELETED]

Jones: [DELETED]

Voice M: [DELETED]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Jones: FOREMAN this is INSULATOR.. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. We only have five good birds now. They are all refueled. However, helicopter leader recommends we abort and return to base. There are no casualties. We could continue at great risk. Request your advice. Over.

Jones: [DELETED]

Voice N: [DELETED]

Jones: [DELETED] Let me get the Secretary on. Do you have any word on the sixth bird? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. We have six there. It has hydraulics problems. One bird is unaccounted for between the launch point and the refuel point. Over.

Jones: One...what is unaccounted for?

FOREMAN: One helicopter. Over.

Jones: It...it cleared the launch point, and what did it do

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

Jones: We concur with your recommendation, but hold one before executing to see if we can get a call through across the river...but we will concur with that. You would leave the six chopper there...would you destroy it or what? Over.

FOREMAN: Yes. We will attempt to destroy it. Over.

Jones: OK. [DELETED] OK. If we go out with those choppers...if they can be alert to any signals or anything from helicopters who might be down, out efforts then will be to get those choppers back on the Nimitz and recycle them for rescue. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger Wilco. Anything further?

Jones: Well hold...if you can hold for...just a minute, ROCK CASTLE is on and trying to get MOMENTUM. We will...should have momentarily.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Waiting. Out.

OK...[pause] [voice in background, indistinct] He is talking across and I should have it in...in 15 seconds here.

FOREMAN: Roger. Waiting.

Jones: I assume the...the people that are in the bus and that know that it's U.S. I would assume.

FOREMAN: We are not certain that they do. We will do everything to preclude their learning that. Over.

Jones: OK. Yup. In...in...we concur that going ahead with five that our previous determination that that does an abort is a sound decision, right?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Plus the helicopter commander has not confidence or low confidence that he can complete the mission. Over.

Jones: [DELETED] One helicopter is...how long...how long do you think for a decision? Do we have a few minutes? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Very few. The birds are already getting into their lowest fuel possible. I will advise

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

longest waiting period. Not more than One Zero, in my opinion. Am checking. Over.

Jones: OK. [DELETED] We got a report there is one helicopter 80 miles out...80 miles out, two hours fuel, no problems. We do not know whether or not it has the second crew aboard. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Most likely it does. We will attempt to learn that soonest. Over.

Jones: Yeah. OK. We get a report from the...ah...they said in five minutes we would have...they are getting MOMENTUM...the ...ah...and therefore we should have it within five minutes. We will try to determine whether there is one or two crews aboard that one that is 80 miles out of the Nimitz. [DELETED]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. I have rechecked. Maximum of 15 minutes with repositioning tankers. Action is being taken. Waiting your additional instructions. Over.

Jones: OK. Well...[DELETED] OK. We should have it less than that time period. It's just to confirm what we believe would be the decision to agree with you...the risk of doing it with less than 5 is very high because of the cycle time and there is... there is no way I assume to repair the one with the hydraulic problem. Over.

FOREMAN: Negative. I understand it is a major leak.

Jones: Major leak.

FOREMAN: You will recall we started with 8 as compared with 7 as was the original plan. We have lost 3 helicopters out of 8, now the fourth one, which is left...it would be of 50 percent of what we started.

Jones: Yeah...I agree...I...

FOREMAN: The commander had low confidence in ultimate success. Over.

Jones: Yeah. OK. I'll repeat that...having already lost 3 out of 8 with the most demanding part ahead, the chances of losing one more very high. So...ah...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger.

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

Jones: ...We..[DELETED] We're querying the ship right now to see if...on those two crews on board that one helicopter.

FOREMAN: Roger. Waiting.

Jones: [DELETED]

FOREMAN: While we are waiting I believe the returning helicopters will be able to find him. They should know his location. By then it will be daylight. They should be able to find him if he has not been recovered. Over.

Jones: Yeah...if he has any communications at all, and thinks they are coming back through there...the...and hopefully they can find if the crew is not aboard the other chopper.

FOREMAN: Did not pick up. Over.

Jones: Yeah. OK. We still don't know whether two helicopters had mechanical difficulties to start with, do we, or one just buddied down? Over. Or two buddied down?

FOREMAN: Negative. Not fully clear. All launched. All crossed the start. All got an hour into the mission, and then we began to have problems...in about one hour with one bird, later with another. Over.

Jones: Uh huh. OK. I had thought that you indicated that two helicopters had landed of the six and picked up people, but now that is erroneous. Right?

FOREMAN: I am not certain. We have no conversation... confirmation that was the plan. I believe that occurred...

Jones: Yeah.

FOREMAN: We concentrated on the mission end and not on the rescue or recovery part...ah...we have two different stories. I'm trying to clear it up. Over.

Jones: Yeah. So...you do not...do not know how many helicopter crews are at Desert One? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Six. Over.

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

Jones: Uh huh. It would be important to find that out...if there's six or seven. If there's seven we do not have a rescue mission. If there's only six then we have the one unaccounted for. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. I will recheck. Wait. Out. [pause] We have only about zero five minutes...

Jones: OK... I think...

FOREMAN: ...recommend we make extraction decision at that time. Worked out details of rescue and route...

Jones: I agree...

FOREMAN: We should have first column with two 130s to [learn whereabouts of downed?] helicopter crews.

Jones: OK. We are...we have MOMENTUM on the line now. I would expect momentarily a confirmation...and...the...in just a matter of seconds.

FOREMAN: While you are waiting we will repeat the reports from Desert One soonest to ascertain whether or not they believe our identity was discovered. Until we do so recommend denial of any assertions. Over.

Jones: OK. We will try that. It will be well after daylight as they cross the coast down there I assume. We will want to ...we will work other problems such as...ah...CAP from E-2 and that sort of thing, but that...we have a little time on it.

FOREMAN: Ah...Roger. Yes. That's a very [sparse?] area...very little danger. Minimal danger. Over.

Jones: Yeah...what the plan would be is to fly the five helicopters back to the carrier, probably destroy...destroy the sixth one, and the MC...the 130s would all return to [DELETED] plan? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Over.

[several indistinct voices in background]

Jones: OK...Will you...OK...you...we concur with your decision to abort. Over.

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

FOREMAN: Roger. Will abort. Will keep you informed progress. Out.

Jones: Key is...on the rescue info whenever we can get it... to see whether we have to mount something for a helicopter. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Will keep you informed. Over.

Jones: OK, Good...and when everybody gets off Desert One let us know. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger Wilco.

Jones: OK. Bye.

[electronic click]

[new call]

Jones: Hello. [DELETED] [electronic click]

Voice Q: [words indistinct]

Jones: Copy you loud and clear. How me? Hello?

FOREMAN: INSULATOR this is FOREMAN. Request for guidance re prisoners. There are 45 people...many of the people from the bus are aged and young. We could bring them out or leave them there. Am checking to be sure we could bring them out. Over.

Jones: [DELETED] Yes...leave them there... leave all there...only take out our people. Leave the people from the bus and all others there, even if they...even if they know. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Will extract task force only. Over.

Jones: Yeah...Extract task force and leave other people there, hopefully as confused as possible, but do not bring out. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Wilco. Out.

Jones: Right. Out.

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

[new call]

[indistinct voices in background]

(phonetic)

[REDACTED] Yes. You won't have to worry about other thing, we're going to lose the circuit. I don't think it's going to set up...It's not setting up.
[dial tone]

[new call]
[indistinct voices in background]
This is Colonel [REDACTED] (phonetic). Standby one.
[indistinct voices in background]. Hello, how do you copy? Hello?

FOREMAN: INSULATOR, This is FOREMAN...

[REDACTED] Standby one, FOREMAN...
(phonetic)

FOREMAN: They have received through other channels BREAK...

[REDACTED] [speaking in background, words indistinct]

FOREMAN: ...there has been an accident at the Desert Tracks. Initial report indicates helicopter has run into C-130. 130 in on fire. Do not have details but believe people are getting out all right. We still have capability to extract, and are continuing to attempt to do so. Over.

JULIET: This is JULIET. Roger. Understand. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. We are also having difficulty communicating via this method. The accident occurred about 25 minutes ago. Over.

JULIET: Roger. Understood. Incident occurred about 25 minutes ago. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is Roger. We are beginning to prepare plans here for extracting the force. [voice electronically garbled]...others...[voice electronically garbled]...

JULIET: Ah...

FOREMAN: ...have any additional...[voice electronically garbled]

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COMJTF Tape #1 Side Two

...discovery...of towns...through... We still cannot account for one crew, but believe the helicopters can find them enroute to their point of origin. Over.

Jones: Ah...This...this is INSULATOR. We received word from [CURTSY] (phonetic) on the Nimitz that five helicopters were enroute with seven crews...with seven crews. Are you reporting that you are sure there are only six helicopter crews at Desert One? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I believe we had anticipated [words indistinct] planning action, not executed airborne endeavor. Over.

Jones: OK, but he reported seven crews coming. I do not know how he got that information of seven crews coming. We need to confirm as to whether or not there are six or seven crews at Desert One. If there are seven crews there then we do not have a crew accountability problem. If there are six then we have to make sure the helicopters coming out are alert for any downed helicopter. We...ah...move the Rh-53s...and we look at the whole business of it. If we could confirm that it would be very important. One other thing...is...do we...have we got any word of any casualties at all, either American or Iranian? Over.

FOREMAN: Thus far, zero, unless there are some from this now reported encounter. BREAK Regarding accounting for helicopter crew. I specifically spoke with on scene commander. He consulted with leader of helicopter force and was told only six were at Desert One. Will continue to work the problem and advise you of details soonest. Over.

Jones: OK. Very good...and...I assume...the one thing that we will want to do...well...as soon as everything is off, let us know. We are working with the carrier on making sure there is protection coming out. If we can avoid casualties on both sides that is desirable because it will not jeopardize our hostages. If we have casualties on the Iranian side it is likely to jeopardize our hostages. Obviously protection of our American lives and our crew overriding. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I believe there are no casualties on either side. BREAK BREAK The bus was left disabled. BREAK One gas truck burned BREAK BREAK Possibly one

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COMJTF JAPG #2

Jones: [DELETED]...your recommendation. It is because by the time we got there there may be Iranian around. If we end up killing Iranians it...it ups the probability that our hostages would be in danger. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I thoroughly agree. That was my recommendation. That was my rationale. Although we have no reason to believe they are there, but by the time the crews [of?] destruction arrive, they more likely would be in view of the fact that one vehicle had escaped...ah BREAK see no reason to extend additional [life?] in that direction. Our effort to this point has been totally humanitarian. We have killed no Iranians. Over.

Jones: Roger. And I concur. That is all I have. Best wishes and we'll be waiting for that call. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Out.

Jones: Ah...this...

FOREMAN: The last three aircraft have cleared Iran 0100 72 approximate time... Continuing to prepare with original ETA or better. Over.

Jones: OK. I got that. Over.

FOREMAN: BREAK first MEDEVAC bird has been launched from [DELETED]. Is now airborne with authority to go direct to [DELETED] Estimating arrival [DELETED] Over.

Jones: OK. That's just about the same time [DELETED]. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Essentially the same. Should be very helpful that way to transfer from one to the other. Our plan is to bring the injured/wounded etc. here and begin to treat them here. I have a facility here which I believe may be adequate. Over.

Jones: [speaking in background] Just hold it one second...one second [conversation indistinct] [speaking to FOREMAN] OK you say you have a facility there that may be adequate for treatment. OK. I got that. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I should explain any treatment which could not have been conducted by the doctors who are aboard the aircraft which is meeting them [DELETED]. We would just simply hold them here aboard the aircraft they

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~~[REDACTED]~~

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COMJTF TAPE #2

are in until the C-9 gets here from EUCOM, if that seems to be feasible. We do not have solid time other than the original estimate of 0808. Planners believe that time can be beat. We believe under those planning factors we can cope with the situation. I will consult with my medical staff here and give you further recommendations when we have information from person on [DELETED].

Jones: Roger. Hold one. [DELETED] Roger...I got that. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Nothing further unless you have something for me. All information in the normal format will be transmitted by me to you via this method unless it's a life or death emergency. We will provide hardcopy through staff channels soonest. Over.

Jones: OK. All right. Well...the number one thing we are waiting for is, of course, a confirmation that there are seven helicopter crews aboard the 130s. That is the most important...and then secondly the determination of the number of casualties, people missing, fatalities, bodies, and so forth. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. This is our first priority. Al who can work that will work it. Will report soonest. If you have nothing further, I will wait for you to [close?].

Jones: [DELETED]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is the same reporting we have here. Over.

Jones: Roger. Thank you. INSULATOR over and out.

FOREMAN: ...TO insulator OVER.

Jones: FOREMAN this is INSULATOR. Over. Go ahead.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. All five mission 130s have now safely recovered [DELETED]. Sorting operation in progress. BREAK we have learned from initial debrief that when accident occurred at Desert One that all of the helicopter crews immediately abandoned their [electronic garble] and went to the remaining C130s which were about to take off. BREAK Crew members now [DELETED] report that considerable amount of or mission essential classified material was left on those helicopters. BREAK Notwithstanding that I recommend no other action, but

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would leave that to you. Over.

Jones: Roger. We concur no action against those helicopters. Any word yet on confirmation whether or not all helicopter crews are accounted for? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Negative. Should know momentarily. Will be back to you. Will go back to the location where I can learn that unless you have something further. Over.

Jones: OK. I do not have anything further at this moment. The... there's great interest if we can find the... just... the seven... or one was probably a fatality at Desert One... six... first pilots on helicopters and just have them tell us or something... but great interest here in whether or not we have a rescue that's needed, or whether or not we have accounted for all helicopter crews. So if you will get that information as a matter of urgency and then pass it back, then later on anything to do with the number of casualties/missing and so forth. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Wilco. This is our plan. This is our highest priority. I should have that momentarily from the senior person present, whom you know. Over.

Jones: Roger. Well, if we can get that right away, and then as we can get the other... So we will be standing by for that. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. This FOREMAN. You know that those who came out was a mixture of the entire force. It will take us a while to sort what we know now. We'll be back to you soonest. If nothing further out here. Over.

Jones: Roger. I assume they are passing from the carrier all the information on who as aboard the helicopters so that they can do that. But we will leave that to you all. We are standing by to hear. Over and out.

FOREMAN: One last word. This is FOREMAN. We have very good records of whom was on what. We'll get back to you. Out.

Jones: OK. Out.
[electronic click]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I have data. Senior person on scene

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COMJTF TAPE #2

has informed that he has all remaining elements of seven helicopter crews. The eight crew is on the Nimitz. BREAK Only three personnel who were in the helicopter which crashed perished at the scene. The aircraft commander has survived. BREAK Five members of the 130 crew perished at the scene which gives a total of eight people lost. BREAK There were only three personnel burned to any extent. Two with second degree burns, and others with lesser spotty burns. It appears that members of the stripe element all survived. BREAK There are apparently absolutely no Americans left at the site, other than those who perished. Over.

Jones: OK. I got that. Let me confirm. It is been assured that all the remaining people of the seven crews are aboard the MC-130s or have arrived. The eighth crew on the Nimitz. That three personnel in the RH-53 perished. The aircraft commander survived. Five members... crew members of the 130 perished at the scene for a total of eight people lost. There are only three personnel that have burns. Two for second degree. One for lesser degree. All the strike people survived. There are no Americans left except those who perished. Is that correct?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. That is correct. BREAK Other details. The first aircraft with those who were injured are... is enroute here. It departed [DELETED]. The second aircraft with most of the remaining mission personnel departed [DELETED]. Over.

Jones: Roger. I got that. Do you have ETA [DELETED]

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Negative. Now being computed. Just received data I passed to you. We are capable of handling situation. Doctor on scene reports minor miracle. All is great. Over.

Jones: Ah...minor miracle...all...I didn't get that last point. Over.

FOREMAN: From a medical standpoint, in sum we are in great shape. We can take care of everything here with my temporary facility until the evacuation aircraft arrives from Europe. Over.

Jones: [DELETED] so we won't have to go to [DELETED]. We would evacuate them to Germany. Are there any injured other

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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COMJTF TAPE #2

than the three burned? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. There are cuts, bruises, and a few minor broken bones per initial report. We will have better data after they arrive here, and after [computation?] is completed at first stop. Over.

Jones: OK. I...I received that information. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I have nothing further at this time. Will continue to work the problem. BREAK We are sanitizing our area and will be prepared to move out of this area as aircraft become available, with you concurrence. Over.

Jones: OK. I'm sure we will...you can plan on moving out...in...with reference to compromise, we need best information and we are trying to get part of it from the one helicopter crew aboard the Nimitz...but best information on total compromise...and...to include were there maps or photos specifically drawn on the warehouse. We are worried about our people in Tehran being compromised. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. We queried Colonel [Pittman] (phonetic) who was the senior person on the helicopter which returned to the Nimitz. It is his belief that he had the only complete CEOI. All others only held fragmentary extracts. It is entirely possible, however, that certain maps were left there, to include the coordinates of the warehouse. Over.

Jones: Let me see. Pittman...I had not heard this. Pittman is back on the Nimitz? Is that correct? Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Over.

Jones: So we may have had fragmentary extracts...and so it might be much less than reported in the CEOI. How fast can we tell whether or not they had other data and what was left. It is important to the compromise at...uh...the warehouse. [speaking in background]...[words indistinct]...get me Secretary Brown...unless...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Understand. We are working that problem. We are having some difficulty contacting our representative in that area. [DELETED] is working frantically to assist them. Those who were in the most

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[REDACTED]
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forward location are working their way away and out. The persons who were observing the scene do not yet know that mission was canceled, in my judgment. BREAK Because we received a report about 20 minutes ago that everything was green green green. Keep coming. Over.

Jones: Who...who sent that report, do you know?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. [DELETED]

Jones: Ah...OK...and that was 20 minutes ago. We will pass that on to see what the problem is. And what we are interested in now is best information as to what was aboard the helicopters...was...did they just have fragmentary extracts. Or do we think...are we sure the whole CEOI was or was not compromised. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. We do not believe it was compromised. Colonel Pittman talked with the communications staff officer who is on the Nimitz who is the dedicated task force staff officer and he is familiar with what occurred. I believe the helicopter air crew is also there, and may be able to provide additional details since he conducted the final brief. Based on guidance I had originally given I believe they would have only fragmentary information, but cannot confirm positively until I talk to more people precisely what they did have. I would estimate we would know in 2 to 3 hours after we talk to them when we arrive here. BREAK I will place highest priority on that requirement and to [words indistinct] answers ASAP. Over.

Jones: OK...and of course we will want the details on the names of the casualties so that we can report those as soon as possible of the eight fatalities. Over. End of this...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Understand. Wilco. Over.

Jones: OK. That is very important. There is some concern about your coming back to the and back to the [DELETED]...uh... because it is likely that Delta and Rangers will be compromised and all the focus will be on location and...uh...therefore we're likely to compromise further [DELETED] but we can determine that later, but there is concern about going to those places. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I would recommend if there is to be a public release that you say Rangers conducted the

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COMJTF TAPE #2

mission. They did not injure. They are still here. They are all healthy. It was our plan to say that with your consent after the mission anyway. BREAK They had planned to go to Hulbert Field and then infiltrate back to home base in a relatively short period of time. However Delta very sensitive to public exposure. Recommend strong action be taken to keep them covered. Do not believe there is much chance of compromise by Delta. Over.

Jones: Ah...it depends on the CEOI. The full CEOI has extensive discussion on the entire mission, to include many references to Delta. So it is critical we find out whether or not the full CEOI compromised, because if it is...then...we...anything we say the credibility will go because they will be able to demonstrate that what we said was inaccurate, if we say the Rangers went. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Understand. Merely suggesting that is possibility. Will confirm soonest whether or not we have...whether or not complete CEOI might have been left. Nothing further unless you have further query. over.

Jones: No, I have nothing further. It is good news that the ...that it is confirmed that the helicopter crew is out. We are going to not launch the RH-53s from MAC. They were just getting ready to go. We will cancel that here. I see no reason for those. Over.

FOREMAN: This FOREMAN. Concur. There is no reason known to me to conduct any [word indistinct] whatsoever. Over.

Jones: OK. Well, we'll be here to get any...to get the casualty information...fatalities and injured...and we will also in particular wait for the CEOI information which will be very critical to our people in Tehran and to the whole determination whether or not the major mission is compromised, plus what sort of maps they had...really what was compromised. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Understand. Will try to provide urgent answer. Over.

Jones: Roger. That is all I have.

FOREMAN: FOREMAN. Roger out. Will continue to work. Out.

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EDITED
COMJTF TAPE #2

Jones: Roger. Over and out.

[electronic click]

[End Side One]

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

FOREMAN: ...in near term would be to debrief thoroughly the helicopter crew aboard Nimitz as their (N2?) and communicator are there along one full typical well-briefed crew. Over.

Jones: Ah...Roger, this is INSULATOR. Problem has been that the...CINCPAC is having communications problems with the Nimitz...and they've been having problems passing information. They are going to do that as soon as they can get through. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. BREAK This is FOREMAN. Five minutes ago we had good comms with them. We had talked to the ship through here. We can relay. Over.

Jones: OK. Why don't you get a hold of them and tell them we need much more information...and particularly what was left aboard those helicopters...what was aboard. They won't know what was left aboard, but what was aboard. Number one, were there any of the full CEOI's aboard, or was that just on Pittman's airplane. He may have had a back up. They normally have a backup. We need as much in...and would be better if you asked because of the difficulties in communications from PAC to Nimitz. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Wilco. In interim suggest someone initiate hardcopy [word indistinct] in that director...or communications [words indistinct]. I will take actions to comply with your request ASAP. Anything further? Over.

Jones: Roger. They are...been working...they've been working hardcopy out of CINCPAC and CINCPAC is sending them hardcopy...but even on hardcopy they've had bad message...they will do it their way and you do it your way and whoever gets it first we will look at. A question. I assume from the comments that you made to me a while back that no bodies were recovered and taken back [DELETED]...that no bodies of those who perished were taken back. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is my belief. They were all [impaled?] and immolated. The 130 crew compartment was struck rather head on and before they could get out of...the galley area immediately behind it burst into flames and they could not extract themselves from the crew compartment because of the burning of the helicopter

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

impact. The helicopter apparently rolled over to one side or another and the pilot was thrown clear...and one other person escaped from the rear of the helicopter...[netting?] their loss three...but perhaps one person out of the crew compartment of the 130 did escape but all others perished in the immolation. Over.

Jones: OK...one other thing..[DELETED] have any word as to the bus, whether it was disabled or drove off...I have been reporting your point earlier that there were no Iranian casualties at all...I assume our evaluation is still the same that there were no Iranian casualties. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That's my current belief. I will affirm that soonest. Still do not have absolute certain information there. BREAK The bus was left...I believe we had already disabled it but do not know. Will affirm to best extent possible what situation was. BREAK We hold same report you [words indistinct] and are working the problem. Over.

Jones: OK. That's all I have. As soon as you get anything...particularly on the...any confirmation on Iranian casualties and the bus and that let as know. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Wilco. Out.

Jones: And the CEOI. Thank you. Out. [speaking in background] Right.

[electronic click]

Jones: This is INSULATOR. Is FOREMAN there? Over. Hello?... Hello?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Jones: FOREMAN this is INSULATOR. You can go ahead and plan on the redeployment of all elements. We will want to work with you... We would like to get out of [DELETED] at an early time. That is...I think...particularly important...but we can start retrograde...still to be decided where Delta will go upon return but we can get started. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. BREAK We are largely out of [DELETED] now except the aircrews which came from the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

Pacific. We kept a airfield control group...a small number of people there with...[fill gas?]. I'll get the exact number. BREAK We will initiate. I would estimate I can begin to move out most of Delta and others within a matter of hours. I would recommend I stay here a while for debriefing, perhaps leave later today or early tomorrow. Would accept your recommendation and guidance. Phil out would stay behind a bit longer. Over.

Jones: OK. I think we do need one of you back here with as full of information as can be gained early...and the other one stay behind. I will leave the judgment to you as to which one stays behind, but I think one...as soon as...get a good debrief to head back. Is Phil coming up on one of those airplanes? Over.

FOREMAN: BREAK. I do not know now. I had asked him to continue debriefing there. [words indistinct] matter. Have not talked with him in about two hours. I will affirm that...shortly and get back to you. BREAK [DELETED] Reference your query about whether any Iranians killed, we still believe no but [voice electronically garbled] will be...[voice electronically garbled] questions are asked. We have debriefing [voice electronically garbled] staff...[voice electronically garbled]...each helicopter crew that arrived here regarding the extent of possible compromise. BREAK I will do a hot wash up with the commanders personally and advise you of relevant information, but do not intend to go into any kind of investigation or inquiry beyond that which I deem appropriate to ascertain [word indistinct] initial facts. Would recommend detailed inquiry your location by those whom you select when we return. I have collected all of my operational notes and logs. Some are sketchy, some are in reasonable detail. We have good copy of most decisions made with exception of those which you and I have discussed here. [DELETED]

Jones: OK. We recorded most here, but I think we have all of the data in the replay. Some of the things that we will be particularly interested in having at an early time period are of course...on the helicopter...the difficulties they had, not only the mechanical difficulty, but the landing, what happened on Pittman's airplane and repair, what happened on the other one, that sort of information. Two, the compromised data we just talked about. Another one [loud electronic click]...another one is really what happened at Desert

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

One, sequence of landing, the tricks, the casual...how the Iranians were handled, how the accident occurred, these are the things we will I'm sure be interrogated on starting tomorrow. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Understand. Will begin to collect all that, as much as possible, and pass it to you by record copy, and if I find something unusually significant I will call via this method. Over.

Jones: Yeah I think that...that's clear...anything that's significant, confirmation that no Iranians were hurt. They may claim something. We've got to be sure we have cold hard facts. Compromise, particularly with regard to threat to our people who are still in Teheran, and the difficulties to the helicopter. Whatever we can get on that I know you will pass. Over.

C
(S) FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Wilco. BREAK I would strongly urge that [REDACTED]

Over.


Jones: Roger. Many hours ago sometime after the abort we gave instructions agreed to [DELETED]

(S) FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That was my understanding. I wanted to affirm that to you very early after the problem. We...I asked the senior staff person [REDACTED]

C
[REDACTED] have no progress to report, however. Over.

Jones: OK. Well, [REDACTED] We'll keep track of it and call upon you for any help. But you've got enough other things to work right now. [speaks in background, words indistinct].

FOREMAN: Roger. Thank you for your help. We'll be in touch. Unless there's something further out. I'll stand by until you [words indistinct]...stay same. Over.



COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

Jones: Roger. That's all I had. Out. Thank you.
[electronic click]

Voice A: Sir, we have two 141's coming into this location. The first arriving at my location, sir, at 0645Z. The second C-141 arriving here at 0655Z, sir.

Jones: OK. We really need a good debrief. Boy, we need...I talked with General [VAUGHT?] (phonetic) but...a real debrief on what happened to the helicopters, what is aboard from a compromise of data standpoint, what...the whole details of it, what happened to the Iranians, I mean...all of that business.

FOREMAN: Well...we are prepared to start those debriefings as soon as the people arrive at this location, especially the helo pilots to follow through on the events of their evening...plus the CEOI. Also we'll be talking to the individual who is in charge of security at Desert [Track?] to ascertain the sequence of events there and specifically the impact on the Iranians themselves...foreign nationals.

Jones: Yeah. OK. We need whatever you've got, even if you've got an incomplete message or something...if you could send it out and then we'll pick it up later, but we're just trying to get lots and pierce now to develop a briefing for tomorrow morning. Here's Colonel...here's General [DIKE?] (phonetic).

[DIKE]: Hey Jerry?

FOREMAN: Yes sir.

[DIKE]: The Chairman's pretty well said exactly what I was calling for. I was just trying to get from you any feel that you can on when we will get that message that gives us the chronological list that...understand you might have given to General [VAUGHT?] (phonetic) earlier.

FOREMAN: Yes sir. I thought that message had been released [words indistinct]...in advance if it hadn't. We'll check on it right now, sir, if you want [words indistinct] message.

[DIKE]: Yeah, we need that and Jerry, we don't want to bug you, but we're really under a lot of pressure to get it pulled together here.

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COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

FOREMAN: I can [words indistinct], sir.

[DIKE]: We can best support you with good information. That's the best way we can support you.

FOREMAN: All right, sir.

[DIKE]: Now the next thing, Jerry...

FOREMAN: ...redeployment...

[DIKE]: Yeah...

FOREMAN: We had tentatively planned on start to move Delta this morning, about two to four hours after their arrival at this location, then follow that with movement of helo pilots back to the states, sir.

[DIKE]: Yes...

A (c) FOREMAN: And then later today to move the Rangers back to ~~TOP SECRET~~
Do you foresee any problem with that movement sir, or shall we hold it up?

[DIKE]: See no problem with the movement. There's some discussion about actual destinations at this point, but you should continue you planning just like you've got it going now.

FOREMAN: Sir, I have the planes on the ground, or inbound, which would permit us to initiate that.

[DIKE]: OK, how much time do you have before you would have to give the pilots a destination? How much time do I have to work that?

FOREMAN: Well, our initial plan, sir, was to start moving within two to four hours after the forces arrival at this location. That would give us sufficient time, for initial hot washup with the commanders...

[DIKE]: Yup...

FOREMAN: ...and then start moving them. The helicopter pilots would be moved at a later time, simply because we have a more extensive debriefing for them.

[DIKE]: OK, now look Jerry, that means you have about two hours

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

before your first plane arrives, is that correct?

FOREMAN: I have...before my first plane arrives, in, approximately 40 minutes.

[DIKE]: 40 minutes, and, so what that means is I have about two hours and a half...

FOREMAN: or five...

[DIKE]: ...to get to you with a firm destination.

FOREMAN: From [DELETED]

[DIKE]: Yeah. OK. All right...

FOREMAN: I have other birds that are prepared with crews, sir, that we can start moving if permitted.

[DIKE]: OK, now we need the names of the Air Force DIA. The five people aboard the EC-130.

FOREMAN: Say again please, sir.

[DIKE]: The Air Force KIA...the five names...

FOREMAN: Yes sir.

[DIKE]: ...aboard the EC-130. We need that as soon as we can. ...and top priority on debrief from the Helo crews.

FOREMAN: Yes sir. Those individuals are scheduled for a more detailed brief, sir, and we'll move them out later today, if given permission.

[DIKE]: OK, and I'll get to you with information on destinations of Ranger and Delta.

FOREMAN: Yes sir. Without personal inquiries, have not been involved up to this point.

[DIKE]: Understand.

A FOREMAN: Commander and so forth we feel that probably [REDACTED] will be the best place to go.

[DIKE]: Yeah.

[REDACTED]

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

A FOREMAN: We have arranged, sir, for the remainder of the companies which is here, join them as they arrive back at [REDACTED] camp, sir.

[DIKE]: Yeah. Understand.

FOREMAN: And I have made arrangements for an aircraft to land about the same time they did, so it will look like they were coming in together.

[DIKE]: OK. And get that message on the wire.

FOREMAN: Yes sir.

[DIKE]: Right. OK. Thank you.

FOREMAN: Yes sir, bye.

[DIKE]: Bye.

[electronic click]

Voice B: ...actual, as given. Over.

[DIKE]: Ah...say again, please.

Voice B: FOREMAN wanted...wanted me to find out if you were aware of an alleged White House press release on this morning's crashes. Specifically that the facts in this alleged article were not correct. Over.

[DIKE]: This is General [DIKE]. We have just seen a news bulletin on television and heard one on radio here. What portion of the news release that you have do you believe to be incorrect? Over.

G [REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED] (phonetic). In fact the release that we have stated that one aircraft was gliding over the desert and crashed, and another one crashed in a remote area of the desert of Iran. In fact, both aircraft collided as we understand it. Over.

[DIKE]: This is General [DIKE]. Your comment about gliding over the desert and crashing has not been seen here by me, and I know no one that has heard or seen that terminology used. What press release are you referring to? Do you know its origin? Is it VPI, AP, Reuters? Over.

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED]. Wait.
(indistinct voices in background)

[DIKE]: (speaking in background). I think we can now. (speaking to [REDACTED]/FOREMAN). Hello?

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED]. It's an AP quote, New York, NBC news. Over.

[DIKE]: Roger...ah...we have not seen that, but in any event the news...does carry stories of the operation and the decision by the President to undertake the operation solely for the purpose of the release of U.S. hostages. What we need right now is the names of the Air Force casualties and the message that provides the chronology. The press report you have seen is indicative of the kind of pressure we are getting for information and we don't have very much. Over.

[REDACTED]: Roger. BREAK (electronic garble). This is Major [REDACTED]. We are gathering and reconfirming the data on the casualties. It must be accurate. We will provide it as soon as we are certain that it is factual. Over.

[DIKE]: Roger. Understand that we have the two services involved here and now with their casualty people. After this has gone public, to include an announcement of the number of casualties, the pressure to provide data is obvious...and I know that you are working it...and that you understand the need to get it in soonest. Thank you for your assistance. Over.

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED]. Roger. Do you have anything further? Over.

[DIKE]: Roger. Affirmative. There is a message that we were told would be coming to us very shortly providing sequence of events and chronology. We have been waiting for over three hours now for that message. Is that message to be released or not? Over.

[REDACTED]: This is Major [REDACTED]. Roger. It's on the typewriter right now. Over.

[DIKE]: This is [DIKE]. Roger. Thank you. Out.
[electronic click]

FOREMAN: ...[contradains?] the necessity for most rigid OPSEC.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

Will control and remind all personnel this location, and then await your instructions to withdraw. We have a number of aircraft here, which you are aware of, and will provide exact numbers in a later report. Will suggest, however, that consideration be given to moving Delta plus others out soonest. We can continue to work from this end. Will give recommended departure times, but are open to any suggestions from you end. Arrangements already have been made for them to go to places known as [DELETED]

Jones: OK. We will address that issue. I think there are some aircraft that are excess to the needs...you could have people not working the primary problem...start moving them out. For example, that gaggle of 135s you've got at [DELETED]. I think there are 11 of them...those could go out...but we will make determination on Delta and the Rangers as to...as to their withdrawal. You all can keep working some plans on it and we will make an overall judgment back here. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. If you concur I will ask my [FAC] (phonetic) tanker manager to begin working up the problem...a plan for that. Recommend they be phased out much like they were phased in, but a little more rapidly. We should hold some people going through here until we are more certain of our situation. Over.

Jones: I agree. No, we shouldn't send them all out, it's just that there's more than conceivably needed for other operations, since we're not going two way. I wouldn't be in any great rush, but we're develop a plan and then address it, probably tomorrow. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I will devise a two phase plan and send it to you for your approval. Over.

Jones: OK. Very good. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I must get back to other things, unless you have something further. Over.

Jones: Negative. I have nothing further. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Everyone here is working the problem rigorously and with great efficiency. I'm proud of them.

COMJTF Tape #2 Side Two

Jones: Well, we are proud and it's just unfortunate that mechanical failure made us turn around, deviate from plan...having to withdraw and evacuate under that circumstance...increase the probability of an accident. It looked like we were going to have it made, but fate intervened and that reliability, but we'll all...you all have done well.

FOREMAN: Roger. We understand. We will concentrate all our energies on extricating the force in a secure manner, and doing our utmost to conserve our force and its members, and will follow normal procedures and notification to you. All will be kept with standard task force classifications. All release of anything will be at your discretion. Over.

Jones: OK. We will do that. The most important thing that we need right now is whether or not there are seven crew...helicopter crews or six helicopter crews aboard those 130s.

FOREMAN: Roger...

[end Side Two]

[END COMJTF Tape #2]

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COMJTF JAPE #3

NOTE: Tape Quality Very Poor

Jones: ...must remain at [DELETED] through tomorrow for maintenance. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. They would be ready to move possibly by early tomorrow. They...we have very limited maintenance capability there. We are now attempting to determine whether or not they can be repaired within capability. BREAK If not we will attempt to do so from here...attempt to do it from here...or make additional recommendations [Our?] scheduling requirement is that relative to what we should say to host country officials at that location [remaining words indistinct].

Voice A: Ah...FOREMAN. Roger, General [name indistinct] here, we'll work the problem and get an answer. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. BREAK First aircraft about to land here at 11 [rest of phrase garbled]. All [words indistinct]
[Quality of Tape Improves]
and all is going OK. If you have no further questions over and out.

Johnson: ~~SECRET~~ General Johnson. Hello? Can you hear me?
~~SECRET~~ this is General Johnson. Over. Maynard, can you hear me [speaking offline] He's checking it.

Voice B: Hello. Testing. Can you hear me? 1-2-3-4-5.

Johnson: ~~SECRET~~ General Johnson here. Over.

Voice C: Hello?

Johnson: Yes. ~~SECRET~~ can you hear me? Over.

Voice C: Hello?

Johnson: Hello, ~~SECRET~~, this is General Johnson. How do you read? Over.

Voice C: Hello?

Johnson: I read you loud and clear. How do you read me? Over.
Hello? ~~SECRET~~ [speaking in background] I can hear him.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
EDITED
COMJTF TAPE #3 (EDITED)

Voice B: Hello, testing, 1-2-3-4-5, 5-4-3-2-1. Do you copy?
Over.

Voice C: Good copy, go ahead.

Johnson: ~~REDACTED~~, can you hear me now?

~~REDACTED~~: Yes sir, I can now.

Johnson: FOREMAN called with a request as to what we should tell
the host country at [DELETED]. The guidance is to
~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~: Ah, yes sir, good copy.

Johnson: This is General Johnson. That's all I have. Do you
have anything else for me? Over.

~~REDACTED~~: No sir, not right now. We just got one of the birds
in. I think this one has the MEDEVAC people on, it
just landed and is unloading now, so I don't have any
information on it... other than that at this time here.

Johnson: OK. Fine. Anything we can do to help you we'll be
here. General Johnson out.

~~REDACTED~~: Yes sir. Thank you.

[electronic click]

Voice D: ...four and one half miles out at the desert. BREAK
No other vehicle came along. Over.

Voice E: Understand. Absolutely certain no casualties at the
bus and that the Iranians were treated with great
courtesy. That the gas truck driver jumped out of the
truck and ran to a following vehicle in a smugglers
pattern. And understand that we have... ~~REDACTED~~ has an item
here for you also.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Over.

Voice E: Yes, the question was about casualties and I'll relay
it here in just a second.

FOREMAN: OK. I will be in the vicinity of this phone if
anything comes up until the time I depart. I do not

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
EDITED
COMJTF TAPE #3

know when that time is yet. BREAK My plan is to travel with the first or second aircraft moving Charlie's element. Over.

Voice E: Understand your plan to travel with first or second element with Delta.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. General [word indistinct-GAST?] (phonetic) will remain here for one or more days. BREAK Has someone given instructions as to the disposition of aircraft at his location? He is at [words indistinct]. He and three operable aircraft out of six. Over.

Voice E: Yes. Our instructions to him were to gradually draw down from the sea surveillance forces and activities, and to coordinate with CINCEUR. If that's not possible with his communications, we will do the coordination here to the extent that we can. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I expect we will need your assistance. I have no communication to him, but do not believe that communications from EUCOM to that particular location are very good. We will as you recall...we did have difficulty communicating with our advance party Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] by name at that location. Hence, I believe some additional effort will have to be made, perhaps personal liaison of some form or another, or possibly hard copy passed to him as instructions from your headquarters. Over.

Voice E: Understand that communications there can be difficult, and we will continue...we will continue to use relay through your headquarters if it's necessary.

FOREMAN: BREAK. This is FOREMAN. That is a Roger and we will pass any instructions that EUCUM worked out. We will keep the commo in position until such time as your employer directs us to take it down. Over.

Voice E: Yes. Appreciate that and understand the necessity and we will keep in mind to have it taken down as rapidly as we can, but appreciate having it stay in position until we ask for it to be taken down.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Unless you have additional that is all from here. Over.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EDITED
COMJTF TAPE #3

Voice E: Let me look around the room, just a second. [speaking in background] Anything for FOREMAN?

Voice F: [in background] We understand that he's coming in with his casualties [remaining words indistinct].

Voice E: Yes, we sent a message to you on casualties...probably crossed yours on the way in...and we're looking for your FLASH message coming in at this time.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. I'll go across and check if it in fact left. I was told it had. Normally they go very quickly, however. I will follow up. I will also observe the commo arrangements. Will get back to you. Over.

Voice E: All right. Right. Thank you. Over.

Johnson: From the crew of the first helicopter...

FOREMAN: [unintelligible]

Johnson: FOREMAN, General Johnson, sir... The Chairman urgently needs information from the crew of the first helicopter which went down as to whether mechanical problems and how many other choppers landed to assist him. Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. Wait. This is FOREMAN. I can provide the information. I must look in my briefcase momentarily. I will be back to you. Wait. Over.

Johnson: Roger. We're waiting. [speaking in background] See what else we need. How about handing me my full briefcase, will you please?

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. The helicopter which first went down was number 6. It had to make a forced landing just north of a dry lake. BREAK The personnel on that helicopter were picked up by helicopter number 8 which was the planned pick up bird for the mission. BREAK Our plan is that the 6 lead birds would always be the task birds and number 7 and 8 would be the replacement birds if there was any difficulty. BREAK The SOP for doing so was followed. Number 8 picked up the crew of number 6 and proceeded on through the desert onto its planned destination. Over.

Jones: Roger, FOREMAN. This is INSULATOR on now. Do you have

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
EDITED
COMJTF TAPE #3

report on what the difficulty was with number 6? Over.

FOREMAN: Negative. I will go get the people who interviewed the crew and get it for you. Over.

Jones: Roger. And the other thing is...I understand that number 5 became disoriented in a sand storm, lost contact, and returned to the Nimitz. I had also indicated that there were other helicopters who became disoriented in the sand storm and landed and then proceeded, but it's a little confusing. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That is correct. I interviewed the helicopter commander and have the details on cards which I am looking at. I could provide you with scenario if you are interested. It is a bit mixed up but I can read it to you. It is how he relayed it to me when he got off the aircraft here. BREAK We had him write up a much detailed report which is for better. In preparation now. If you desire I can have that put on line later today. Over.

Jones: I think we need it on the wire, but I need as much as...you can give me to sort of clarify a little bit to what happened. The way I understand it right now is that number 6 had mechanical difficulty, type unknown. Would like to know what it is. Landed, number 8 picked them up, they proceeded north. Number 5 became disoriented...returned to the Nimitz. Can you fill in any other than that? Over.

FOREMAN: Roger. I'll read it to you as he gave it to me as I asked him questions. All got off at the planned hour. All crossed the coastline at dark as planned. The...number 6 was the first one down. I did not note the reason why he did not get it and I did not go back and ask him. Will find that out. Basically, let me continue. Eight picked up the crew from 6. Their plan [words indistinct]..dry lake. There was a dust storm over the dry lake. After going into the dust a ways the leader elected to make a 180 and come back out. When he landed he had number 1 which he was flying and 2 only. He had lost 3, 4, 5 and 8. He then elected to proceed on toward Desert [TRACK] (phonetic). BREAK Without his knowing their whereabouts, numbers 3, 4 and 5 got together and were within 40 minutes of Desert [TRACK] (phonetic) when number 5 was discovered missing by 3 and 4. BREAK 3 and 4 believed just prior to that

COMJTF TAPE #3

Jones: OK

Jones: Roger. I think I got the complete story with the exception of what happened to number 6 to go down. The only other part of it is...and we'll have to get this from PAC..is a better feel of what happened to number 5 and why it elected to turn back to the ship.

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Information from the other commanders suggests the pilots were very nervous when they arrived. BREAK but they were still within and did agree prior to the accident that they could have continued the mission and accomplished it just prior to the planned arrival time, which would have been entirely successful. We were within mission profile and all had agreed to that. Over.

Jones: [speaking in background] Uh huh...Yeah...[speaking to FOREMAN] From CINCPAC we get a report that number 5 lost all contact and lost altitude and directional gyros. Severe pilot and copilot vertigo...and I'm seeing...anything else on that.

FOREMAN: [electronic garble]...the reasons. Under those circumstances do not know why they did not climb to altitude, but if they lost gyros I could understand. They should of had [TO or TWO] (cannot determine context, ie.. to climb ..or two gyros...) Over.

Jones: Yeah. It's an unknown. We still have to sort it out. Number 6...[speaking in background] what did 6 have [reply indistinct], [speaking to FOREMAN] Number 6 had some altitude gyro and flight control instrument problem.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. I do not know what 6's problems was. I'll have to ask them. BREAK I had each crew interviewed and a record made. I can ascertain that...what their answer was within a few minutes. Over.

Jones: OK. We need...whenever they get it what happened to number 6. I think I got a pretty good chronology on everything else. There's still an uncertainty on number 5. Over. We will have...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Colonel [PITTMAN] (phonetic) was aboard that as an observer and overall coordinator for the mission into the other objective. BREAK The pilot of that was Navy Commander [REDACTED] (phonetic) one of our more experienced pilots from the very outset. I do not know why he would have had this difficulty. Over.

Jones: OK. Well, we'll try to work through CINCPAC at getting further clarification. The Rangers and Delta and helo

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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crews will leave [DELETED] today I understand. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. That was our plan. We are loaded and ready to move. BREAK I just learned when I came to the phone to initiate this call that we are having diplomatic problems with the countries where we are. BREAK Can anyone help from there? As you know it is very [word indistinct] here. We may have problems. Over.

Jones: Yeah. Diplomatic clearance problems [DELETED]. I will have somebody contact [DELETED] get it expedited. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. I just was informed of that when I initiated this call and we have six [LOADS] (phonetic). Would appreciate that. We will run into crew rest problems is we do not start departure soon. Over

Jones: OK. We'll have someone get [DELETED] on the phone and see what we can do about it. The... I understand now there were five people that were injured, one fairly severe burns. What about the other four that went up to [LAND STOOL] (phonetic)? Over.

FOREMAN: Fairly light. All stable. The extent of their injuries was in the message, the same one giving the casualty list. It should be in your vicinity now. Over.

Jones: OK. I can get it. Can you think of any other... comments? What about difficulties on the... of the various types on those helicopters? Was that a much worse situation even the major and minor problems... much more serious in total than the exercises you have been running? Over.

FOREMAN: I would say that we have between 10 and 20 percent negative degradation in maintenance readiness below what we had experienced in my last four exercises. Over.

Jones: Uh huh...OK ...all right...

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. But in the net, had that one...number 5 not gone back we would have been in outstanding

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condition to go with five strong birds and one other that could have followed. In the net we would have had six going forward with one limping along and only one lost. Over.

Jones: OK. All right...

FOREMAN: It was a maintenance problem with helicopters. I do not know...I never did visit the Nimitz... who made many visits there, you would have seen message traffic that assured they were improving. BREAK The team from the detachment that went out thought they were improving and doing about as well as they had done at their training location. BREAK But that is the only component of the task force I never personally checked and approved. This was the piece of machinery that the mission would ultimately require. Over.

Jones: OK. Yeah. All right. Can you think of any other information I'll need for this morning? I'm leaving in just a few minutes. Over.

FOREMAN: I would summarize by saying that the activities at Desert [TRACK] (phonetic)...the actions taken by the Delta force and others there were very heroic. They were in a plane that was literally on fire. They all got out. They quickly got onto other aircraft. Aircraft were heavily overloaded, but the pilots did a super job and got them all the way back to their launch place with no difficulties...with acceptable difficulty and no further accidents. BREAK On the way in the [word indistinct] and the fuel birds...super super job says all commanders. Right on time, right to the right place. Desert [TRACK] (phonetic) was an outstanding airfield, both sides of the road no problems. BREAK They...the difficulty or the encounter with the vehicles occurred within a minute or so after the first helicopter landed...I mean airplane landed. BREAK Our [words indistinct] was to control the roads immediately jumped out and stopped the bus and got the people off. They were treated very courteously. Our people even carried their bags to the assembly area, kept them there under supervision. No one was pushed around, shoved around, there was no necessity to restrain anybody. And prior to leaving they took them all down the road out of the danger area and released them. So there was absolutely no Iranians killed. They were handled with the utmost of courtesy. BREAK With

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regard to the fuel truck. It had followed shortly behind the bus. When it was signaled to stop, it disregarded the signal and attempted to proceed. Whereupon they fired into the truck...into the engine compartment and it burst into flames. It stopped, the driver jumped out, ran to the rear, and got into the sedan which was following it. BREAK It is believed by people who are familiar with that section that it was some kind of a contraband or smuggling activity. That is the normal pattern, a truck with a car closely behind it. BREAK Other than that, they then remained in the desert for more than four hours and no other vehicles of any kind made any approach. Over.

Jones: OK. I got that. And if we'd just been five minutes later we guess those vehicles would have gone...we'd have seen nobody.

FOREMAN: That is right. There would have been no encounter whatsoever for a four hour period in the desert. We thought we had to be there then in order to get the fuel supply out. That was the time we picked. Just a misfortune. [DELETED] BREAK Had we elected to go on with the mission as we'd planned and had we [words indistinct] all those people we'd encountered it is highly likely no discovery would have been made and the mission could have continued. BREAK Reports from the [HLD] (phonetic) radio were made, contact had been established at Desert [TRACK] (phonetic) and they were ready to proceed. News from that location was we are ready to receive you. BREAK We do not know, but believe he had at least two and perhaps all of the vehicles with him at that time. BREAK They could have gone immediately to the warehouse. They were at the gate. BREAK He was reporting everything green. The situation even better than hoped for. Road was clear all the way to target area. BREAK Personal building in compound continued to report for the next six hours that all was green east of gate, looking good. Hence everything was lined up. Only difficulties that caused mission failure was helicopter maintenance. That is the final opinion of all my subordinate commanders. Over.

Jones: OK. I think I got that. I've got to run to a meeting. Later today we will have congressional discussions and...answering all the press queries. We are doing our best as to handle those. Appreciate this info and

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any flow of info you get from here on in. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. With regard to the cause of the accident. The leader of the helicopters observing the take off...the person piloting the helicopter [electronic garble] who is a instructor pilot with four years experience. He is a member of the staff faculty out there where they teach people how. He simply lifted the helicopter off to go to another place to top off his fuel and picked it up and flew right over the airplane. A violation of every procedure known to anyone who flies. We do not know why. He was one of the burn victims and I elected not to question him until he was more stable. However, he is up and about walking when he came here. He is in evacuation channels and could be interviewed by someone to learn why. BREAK. I would suggest formal flight evaluation board in this instance. Over.

Jones: OK. We will see. All right. Anything else for me and keep the info flowing after I leave and we'll come back and get it for the other meetings. Have any other critical issues? Over.

FOREMAN: Nothing further. I had planned to leave on number 2 Delta. BREAK. Colonel (CASTLE) (phonetic) will remain here as will [redacted] (phonetic). Over.

Jones: OK. All right. That's fine. and we will see what we can do about getting the diplomatic clearance. When you leave and out. We look forward to seeing you when you get back. It's extremely unfortunate we had mechanical difficulty. You and the whole JTF did a magnificent job. Over.

[electronic click]

Johnson: FOREMAN, General Johnson here. Over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. REGULATOR has asked me to ascertain reason why helicopter number 6 had to abort and abandon. BREAK. The answer is they had a BIM indicator...

Johnson: Roger...

FOREMAN: The abbreviation...all in blocks... Bravo...Item...Mike...I am sure your leader can tell you what the details

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COMJTE TAPK 13

of that problem are. BREAK. Basically, the indicator light comes on and says you have lost gas in the blade, which means the blade is bad. That is a master caution and one should immediately land and change the blade. BREAK. That rarely happens, but it happened once in training last December. BREAK. What was the problem. In addition, that same helicopter was experiencing internal tank transfer problems. In other words, fuel was not moving as it should have from one tank to the other. It might have made it to the mission area. In any event, it would have proceeded had it not had the BIM problem. How Copy C over.

~~Johnson-FOREMAN have good copy over.~~

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. REGULARLY HE indicated he would like to have that information, and I would like to try and pass it to him where he is now. That was his request to me. Can you carry that out over

Johnson: Ah. REGULATOR. That's all right. We will forward

[illegible]

Johnson: This is General Johnson. Room. Understand. We have people working that problem now. Also I will get this information to REGULATOR over.

FOREMAN: This is FOREMAN. Roger. Out.

[electronic click]

[End Side One]

[Side Two Is Blank]

End EDITED COMJTF Tape #3 I

CLASSIFICATION EXTENSION

DECLASSIFIED ON 18 NOV 92

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD/SENSITIVE~~

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCL

☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO

IRAN OPTIONS

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

I. Rescue. [REDACTED] Joint Task Force has been formed and is being trained and exercised; but there is at present no rescue option that is recommended for implementation. A clandestine infiltration/exfiltration operation would be preferable to other options but development of a workable plan is hampered both by [REDACTED]

II. Show of Force. The US could demonstrate increased concern over events in Iran by moving additional forces into the area or by taking other actions to visibly improve readiness. For example:

- Carrier-based fighter aircraft could be flown into the Gulf of Arabia on very short notice. (No such flights have occurred since the hostage crisis began.)

- Land-based fighter aircraft could be deployed to south-west Asia, arriving 31-48 hours after a deployment decision is made. It would be preferable to bed the aircraft down at bases in [REDACTED] or [REDACTED], but it would be difficult to obtain either country's approval under current circumstances. The aircraft could be deployed to more rearward bases in other countries, but their visibility would be diminished; however, NATO exercises in [REDACTED] and joint operations in [REDACTED] have value.

- Additional ships could be deployed to the Arabian Sea, including a third carrier (from the Western Pacific). Ships would arrive 7-14 days after the deployment decision, but would have to be taken from areas where our capabilities are already stretched thin.

- Additional amphibious capability could be moved into the Indian Ocean.

- (c) - SR-71 aircraft, flying out of [REDACTED], the [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] could carry out reconnaissance missions over Iran 72 hours after decision. Iranians would hear sonic booms and might be able to track the aircraft on radar, but would not be able to destroy them.

- One or two B-52s could be deployed to [REDACTED], arriving 24-36 hours after decision. Guam-based B-52s already exercise with the fleet in the Arabian Sea, but our B-52 capability in southwest Asia is very limited. [REDACTED] facilities--including aircraft parking ramps--are quite crowded, and there is some concern that its runways are too narrow and lack the weight-bearing capacity to support sustained B-52 operations. To date, B-52s have not staged through the base, and any that do in the future should probably not stay longer than a few hours.

III. Interruption of Seaborne Commerce.

Imports: 70% of Iran's imports are processed through its ports in the Arabian Gulf. While very little of its military materiel arrives by sea, almost 30% of its foodstuffs and significant amounts of both kerosene (for cooking and heating) and industrial spare parts (especially for the oil industry and the utilities) are brought in by ship.

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Iran currently has three major ports of entry in operation: the Bandar Abbas complex including Shah Bandar Abbas (receives 65% of the import volume), Bandar-e-Khomeini (27%), and Bushehr (7%). Approximately 2-3 of the 20-25 major tanker/cargo ships entering the Arabian Gulf each day are bound for these ports.

Australia and New Zealand would be the supplier countries most affected by an interruption of Iranian food imports. Suppliers of other goods would not be seriously affected because Iran accounts for only a very small part of any one country's exports.

If seaborne imports are curtailed, Iran would attempt to expand its imports by air and overland; but the effort would provide very little relief since the overland trade routes through the Soviet Union and Turkey are currently either essentially saturated or closed by weather.

In the first thirty days of a cutoff, the impact would be primarily psychological except at the major ports where there would be significant economic disruption due to reduced commercial activity (local unemployment, etc.). Goods already in storage at port areas or in pipelines to population centers would reduce the cutoff's immediate effectiveness; but the fear induced by it could lead to panic buying, hoarding and government rationing.

Whether the increased privation resulting from the cutoff would end or strengthen the clergy's hold on the country is unknown. The population has shown remarkable resilience to date in the face of continued economic decline, but recent indications of growing disenchantment by some segments may portend that further sacrifices will not be readily accepted.

Iran's short term reaction may include a request for additional economic assistance from communist countries. While such aid, if forthcoming, may be of only token quantity, the propaganda gain for donors would be tremendous. The Communist countries would certainly show an interest, hoping to permanently improve their access to Iranian markets and oil supplies.

It is unlikely that Iran could offset an import cutoff for more than thirty days. In the second month, there would probably be increased shortages, tighter rationing, diminished economic activity, and increased illegal activity to procure basic necessities. It is possible that Iran could reach some viable reduced level of consumption that could be sustained for several months without serious popular disturbances; but once the full impact of the cutoff is felt, popular pressure could force some sort of change in government policy toward the hostages.

If the cutoff continued into a third month, the economic cost to Iran--primarily in terms of inflation--would increase tremendously. At this stage, it is possible the central government would lose control over the country's economy.

Exports. Iran's principal export is oil. Kharg Island currently handles nearly 90% of Iran's 600,000 barrels-per-day export volume--which equals approximately one large tanker load every other day.

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About 20% of the oil consumed by Turkey, Spain, India and Romania is from Iran, as is 10% of Sri Lanka's and South Korea's. But of these countries, Turkey is the only one that would experience severe hardships in the event of a cutoff.

Iran is already drawing down its foreign exchange reserves to pay for its imports because their costs exceed current oil export revenues. A cutoff of oil exports would accelerate the drawdown: at the current rate of imports, Iran would exhaust its remaining reserves in about 4-6 months. But at some point before that, foreign creditors and banks may decide to seize Iran's reserves to guarantee payments on past obligations.

Options. Iran's seaborne commerce could be interrupted by mining, quarantine, or blockade.

- (5) A. Mining. The Bandar Abbas complex, Bandar-e-Khomeini, Bushehr and, if desired, Kharg Island, could be mined 24-39 hours after the order is given, using assets already on board ships of Carrier Task Force-70 in the Arabian Sea. Two carrier-borne A-6 aircraft carrying three mines each would be sent to each of the ports. Mine delivery would be at night and at low level.

The ports in question are defended to some extent by radars and fighter aircraft, and in some cases by anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missile batteries; but their effectiveness against low-flying aircraft at night is judged to be very poor. There should be no US losses in the initial mine-seeding operations.

Iran has no appreciable mine countermeasures capability, and the Soviet Union's nearest countermeasures assets are 2-4 weeks away from the area. The US, France, Australia, the UK and Saudi Arabia have counter-measures assets that could be used to sweep the Iranian ports if a political settlement were achieved. The preferred sweeping arrangement, however, would be to have the US Navy conduct the operation in order to minimize the risk of revealing US mine capabilities and technology, and to give greater confidence in the end results.

The advantages of mining compared to quarantine or blockade include: small size and cost of the operation and ease of conducting it; reduced risk of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union; and the fact that US forces in the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean would not have to operate within the effective range of Iranian tactical fighter aircraft and naval forces except during actual mining operations.

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~~TOP SECRET/COBWORD/SENSITIVE~~

B. Quarantine or Blockade. A blockade would be considered an act of war, requiring a declaration of war. In the absence of such a declaration, a blockade would be illegal under international law.

A quarantine of certain kinds of goods would be considered legal under international law because of US rights under the UN Charter and Iran's earlier and continuing violation of international law. (The quarantined goods, however, should be ones that could reasonably be expected to lead to release of the hostages.)

A quarantine could be established either inside the Arabian Gulf or outside of it, in the Gulf of Oman. A strong disadvantage of the former is that Iran could mount considerably stronger opposition to it.

The concept of operation for an "outside" quarantine would be as follows: all ships approaching the Arabian Gulf would be required to declare their destinations before entering the Strait of Hormuz. (Communications would be by internationally-accepted and understood ship-to-ship signals.) Ships declaring Iran as a destination would either be turned away, seized or destroyed depending upon their degree of cooperation with the US fleet. Ships that enter the Arabian Gulf after declaring that they do not intend to visit Iran would be tracked. If such a ship subsequently went to Iran, it would be seized or destroyed when it exited the Gulf.

This kind of quarantine would require the services of two carrier battle groups to ensure air and sea supremacy, one command/control flagship to direct the operation, six destroyers or frigates to inspect/board/coerce, one helicopter assault ship to carry helicopters for boarding, and several land-based aircraft airborne at all times for surveillance--or sea-based if no host nation can be found.

If the US takes military action, the Iranians would probably retaliate. Their response could take several forms. Militarily they could attack US forces with their air and naval forces. Any such action, however, would be tempered by Iran's probable reluctance to diminish its capability against Iraq. Although there is evidence that the Iranians have practiced coordinated air and naval operations, little is known about their actual capabilities. US forces should be able to counter any military threat posed by the Iranians; but there is a chance that some damage to aircraft or naval forces could result.

The Soviets have surface and sub-surface combatants as well as naval and long-range aviation assets available either in the area or nearby. It is possible that Soviet combatants might try to escort Soviet merchant vessels into the Arabian Sea. But most likely the Soviets would not try to militarily challenge the US over the quarantine. More likely, they would increase their surveillance of the area, improve the readiness of their forces north of Iran, and forward-deploy certain assets (e.g., naval strike aircraft) to friendly nations in the general area (e.g., Ethiopia).

~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD/SENSITIVE~~

IV. Punitive Actions. If Iran harmed any of the hostages, or if it became apparent they were about to be harmed, there are many actions the US could take to indicate its anger. The targets listed below could be surgically attacked by strike aircraft already on board carriers in the area--some in 24 hours--or by land-based aircraft brought into the area:

- o key roads or rail facilities
- o electrical power sources and grids
- o communications nets
- o water reservoirs
- o oil transshipment points
- o oil refineries
- o airfields, aircraft, military complexes

Targets in Tehran could be included. In all cases, US losses could be anticipated--but very limited peripheral operations could be conducted with only small chances of loss.

V. Lodgement. If desirable, US forces could assault and occupy Iranian territory to hold it for ransom or provide an area for future operations. Some relatively low value objectives could be taken at relatively low risk--e.g., isolated territory in southeastern Iran or Iran's three small islands in the Arabian Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. Higher value targets would involve greater forces and higher risk--e.g., the Bandar Abbas port complex or Kharg Island. In any case, establishing a lodgment might seriously tempt the Soviets to enter Iran under provisions of the 1921 bilateral treaty.

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RELATION TO
THE WAR POWERS ACT

Options III (mining or quarantine), IV (punitive actions) or V (lodgement) would fall within the jurisdiction of the War Powers Act:

Section 3 would require advance Presidential consultation with Congress, since the "...limited involvement of US forces in hostilities" would be "...clearly indicated by the circumstances." If any of the three options were exercised without prior consultation, Congress would probably object strongly unless the operation required extraordinary secrecy (e.g., a rescue mission).

Section 4 would require a written report to Congress within 48 hours of the action (unless war had been declared). The notification would have to cite the authority for the action, as well as its estimated scope and duration.

Section 5 would require that the action be terminated within 60-90 days unless Congress authorized its continuation.

~~SECRET~~

GEN JONES

23

L-4

TIME DU	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
05	1/MC-130 with 50 DELTA Deps [REDACTED] - MC-130 Aborts	Lead DELTA Team late or unavailable	- Abort - Have spare MC- ready; transload DELTA continue 2hr.
10 11	NOTE: Maximum delay for MC-130 launch, 2+00. 1/MC (50 DELTA) & 1/EC (FUEL) T/O from [REDACTED] - MC-130 ABORT	OK DELTA unavailable	- Transload DELTA to spare - continue.
E	- EC-130 ABORT	Require 2/EC-130's at refuel point.	- Use 3rd EC-130 primary fuel A Land all EC's -
	NOTE: 2+00 delay acceptable NOTE: Any delay of these A/C beyond 10 min requires notification to Helos for possible delay.		
506	7/Helos dep carrier < 7 airborne	Insufficient helos for mission.	<u>ABORT</u>
117/16/19 on wing →	1 st 3 rd 1/MC-130 (21/DELTA) 2/EC-130 (FUEL) T/O from [REDACTED] - 1/MC-130 Abort	Equip & parts of DELTA unavailable	Transload to spare MC-130, if un- available ... ABORT and recall all forces.
	- 1/EC-130 ABORT	Insufficient fuel for helos	- If no refueling available for MC-130 ... ABORT - If refueling available, con- tinue give 5000 from each of 3/ MC-130s to helo plan a 5 helo launch out of refueling.
Afford 1 MC130 and abort no prob - " 1 MC130 air abort - providing relaunch in spare in 2 hrs - 1 hr 2 nd case		CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356 CONDUCTED ON 18 Nov 97 DERIVATIVE CL BY DPO NMCC <input type="checkbox"/> DECL <input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADED TO _____ REVIEW ON OADR DERIVED FROM JS	Have hoses - transfer fuel from MC130 to helo FUEL Sops down to 10 all 3 MC130
		1	
		SECRET	

~~SECRET~~

TIME
LU IPAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

810

1/MC-130 (DELTA) lands
at refuel point.

OK

Blind landing

- If decision made
to ABORT, give
800 gals to ea
7 helos, helos
return to carr
all C-130s ret
to [REDACTED]

Continue *about 10*

- [REDACTED] gui
pilot to landi
by the road

- CCT jumps in a
[REDACTED]

- A/C damaged or
breaks through
crust on landing

A/C will have to be
destroyed in place

- Make area near
[REDACTED]

burn it, conti

Helos pass turn around
≥ 6 helos OK

*about 15 min before
Desert 1.*

Sufficient force to
support extraction.
Insufficient helos.

Continue

ABORT

< 6 helos OK

Continue

Same as above

910

2nd/MC-130 lands
at refuel point

OK

Same as above

- A/C damaged or
breaks through
crust

917

3rd/MC-
[REDACTED]-130 lands
- A/C damaged

OK

Same as above

Continue

Same as above

Continue, bring
crew out on MC-130
Continue

920

1st E
[REDACTED] MC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

OK

Same as above

Continue

Same as above

923

2nd/EC-130
lands
- A/C damaged

OK

Same as above

Continue

Same as above

- Because of damage
or malfunction,
unable to pass fuel

Land 3rd EC-130

Continue

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TIME PLU IPAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
130	LANDS AT 3rd EC-130 enters orbit over landing REFUEL site	Provide terminal FUEL guidance for helos	Continue
930	Helos arrive at landing site - If helos are more than 45 min late	OK Will not be enough darkness to reach hideout	Continue Helos refuel and move north to desert hide location
010	Helos depart refuel point with DELTA ≥ 6 OK < 6 OK	Sufficient helos for operation Insufficient helos for operation	Continue Good helos return to carrier, res of force return [redacted] on C-130
A, E	NOTE: Max headwind from desert 1 to dropoff is 15 knots. NOTE: <i>Be little more now</i> If there is a problem with any A/C departing the refuel point, it will be destroyed in place and [redacted]		
	2220 Helos arrive at dropoff with DELTA - No reception party - Helo breaks at dropoff	OK DELTA unable to move to city [redacted] Possibility of discovery	Continue - DELTA moves to hideout with - DELTA remains dropoff to wa [redacted] call for helos help - Leave Farci speaker at He with cover st If possible, capture disco keep with hel hideout, rele when helos le continue.

~~SECRET~~

<u>TIME</u> <u>LU IRAN</u>	<u>EVENT/</u> <u>SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OPTION</u>
50	Helos depart dropoff <u><5 Helos OK</u> <u>↑ vehicle on 4</u>	OK Insufficient helo support	Continue <u>ABORT</u> - load DE hide till next return to deser one.
315	Helos arrive hideout Helos must be in the hideout by 0016Z to arrive in <u>total</u> darkness	OK	Continue

8 carrier - seal -
7 →

Nautschel - 12 Astrom - 18 /hr -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Schedule for
- everything since 18th

Post flights

Wx
Intell - quiet ↑ watch

Helos

Delivery of ltra -

Tanker -

Alert status -

"We have not put I F on A
+ expect you to follow same course"

Code words

E.G.

1. Answer - not Vol.
2. Not back about other things
3. Not connected -

[redacted] times -

our contact with [redacted]
- code word -

[redacted]

Amb accompany if avail
- I think not in town
- go w/o

Nothing ~ 6 PM F
add pronunciation -

Call [redacted] Important
who lives

[redacted]

Msg on FMS - what in it

Latest on front tanker -
etc -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>TIME Z (ZULU)</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
241405Z	FIRST MC-130 LAUNCHES
1506Z	8 RH-53s LAUNCHED
1511-1519Z	REMAINDER OF C-130s LAUNCHED
1715Z	HELO NR 6 FORCED LANDING
1740Z	HELOS HIT DUST
1810-1930Z	C-130s LAND AT DESERT TRACK
1812Z	BUS/TRUCK STOPPED
1930Z	SCHEDULED HELO ARRIVAL TIME
1920Z	HELO NR 5 TURNS BACK
2022Z	FIRST HELO LANDED AT DESERT TRACK
2057Z	SIXTH HELO ARRIVE AT DESERT TRACK
2120Z	HELO NR 2 DETERMINED TO BE NON-FLYER
2135Z	ABORT RECOMMENDED BY ON-SCENE COMMANDER
2202Z	ABORT DECISION
2215Z	BACKLOAD OF C-130s
2222Z	HELO NR 3 COLLIDES WITH EC-130
2246Z	C-130s DEPART DESERT TRACK
2303Z	HELO NR 5 LANDS ON NIMITZ

ZULU TIME IS 4½ HOURS BEHIND IRAN TIME

Declassified by: DDO NMCC
18 Nov 92

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The Commissary, Consulate, Staff Cottages and Old Police Quarters are to the West. The Ambassador's and DCM's residences are located in the Eastern half of the compound which is forested with high trunked pine trees. The Northwest segment of the Embassy compound abutts an Iranian Army Depot. The compound is surrounded by a series of walls and fences which restrict visibility of the grounds from the surrounding streets. Street and building lights are located throughout the compound and surrounding area but many are not functioning.

(1) ^(U) (TS) The compound is located in downtown Tehran in the midst of a mixed business and residential area, with relatively easy road access from the North and East. Several high buildings in the area provide good vantage points for viewing the interior of the compound. A major sports complex with large stadium and several playing fields is located northeast of the compound diagonally across Roosevelt Avenue. A large parking lot is also located East of the compound on Roosevelt, midway between the stadium and Tasht-E-Jamshid Blvd.

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(2) (U) (TS) The buildings facing the compound on the South (Takht-E-Jamshid) are mostly office buildings with some residents. On the West side the principal structures appear to be four small professional office buildings surrounded by trees and backed by two large parking lots. The North side of the compound extends into a middle class residential area consisting of three blocks of multi-story apartment houses.

(3) (U) (TS) Activity related to the Embassy takeover is largely localized within a two block radius of the compound even when major demonstrations are in progress.

(4) (U) (TS) Traffic in the city is highly congested between the hours of 0600-2300 during the Islamic work week (Sat-Wed) decreasing in volume on the Islamic weekend (Thurs-Fri) although traffic activity is likely to continue Thursday night until 0200 Friday morning.

(5) (U) (TS) The Embassy is located approximately 5 KM West of the nearest airfield (Doshan-Tappeh AFB

[REDACTED] Two other airfields are within 10 KM; Ghale-Morgha, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] is 8 KM SSW and Mehrabad International [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is located 10 KM WSW [REDACTED]

(6) (TS) [REDACTED]

(5) [REDACTED]
was used in conjunction with the physical layout of various compound buildings and with due consideration of the building's previous use and the security concerns of the hostile guards to prepare the following breakout of the current functions of the compound buildings:

(a) (TS) Chancery [REDACTED]

(b) (TS) Motor Pool area, Focus of hostile propaganda/media effort, center for staging public displays of hostages [REDACTED]

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(c) (7S) Staff Cottages: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] for [REDACTED]

(c) [REDACTED] May be used by student elements of guard force as sleeping quarters.

(d) (7S) Commissary/Commissary Warehouse: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] lacks water and toilet facilities.

(e) (7S) Consulate Building: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Used during days of takeover as hostage holding area.

(f) (7S) Old Police Guard Quarters, and Utility Workshops: [REDACTED]

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(g) (TS) Warehouse: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Basement floor used by elements of Marine guard as sleeping quarters prior to takeover. Part of space was used as snack bar nicknamed Mushroom Inn. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ventilation and plumbing may be poor shape.

(h) (TS) Temporary Apartments/Old Marine House:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(i) (TS) DCM Residence: Single story house capable of accomodating 8-12 hostages. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(C) (TS) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(C) (TS) Ambassador's Residence: Two story building with a small glass penthouse on roof. The building is capable of housing 12-16 hostages in the residence proper and another 6 to 8 in the adjoining servants quarters. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

c. (TS) Hostage Distribution (Embassy):

(1) (TS) The following assessment as to probable location of the US hostages is based upon a detailed analysis of all information available as of 24 April 80. An overall confidence factor [REDACTED] has been assigned to this estimate.

(C) (S) (2) (TS) Probable hostage locations:

(a) (TS) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(especially in preparation for a media event).

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(b) (TS) [REDACTED]

(c) (TS) [REDACTED]

(1) (TS) Possible Hostage Locations [REDACTED]

(4) (TS) In the opinion of [REDACTED] all the US hostages originally captured in the Embassy are alive and [REDACTED] are being held on the compound.

d. (TS) ENEMY FORCES (EMBASSY):

(1) (TS) Compound Internal Security: The situation in the compound has now settled into a routine with demonstrations periodically staged outside the Chancery/Motor Pool gate on Takhte-Jamshid Blvd. Crowd size varies from 50-75 curiosity seekers to several thousand at lunch/prayer time or when announcements go out via the radio and the local public address system.

(a) (TS) [REDACTED]

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personnel within the compound are made up of several factions in approximately the same proportions.

Actual students: 600/Up to 1200 personnel

Foreign trained militants: 100/Up to 200

Pasdarans: 50/Up to 100

Student leadership cadre: 50/Up to 100

Advisors: 50/Up to 100 personnel

NOTE: [REDACTED]

They are probably not present at all times. They are believed to have relatively little influence. They probably serve as observers and advisors, trying to forward their own cause.

The actual students function as [REDACTED] the hostages and [REDACTED] trying to indoctrinate the hostages. The [REDACTED] students supervise [REDACTED]

They can be regarded as the "hard core" of the student force.

The Pasdarans, besides providing external security, maintain a presence within the compound, [REDACTED]

Students typically carry pistols and G-3's.

Those on duty outside typically are armed with G-3's. Guards carrying rifles have not been observed with any spare magazines for their weapons.

(b) (TS) The number of personnel present seems to [REDACTED]

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vary according to the occasion and day of the week.

Other factors being equal, the number of personnel in the compound drops on Thursdays and Fridays (The Islamic weekend, when some leave to visit families).

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(c) (TS) Guard force distribution is estimated as follows for night-time with a day/night duty ratio

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(e) (TS) Within the compound several defensive construction measures have been noted.

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(C) (S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The possibility exists that mines or demolitions have been positioned around the athletic fields. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] possibly as part of a warning system of some sort. The students have installed additional lighting and loudspeakers in several locations. They are reportedly using some of the [REDACTED] system in the compound, which [REDACTED] circuit [REDACTED] and electronic door locks. Three base station radios, in the Ambassador's residence [REDACTED] and the Chancellery [REDACTED] security [REDACTED]. In addition there are believed to be several rooftop observer positions in the compound which are probably manned at night.

(2) (TS) Compound External Security:

(a) (TS) General: This is an overview of perimeter security around the embassy compound.

(b) (TS) East Wall: Roosevelt (Mobarezam) Avenue. Four chest-high sandbag positions are along Roosevelt. One is at the Ardalan intersection and there is one each across from the intersections with

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

(g) (TS) South Wall: Takht-E-Jamshid (Taleghani).

southeast gate. The increased traffic at the
southeast gate has been

entrance to America. Also, and approximately
part of the motor pool.

(d)(c) TS West Wall:

-- America Alley (Kutche America): America is blocked with light barricades at both ends, with one guard at each point. At the south end, there is simply a pole across the road. Pedestrians and local vehicles are still allowed access.

-- Kutche Bist Metri (east-west alley in front of consulate), Arak Street, the western continuation of Bist Metri, was previously blocked at the intersection of Forsat, one block west of the intersection of America,

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These may not be directly involved in guarding the compound. Along Bist Metri itself, one guard has been reported.

-- Kutche Dah Metri (Alley running north to Bijan). One sandbag position has been reported on the roof of the old police barracks along the west wall.

Previously, [redacted] had put the strength of the [redacted] at 15 Pasdaran.

(e) (TS) North Wall (Ardalan): One guard may be at each end of Ardalan, and one on the north wall along Ardalan.

Pasdaran [redacted] but two [redacted] could probably be more accurate.

Ardalan at [redacted] Pedestrians and local vehicles are still allowed through.

(f) (TS) Off-Duty/Reaction Forces [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

This brings to four the number of possible billeting locations for such a reaction force (referenced to Embassy gridded photo).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(g) Other External Reaction Forces: Reinforcements for the student guards and Pasdaran are available from several locations and organizations. Principal forces and their estimated reaction times once they have received notification or have heard a major disturbance in the vicinity of the compound are shown below:

- (1) (TS) Within 4-7 min: Fire from the Chancery and weapons positioned in surrounding buildings.
- (2) (TS) Within 10-15 min: Reinforcements from student qtrs and Pasdaran Komiteh, strength 75-100, from nearby Komiteh stations.
- (3) (TS) Within 15-20 min: 100-300 Pasdaran and the beginnings of local crowds.

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(4) (TS) Within 20-30 min: Pasdaran reinforcements of an additional 200-300 plus.

(5) (TS) Within 20-30 min: Launch of [REDACTED] fighters from [REDACTED] airport.

(6) (TS) Within 30-30 min: Pasdaran back-up units and additional crowds.

(7) (TS) Within 45-60 min: Pasdaran residual forces and mobs of 2,000-3,000.

(8) (TS) Within 60 min: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could launch and attempt to interdict the force at the compound or extraction airfield if the location becomes known.

(9) (TS) Within 60-90 min: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] could react and attempt a launch against any orbiting aircraft.

e. (TS) Hostage Location and Situation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

(1) (TS) Location and Background: When the terrorists stormed the U.S. Embassy Compound, three American diplomats were in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These three - Tomseth, Howland, and Charge d'Affairs Laingen - were placed under 'protective custody' of the Iranian Government and refused permission to leave the building. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is located approximately 2.3 kilometers Southwest of the American Embassy compound. The main MFA building is an old ornate structure running East-West and facing the Ministry of War northward across Forughi Street. The MFA complex is bounded on the

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south by Kheyaban-e Muzeh, on the east by Rudaki Street, and on the west by Kheyahan-e Marshal Stalin (Coordinates: 35 41N/05 12E). A second building housing MFA staff offices is also located in this area. Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth had been held on the third (top) floor of the old building in a diplomatic reception area. [Their location has changed recently from the west central section of the third floor to the southwest wing of the third floor. Normal entry to the hostage location is via ground level at the East end of the building in the center of a "U-saped parking court. No walls or fences impede access. Upon entering this door, visitors to the diplomatic reception area normally turn left and ascend a staircase which leads to a long central hallway on the second floor. Here, one must turn right and proceed down the hallway to a second stairway at the West end of the hall. Upon reaching the third floor, the visitor turns left into the reception area.]


(U)
Z (2) (S) Security Measures: [Guards within the MFA are low ranking conscripts possibly assigned from the [redacted] normal guard component attached to the Ministry of War. They are generally armed with light infantry weapons. During daylight hours, the total guard force [redacted] appear to consist of a maximum of three [redacted] such soldiers and a single elderly receptionist at the east entrance and possibly a receptionist in front of the door of the hostage quarters. The status of patrol/guard forces in the compound area is as follows:

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- ✓ TS
- a. (TS) [Four military guards with G-3's at the northeast corner to the main MFA building at the entrance to the compound which is located there.
- ✓ TS
- b. (TS) One military guard, armed only with a bayonet on his belt, at the north corner of the building
- ✓ TS
- c. (TS) Two to four guards with G-3's at the east gate to the comound. (If two, the remaining two are probably roving guards, covering the area south of the main MFA building and east of the ethnological museum.
- ✓ TS
- d. (TS) One civilian guard (probably unarmed) at the south gate to the compund.
- ✓ TS
- e. (TS) One civilian guard (probably unarmed) at the NIOC, south of the south gate to the compound.
- ✓ TS
- f. (TS) One civilian watchman (armed with a pistol) may be in the archaeological museum.
- ✓ TS
- g. (TS) Two civilian guards (probably unarmed) at the west gate to the MFA compound.
- ✓ TS
- h. (TS) Two civilian guards (probably unarmed) across the street from the west gate to the MFA compound.
- ✓ TS
- i. (TS) Three police guards (armed with UZI SMG's and pistols) are posted across the street to the east of the MFA.]

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- f. ^(u) ~~(TS)~~ Enemy Command and Control. The Iranian command and control structure inside the AMEMB compound and in the immediate vicinity consists of a series of overlapping but not consciously connected communications circles.
- CC
(c)
- 

(2). ^(u) ~~(TS)~~ Telephone is the principal means of communications to areas outside of the compound. This means is complemented in the immediate vicinity of the compound by a public address (PA) system. Telephone and the PA system are the two primary means that can be expected to be used to sound an alarm, to request reinforcements, and to rally crowds to the compound. Once calls/announcements are initiated by telephone or PA system, the information can be relayed to all points of the city from neighborhood Khomiteh offices and mosques.]

(3) ^(u) ~~(TS)~~ Key Communications Facilities:

- a. ^(u) ~~(TS)~~ The telephone switchboard for the compound is located in the Chancery basement.

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
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g^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Enemy Courses of Action:

(1) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Prior to initiation of rescue operations:

a^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Possible Enemy Courses of Action:

(1) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Maintain the current situation, i.e., hold all hostages pending return of the Shah.

(2) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Begin to execute the hostages as means of applying pressure on US.

(3) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Move hostages from AMEMB compound to prisons or other locations in Tehran.

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- (4) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Release all hostages without trial.
- (5) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Release majority of hostages; hold remainder under threat of trial.
- (6) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Convene international tribunal to investigate charges of U.S. improprieties.
- (7) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Release all hostages after international tribunal published its findings.
- (8) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Grant clemency to all hostages after individual espionage trials.
- (9) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Release majority of hostages following espionage trials; sentence those found guilty to prison terms or death.
- (10) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Lose control of situation as result of anarchy.

b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Probable Enemy Courses of Action: For the immediate future, 30-45 days, the Iranians will maintain the current situation. They will neither release all the hostages nor commence arbitrary executions. (NOTE: The power struggle within the Iranian hierarchy continues. The "students" at the compound, the IRG, Khomeini and the clergy, and other groups are vying for power. Leftist elements within each of these groups are also making their influence felt. Given these political conditions, the possibility of unexpected and/or illogical behaviour by any of these groups with

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regard to the hostages is high. For the time being, though, the "students" are in charge at the compound, and their actions/pronouncements still have the primary impact on the hostages' well-being).

(2) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ During Assault Phase:

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Possible Enemy Courses of Action:

- (1) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Surrender hostages to the US raid force with minimal resistance.
- (2) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Resist the raid force with all available weapons and personnel.
- (3) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Kill the hostages once the raid force is discovered.
- (4) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Reinforce personnel at the compound with Pasclan and/or Iranian Army elements.
- (5) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Engage US personnel in and near the compound with fighters/attack helicopters.

b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Probable Enemy Courses of Action: The majority of the Iranian personnel in the compound are non-military and have acquired only limited military training. Nevertheless, sufficient military-trained individuals are present to offer a brief credible resistance during the assault phase. Guard personnel should be expected to resist the assault force with small arms, grenades, and possibly mines. Some personnel may attempt to kill the hostages with small arms/grenades, once

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the raid force is discovered. Irregular forces in Tehran will attempt to reinforce the compound as soon as the alarm is given. The possibility that military air assets will be used to support personnel at the compound exists, but is not considered likely.

(3) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ During Extraction:

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Possible Enemy Courses of Action:

- (1) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Provide token or no resistance.
- (2) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Engage US aircraft with AAA/SAM/fighters enroute to extraction airfield.
- (3) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Engage US forces at extraction airfield with fighters/attack helicopters/ground elements.

b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Probable Courses of Action: The capabilities of the Iranian Army/Air Force are limited. However, only one determined fighter/helicopter pilot would be sufficient to wreak havoc on the raid force during extraction. The likelihood of some Iranian military effort to engage raid force aircraft or conduct ground attack operations with fighters/attack helicopters against the extraction airfield is considered high; if the US presence and purpose is detected and reported and excessive time is expended at the airhead after extraction begins.

(NOTE: The minimum reaction time is estimated to

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be 60 minutes, with the most probable being 90 minutes. Reaction times are calculated from the time that the compound assault enters the overt action phase, and is further qualified by the assumption that US force presence and purpose at the airhead becomes known to higher authorities in Tehran. Although attempts to intercept extraction aircraft are possible, the probability of success is considered extremely low if proper precautions (radio silence, low altitude, radar and population center avoidance) are employed by the extraction aircraft).

h. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Enemy Order of Battle: See Appendix 9 to this Annex for a general discussion of Iranian ground, air and naval military capabilities as they impact on the JTF mission.

i. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Weather and Terrain: See Appendices 7 (Weather) and 10 (Situation data on supporting operational locations) for detailed discussions of Weather and Terrain considerations in the planning and execution of the mission.

3. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Direction: Intelligence Activities are directed by COMJTF through the designated J-2. A variety of sources have been employed to satisfy collection and production requirements. Tasking, analysis and dissemi-

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nation are centralized within the JTF J-2. Where outside support agencies are required, DIA (JSI) will serve as the primary point of contact for establishment of liaison. Direct support arrangements and procedural mechanisms. Direct support arrangements and procedural mechanisms have been established with [REDACTED] DMA, and [REDACTED]. Access to unclassified media products such as videotapes of television news broadcasts is through DIA (JSI). Tasking of [REDACTED] is coordinated with and validated by the Director of Current Operations, J-3 prior to submission to [REDACTED] through DIA. JTF J-2 provides general guidance to force component intelligence elements and satisfies component EEI's through national level assets as appropriate.

(1) (U) EEI: See Appendix 1 to this Annex.

(2) (U) New Requirements: New requirements generated either by the COMJTF or his subordinate commanders will be prioritized and managed by JTF J-2. Tasking of support elements for collection and production of intelligence products resulting from new requirements will be in accordance with the established procedures for intelligence activities as detailed in paragraph 3a above.

b. (U) Collection: Collection management is centralized within JTF J-2. Subordinate and supporting elements conduct intelligence collection activities within their

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areas of expertise using available resources. Agencies conducting collection in support of the mission may be informed of the JTF mission, organization, and functioning only on a "must-know" basis. Collection requirements, regardless of source generation, will normally be validated by COMJTF prior to tasking outside agencies. Guidance on specialized forms of collection activity is provided as indicated below.

(1) (U) Reconnaissance: See Appendix 5 to this Annex.

(2) (U)

(3) (U) Human Intelligence (HUMINT): See Appendix 6 to this Annex.

(4) (U) Weather: See Appendix 7 to this Annex.

(5) (U) Open Source Intelligence: See Appendix 8 to this Annex.

(6) (U) Ground and Water-based sensors: Not applicable.

(7) (U) Reporting: Reporting procedures will be in accordance with Part 9, Volume II, DIAM-58-11 as modified for JTF purposes by COMJTF. Reporting will be by secure means only.

(U) Processing: JTF J-2 intelligence elements will process and evaluate intelligence and information collected in support of the mission. In general, all analysis of intelligence information having specific bearing on the operational mission will be

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accomplished by JTF J-2. Raw, unevaluated intelligence data will be forwarded to component commands only when the situation demands near real time transmission. Coordination of the evaluation process is continuous.

d. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Production: Production of intelligence products is decentralized within the national community. DIA (JSI) provides primary point of contact for those outside agencies which have not previously established direct support mechanisms with COMJTF.

e. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Dissemination: COMJTF serves as centralized point of dissemination for all intelligence information and products associated with the mission. Dissemination below the CJCS/JTF level will be by secure lateral means. Independent dissemination of intelligence by component commands is not authorized during the planning or deployment phases of the operation. During the execution phase, critical intelligence information may be laterally disseminated on a secure basis, when failure to do so could adversely affect the accomplishment of the mission.

f. (U) Counterintelligence: See Appendix 3 to this Annex.

g. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Mapping, Charting and Geodesy: Defense Mapping Agency will provide direct MC&G support to COMJTF. Products already in being include General Navigational Charts, Operational Navigation Charts, Joint Operational

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Graphics, commercial Iranian road maps, Tehran City plan and special charts of key mission routes and areas developed from current photography. DMA also provides Data Reduced Coordinates of specified areas and facilities for navigation purposes and Projected Map Display materials. A single point of contact has been established and all requests for DMA support are coordinated by JTF J-2. Distribution of MC&G is centralized at JTF headquarters with mission component intelligence elements serving as local agent for their respective organizations.

h. (U) Communications Requirements:

(1) (TS) The appropriate unified commands, Services, and Defense Communications Agency will provide separate and secure circuits for transmission of intelligence data in both voice and hard copy. (2) (TS) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has a similar direct circuit to SFOD-D. JCSE provides direct secure OpsComm links with other components of the JTF.

(3) (TS) Copies of intelligence messages associated with the mission will not be disseminated outside JTF channels on other than a "must know" basis. Disclosure of communications support structure, operating procedures, etc., is not authorized.

i. (U) (TS) Medical Intelligence: Medical intelligence support will be provided by the Services on an as required basis. DIA (JSI) serves as primary point of contact for medical information available through Department of State.

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4. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS:

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Military Services will:

(1) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Provide intelligence support to COMJTF during all phases of the operation in the areas of personnel, equipment, transportation, communications, weather, special security requirements, and training/exercise areas.

(2) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Provide intelligence personnel augmentation to JTF or operational component staffs based on COMJTF requirements.

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d. (U) (TS) Department of State: Provides information on hostages, third-country evaluations of situation, and specific data on details of construction and normal operating procedures within U. S. Embassy, Tehran prior to seizure. Provides information on status, location, welfare and other pertinent details regarding personnel held at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran. Supports COMJTF with periodic analysis of hostage situation from DOS viewpoint.

e. (U) (TS) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA): Provides intelligence support to COMJTF from all appropriate assets. Serves as point of contact for external liaison requirements and requests. Augments JTF J-2 with personnel assets for operation of JTF (Rear) Headquarters during deployment and execution phases of the mission.

f.



g. (U) (TS) Defense Mapping Agency: Provides direct Mapping, Charting and Geodesy support (MC&G) to COMJTF. Produces special products on a time-sensitive basis to assist in mission planning and execution. Develops Evasion and Escape navigational charts/maps for RICE BOWL. Provides navigational data such as Data Reduced Coordinates to subordinate operational components of JTF through JTF J-2. Provides projected map display materials.

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h. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Coordinating Instructions:

(1) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ DIA serves a focal point for all national level intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMJTF. Assists in establishment of direct working relationships within the intelligence community.

(2) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Serves as executive agent for certification of security clearances and access to compartmented intelligence information for personnel assigned to JTF.

(3) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Initiates required actions to disseminate any intel or intel-related products developed by or for the JTF.

5. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS: SERE. COMJTF insures that all operational personnel assigned to the JTF are indoctrinated in Survival, Evasion, Resistance to Interrogation techniques, Escape and are properly briefed on avenues of egress from Iran. Component commanders are responsible to COMJTF for the training of there respective units in SERE.

Appendices:

1 - Essential Elements of Information (EEI)

3 - Counterintelligence (CI)

4 - Areas of Critical Concern

5 - Reconnaissance

6 - Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

7 - Weather/Climatology

8 - Open source Intelligence (TBP)

9 - Enemy Order of Battle (OB)

10 - Situational Data on Supporting Operational Locations

11 - Mapping, Charting and Geodesy

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HEADQUARTERS
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

REFERENCE: Appendix 1, Essential Elements of Information,
to Annex B, Intelligence, to JCS CONPLAN 0300, dated 13
August 1979.

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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (U) GENERAL:
 - a. (U) During the planning phase, Military Service counterintelligence agencies will accomplish their counterintelligence missions within their respective areas of jurisdiction in accordance with established Service policies and procedures.
 - b. (U) To insure a smooth transition from planning/ deployment to execution phase, in terms of counterintelligence activities and responsibilities, subordinate and supporting commanders will insure that the COMJTF is apprised of appropriate counterintelligence activities within their areas of responsibility.
 - c. (U) Counterintelligence and security factors will be integrated into all phases of operational planning by all elements.
2. (U) Requests by COMJTF for counterintelligence personnel and equipment support will be made directly to DIA. All US military counterintelligence organizations will provide maximum support required to support the JTF.
3. (U) Measures will be taken to insure that information concerning deployment and employment planning, staging bases, troop movements, and routes is appropriately safeguarded until such information is approved for release by competent authority. Prior arrangements will be made with commanders of staging bases to insure security
4. (U) JTF will forward pertinent data from SATRAN Extension messages to field elements to be used when developing training plans at the effected sites.

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5. (U) Classified materials carried into forward areas will 1
be safeguarded as appropriate to their individual classification 2
Deployed units will provide for the safeguarding or 3
destruction of materials carried to preclude compromise. 4
Individual responsibility will be assigned for classified 5
materials required at operational level. 6
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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
AREAS OF CRITICAL CONCERN

1. (TS) Tehran/Mehrabad International Airport:
 - a. (TS) ATC Radar (35 40 26N/051 18 05E).
 - b. (TS) [REDACTED]
 - c. (TS) [REDACTED]
 - d. (TS) [REDACTED]

(U) -- Capability to detect JTF aircraft; approximately 50 fighters, [REDACTED]
2. (TS) Tehran HAWK Complex, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-- Capability to engage JTF aircraft vicinity of Tehran.
3. (TS) Tehran HAWK Site, [REDACTED]

-- Capability to engage JTF aircraft vicinity of Tehran.
4. (TS) Tehran HAWK Site, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-- Capability to engage JTF aircraft vicinity of Tehran.
5. (TS) Sepah Square PTT Antenna (32 40 50N/051 39 05E):

-- Main telecommunications facility for Tehran.
6. (TS) Tehran TV/AM Antenna (35 47 00N/051 24 36E):

-- Major TV/Radio broadcasting site.
7. (TS) Karim-Khan-E Zand Transformer Yard/Power Substation (35 42 58N/051 25 28E):

-- Provides electric power to US Embassy compound and surrounding neighborhood.
8. (TS) Kushk-E-Nosrat Communications Site (ATC Radar) (35 09 00N/050 52 50E):

-- Capability to detect JTF aircraft vicinity of Manzar-iyeh.
9. (TS) [REDACTED]

-- Capability to detect JTF aircraft vicinity of Tehran.

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APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
RECONNAISSANCE

1. ^(U) JTF aerial reconnaissance requirements will be provided directly to DIA by the J-2. Initial target priorities will be provided to DIA, with periodic updatings by the J-2.
2. (U) The basic format that DIA will use to provide the imagery analyses is located at Tab A.
3.  

Tab

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JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
HUMAN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

1. (TS) GENERAL: Human source intelligence is vital to the planning and conduct of the mission. The hostage situation - both at the American Embassy compound and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - is, in many ways, not susceptible to technical collection. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] human sources both in Iran and elsewhere can provide information or corroborate data gathered by other means. Human sources can physically inspect operational sites and conduct surveillance of critical facilities. Without accurate, timely, and detailed human source intelligence, the mission becomes immeasurably more difficult.

2. (TS) HUMINT ORGANIZATIONS: The following organizations will provide HUMINT support to the JTF based on currently operative working mechanisms.

a. [REDACTED]

b. (TS) US Air Force provides information, personnel, and equipment support to COMJTF through Air Staff OSI Liaison single point of contact and [REDACTED]

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(U)

c. (TS) US Army provides information, personnel, and equipment support to COMJTF through [REDACTED]

d. (U) (TS) US Marine Corps provides information and personnel support to COMJTF through single point of contact, [REDACTED]

3. (TS) COLLECTION ACTIVITIES, FUNCTIONS AND PLANS

b. (TS) COMJTF coordinates access to active duty and retired US military personnel possessing intelligence information regarding the JTF target through DIA (JSI).

c. [REDACTED]

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d. (TS) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

e. (U) (TS) COMJTF coordinates conduct of HUMINT operations by appropriate Service intelligence organizations in support of the mission.

4. (U) (TS) EEI, TARGETS, AND OTHER COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS:

a. (U) See Appendix 1 to this Annex.

b. (U) (TS) Priorities of collection:

(1) (U) (TS) US Embassy Compound and vicinity, Tehran; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and vicinity, Tehran.

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(2) (U) (TS) Manzariyeh A/F complex; vicinity [REDACTED] ruins (laager site/dropoff point).

(3) (U) (TS) Facilities/Areas of Critical Concern (see Appendix 4 to this Annex).

(4) (U) (TS) Iranian military and paramilitary organizations which could react to the conduct of the mission.

3, C, E
(5) (TS) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5. (U) (TS) COORDINATION: JTF J-2 coordinates HUMINT activities associated with the mission. Planning, direction, analysis, and dissemination of HUMINT is centralized. Collection and production is decentralized. Subordinate elements conduct HUMINT operations based on prior coordination with COMJTF. Counter-intelligence support will be coordinated through DIA.

6. (TS) MISCELLANEOUS: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

JTF provides sanitized HUMINT to other subordinate elements as required.

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JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
25 February 1980

APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)

WEATHER INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: Listed in paragraph 21, Table of References,
JOPS, Volume I.

1. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ GENERAL:

a. (U) Purpose. This appendix provides the concept
for providing environmental data required to support the
operations outlined in this OPLAN.

b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Concept of Environmental Support. The Military
Airlift Command (MAC), through Air Weather Service
(AWS), will provide environmental support for all United
States Army and United States Air Forces. The U.S. Navy
Forces will receive environmental support from the Naval
Oceanography Command (NOC). One forecaster from Det 2,
Hq AWS, will be designated as the Joint Task Force
Environmental Officer (JTFO). He will serve as the
Staff Meteorologist to the Joint Task Force Commander
(COMJTF), will coordinate all COMJTF environmental
requirements and task appropriate AWS or NOC Centralized
Production Facilities (CPF) to generate all required
data. The CPFs will forward environmental products
directly to the JTFO, and other addressees at his
direction, for presentation to the COMJTF.

c. (U) Assumptions.

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- (1) (U) Adequate environmental communications (teletype, facsimile, Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)) will be available at the Forward Operation Location (FOL) to support the proposed scope of operations.
- (2) (U) Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC), as the AF CPF, will be able to provide the quality and scope of environmental support required.
- (3) (U) ~~(S)~~ The European Forecast Unit, as backup CPF, will be capable of generating all required support in the event of communications outage between AFGWC and the FOL.
- (4) (U) AFGWC and NOC will have adequate environmental data available to support the operations proposed by this OPLAN.
- (5) (U) National Environmental Satellite Service (NESS) operational satellites will be available to compliment DMSP satellites.
- d. (U) Responsibilities.
- (1) (U) Det 2, Hq AWS, will provide one Staff Weather Officer to serve as JTSEO to the COMJTF. The JTSEO will be responsible to the COMJTF for all environmental data required for go/no-go decision assistance.
- (2) (U) Air Force Global Weather Central will provide all environmental data requested by the JTSEO. AFGWC will be responsible for obtaining required information from NOC when tasked by the JTSEO.
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(3)(U)(~~TS~~) European Forecast Unit will be prepared to back up AFGWC with immediate support in the event of communications outage between AFGWC and the FOL.

(4) (U) Naval Oceanography Command, through its subordinate organizations, will provide environmental data as tasked by the JTFEO or AFGWC.

(5)(U)(~~TS~~) Military Airlift Command will transport and position one Mark III DMSP terminal facility to the FOL. This facility will be manned and operated by AWS and AFCC personnel. Satellite data requirements will be as specified by the JTFEO through the on-site DMSP Staff Meteorologist.

(6)(U)(~~TS~~) Defense Communication Agency (DCA) will provide two data circuits. A teletype circuit will be established between Det 40, 2nd Weather Wing, and the FOL. A facsimile circuit will be established from West Germany to the FOL.

(7)(U)(~~TS~~) Air Force Communications Command (AFCC) will provide two communications vans (TWAC and DSTE) to terminate the required communications circuits. AFCC will also provide all required personnel and spares/expendables to operate these two vans and the DMSP Mark III van.

2(U)(~~TS~~) SITUATION: The proposed nighttime low-level helicopter operations over mountainous terrain presents flight hazards. The length of the mission makes success of the operation dependent on favorable flight level winds. In addition, the mission will be sensitive to cloud cover, precipitation, visibility, wind shear and turbulence. A pin-point air landed night operation deep in hostile territory

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requires good visibility at and below flight level. Helicopter landings are influenced by surface winds, dust, and soil bearing capacity. Rescue activities will be dependent on visibility, wind and ceilings. Due to the limited data base available to the JTSEO at the FOL, the AWS CPF will provide tailored route bulletins discussing in detail the weather parameters identified above. The DMSP facility will provide real time weather satellite imagery available for inclusion in the decision process.

3.(U)(TS) EXECUTION.

a.(U)(TS) Concept of Operation.

(1)(U)(TS) Pre-deployment Phase. The concept of environmental support will be exercised and refined. The CPFs will generate products for the employment area and all weather support personnel will become familiar with the special problems associated with the operation. The JTSEO will brief the COMJTF on existing environmental conditions. Communication requirements will be identified. Resources and personnel for deployment will be identified and alerted.

(2)(U)(TS) Deployment Phase. All previously identified resources will move to the FOL. Communication lines will be activated and the CPF products sent to the FOL. The JTSEO/COMJTF relationship will continue as in the pre-deployment phase. The DMSP facility will be activated and direct-readout imagery from weather satellites will be joined with bulletins from the CPFs to provide decision assistance for the COMJTF. Staff meteorologists will assist by doing

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on-site analyses of regional weather to compliment
final briefing package for COMJTF.

(3) (U) (TS) Employment Phase. The existing and
forecast weather will be the main consideration for
the go/no-go decision. Daily conditions will be
monitored until weather conditions are favorable for
succssful mission accomplishment. Once the go
decision is generated, the JTFEO and assistant staff
meteorologists will monitor the developing synoptic
situation and keep the COMJTF advised of any devia-
tions from forecast conditions.

(4) (U) Redeployment Phase. When directed by the
COMJTF, the JTFEO will terminate all CPF support,
release all deployed personnel supporting environ-
mental activities, arrange for redeployment of MAC
owned equipment and report to home station.

b. (U) (TS) Tasks and Responsibilities.

(1) (U) (TS) Defense Communications Agency will provide
two circuits to the FOL, one teletype from Det 40, 2nd
Weather Wing, and one facsimile from West Germany.

(2) (U) (TS) MAC will:

(a) Provide airlift for deployed DMSP, TWAC, and
DSTE equipment.

(b) Through AWS, provide the DMSP van, all
deployed weather personnel at the FOL, the CPFs,
and other tasked units required to produce the
support requested by the JTFEO.

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(3)(U)(TS) Air Force Communications Command will
provide two communications vans (TWAC and DSTE) to
terminate the required communications circuits.
AFCC will also provide all required personnel and
spares/expendables to operate these two vans
and the DMSP.

(4) (U) Naval Oceanography Command, through
its subordinate organizations, will provide environ-
mental data as tasked by the JTFEO.

(5) (U) The deployed JTFEO will be the Staff
Weather Officer to the COMJTF. He will advise
on the availability/reliability of weather data,
provide that data where, when, and in the format
requested. When relieved by the COMJTF, the JTFEO
will be responsible for the termination of all
weather support and redeployment of all assigned AWS
equipment.

c. (U) Coordination Instructions. Direct coordination
between any environmental support organizations tasked
by this OPLAN is authorized and encouraged. OPSEC and
COMSEC must be considered in all contacts.

4.(U)(TS) Administration and Logistics.

a. (U) Administration. AWS personnel alerted to
deploy in support of this OPLAN will be prepared to
depart immediately upon notification by the JTFEO. When
ordered to depart, they will travel on the mode deter-
mined by the local transportation officer. MAC channel
traffic enroute to the FOL should be used whenever
available. All personnel will travel on TDY orders
prepared by their unit of assignment.

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b. (U) (TS) <u>Logistics</u> . All communications and DMSP vans will be deployed with adequate spares and expendables required for 60 days field operations.	<u>1</u> <u>2</u> <u>3</u>
5. (U) <u>Command and Signal</u> .	<u>4</u>
a. (U) <u>Command</u> . The JTFEO is directly responsible to the COMJTF. All weather personnel attached to this operation will be under the operational control of the JTFEO. AFCC support personnel will respond to the communications requirements identified by the JTFEO.	<u>5</u> <u>6</u> <u>7</u> <u>8</u> <u>9</u>
b. (U) <u>Signal</u> . Most weather data will be transmitted over dedicated communications circuits between designated weather facilities and the FOL. Select information will be received by AUTODIN message and Secure Phone.	<u>10</u> <u>11</u> <u>12</u> <u>13</u> <u>14</u> <u>15</u> <u>16</u> <u>17</u> <u>18</u>
TABS:	
A. Climatic Brief for Iran, February-April	<u>19</u>
B. Climatic Brief for Teheran, Iran, March-June	<u>20</u>
C. Climatic Brief Addendum for Iran, February-April	<u>21</u>
D. Climatic Brief - Hazardous Weather , .	<u>22</u> <u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u> <u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u>

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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TAB A TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
CLIMATIC BRIEF - IRAN, FEB-APR

1. General. The weather ranges from cold and snowy in the far north and mountainous regions to warm and humid along the Persian Gulf coast. Skies are clear to partly cloudy 50-60% of the time over most of Iran. Precipitation is expected on 5-10 days per month usually as light rainshowers. On rare occasions heavy rainfall may occur and cause flash flooding. Snowfall is expected at most locations with the heaviest snowfall in the mountains. Snow avalanches are a hazard in the mountainous areas particularly between Tehran and the Caspian Sea. Gusty winds can be expected at most locations but are most prevalent in the Central Plateau region. At Kerman the winds are in excess of 25 knots 15% of the time. Sandstorms and/or duststorms can be expected 5-10 days per month in the interior. They are reported to be so severe at times as to scrape the paint from automobiles and frost windors so you can not see out of them. Severe earthquakes are also a hazard. Infrequent northwest winter Shamal winds following cold frontal passages in Persian Gulf reach gale forces for 24-36 hrs or as long as 3-5 days in February-March.

2. Flying Weather. Generally good. The percent frequency that the ceiling/visibility is less than 5000/6 ranges from 10-25% and less than 1500/3 ranges from 1-10%. Flying activities may be restricted during the early morning hours due to low clouds and/or fog and also sandstorms/duststorms in the interior. Severe clear air turbulence is a hazard over southern Iran in the vicinity of the jet stream and at low levels along Persian Gulf coast associated with Shamal Winds.

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3. Reconnaissance Weather. The weather is generally favorable for aerial reconnaissance. The mean number of days with cloud cover 2/8ths or less and visibility 2 1/2 miles or greater ranges from 10-20. The percent frequency that the cloud cover is 2/8ths or less ranges from 35%-55% over most of Iran. Generally the late evening and early morning hours are the most favorable for aerial reconnaissance. April is the cloudiest month. The Persian Sea coastal area has the lowest frequency of cloudiness.

4. Terminal Weather. Tehran, Iran - Tehran generally experiences clear to partly cloudy skies, a general warming trend and an occasional rain or snow shower. Precipitation occurs 6-7 days per month. Snowfall is expected on 2 days in February and is rare in other months. Gusty winds with speeds greater than 16 knots are expected 5% of the time. Gale force 1%. Runway crosswinds in excess of 15 knots are expected 5-10% of the time. Crosswinds are the strongest from 1200-2100 local. Ceiling/visibility less than 300/1 occurs 1-3% of the time.

5. Exposure Weather. The weather ranges from warm and humid in the extreme south to cool with possible duststorms/sandstorms in the interior to cold and snowy in the mountainous areas. Sandstorms/duststorms may be hazardous to personnel and damaging to equipment. Heavy flooding may be caused by heavy rainfall or high runoff of snow melting in the mountains.

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Exposure Weather - Tehran, Iran	FEB	MAR	APR
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM	73	79	90
MEAN MAXIMUM	51	59	71
MEAN MINIMUM	32	40	49
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	12	22	32
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.1	1.1	1.3
# DAYS RAINFALL	5	7	7
# DAYS SNOWFALL	2	*	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORM	*	1	2
# DAYS DUSTSTORM	*	1	2

* = LESS THAN 0.5 DAY OR 0.5 INCH

6. Paradrop Weather. Favorable paradrop weather varies widely from location. The percent frequency of favorable paradrop weather varies from 40-95% over all Iran. Generally, the afternoon hours are the least favorable for paradrops. Primary weather restriction is winds in excess of 13 knots.

7. Trafficability. Most of Iran has core index (CI) rating of 150 or greater (soil will support most surface vehicles and helicopters). Isolated sections along the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and the Central Plateau have a much lower rating. In the Central Plateau region are large marshy areas that are impassable even to man on foot.

8. Astronomical Data. Tehran, Iran

	FEB	MAR	APR
Civil Twilight (Local Time)	15	15	15
First Light	0652	0617	0533
Last Light	1746	1812	1837

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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TAB B TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
CLIMATIC BRIEF - TEHERAN, IRAN - MAR-JUN

1. General. Spring is a transition period from cold wintery to the long hot summer ahead. Skies are generally clear to partly cloudy. Average high temperatures increase rapidly from near 60F to over 90F; low temperatures from near 40 up to mid 60's. Midnight temperatures likewise rise from mid 40's to mid 70's. The ground surface generally thaws between mid February and early March as these temperatures rise. The frequency of rainy weather gradually decreases from 7-6 days during March to May, then drastically drops of to only one day in June. The probability of flash flooding is at the highest for the year due to melting snow at higher elevations combined with spring rainfall and thunderstorms. The thunderstorm season peaks in the spring with 1-2 days of occurrence per month. Reduced visibility occurs as gusty surface winds produce blowing dust or sand through the region on 1-2 days per month.

2. Exposure Weather.

Teheran, Iran	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	79	90	97	103
MEAN MAXIMUM	59	71	81	92
MEAN MIDNIGHT TEMPERATURE	46	56	65	76
MEAN MINIMUM	40	49	59	67
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	22	32	37	48
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.1	1.3	0.5	0.0
# DAYS RAINFALL	7	7	6	1
# DAYS SNOWFALL	*	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	2	2	1
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	1	2	2	2

* = LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

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TAB C TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
CLIMATIC BRIEF ADDENDUM FOR IRAN - FEB-APR

<u>Exposure Weather</u>	FEB	MAR	APR
Jask, Iran (Gulf of Oman) (13 ft)			
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	88	93	108
MEAN MAXIMUM	75	81	87
MEAN MINIMUM	62	67	73
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	47	47	60
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.9	0.6	0.2
# DAYS RAINFALL	2	1	1
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	*	*
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A
Zahedan, Iran (Desert) (4,495 ft)			
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	75	90	99
MEAN MAXIMUM	61	72	81
MEAN MINIMUM	35	46	52
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	12	29	35
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.8	1.8	0.6
# DAYS RAINFALL	2	4	1
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	1	1
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	6	10	5

*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

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<u>Exposure Weather</u>	FEB	MAR	APR
Kerman, Iran (Southern Mountains) (5,738 ft)			
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	74	75	93
MEAN MAXIMUM	56	66	76
MEAN MINIMUM	28	38	44
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	2	19	23
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.1	1.4	0.4
# DAYS RAINFALL	2	3	1
# DAYS SNOWFALL	*	0	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	0	2	2
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	6	9	9
Birjand, Iran (Desert) (4,774 ft)			
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	70	84	93
MEAN MAXIMUM	53	68	74
MEAN MINIMUM	31	42	50
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	16	27	37
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.1	1.4	1.6
# DAYS RAINFALL	3	3	3
# DAYS SNOWFALL	1	*	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	0	1	3
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	4	4	3

*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

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<u>Exposure Weather</u>	FEB	MAR	APR
Tehran, Iran (Northwest Desert) (3,908 ft)			
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	73	85	91
MEAN MAXIMUM	50	59	71
MEAN MINIMUM	32	39	49
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	4	16	28
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.5	1.8	1.4
# DAYS RAINFALL	3	4	3
# DAYS SNOWFALL	2	*	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	*	1	3
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A
Kazvin, Iran (Northwest Desert) (4,272 ft)			
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	72	84	90
MEAN MAXIMUM	53	59	68
MEAN MINIMUM	28	35	43
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	3	16	28
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.3	0.7	2.5
# DAYS RAINFALL	N/A	N/A	N/A
# DAYS SNOWFALL	3	2	0
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A

*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

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<u>Exposure Weather</u>	FEB	MAR	APR
Zanjan, Iran (Northwest Mountains) (5,407 ft)			
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	63	77	90
MEAN MAXIMUM	41	53	62
MEAN MINIMUM	24	30	39
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	-9	5	10
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.1	1.4	3.0
# DAYS RAINFALL	N/A	N/A	N/A
# DAYS SNOWFALL	5	3	1
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A
Tabriz, Iran (Northwest Mountains) (4,468 ft)			
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	66	68	81
MEAN MAXIMUM	39	49	62
MEAN MINIMUM	21	31	41
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	-8	9	28
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.9	2.0	1.7
# DAYS RAINFALL	2	4	4
# DAYS SNOWFALL	6	3	2
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	0	*	1
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	1	1	1

*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY

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
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<u>Exposure Weather</u>	FEB	MAR	APR	<u>1</u>
Yazd, Iran (Southern Mountains) (4,068 ft)				<u>2</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	75	90	99	<u>3</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	57	72	80	<u>4</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	33	46	54	<u>5</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	19	28	43	<u>6</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.0	0.2	0.1	<u>7</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	*	1	*	<u>8</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	*	0	0	<u>9</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	0	0	1	<u>10</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	2	7	4	<u>11</u>
Qom Iran (Northwest Desert) (3,045 ft)				<u>12</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	79	88	95	<u>13</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	57	67	76	<u>14</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	37	46	52	<u>15</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	19	27	36	<u>16</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.4	0.7	0.8	<u>17</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>18</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	1	*	0	<u>19</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>20</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>21</u>
				<u>22</u>
				<u>23</u>
				<u>24</u>
				<u>25</u>
				<u>26</u>
*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY				<u>27</u>
				<u>28</u>
				<u>29</u>
				<u>30</u>
				<u>31</u>

TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO COMJTF OPLAN
COMMAND NET DELTA (HF/SSB)

DAY: 17967 KHZ
NIGHT: 8855 KHZ



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ANNEX L TO COMJTF OPLAN (S)
OPERATIONS SECURITY (U)

- REFERENCES: a. JCS Pub 18, Subj: Policy, Concept and Standards for Operations Security (U), dated 25 October 1975 (C)
- b. NSA National Tactical COMSEC Plan (U) (S), dated Jan 1975

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. (U) Purpose. This annex provides guidance for the secure planning and conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) operations aimed at accomplishing the mission as outlined in the basic plan. It is prepared on the basis of the concept of operations as expressed at Annex C of this plan. Other Annexes and Appendices are prepared in accordance with the Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) criteria attached at Appendix 1, this Annex.

b. (U) Definition. Operations security (OPSEC) is the security of military operations and activities resulting from the identification and control of information sources susceptible to hostile exploitation. Information sources are categorized as observable operational patterns, sources of unclassified information, and sources of classified information.

2. (U) RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPSEC (U)

- a. ~~(S)~~ Only those individuals specifically tasked to plan

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and execute this operation are authorized access to the
plan information. Denial of information to anyone not
specifically authorized, whether friendly or enemy, is
the responsibility of all assigned. Commanders at all
levels must be aware of the sensitivity of OPSEC for this
mission during all four phases: planning and rehearsal;
preparation; execution; and post mission. OPSEC must be
maintained whether or not mission execution is directed.
Any breach of OPSEC prior to D-Day H-Hour creates a high
probability of mission failure. A breach of OPSEC could
result in loss of the hostages lives and the entire
rescue force as well as grave consequences to the U.S.
Government at the international level.

b. ^(U)~~(S)~~ JTF Staff: All individuals assigned to the JTF
must insure all staff efforts, including those of counter-
intelligence and communications, (written or spoken) are
coordinated toward this end.

c. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Individuals: All individuals must be aware of the
sensitivity of OPSEC. It is critical not only to the
mission success, but to the welfare of those involved and
their families after the operational activity is complete.

3. (U) OPSEC THREAT. The threat does, not center on a
traditional enemy. Unauthorized disclosure is the enemy
regardless of the recipients category of friend or foe.

a. ^(U)~~(S)~~ SIGINT Threat. Disclosure is threatened by
friendly communications systems for physical compromises,
interruption, traffic analysis, direction finding,
initiative deception, jamming and cryptanalysis
especially during the execution and post mission recovery.

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b. (U) Electronic Surveillance Threat. Hostile capabilities in radar, IFF, sonar and similar active emitters are not considered sophisticated.

c. (U) HUMINT Threat. The sensitivity of this mission demands explicit control of all mission related information. The problem is global since the capability exists for the enemy and potential enemies obtaining, analyzing and exploiting security violations and weaknesses of friendly force individuals. Dispersion of force origins increases the potential penetration susceptibility. All agencies worldwide can be expected to attempt to identify the operation by monitoring activity levels.

d. The Reconnaissance Satellite Threat. The Soviet overhead reconnaissance threat is substantial.

photographic and electronic coverage of U.S. military activities on a worldwide basis. operations must be conducted to minimize the potential for force disclosure. Launch of the MC/AC-130s, KC-135s and C-141 support aircraft should be considered based on Soviet satellite schedule to prevent the disclosure of the deployed force at:

4. (U) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI): Appendix 1 of this ANNEX contains EEFI which cover broad areas and are ongoing in nature.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA
Commander, JTF

Appendix:
1- Essential Elements of Friendly Information

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX L TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)						<u>1</u>
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (U)						<u>2</u>
	PROTECTION REQUIRED DURING					<u>3</u>
(U) SUBJECT REQUIRING	PLAN	PREP	EXEC	POST		<u>4</u>
PROTECTION a/	PHASE	PHASE	PHASE	PHASE		<u>5</u>
Indications that plans exist to						<u>6</u>
execute similar UW operations to						<u>7</u>
recover hostages.	X	X	X	X		<u>8</u>
Contents of this OPLAN and related						<u>9</u>
plans require protection from						<u>10</u>
person not specifically designated						<u>11</u>
as "need to know".	X	X	X	X		<u>12</u>
Circumstances under which various						<u>13</u>
types of response would be executed.	X	X	X	X		<u>14</u>
Primary and alternate deployment						<u>15</u>
locations.	X	X	X	X		<u>16</u>
Units designated to fill force						<u>17</u>
requirements.	X	X	X	X		<u>18</u>
Structure and composition of force.	X	X	X	X		<u>19</u>
Mission of force or force components.	X	X	X	X		<u>20</u>
						<u>21</u>
						<u>22</u>
a/ (U) The subjects listed as requiring protection pertain						<u>23</u>
to operations conducted under or in support of this OPLAN.						<u>24</u>
These subjects may also require protection at other times.						<u>25</u>
All supporting forces/operations/activities are subject to						<u>26</u>
provisions of this Appendix.						<u>27</u>
						<u>28</u>
						<u>29</u>
						<u>30</u>
						<u>31</u>

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(X) SUBJECT REQUIRING
PROTECTION a/

PROTECTION REQUIRED DURING
PLAN PREP EXEC POST
PHASE PHASE PHASE PHASE

Identification of OPSEC

weaknesses.

Intended or actual use of any

communications jamming or deception

units.

Capabilities of communications

deception and jamming units.

Actions to encourage friendly

nations to cooperate with the

support US operations.

Structure of organization to

accomplish intelligence missions

and responsibilities.

Information on liaison, support

and coordination from other intelli-

gence agencies

UW intelligence plans, policies

and procedures.

JTF essential elements of Enemy

Information (EEI).

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(U) SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION a/	PROTECTION REQUIRED DURING				<u>1</u>
	PLAN PHASE	PREP PHASE	EXEC PHASE	POST PHASE	<u>2</u>
Specific themes to be exploited					<u>3</u>
for PSYOP and PSYOP EEI.	X	X	X	X	<u>4</u>
Capability for conducting counter-					<u>5</u>
intelligence and offensive CI					<u>6</u>
missions/operations.	X	X	X	X	<u>7</u>
Information on what hostile CI					<u>8</u>
forces will be available to					<u>9</u>
neutralize/sabotage our plans.	X	X	X	X	<u>10</u>
Status of UW project/special					<u>11</u>
stocks.	X	X	X	X	<u>12</u>
Provisions for defense against					<u>13</u>
enemy chemical and biological					<u>14</u>
attacks and capability of JUWF					<u>15</u>
to operate in a toxic environment.	X	X	X	X	<u>16</u>
Identity of commanders.	X	X	X	X	<u>17</u>
Locations and vulnerability of key					<u>18</u>
US Headquarters.	X	X	X	X	<u>19</u>
JTF deception objectives					<u>20</u>
and means of implementation.	X	X	X	X	<u>21</u>
Strength, disposition, and					<u>22</u>
capabilities of and US relationship					<u>23</u>
with allied friendly ethnic,					<u>24</u>
religious, and political groups					<u>25</u>
in the theater and target areas.					<u>26</u>
Planned wartime communications					<u>27</u>
capabilities and/or requirements.	X	X	X	X	<u>28</u>
					<u>29</u>
					<u>30</u>
					<u>31</u>

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(U) SUBJECT REQUIRING PROTECTION PROTECTION <u>a/</u>	PROTECTION REQUIRED DURING				<u>1</u>
	PLAN PHASE	PREP PHASE	EXEC PHASE	POST PHASE	<u>2</u>
Commands to which contingency communications support equipment is assigned.	X	X	X	X	<u>3</u> <u>4</u> <u>5</u> <u>6</u>
Communications equipment and/or facilities available outside the European area designated to support USEUCOM contingency operations.	X	X	X	X	<u>7</u> <u>8</u> <u>9</u> <u>10</u> <u>11</u>
Frequencies published in CEOI Frequency requirements developed by Task Force elements during execution phase.	X	X	X	X	<u>12</u> <u>13</u> <u>14</u> <u>15</u>
Intelligence capabilities of the command against specific countries.	X	X	X	X	<u>16</u> <u>17</u> <u>18</u>
Meanings of nicknames currently being used in this operation.	X	X	X	X	<u>19</u> <u>20</u>
Rights and privileges at staging areas, ports, airfields, and logistic staging areas.	X	X	X	X	<u>21</u> <u>22</u> <u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u> <u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u>

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ANNEX X TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
EXECUTION CHECKLIST

The following list of agency actions and timing is provided for support of this plan.

<u>ACTION</u>	<u>HQS/AGENCY</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>5</u>
Issue Alert Order	JCS	D-Day minus 6 days	<u>6</u>
		A-Hour declared	<u>7</u>
Distribution OPLAN	JCS	D-Day minus 6 days	<u>8</u>
Deployment Direction	JCS	C-Day declared at	<u>9</u>
		D-Day minus 5 days	<u>10</u>
	JCS	C-Day	<u>11</u>
Direct Execution of	JCS	D-Day minus 1 day	<u>12</u>
COMJTF OPLAN			<u>13</u>

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Commander, JTF

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ANNEX 2 TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
DISTRIBUTION (U)

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>NO. COPIES</u>	<u>COPY NO.</u>
JCS	3	1-3
CSA	1	4
CNO	1	5
CSAF	1	6
CMC	1	7
CINCPAC	1	8
CINCPACFLT	1	9
CINCPACAF	1	10
CINCEUR	1	11
COMJTF	3	12-14
STOCK	6	15-20

JAMES B. VAUGHT
MGen, USA
Commander, JTF

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KC-135 Activity (24 April) ^{in Jg} folder

E Seven KC-135s Launched from [REDACTED]

OS
25.30
- FOR TF-70 REFUELING

- KC-135 ART (150) 1517Z(100) / 0445

KC-135A 1519Z(100) / 2145

KC-135A 1518Z(100) / 0045

NOTE: KC-135A's REFUELED ART
ENROUTE TO ORBIT AREA

25.20
ART + A
- FOR MC/EC-130 EGRESS

- KC-135 ART (170) 1730Z(700) / 0500

KC-135A 1736Z(100) / 2337

NOTE: "A" REFUELED ART ENROUTE

- KC-135A (170) 1737Z(100) / 0445

KC-135A (170) 1836Z(100) / 0450

E Two KC-135s Launched from [REDACTED]

- FOR POSSIBLE TF-70 RESCAP

- KC-135 ART 0033Z(700) / 110

KC-135A 0034Z(100) / 0330

over TF
70
2030Z - 2330Z
off land
25, 26, 27
NOTE: "A" REFUELED ART IN K
AND RECOVERED AT [REDACTED]
E ART RECOVERED AT [REDACTED]

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) (U)

REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN.

1. (U) SITUATION.

a. (U) General. See basic OPLAN.

b. (U) Enemy. See basic OPLAN.

c. (U) Friendly

(1) (U) General

(a) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Forces involved in the rescue are authorized to discriminately use all weapons made available by the JCS to obtain release of the hostages and to protect the rescue force as determined by COMJTF.

(b) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Opposing military, paramilitary, or other persons may be engaged with deadly force to the extent required to control the situation, overcome resistance, rescue/protect hostages and protect the rescue force and to minimize casualties on both sides.

(2) (U) AIR

(a) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Air-to-air forces (if involved) will only engage Iranian aircraft if those aircraft pose a direct threat to the rescue air, ground, or sea force.

(b) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Third party forces will not be attacked unless a direct threat to rescue forces is detected.

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(c) (U) (TS) Air-to-ground forces will only engage targets that pose a direct threat to the rescue force or that have been previously approved by COMJTF.

(d) (U) (TS) Air-to-ground forces will attempt to keep all ordinance inside the confines of the AMEMB compound until the rescue forces withdraw to the extraction area. However, ordinance may be used on gun positions which, due to their position overlooking the AMEMB compound, pose a direct threat to the rescue force, or on groups of hostile elements attempting to reinforce compound elements or block withdrawal. Ordinance may be directed to prevent unfriendly aircraft from taking off in response to rescue situation.

(3) (U) Land

(a) (U) (TS) Upon approval from COMJTF, the ground force commander (FAG) will designate targets for all air delivered suppression weapons in vicinity of AMEMB.

A

(4) (U) (TS) Sea. Not applicable.

d. (U) Assumptions. None.

2. (U) Mission. See basic OPLAN.

3. (U) Execution. See basic OPLAN.

4. (U) Administration. A full report will be provided by all force commanders if these ROE are violated for any reason with full particulars.

5. (U) (TS) Command and Signal. See Annex K this OPLAN.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
26 FEBRUARY 1980

APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES (U)

(U) REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN.

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. (U) Enemy. See ANNEX B, this OPLAN.

b. (U) Friendly. See basic OPLAN.

c. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) (S) The Government of Iran will enlist all Iranians
in evader location searches around downed aircraft,
and vicinity.

(2) (U) Local civilian populace assistance can not be
counted upon, and is at best situationally hostile.

(3) (U) (S) Post-operation Iranian actions can be expected
to be violently Anti-American; show little mercy to
captured personnel, and be nationwide shortly after
the hostage recovery operations is discovered.

(4) (S) Assistance from third nations cannot be
counted-on.

(5) (U) (S) Mission aircraft are primary SAR along entire
mission route.

2. (U) (S) MISSION: JTF forces will take necessary actions to
separate themselves from downed aircraft, deter tracking on
the ground, and assist in friendly recovery operations by
adhering to SOP where possible.

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3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) Concept of Operations. See ANNEX C, this OPLAN.

b. (U) (S) Concept of Emergency Procedures. Emergency procedures and actions are those activities undertaken by mission members in the event an aircraft goes down during any segment of the flight route (s), or the operation is compromised at the hide site. These procedures are immediate in nature, and are undertaken prior to the implementation of Escape and Evasion (E&E) procedures/plans. These procedures are designed to safeguard mission personnel until a Search and Rescue (SAR) can be mounted.

c. (U) (S) Tasks of Subordinate JTF Units.

(1) Delta. Provide guidance/support to aircrew forces, as required.

(2) (S) Rangers. Provide guidance/support to aircrew forces, as required.

(3) (S) Helicopter Squadron. See Tab A, this APPENDIX.

(4) (S) MC/AC-130 Element. Execute immediate actions as follows:

(a) (S) Upon impact, execute standard emergency procedures for exiting aircraft.

(b) (S) Determine aircraft location and report location from Ops Code. Do not broadcast in the clear.

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(c) ~~(S)~~ If aircraft has been discovered, or serious injuries have resulted, immediately activate Survival radio alternate guard frequency: 282.8. Establish defensive perimeter, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (3-10K), terrain and opposition dependent. Be prepared to establish a HLZ. Mark with [REDACTED] when helicopter is heard/seen.

(d) ^(U)~~(S)~~ If aircraft is down in remote area, without serious injuries, follow above procedures and prepare to execute E&E plan for sector in which you are down.

(e) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Advise JTF of procedures developed by MC/AC-130 Element Intelligence personnel for each sector, as required.

d. (U) Tasks of Friendly Forces.

(1) ^(U)~~(S)~~ JTF mission aircraft report location and condition of downed aircraft/crew as can be determined. Helicopters land and follow directions in Tab-A, this APPENDIX.

(2) (U) Non-mission friendly forces are unlikely to assist in pre-operation recovery/assistance with the exception of TF 70 SAR within their range limits.

e. (U) Coordinating Instruction.

(1) ^(U)~~(S)~~ If aircraft goes down with Delta/Ranger personnel on-board, they will be in operational control, regardless of relative rank.

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(2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Destroy all aircraft mounted radios/cyphers/
maps/charts/weapons that can not be removed and
carried during the evasion attempts.

(3) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Think before you move.

(4) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Where possible ~~_____~~
slow local militia and Army units who will investigate
the downed aircraft.

(5) ^(U)~~(S)~~ As SOP move from the nose of the aircraft at a
12 o'clock direction (3- 10K) away from the aircraft.
SAR activity will orient their search in that direc-
tion. (Terrain and populace in the vicinity of the
aircraft allowing).

(6) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Hostages, regardless of their rank/position,
will not be placed in a command position of mission
forces.

(7) (S) For all phases of the operation, with the
exception of the phase from the Laager Site to
Manzariyeh via Tehran (i.e.; Tehran Phase), downed
aircraft crews/passengers will not execute E&E proced-
ures for their sector for 48 hours, but will hide
within 3-10K of aircraft at 1200 O'clock from the nose
of the aircraft.

(8) ^(U)~~(S)~~ For the Tehran Phase, the following procedures
will apply:

1 ^(U)~~(S)~~ Laager Site to Compound (Rural). Helicop-
ters and Fixed Wing: per SOP, para (7) above.

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~~(U)~~
A 2 (S) Tehran City Phase. As directed by Delta,
if available. If not available, helicopter
procedures, TAB -A apply. MC/AC-130 procedure is
to head to emergency airfields/landing zones per
TAB B, this APPENDIX.

~~(U)~~
A 2 (S) Tehran to Manzarīyeh (Rural). Per SOP.
However, all attempts will be made to get to
Manzarīyeh, or as close as possible, to allow the
shuttling of helicopters to the crash site to
transport mission personnel and hostages to
awaiting aircraft for exfiltration from Iran.

(9) ~~(U)~~ (S) After the compound has been breached, and the
operation to recover the hostages has been taken to
the captors, the use of the open communication (non-
covered) may be utilized in emergency conditions.
This should, however, be avoided. Unit/place names
are not to be used.

(10) ~~(U)~~ (S) Ground to air visual recognition signals will
be utilized as noted in TAB C to APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX
C to this OPLAN.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. ~~(U)~~ (S) Logisitics. See Paragraph 4, APPENDIX 13, E&E.

b. ~~(U)~~ (S) Administration. See basic OPLAN.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. ~~(U)~~ (S) Signal. See ANNEX, this OPLAN and TAB F, APPENDIX
13, E&E. Communications utilized during the emergency
procedures phases are to mirror those of the long term
E&E phase.

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b. (S) Command. Joint emergency procedures operations will be conducted under the operational control of the senior Delta/Ranger person present, regardless of relative rank. Unilateral emergency procedures activities will be under the operational control of the senior mission personnel of the aircrew involved, (Command Pilot). Under no circumstances will hostage personnel be placed in a command position of mission forces, regardless of hostage rank/position.

TAB - A: Helicopter Force Emergency Actions
TAB - B: Emergency Landing Zones (Tehran Area)

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TAB A TO APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
HELICOPTER EMERGENCY ACTIONS (U)

	<u>1</u>
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1. (U) <u>BACKGROUND.</u>	<u>3</u>
a. ^(U) (TS) Emergency situations may result from mechanical	<u>4</u>
failures or enemy action during conduct of the mission.	<u>5</u>
The number of variables involved in such a complex	<u>6</u>
undertaking create a wide variety of possible contingen-	<u>7</u>
cies. Consequently, it is not feasible to develop	<u>8</u>
specific actions for all possible emergency situations;	<u>9</u>
however, guidelines are necessary for each of the major	<u>10</u>
phases of the operation.	<u>11</u>
2. (U) <u>ASSUMPTIONS.</u>	<u>12</u>
a. ^(U) (S) SAR activities which could compromise the mission	<u>13</u>
will not be taken.	<u>14</u>
b. ^(U) (S) Under certain conditions Navy SAR assets will be	<u>15</u>
available for over-water leg and up to 150NM inland along	<u>16</u>
the projected mission route.	<u>17</u>
c. ^(U) (S) Mission aircraft will have primary initial SAR	<u>18</u>
responsibility along the entire mission route.	<u>19</u>
d. ^(U) (S) There are no positively identified friendly assets	<u>20</u>
in Iran, Iraq, the USSR, or Afghanistan.	<u>21</u>
3. (U) <u>GENERAL.</u>	<u>22</u>
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a. (U) (TS) Emergency Actions are those activities undertaken by mission members in the event an aircraft goes down during any segment of the flight route or the operation is physically compromised at the laager (hideout) site. They normally precede commencement of long-range evasion and are designed to safeguard personnel until a successful Search and Rescue (SAR) operation is mounted.	<u>1</u> <u>2</u> <u>3</u> <u>4</u> <u>5</u> <u>6</u> <u>7</u>
b. (U) (TS) During the in-bound route to rendezvous, the senior officer present will direct all Emergency Actions.	<u>8</u> <u>9</u>
c. (U) (TS) When SFOD-D (Delta) personnel are present, the senior Delta officer/NCO takes precedence regardless of rank.	<u>10</u> <u>11</u> <u>12</u>
4. (U) <u>BASIC ACTIONS AND PROCEDURES.</u>	<u>13</u>
a. (U) (TS) Aircraft goes down enroute to rendezvous/refuel point.	<u>14</u> <u>15</u>
(1) (U) (TS) Determine location of aircraft and report using appropriate codewords from opsched. <u>DO NOT</u> use clear voice.	<u>16</u> <u>17</u> <u>18</u>
(2) (U) (TS) Upon impact, execute standard emergency procedures for exiting aircraft.	<u>19</u> <u>20</u>
(3) (U) (TS) Evaluate tactical situation. If aircraft has been discovered or serious injuries have resulted, immediately activate survival radios on Guard. Establish defensive perimeter and prepare for extraction. Mark LZ with single IR strobe centered when pick-up aircraft commander directs. If aircraft is down in remote area without serious injuries, immediate extraction will be made by mission helo. Utilize IR strobe. Avoid using radio if possible.	<u>21</u> <u>22</u> <u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u> <u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u>

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- (4) (U) In the event that immediate extraction fails, utilize Emergency Action recommendations. 1
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- b. (S) Aircraft Fails to Start at Refuel Site. 3
- (1) (U) Senior JTF commander on-scene will provide appropriate orders. 4
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- c. (U) Aircraft Goes Down Enroute to Laager Site. 6
- A- (1) (S) Ranking Delta Officer/NCO direct emergency action. Mission aircraft will extract. 7
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- d. (S) Delta discovered enroute to AmEmbassy. 9
- A- (1) (S) Delta moves to nearest defensible position, and calls in helicopters from Laager Site. 10
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- (2) (S) Helicopters launch to vicinity Delta to extract them. 12
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- A- (3) (S) Helicopters and Delta pick HLZ: conduct extraction to hide site. Await further information on extraction point. 14
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- e. (U) Aircraft Goes Down Enroute to Stadium. 17
- (1) (U) Same procedures as in subparagraph 4.a. above. 18
- f. (U) Aircraft Goes Down in Stadium LZ. 19
- (1) (S) If possible move aircraft to track area. Position rotors parallel to track to keep LZ as clear as possible. Upon exiting aircraft; Emergency Actions will be directed by Ranking Delta Officer/NCO if present. Mission aircraft will extract downed crew along with assault force and hostages. 20
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- A- g. (U) (S) Aircraft Goes Down between Stadium and Manzariyah. 26
- (1) (TS) If Delta personnel are aboard they will take charge. 27
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(U) (TS) If aircrew only are aboard (spare bird), center [REDACTED] on emergency LZ form defensive perimeter, activate survival radio, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5. (U) PROCEDURES PRIOR TO COMMENCING E&E:

a. (TS) Escape and evasion measures should not be undertaken unless Emergency Action procedures have failed and protacted loitering in proximity (5-15 NM radius) of the downed aircraft would result in detection or capture. Downed crews must anticipate that COMJTF will not launch any external SAR missions prior to execution of the assault phase in Teheran.

b. (U) (TS) Destroy all communications equipment remaining with the aircraft.

c. (U) (TS) Orient all members of the evading party to the ground and brief them as thoroughly as possible. If in a remote area, think and plan before moving. Camouflage aircraft before departing. See Appendix 13 to Annex C (Escape and Evasion) for detailed guidance onlong-range E&E.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
EMERGENCY LANDING ZONES (TEHRAN AREA) (U)

REFERENCES: See basic Appendix

1. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Purpose. This TAB describes Emergency Landing Zones for helicopters and fixed wing aircraft in the Tehran Area.
2. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Designated Landing Zones. Helicopter landing zones (HLZ) and one fixed wing landing zone (FWLZ) have been designated by JTF intelligence personnel for emergency use within the Tehran City area. Inclosure 1 to this TAB details each of these zones.
3. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Nondesignated Landing Zones. Use of other landing zones and available airfields is authorized, at the discretion of the aircraft commanders. However, caution is required to preclude an unsafe landing or hostile action against the aircrew/aircraft by local Iranian militia or civilians. All Iranian airfields should be considered to be occupied by hostiles, with exception of those designated above.
4. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Landing Zone Markings. If the tactical situation permits, all landing zones will be marked as specified in this APPENDIX.

Inclosures:

1. Emergency HLZ/FWLZ in the Tehran Area
2. Map of Emergency HLZ/FWLZ in the Tehran Area

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 12 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF
OPLAN (U)

EMERGENCY HLZ/FWLZ IN THE TEHRAN AREA (U)

1. (U) (TS) Emergency HLZ "Race Track" (For use during ingress from east).
 - a. Location of center (UTM): 39S WV 4694 5181
(LAT/LONG): 35° 42' 28" N
051° 31' 08" E
 - b. Dimensions (Approx): 720M x 280M
 - c. Axis (approx): 171° Mag Elev (approx): 4060'
 - d. Obstacles: Power lines on east side, light towers on north, east, and south; trench on north end, small dirt mounds.
 - e. From Embassy Stadium 090° Mag/8300M
2. (U) (TS) Emergency HLZ "Construction Area" (For use - ingress from north).
 - a. Location of center (UTM): 39S WV 3842 5558
(LAT/LONG): 35° 44' 36" N
051° 25' 40" E
 - b. Dimensions (approx): 250M x 400M
 - c. Axis (approx): 170° Mag Elev (approx): 4510'
 - d. Obstacles: There are some vehicles in the area, which could move without prior notice onto the LZ.
 - e. From Embassy Stadium 350° Mag/4000M.
3. (U) (TS) Emergency HLZ "School Yard" (For use - egress to south).

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a. Location of center (UTM): 39S WV 3861 5134	<u>1</u>
(LAT/LONG): 35° 42' 15" N	<u>2</u>
051° 25' 38" E	<u>3</u>
b. Dimensions: (approx) 67M x 57M	<u>4</u>
c. Axis (approx): 085° Mag Elev (approx): 3900'	<u>5</u>
d. Obstacles: None observed.	<u>6</u>
e. From Embassy Stadium: 182° Mag/750M	<u>7</u>
4. (U) (TS) Emergency HLZ "Small Field" (For use - egress to	<u>8</u>
south). (This is a small stadium/athletics field)	<u>9</u>
a. Location of center (UTM): 39S WV 3724 5068.	<u>10</u>
(LAT/LONG): 35° 51' 54" N	<u>11</u>
051° 24' 44" E	<u>12</u>
b. Dimensions (approx): 100M x 57M.	<u>13</u>
c. Axis (approx) 105° Mag elev (approx): 3850'	<u>14</u>
d. Obstacles: None observed.	<u>15</u>
e. From Stadium 232°/2500M.	<u>16</u>
5. (U) (TS) Emergency HLZ "South Field" (For use - egress to	<u>17</u>
south). (This is a small stadium/athletics field)	<u>18</u>
a. Location of center (UTM): 39S WV 3599 4939.	<u>19</u>
(LAT/LONG): 35° 41' 12" N	<u>20</u>
051° 23' 54" E	<u>21</u>
b. Dimensions (approx): 88M x 87M	<u>22</u>
c. Axis (approx): 357° Mag Elev (approx): 3770'.	<u>23</u>
d. Obstacles: Light towers on SW & SE corners, 5	<u>24</u>
small towers and pit on west side of field.	<u>25</u>
e. From Stadium: 240°/4300M.	<u>26</u>
6. (U) (TS) Emergency fixed-wing LZ "Kahrizak" (For use - egress	<u>27</u>
to south).	<u>28</u>
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
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
a. Location of center (UTM): 39S WV 385 231	<u>1</u>
(LAT/LONG): 35° 27' 15" N	<u>2</u>
051° 15' 20" E	<u>3</u>
b. Dimensions (approx): 4900' x 95' (western	<u>4</u>
3600' usable).	<u>5</u>
c. Axis (approx): 100° Mag Elev: 3600' (approx)	<u>6</u>
d. Obstacles: Power lines approx 400M West of runway.	<u>7</u>
e. From Stadium 195° Mag 30KM.	<u>8</u>
7. (U) (PS) Emergency HLZ "KARAJ" (For use - egress to West).	<u>9</u>
a. Location of center (UTM): 39S VV 882 596.	<u>10</u>
(LAT/LONG): 35° 46' 38" N	<u>11</u>
050° 52' 45" E	<u>12</u>
b. Dimensions (approx): 3250' x 70'.	<u>13</u>
c. Axis (approx): 142° Mag Elev: 4050'	<u>14</u>
d. Obstacles: None observed.	<u>15</u>
e. From Embassy Stadium: 272° Mag 53 KM.	<u>16</u>
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
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APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
ESCAPE AND EVASION (E&E) (U)

(U) REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN.

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. (U) Enemy. See ANNEX B, this OPLAN.

b. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Friendly. There are no positively identified friendly assets or assistance, nor available Selected Areas for Evasion (SAFE) within Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, or the USSR.

c. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Assumptions.

(1) ^(U)~~(S)~~ The hostage recovery operation is conducted independent of other options/operations in the Persian Gulf area.

(2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Iranian military forces will oppose all post-operation evasion attempts.

(3) ^(U)~~(S)~~ The Government of Iran will enlist all Iranians in evader location searches, country-wide.

2. ^(U)~~(S)~~ MISSION: JTF forces will conduct evasion and escape operations, as required, to attain refuge and subsequent repatriation of U.S. control., .

3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) Concept of Operations. See ANNEX C, this OPLAN.

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b. (U) Concept of E&E Operations. JTF subordinate

A- commands, (Delta, Rangers, Helo/Fixed Wing Squadrons),
are responsible for developing E&E plans for those
phases of the operations over which they have
operational control. Joint E&E operations will be
under the operational control of those Delta/Ranger
forces command, regardless of relative ranks, when
other forces are joined with Delta/Ranger forces in
an E&E situation.

c. (U) Tasks of Subordinate JTF Units.

A- (1) (U) Delta. Prepare specific guidance and
procedures for the conduct of E&E from within
and around Tehran for mission personnel (Delta
and Aircrews) and the hostages. Plan for and
conduct training for the conduct of E&E as noted
above.

A- (2) (U) Rangers. Prepare specific guidance and
procedures for the conduct of E&E from
Manzariyeh Airfield for mission personnel and
hostages. Plan for and conduct training, as
appropriate for the conduct of E&E, as noted above.

A- (3) (U) Helicopter Squadron. Prepare specific
guidance and procedures for the conduct of E&E

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from along the flight route from the USS
NIMITZ to the desert LZ; from along
the flight route from the desert LZ-Delta
Dropoff/hide Site; hideout-AmerEmbassy
Compound; Compound-Manzariyeh Airfield. Plan
for and conduct training, as appropriate, for
the conduct of E&E, as noted above.

- (4) (U) MC/AC-130 Squadron(s). Prepare specific
guidance and procedures for the conduct of E&E
from along the flight route from the Iranian
border-desert LZ; Iranian border to
Tehran (AC-130); Iranian border-Manzariyeh
Airfield, and along selected alternate egress
routes to bordering countries, as desired. Plan
for and conduct training, as appropriate, for
the conduct of E&E, as noted above.

d. (U) Tasks of Friendly Forces.

- (1) (U) TF 70 forces support E&E operations of this
plan as directed by CINCPAC, to the limit of
their SAR capability, and to the extent that
their CAP can support post-operation E&E.

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e. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Common Procedures.

(a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Primary means of communications will be by secure voice radio, if possible. Backup commo will be by crew survival radios on alternate guard frequency (282.8).

(b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Delta E&E plan will be utilized by all personnel evading in the desert LZ and Tehran area. Ranger E&E plan will be utilized by all personnel evading in the Manzariyeh area, including aircrews downed within this area.

(c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Hostages, regardless of rank, will not act with command authority, except as directed by the senior recovery force element commander. In a conflict of opinion on where to go, or how to evade between Delta/Ranger force personnel and other personnel (air crews), the ranking Delta/Ranger will have command authority regardless of relative ranks.

(d) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Personnel conducting E&E operations will make every effort to remove wounded personnel with them as they evade. No mission personnel will be left behind unless absolutely necessary to avoid total operation/element

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failure. Personnel remaining behind will be clearly marked as incapable of defending themselves. KIA's left behind will be concealed as best as possible; identification and compromising documents removed, and the location marked on a map for future personnel accounting/decedent affairs purposes.

(e) (U) (S) Key personnel, only, will be briefed on the pickup point, time, and coordinating instructions prior to mission launch. Other personnel will be briefed only on the E&E concept in broad terms, and only provided with initial rally point/communications point information to receive further instructions. Upon mission launch, personnel may be briefed to the degree deemed appropriate by their commanders.

(2) (U) (S) Corridor Designation. Two general areas have been designated, referred to as the EASTERN AREA and the WESTERN AREA. The EASTERN AREA is a north-south strip running along a line from the coast nearest the Pakistani border, northwest to a point near TABAS, and then-west by northwest to TEHRAN. The WESTERN AREA is a north-south strip running along a line from KHARK ISLAND north to TEHRAN, extending east to

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a width of approximately 50 miles on its northern half of the area., See Tab A for a more detailed discussion of these areas.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. (S) Logistics.

[REDACTED] Other logistic requirements will be coordinated with the JTF should service elements be unable to provide; i.e., compasses, signal panels, signal mirrors, etc. Specific requirements for survival bundles to be dropped to evading elements will be configured by the JTF upon receipt of D-Day/C-Day authorization from JCS.

b. (U) Administration. See basic OPLAN.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. (U) Signal. See ANNEX K this OPLAN, and Tab D this Appendix for communications procedures.

b. (S) Command. Joint E&E operations will be conducted under the command of the senior Delta/Ranger person present, regardless of relative rank. Unilateral E&E operations will be conducted under the command of the senior person present., Under no circumstances will hostage personnel be placed in a command position of mission forces, regardless of hostage rank/postion.

Tabs-

A. Corridors

B. Evasion Aids

C. Visual Signals/LZ Markings

D. Communications Procedures

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April 30, 1980

L-6

G ... getting on and then one of the helicopter pilots got out of his helicopter, came out and got me by the arm and said that - I think it was [REDACTED] - he said I have a message for you and the message is from Colonel Siefert that all these five choppers will fly -- one is down. At that point I went straight and got Jim Kyle and said Jim I have only got five choppers and I am not going to go with five choppers. I can't make it. I said I cannot make it with five choppers based on my loads. And Jim did his job there sir. He said Charlie think about it a minute now. What do you think? Do you think you can make it? Why don't you consider going part way? And I said well let me think about it a second Jim, and I said, and I thought a few minutes and I said, no Jim, it's a mistake. I said if eight choppers took off and there are only five flyable ones here then obviously the percentage is not very good. And I said coupled with the fact that I have lost some choppers and the pilots abilities to get me there -- and I had sir. And then I said Jim I am not going to get on these choppers because we don't have what we agreed on and I am going to load my people on the 130's, so tell me which ones you want me to get on, and Jim said spread your people out and get them on all the 130's and before he said that, and before I said that, Jim Kyle had already talked to Siefert sir. Now when I finished talking to General Siefert and he said he would go and then I got off -- going back now and McGuire met me there and I was checking if we were loaded, and he said there were only five and I immediately turned and went and got Jim Kyle because Jim was the commander over me there.

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GENERAL JONES: I think that was just exactly what you should do. The report we have and we haven't been able to confirm this with Jim Kyle is that he went to helicopter number two -- the sixth helicopter, the one that had the hydraulic problem and talked to the pilot about it and then went to talk to Siefert and said here is this problem; he had a hydraulic pump out; is that a go or no go and Siefert said that is no go or something like that.

BECKWITH: I was not there and cannot witness that.

GENERAL JONES: Yea. But we'll talk to Kyle, but yours is consistent with what he said. OK.

BECKWITH: I wrote a paper and gave it to General Gast this morning on one of the problems that he asked me today. Why six choppers? Why didn't you go with five and the impact; and I gave him about four pages of rationale.

GENERAL JONES. You would have had to drop off 5,000 pounds of stuff and all that sort of thing I understand.

BECKWITH: Sir, I wouldn't have made it in my view. That was the reason that I guess you could say that I -- I didn't ask Jim Kyle. I said Jim I'm not going because I only had five choppers that are flyable and we all agreed we wouldn't go unless we had six _____. And secondly, the percentage with eight choppers taking off the carrier and only five flyable -- that means that three are down -- and the probability of losing two more is very very high.

GENERAL JONES: And you would have lost the 5,000 pounds and the people on that ...

BECKWITH: I would have left the people off sir.

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GENERAL JONES: To try to pick up and go with that and one of the helicopters enroute would have had difficulty _____. OK.

BECKWITH: I was _____ all the time there and I was behind my schedule, and I said to myself I know I have got three and a half hours and I will take the risk of getting in there in daylight, but I will not take the risk of going with five choppers sir.

GENERAL JONES: Yea. I think it was absolutely right and we concurred in that decision and I think the main thing we have got to be sure is that we don't try to judge what others would or would not do and I don't think you are doing that. The last we -- what we heard is Siefert said and the helicopter pilots said we will go...

BECKWITH: And I would try...

GENERAL JONES: and they would try and we have got to take them at their word that they would have tried if they had had six helicopters.

BECKWITH: With all due respect I wish that if you have the time or later on ask Colonel Pittman to come in. This morning for two hours he put me through the whole thing and I feel a little bit better about the helicopter pilots; that they had a rough road sir.

GENERAL JONES: I talked to Pittman at great length and I think people who have talked to the helicopter pilots; people from the the Congress have come away with an opinion that that was a very very rough ride under some very difficult circumstances and people can understand why they were worn out when they got there.

BECKWITH: Yes sir, well I personally at the site at Desert I felt that the pilots were short of courage and that is how I

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felt. But I do not feel that way now after hearing what Colonel Pittman said. Many of those pilots had not experienced things that I have experienced and other people. If they had done that -- in other words I understand that sir -- I am not blaming anybody. We in the Defense Department have got to get along with all the Services.

GENERAL JONES: Well I. OK Charlie. What we would like to have you do is come back up.

BECKWITH: I am due there in the morning at nine o'clock, but I can come back earlier if you like sir. Whatever you tell me to do I will do it.

GENERAL JONES: I think nine o'clock or if you can get here a little bit before that, but that is probably OK.

BECKWITH: I will do that.

GENERAL JONES: What we need to do as I mentioned to you is to have you -- and we will talk about it with you in the morning, but to meet on backgrounder with the press along with at least Jim Kyle and maybe Siefert, particularly Jim Kyle, and just lay out without trying to guess what others would do but lay out essentially what we have talked about here.

BECKWITH: Yes sir.

GENERAL JONES: And I think we will put to bed many of these allegations that there were arguments as to whether to go with five or whether you were overruled and everything else.

BECKWITH: There was no argument about it at all. And we made an estimate of the situation and made a decision and thought that was the best thing to do.

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GENERAL JONES: And I think everybody agrees and the more we look at it in the aftermath, the wiser the decision was.

BECKWITH: General Meyer told me yesterday sir had I loaded on and gone with five choppers he would have cut off my testicles. (laughter) -- but he said that would have been unwise and I said well sir ...

GENERAL JONES: I think that everything in the aftermath indicates that if we didn't have six good helicopters it was a very wise decision to make and you acted properly. And everyone acted properly. If you could get up here in the morning.

BECKWITH: I will be there.

GENERAL JONES: And we will get together at that time and have a meeting and a backgrounder with the press and just tell it. We want to make sure they understand that we are not giving anybody any orders to shut up; there is no muzzeling; the only area which we tell the press that we are going to restrict people talking about are those things from a classification standpoint beyond Desert I; what would happen in Tehran; and also the bases from which we operated. The things of that nature. What went on in the desert we have got nothing to apologize for, and we will tell them what happened and let the chips fall where they may. But the point is we have got a good story and we want to be honest and straightforward and candid on it.

BECKWITH: I understand. I just want the chance to get back; that is the only thing I am mad about.

GENERAL JONES: OK

BECKWITH: I will tell it like it is sir.

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GENERAL JONES: I know you will. You always have Charlie and I look forward to seeing you and when you get in in the morning come and we will have a little discussion and then ...

BECKWITH: I will come to your office as soon as I get in and that will be about 8 o'clock sir.

GENERAL JONES: Very good. Thank you Charlie.

BECKWITH: Sorry to bother you sir.

GENERAL JONES: No no, this is part of what we're paid for and I think we can put a lot of things to rest tomorrow.

BECKWITH: Yes sir. Thank you sir. Bye.

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INTRODUCTION

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On 24 April 1980, the first phase of a three-phase hostage rescue mission was initiated. This phase included a nighttime clandestine entry and a desert rendezvous between eight RH-53 helicopters and a flight of six transport aircraft. The latter were to arrive first, carrying (a) a combat control team to direct subsequent aircraft operations, (b) a team of Rangers to secure the rendezvous site, (c) the main rescue force of approximately 90 Special Operations personnel and their equipment (hereafter referred to as the "Delta force") who were to transfer to the helicopters for the next leg, and (d) fuel bladders from which the helicopters were to refuel upon arrival.

The transport portion of this insertion phase proceeded as planned. The lead aircraft landed about an hour in advance of the others and disembarked the combat control team and security force. In short order, the landing site and refueling area, code named DESERT ONE, were set up and secured and the remaining aircraft landed on schedule. When the Delta force was disembarked and the fuel-carrying aircraft were safely on the ground, the first two transports departed for their recovery base. The rest of the force awaited the arrival of the helicopters.

However, while enroute to the site the helicopters encountered an unforeseen combination of material and weather mishaps, such that only six of the original eight RH-53s arrived at the refueling point and one of these had a malfunction that made continued flight unsafe. Since a minimum of six operational helicopters was required for the next leg of the mission, the decision was made to abort and return transports and operational helicopters to their respective launch points. However, after a tragic collision between a helicopter and one of the transports, the transports evacuated all

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surviving US personnel from the refueling site, leaving the helicopters behind.

The following report will explain the major elements of the plan for the balance of the rescue mission. This report will be as complete as possible, omitting only those details of the mission whose revelation could (a) compromise prospective special operations of this nature anywhere in the world, or (b) risk the welfare or the lives of friendly elements in any way associated with the planned operation.

Phase I -- Insertion Continued

As soon as all refueling was completed, the helicopters would have departed DESERT ONE with the Delta force and their equipment aboard and flown at low altitude to a remote and desolate desert location some 60 road miles southeast of Tehran. After the helicopters' departure, the remaining transports also would have taken off and would have departed Iran at low altitude under cover of darkness.

Landing before dawn on 25 April, the arriving helicopters were to be met by a reception party that would update the Delta Commander on late developments in Tehran. As soon as conditions permitted, the reception party would escort key members of the Delta force on a clandestine vehicle reconnaissance of route and objective areas in the morning hours. Meanwhile, the remainder of the Delta force would unload, set up concealed defensive positions in ravines along an adjacent desert plateau, post perimeter guards, and settle in before sunrise to rest and to await execution of the next phase of the mission.

As soon as Delta was disembarked, the helicopters were to disperse to a series of previously identified shallow craters and depressions atop the

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nearby desert plateau. In addition to the concealment afforded by their remote location and terrain features, the helicopters were to be covered with camouflage nets to protect against a chance sighting from the air during the day. After their helicopters were secure, the crews were to establish perimeter guards and, like the Delta force, attempt to rest for the following night's mission.

The landing and hideout sites had been selected after an exhaustive analysis of several candidate locations by photo interpreters followed by physical inspection by on-scene operatives. The planned locations were selected in part because of their isolation from population concentrations and thoroughfares. The only road in the area was well out of sight and earshot of the drop-off point and several miles from the helicopter hideout site. The Delta hideout area was situated far enough from the road to permit concealment, particularly in light of the surrounding rough terrain features, yet close enough for the Delta force to move to the road on foot when the next phase of the mission got underway.

Another consideration in site selection was that, in any such clandestine operation in an unfriendly country, the risk of discovery is ever-present. The planned hideout locations were determined to offer the best operational and physical security. Concealment was good and, in the unlikely event of discovery, it would be better to have the helicopter force and Delta positioned to be mutually supporting with firepower and mobility. In the absence of any such discovery or any indication [REDACTED] had occurred, the forces would be in good position to maintain their cover until it was time to depart the hideouts for the next phase.

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Phase II -- Rescue

This phase consisted generally of four interlocking and overlapping sub-units: the main hostage release at the Embassy compound; the coordinated and concurrent release of the three diplomats held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Building; the helicopter pickup; and air support covering the entire operation.

(S) If all indications supported continuing the mission, several [REDACTED] hideout area after nightfall from an [REDACTED] Acquired earlier by on-scene operatives, each [REDACTED]

(S) The Delta force was to break camp, move overland with their equipment to the loading site near (but concealed from) the road, and [REDACTED] in predetermined and well-practiced order. [REDACTED] would then be [REDACTED] an unobtrusive pace into and through Tehran over a reconnoitered route assuring there were no last minute roadblocks or other such indications of alert in their path. Blending in with the substantial [REDACTED] which is a commonplace feature of Tehran's streets, even at night, the Delta [REDACTED] would move inconspicuously to a frequently used area where [REDACTED] some distance from the Embassy compound. There they were to await the signal from the Delta force commander to move forward.

In order to understand fully the team's confidence in this portion of the plan, one must appreciate the peculiar mixture of social disorganization, carelessness, and acceptance of the bizarre that pervaded most of the city. Despite the hostage crisis, Americans and other Westerners moved freely and

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unmolested throughout Tehran. There was a relaxed attitude, even around the exterior of the Embassy compound (loose security procedures, no roadblocks, etc.). At the same time, there were frequent nighttime disturbances, including gunfire, which rarely sparked official reaction. In short, the unusual had become the norm, and it is against this physical and psychological backdrop that the remainder of the rescue mission was to be conducted.

A ~~(S)~~ In the early morning hours, [REDACTED] were to move to the vicinity of the compound and the Delta force was to begin the main rescue operation. They had reliable intelligence that the perimeter of the compound was lightly guarded at night and there was a good probability that they would have been able to surprise and overcome the small number of sentries without alerting those inside the compound. With this accomplished, the force would have set up its own perimeter security and the bulk of the force would have gone over the wall. Once inside, Delta would have separated into a number of previously rehearsed task groups.

~~(S)~~ The force had good evidence that the rumors of mines, explosive booby traps, and other warning devices on the Embassy compound were untrue. However, they had been trained to cope with the unexpected and would have been prepared to adjust their tactics to accommodate whatever conditions they actually encountered. For example, among other specialized equipment at their disposal, the force had quantities of [REDACTED] [REDACTED], which could have been employed if the tactical conditions warranted.

The force also had what was considered to be highly reliable intelligence on the location of the hostages. Making their way under cover of darkness to the buildings where the hostages were thought to be confined, the teams would

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have made simultaneous entries, relying on shock, speed, darkness, and surprise to free the hostages with the minimum use of force.

As the members of the team freed groups of hostages, they would be brought to a central location near a large open field to prepare for extraction. Under optimum circumstances (i.e., all hostages located where anticipated and no unexpected resistance by their captors), the entire group could have been assembled and ready for extraction within 30 minutes. However, the team was prepared to remain in the compound for more than an hour, if necessary, to insure that all the hostages were accounted for and free.

As the main rescue force was commencing its move on the Embassy compound, a separate rescue operation was to be launched at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs where the US Chargé and two colleagues were being held. As with the main effort, surprise was a critical factor for success. Therefore, timing would be important: if the rescue were attempted prematurely, there was a risk that Iranian authorities might be alerted and an alarm could have been flashed to the Embassy guards and/or other armed elements in the vicinity. Conversely, any significant delay after the main rescue was begun could have complicated or compromised the attempt at the Ministry, both because the captives' guards might be alerted and because the pickup of both groups was best carried out concurrently.

The helicopter pickup of freed hostages and rescue forces was the third key component of the rescue operation. Earlier in the evening, after the Delta force had departed the hideout, the helicopter crews would have cast off the camouflage nets and readied their machines for flight. At a signal from the Delta commander, they were to take off from their concealed

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locations and fly to separate predetermined orbit points to await the call for pickup of the freed hostages and the rescue force.

Back at the Embassy, while the hostages were being freed and assembled, elements of the Delta force would have attempted to clear the stakes and other obstructions to helicopter landing in a portion of the large open field within the compound. If a helicopter landing appeared feasible, the Delta force commander would have summoned one of the orbiting helicopters to this landing site where the first helicopter load of freed hostages and any US casualties would be quickly placed aboard for their flight to the extraction site. (The three freed MFA captives and their rescuers would already have been picked up separately at another designated location.)

Other helicopters would be called in to an empty sports stadium across the street from the compound as the rescue force and the remaining hostages moved to that location. (The ground approaches to the stadium would have been secured previously by an element of the Delta force.) A second pickup area was required because hostile fire could have posed a serious risk to subsequent helicopters approaching the compound once the element of surprise was lost after the appearance of the first helicopter.

A different helicopter approach to the sports stadium was judged the best way to keep the Iranian defenders off balance. Also, the large playing field, shielded by the high stadium walls, offered a suitable area for protected, near-simultaneous landing of multiple helicopters, rapid boarding of the Delta force and the remaining hostages, and high speed escape.

(5) An additional confidence factor overarching the other three components of the hostage rescue was the planned support from two tiers of air

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A capability: on-scene and on-call. The on-scene tier involve a flight of AC-130 gunships which would have penetrated to the outskirts of Tehran [REDACTED] until the two near-simultaneous rescue operations commenced.

At the appropriate time, the crews of two AC-130s, equipped with night vision devices, direct communications with the Delta force commander, and an array of sophisticated fire support armament, would have taken up preplanned orbits over the city. Their principal mission was to maintain direct aerial observation of the ground situation in order to keep the Delta force commander informed of hostile movements. Their considerable firepower was to be used only as necessary to repel direct threats to mission success.

(S) One aircraft was to orbit so as to observe developments within and around the Embassy compound. The other aircraft was to monitor events at the MFA and also to maintain watch on Mehrabad Airport [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] Either was capable of demonstrating and employing firepower to deter and, if necessary, to suppress any attacks on itself or the rescue force. For example, the aircraft had highly [REDACTED] well suited to inhibiting personnel approaches to the Embassy on [REDACTED] without necessarily causing personal injury. Naturally, if opposition forces were heavier than anticipated, the full AC-130 firepower (high rate-of-fire machine gun, 105mm cannon, etc.) could have been brought to bear to protect the mission.

Additional tactical air support in an emergency was available "on-call" from carrier-based F-14s and A-6s. According to plan, armed flights of each type of aircraft would have been launched as the rescue force entered the

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compound and would have been accompanied by air refueling support into the northern portion of the Persian Gulf. They were to loiter there awaiting the call of the Delta force commander for assistance. In the event the rescue force had been seriously delayed or pinned down by an unexpected Iranian force, this air support provided an additional safety valve to help prevent collapse of the mission.

Phase III - Extraction

At roughly the same time that the Delta force was to commence its operations at the Embassy compound, a formation of transport aircraft would begin arriving at an unoccupied landing site several miles away from Tehran after a clandestine, low altitude penetration. The lead aircraft would be carrying a Ranger force whose mission would be to establish a security cordon around the landing site and deny ground interference with extraction operations. Also aboard would be a combat control team and contingency fuel in the event the helicopters needed refueling for an unplanned return to the compound.

Air support for this mission was also to be provided from the AC-130 gunship flight which had penetrated earlier to support the rescue operations. Emergency air support against unexpectedly heavy ground opposition and/or an air threat would have been available from the on-call tactical air formations mentioned earlier (if not otherwise committed in the rescue attempt).

With the landing site secured, the remaining transport aircraft would land and wait with engines running until the rescue helicopters arrived with the freed hostages and the Delta force aboard. Medical personnel would be aboard to provide immediate care to any casualties.

As the helicopters landed (according to plan, those carrying freed hostages were to arrive first), the passengers would board the waiting

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transports, each of which would take off as soon as it was loaded. The helicopter crews were to transfer all classified materials from their helicopters to a transport aircraft and abandon their aircraft at the landing site.

The remaining freed hostages, the Delta force, the helicopter crews, and finally the Rangers would board the remaining aircraft and all would take off, withdrawing from Iranian airspace at low altitude and within the protective reach of the fighters orbiting over the Persian Gulf. As the transports departed, the remaining covering tactical air and air refueling forces would complete their withdrawal, recovering at a designated landing base or back aboard the carrier.

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L-8

Time
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Foreman: This is Foreman, over

Insulator: Foreman, this is Insulator, over

Foreman: This is Foreman. We only have 5 good birds now. They are all refueled. However, helicopter leader recommends we abort and return to base. There are no casualties. We could continue at great risk. Request your advice, over.

(Brief background conversation -- Insulator directs that President and SecDef be called to phone)

0:12

Insulator: Do you have any word on the sixth bird, over?

Foreman: Roger, we have six there. It has hydraulics problems. One bird is unaccounted for between the launch point and the refuel point, over.

Insulator: One what is unaccounted for?

Foreman: One helicopter, over.

Insulator: It cleared the launch point and what did it do with regard to the . . .

(Pause -- brief background conversation. Asks SecDef to come to ops center)

1:28

Foreman: This is Foreman, over

Insulator: OK -- on the helicopter, one you say is missing. Do you have any idea where it is? Over

Foreman: Negative. I'll attempt to find out. It is unaccounted for.

(Brief pause)

Foreman: I'll recapitulate the information we hold.

Insulator: OK

1:52

Foreman: Eight helicopters launched. One supposedly returned to Nimitz. We do not have confirmation that he arrived at the Nimitz. One is unaccounted for. Six are at the refuel site. Five of those six are refueled and are prepared to return to launch base. Delta Force has loaded aboard 130s and is prepared to extract. All commanders at refuel site recommend we extract the force. Request your decision urgently. Over

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2:37 Insulator: OK, (Repeat off -- mike call for phone contact with President)
In 30 seconds, Rock Castle will be here and we will end up
making our determination. If all people would be aboard,
you would leave the truck (Iranian bus) and so forth there.
Is that correct? Over

Foreman: That is a Roger. We have gone back with that force in the
advance area. We would attempt to return them to their
original location and extract. Over

3:30 Insulator: OK, Rock Castle is here now. Let me give him a quick recap
(Insulator briefs SecDef on situation and abort recommendation)

4:17 Insulator: We concur with your recommendation but hold one before
executing to see if we can get a call through across the
river but we will concur with that. You would leave the sixth
chopper there; would you destroy it or what, over?

Foreman: Yes, we will attempt to destroy it. Over

Insulator: OK.

(Brief discussion)

4:48 Insulator: OK. If we go out with those choppers, if they can be alert
to any signals or anything from helicopters who might be down,
our effort then will be to get those choppers back on Nimitz
and recycle them for rescue. Over

Foreman: This is Foreman. Roger. Wilco. Anything further?

Insulator: If you can, hold for just a minute. Rock Castle is on and
trying to get Momentum. We should have him momentarily.

Foreman: This is Foreman. Waiting, out.

5:33 Insulator: OK.

(Brief pause)

5:55 Insulator: He is talking across and I should have it in 15 seconds here.

Foreman: Roger, waiting.

Insulator: I assume the people that are in the bus know that it's U.S.

Foreman: We are not certain that they do. We will do everything to
preclude their learning that, over.

	<u>Time</u>	<u>Ref:</u>	
0	6:29		Insulator: OK. We concur that with only five, our previous determination that that was an abort is a sound decision, right?
			Foreman: This is Foreman. Roger, plus the helicopter commander has no confidence, or low confidence that he can complete the mission. Over
5	6:51		Insulator: Hold a second (Brief pause -- discussion)
2	7:20		Insulator: How long do you think (you can wait) for a decision. Do we have a few minutes. Over Foreman: This is Foreman. Very few. The birds are already getting into their lowest fuel profile. I will advise longest waiting period. Not more than 10 in my opinion. Am checking. Over
3	7:44		Insulator: OK. (Brief discussion)
1	7:55		Insulator: We got a report there is one helicopter 80 miles out, 2 hours fuel, no problems. We do not know whether or not it has the second crew aboard. Over Foreman: This is Foreman. Most likely it does. We will attempt to learn that soonest. Over. Insulator: OK. We get a report from the ... (interrupted) They said in five minutes we would have Momentum on; therefore we should have a decision within five minutes. We will try to determine whether there is one or two crews aboard that one that is 80 miles out of the Nimitz.
5	8:53		Foreman: This is Foreman. Roger. I have rechecked maximum of 15 minutes with repositioning tankers. Action is being taken. Waiting your additional instructions. Over Insulator: OK. We should have it in less than that time period. It is just to confirm what we believe would be the decision to agree with you. The risk of doing it with less than five (meant six) is very high because of the cycle time and there is no way I assume to repair the one with the hydraulic problem. Over Foreman: Negative. I understand it is a major leak. We will resolve. We started with eight as compared to seven which was the original plan. We have lost three helicopters out of eight; now the fourth one which is 50% of what we started with. The commander has low confidence in ultimate success. Over

Page	Time	Ref:	
35	10:03		<p>Insulator: OK, I'll repeat that; having already lost three out of eight with the most demanding part ahead, the chances of losing one more are very high.</p> <p>Foreman: This is Foreman, roger.</p> <p>(Pause -- Background conversation)</p>
33	10:40		<p>Insulator: We are querying the ship right now to see if there are two crews aboard that one helicopter.</p> <p>Foreman: Roger, waiting.</p> <p>(Pause -- Background conversation)</p>
32	11:15		<p>Foreman: While we are waiting, I believe the returning helicopters will be able to find him. They should know his location. By then it will be daylight. They should be able to find him if he has not been recovered. Over</p> <p>Insulator: If he has any communications at all and thinks they are coming back through there. Hopefully they can find them if the crew is not already aboard the other chopper.</p> <p>Foreman: If not picked up. Over</p> <p>Insulator: We still don't know whether two helicopters had mechanical difficulty to start with do we? Or one just buddied down, or two buddied down? Over</p>
	11:56		<p>Foreman: Negative. Not fully clear. All launched, all crossed the coast, all got an hour into the mission, and then we began to have problems. At about one hour with one bird, later with another. Over</p> <p>Insulator: OK. I had thought that you indicated that two helicopters had landed of the six and picked up people but now that is erroneous. Right?</p> <p>Foreman: I am not certain. We have no confirmation. That was the plan. I believe that occurred. We concentrated on the mission end and not on the rescue or recovery part. We have two different stories. I am trying to clear it up. Over</p> <p>Insulator: Yeah. Do you know how many helicopter crews are at Desert One? Over</p>
8	12:50		<p>Foreman: Roger. Six. Over</p>

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Insulator: It would be important to find that out if there are six or seven. If there are seven we do not have a rescue mission. If there are only six then we have one unaccounted for. Over

34 13:07 Foreman: Roger. I will recheck. Wait, out.
(Pause)

41 13:36 Foreman: We have only about five minutes. Recommend we make extraction decision at that time, work out details of rescue enroute.

Insulator: I agree

Foreman: We should have good comm with C-130s to learn whereabouts of all helicopter crews. Over

47 13:58 Insulator: OK. We have Momentum on the line now. I would expect momentarily a confirmation, in just a matter of seconds.
(Pause)

53 14:18 Foreman: While you are waiting, we will debrief the force from Desert One soonest to ascertain whether or not they believe our identity was discovered. Until we do so, recommend denial of any assertions. Over

Insulator: OK. We will try that. It will be well after daylight as they cross the coast down there, I assume. We will work other problems such as CAP from E-2 and that sort of thing. But we have a little time on it.

Foreman: Roger. Yes, that is a very sparse area -- very little danger or minimal danger. Over

E (C) Insulator: What the plan would be is to fly the five helicopters back to the carrier, destroy the sixth one, and the 130's would all return to [REDACTED] Is that the plan? Over

Foreman: Roger. Over

271 15:21 Insulator: OK. Well you...
(Pause -- abort decision confirmed by President)

274 15:28 Insulator. We concur with your decision to abort. Over

Foreman: Roger. Will abort. Will keep you informed (on) progress. Out.

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Insulator: The key is on the rescue info, whenever we can get it, to see whether we have to mount something for a helicopter.
Over

Foreman: Roger. Will keep you informed. Over

Insulator: OK. Good, and when everybody gets off Desert One let us know.

32 15:45 Foreman: Roger, Wilco.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF **L-10**
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DATE 28 AUG

MEMORANDUM FOR Col Stebbins

(C) This is a transcript of the
tapes made during the Rescue mission
between ~~██████████~~ and Gen. Jones

E

Though doubtful, it is possible
that certain members of the BASC
may be granted a request to hear
the tapes.

There exist today, the original
tape and an edited tape. You
have both.

The edited tape ^{is} ~~has~~ verbatim
of this script minus portions
yellowed out. (+ clipped)

G

Mr. ~~██████████~~ has concurred
with edited version. ETCS
informed me that he wanted
to review the transcript and
also to be in the loop on any
decision for anyone to review.

This ^{are} ~~is~~ the only ^{two} ~~one~~ copy of
the transcript. ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~disc.~~ ^{disc.}

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 8012355

INDUCED ON 18 NOV 92

EXEMPTED BY DDO NMCC

DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO

VIEW ON OADIR

DERIVED FROM JS

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During 24-25 April 1980, personnel from the Joint Task Force ~~here~~^{Rear} recorded transmissions between HQ Joint Task Force, from their deployed location, and JCS in the Pentagon. These recordings were undertaken by the JTF communications officer in the Pentagon to aide in the preparation of the after action report which was expected to follow completion of the mission. The transcribed record, however, is not complete and in places has been edited.

Because of the sensitivity and classification of the mission, normal recording capabilities associated with the National Military Command Center (NMCC) were not used. Instead, a portable cassette recorder, identical to those used within the NMCC, was connected to the secure instrument provided for dedicated point to point communications with HQ, JTF. This recorder requires ~~manned~~^{manual} start-stop for each transmission to be recorded and does not provide any electronic means of establishing the time of each call recorded. In addition, the use of cassettes requires close monitoring to insure cassettes are turned over or replaced without missing transmissions. Due to the activity generated as a result of the mission as executed, there were times the recorder was not started promptly with each call and on two occasions total transmissions were not recorded because cassette tapes ran out.

Duplicates of the original cassettes were prepared and edited to remove portions of some of the calls. Deleted items are references to actual deployment and employment bases, discussions of events beyond Desert One, and ^{particularly} sensitive classified intelligence related information *and background conversations.*

To assist in understanding what will be heard, the following list of identifiers is provided.

<u>IDENTIFIER</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
MOMENTUM	PRESIDENT
ROCK CASTLE	SECDEF (Mr. Brown)
INSULATOR/REGULATOR	CJCS (Gen Jones)
FOREMAN	COMJTF (Gen Vaught)
NEWSPRINT	DEPCOMJTF (Gen Gast)
JULIET	J-33 (Gen Johnson)
HORSERACE	HELICOPTER
POSTMASTER	C-130
MERMAID	
WHISTLER	DELTA

In some instances, a series of rings or buzzes can be heard prior to a conversation. These sounds are associated with the security devices used and they are audible indications of the calls being established and going secure.

CONDUCTED ON 19 NOV 92
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☐ DECL ☐ CONTINGENCY TO
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Executive Summary

Within a few days following the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, a small team of military experts was formed to begin developing contingency plans for a possible hostage rescue mission. In simplest terms, the guiding concept was to develop the capability for a rapid, covert entry into Tehran, a surprise assault on the Embassy with as little violence and loss of life as possible on either side, and rapid exfiltration of the hostages and the rescue force.

After studying a variety of alternatives, it became clear early in the planning effort that a helicopter-supported operation offered the best prospects for success. Due to the distances involved, a corollary to this realization was that, at some point, a helicopter force would have to be refueled enroute from its launch point to its destination in the vicinity of Tehran. A major portion of the planning effort was focused on finding the best combination of location, tactics, and equipment to make the refueling, as well as the remainder of the mission, militarily feasible. Such a combination was found, although as this report will set out, another combination of events and circumstances was to cause the rescue mission to be aborted at this very refueling site, with the subsequent loss of eight American lives and seven US aircraft.

At about dusk on the evening of 24 April 1980, eight RH 53 helicopters took off from the aircraft carrier NIMITZ, cruising south of the coast of Iran, and began a journey of nearly 600 nautical miles at night and low altitude to a pre-selected refueling site in the desert. Approximately one and a half hours

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after takeoff, the crew of the number 6 helicopter received cockpit indications of an impending rotor blade failure, landed, verified the malfunction (an automatic abort situation), and abandoned their aircraft. The crew was picked up by another helicopter which then continued the mission as an individual unit.

Shortly thereafter the helicopter formation unexpectedly encountered a dust cloud of unknown size and density. While attempting to navigate through the dust with severely degraded visibility, a second helicopter (number 5) experienced a failure of several critical navigational instruments. Due to progressively deteriorating flight conditions that made safe navigation extremely questionable, the aircraft commander determined that it would be unwise to continue. He aborted the mission, reversed course, and recovered on the NIMITZ.

All crews experienced severe spatial disorientation (vertigo) while continuing to penetrate the obscuring dust cloud. It was impossible to maintain formation integrity, but six of the original eight aircraft arrived at the refueling site between approximately 50 minutes and one hour and 25 minutes later than planned.

While enroute, a third aircraft (number 2) experienced a severe hydraulic failure but elected to continue to the refueling site. Upon landing, however, the crew and on-scene commanders determined that it would be unsafe for this aircraft to take off again.

Earlier, it had been determined that a minimum of six operational helicopters would be required at the refueling site to continue the mission. Since at this point there were only five operational, the on-scene commanders, after advising the Joint Task Force Commander, (and through him the National

Command Authorities) of the situation and their recommendation to abort the operation and return to launch base. The President concurred in the recommendation and preparations began for withdrawal of the helicopters, C-130s, and the rescue force.

While repositioning one helicopter to permit another to top off his fuel tanks for the return mission, the first helicopter collided with one of the refueling C-130s. Both aircraft were almost immediately engulfed in flames in which eight crew members died. Since the C-130 was loaded with members of the rescue force awaiting extraction, even greater loss of life and injury were avoided only by swift and disciplined evacuation of the burning aircraft. Shortly afterwards, ammunition aboard both aircraft began to explode. Several helicopters were damaged by shrapnel from the explosion and/or the burning ammunition and at least one and possibly more were rendered non-flyable. At this point, with time and fuel running out for the C-130s, the decision was made to transfer all helicopter crews to the remaining C-130s and to depart the area.

Introduction

The report which follows will provide a detailed history of the key aspects of the attempted rescue mission, including planning, training, mission preparation, and events the night the positioning portion of the mission was attempted. At various points in this process, judgments were made. This report will set down the rationale and the conditions under which those judgments were reached. It will be left to the reader to evaluate the validity of the decisions. Since helicopter operations played such a central role in both the concept and the eventual abandonment of the mission, this report will focus particularly on this aspect of the mission.

Planning and Training

It was evident from the start that one of the most critical and most difficult portions of the operation--second only to the actual rescue attempt at the Embassy compound itself--was the refueling of the helicopters enroute from their launch point to their landing site in the vicinity of Tehran. Essentially, selection of a refueling site came down to a choice between an airfield or an area sufficiently flat, firm, and large to accommodate landing of refueling aircraft and the conduct of refueling operations. Before arriving at this conclusion, many other alternatives had been considered, including air drop and caching of fuel, air refueling of the helicopter, etc. The risks, complexity, and dangers of compromise to the mission of any of these other alternatives were judged to be more serious than the selected concept of air landing and ground refueling.

Some will argue from the vantage point of hindsight that some other alternative could hardly have produced a worse result. However, it should be borne in mind that, as this report will show, an abort decision on the night of the mission was inevitable before the first helicopter landed at the refueling site--and for reasons that had nothing to do with the refueling method selected. Despite the outcome of the mission, planning experts are still convinced that ground refueling from C-130s gave the mission the highest likelihood of success.

For example, a decision to seize an air field would clearly have imposed operational limitations involving possible additional loss of life and premature compromise of the mission. Other alternatives had similarly disabling disadvantages.

Therefore, the planners decided it was necessary to find a refueling site which was in a remote area within unfueled range of the helicopter force, yet close enough to Tehran to allow the helicopters to carry the rescue force and their equipment to their destination with sufficient fuel reserves to support a subsequent rescue mission. These boundaries on the problem forced the planners to focus on a relatively constrained geographical area southeast of Tehran.

The site eventually selected was the only one which satisfied the demanding criteria, in that it provided enough space for landing and refueling, met the requirement for both isolation and proximity, and provided useable visual references for night landing without use of aircraft lights. There was an obvious calculated risk in using the site because the area selected, code named Desert One, straddled a narrow, unpaved road. However, this risk was considered acceptable because of the probability of very light nighttime traffic on the road. For extra insurance, however, the concept of operations was adjusted to send in an advance C-130 with a combat control team aboard to secure the landing and refueling area.

The planning for the operation underwent an almost continuous evolution since the quiet gathering of flight crews and helicopters began the day prior to Thanksgiving 1979. One early decision was the selection of the US Navy RH-53 helicopter as the mission aircraft, based on its range, payload, and "protective coloration" as a recognized fleet aircraft. (The Navy had procured 30 of these aircraft in the early 1970s and employed them routinely in an aerial mine countermeasures role.) Six of these helicopters were transported to the aircraft carrier KITTY HAWK in the Arabian Sea in late November. These were later transferred to the NIMITZ when she arrived to replace KITTY HAWK carrying two additional RH-53s.

Meanwhile, the process of training, refinement of concepts and procedures, and more training was carried out in the final weeks of 1979 and into 1980. The bulk of the helicopter training was conducted in areas of the western U.S. where weather and topography closely approximated that of south and central Iran. The training aircraft were a mix of two similar models of the same basic design: three RH-53s and five CH-53s. (Although there are some differences in cockpit lay-outs between the two aircraft, the flight characteristics are virtually identical and all crews were given extensive experience in the mission type--the RH model--throughout the training phase. In no respect was the fact that slightly different models were sometimes used during training considered an operational limitation by any of the planners or flight crews, either before or after the actual mission.)

The pilots selected were the best around and the crew composition was specially adjusted for this mission. For comparison, the normal cockpit crew consists of an experienced pilot (the aircraft commander) and a less experienced co-pilot. For this mission, both pilots of each crew were highly experienced aircraft commanders to insure the highest level of flying skills obtainable under

the very difficult flying conditions the mission would impose. In view of the flight conditions actually encountered during the night of 24-25 April, this experience was taxed to the limit.

The aircraft and flight crews were provided the latest state-of-the-art electronic and visual navigational equipment including night vision devices. Even with these aids, the mission--and therefore the training--called for superior airmanship. Every effort was made to duplicate as closely as possible in training the distances, conditions and stresses that the crew might conceivably expect to encounter on an actual mission. This included some experience in flight through conditions of reduced visibility such as fog, as well as refueling and other ground operations at night in blowing sand with engines running on all aircraft.

During the period between the preliminary planning efforts and the final mission execution, seven full-scale dress rehearsals of the entire operation and about 20 exercises of separate parts of the planned mission were conducted. As the crews' proficiency increased and lessons continued to be learned from this intensive training program, confidence gradually grew among the crews, the planners, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the mission was not only possible, but, in fact, had more than a reasonable chance of success. From the beginning, the military planning, resource requirements, and force recommendations were fully supported by the President. Contrary to some recent allegations, rather than being scaled back, the size of the planned rescue force had actually increased slightly from earlier estimates.

The many risks and uncertainties were clearly understood and taken into account, but by the time the countdown for the mission began in April, the crews, aircraft (C-130s and helicopters), and rescue force were ready and there was an air of confident resolve among all participants.

Mission Countdown

As it became increasingly clear that the political and economic sanctions against Iran were not producing the desired effect, and it appeared that the hostages faced a further prolonged and indefinite period of captivity, the President in early April authorized an increased level of preparation for a possible rescue attempt. The necessary supporting deployments were blended in with other routine operations and crews and aircraft were "peaked" for mission tasking on short notice.

Earlier in the year, there had been a widespread reluctance to fly the shipborne mission aircraft often, to avoid drawing excessive attention to their presence. Later the tempo of flying increased significantly, partly to establish a familiar pattern for observers, but more importantly, to permit regular exercising of aircraft systems and subsystems. The aircraft had been maintained at a high level of readiness for a prolonged period of time and a special system had been covertly established within the naval aviation supply system to keep the NIMITZ supplied with essential helicopter parts in a timely fashion without revealing the possible mission. The helicopter detachment aboard NIMITZ had all the people and technical skills the on-scene commanders determined they needed, in contrast to the shortages which are standard elsewhere in the Navy.

When the decision was made to begin the countdown for the rescue mission, seven of the eight helicopters aboard the NIMITZ were in commission. The plan called for a minimum of six operational helicopters to complete the mission successfully and one spare was to be sent for additional confidence. Extraordinary efforts were made to expedite the necessary parts to bring the eighth helicopter into a full mission readiness status prior to the time the mission

launched. (Ironically, this eighth so-called "hangar-queen" was one of the aircraft which made it all the way to the refueling site without any major discrepancies.)

The helicopter crews (pilots and crew mechanics) arrived on the NIMITZ four days prior to the target date for the mission. In the period between arrival and mission execution, each of the flight crews flew its assigned mission aircraft on a thorough check-out of all systems. By the time the mission was ready to launch, every crew was totally satisfied that it had not only the best aircraft available, but the best maintenance and the highest prospects of success of any point in their training.

Two separate pre-mission events bear direct comment since they have attracted considerable press attention and speculation in the aftermath. First, a conscious decision was made to remove the sand screens normally carried over the engine for an overland mission. These screens were designed as a measure to protect the service life of the engines, but carried a penalty in terms of weight, drag and power loss. Since the aircraft were to be operating at very heavy gross weights and would have been abandoned once the mission was successfully completed, long term engine life was not a consideration and the sand screens were removed to gain the maximum available engine performance.

Second, the morning of mission execution, five of the eight mission aircraft were inadvertently wetted to varying degrees with a salt water and foam spray from the hangar deck fire protection system. Within minutes, fresh water rinsing of the aircraft had begun and careful inspection of the possible impact was made by maintenance and crew people. No foam or salt water was found in any cockpit, communications or navigation equipment bay, or equipment

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compartment. External electrical power was applied to each aircraft and all aircraft electrical systems checked out satisfactorily. As an additional precaution, the aircraft were brought up to the flight deck somewhat earlier than planned and the crews made extensive checks of engines, flight controls, and aircraft systems prior to launch. No discrepancies were noted and it was the judgment of the pilots, crew, and maintenance people that the short duration, limited wetting, and speed of cleanup had prevented any possible adverse impact on the mission.

Mission Execution

(2) Takeoff and enroute: Shortly after 7:30 p.m. on 24 April, all eight helicopters departed the NIMITZ fully mission ready. (The C-130s carrying their fuel, the refueling site security force, and the rest of the rescue force were already enroute to Desert One.) The helicopters joined up in enroute formation, four sections of two each in roughly a diamond pattern. Using the night vision devices, each crew was able to maintain visual contact with all other aircraft as they proceeded toward the coast at low altitude. They crossed the coastline [REDACTED] feet above the ground, on course, with winds and weather as predicted. Except for an intermediate gear box chip light experienced by number 8 (which posed no threat to continuing the mission), the flight continued uneventfully for about the first third of the distance.

A At this point, number 6 helicopter received a cockpit warning light indicating possible imminent main rotor blade failure, an unusual but potentially disastrous occurrence. The crew elected to land immediately to confirm the malfunction and dropped out of the formation toward a dry lake

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bed below. In accordance with preplanned radio silence procedures, the last aircraft in the formation, number 8, followed number 6 down to render assistance and, if necessary, to evacuate the crew.

Upon landing, the crew of number 6 visually inspected the main rotor and confirmed that one of the blades had actually experienced a spar pressure malfunction which made continued flight dangerous. The aircraft commander made an abort decision and the crew transferred all classified documents and equipment to the number 8 helicopter.

Consideration had been given to destroying the downed helicopter, but the decision was to abandon it intact. This judgment was based partly on the tight mission timetable, but more importantly, on the assessment that abandoning the aircraft intact induced less chance of premature discovery in such a remote location than destroying it; an explosion and fire at night would be more likely actually to draw attention to the aircraft and its location. Therefore, the crew boarded number 8 helicopter and the aircraft took off and continued the mission. At this point, there were seven operational helicopters, one more than the mission required.

Several miles ahead, the rest of the formation was approaching what at first appeared to be a fog bank, but which turned out to be the first of several nearly continuous dust/sand clouds. Immediately upon penetrating the cloud, visibility was degraded to the point where it was impossible for all mission aircraft to maintain visual contact with one another. Ground references were obscured or completely invisible and the inherent vertigo-inducing properties of the night vision devices were seriously compounded.

This weather phenomenon had not been forecast and the degree and duration of obscured visibility far exceeded the crews' previous training experience

with reduced visual contact. Still unsure of the nature or extent of the phenomenon they were experiencing, and without the means to communicate in a radio-silence environment, the only alternative for the crews was to spread the formation for safe separation and to proceed as best they could with individual navigation. (Some of the crews tried to maintain loose visual formation on one or more of their colleagues. However, the combination of reduced visibility--likened to being inside a bowl of dark milk--and frequently violent aircraft maneuvers as pilots experienced almost continuous vertigo and recovered from dives, climbs and steep banks made it progressively more difficult to maintain any formation integrity.)

The flight leader (helicopter number 1) and his wingman had proceeded into the cloud for a few minutes, expecting to break out into the clear momentarily. When conditions did not improve, the leader elected to reverse course and exit the cloud (the normal procedure when encountering severely reduced visibility). Number 2 followed him out and both landed.

The leader anticipated that the rest of the formation would likewise pull out and land until the cloud (or storm--no one was sure what they were in) "blew past." After about 20 minutes with no sign of the rest of the formation and no improvement in the weather, the leader had to assume that the others had elected to continue. He and number 2 took off again, re-entered the dust cloud, and continued to navigate along the planned course under instrument flight conditions. By this time, they were at the tail end of the formation.

Shortly afterwards, the second major materiel problem in the helicopter formation occurred. The number 5 helicopter had penetrated the storm like

the others and, for a time had attempted to remain in visual contact with aircraft 3 and 4 which were ahead of him. Seeing the serious control problems they were having and experiencing the same problems himself due to vertigo, he soon became visually separated from the rest. (It will be recalled that his wingman had previously aborted.)

About 45 minutes into the storm, number 5 experienced a malfunction of a motor which powered a blower providing cooling air to an aircraft power supply. The power supply overheated and failed, rendering the aircraft's heading reference inoperative. Additionally, other flight instruments and part of the flight control system either failed or began to operate intermittently.

An already difficult navigation problem was becoming impossible. At one point, the crew descended on their radar altimeter to about 75 feet above the ground and still could not see the surface, either for navigational reference or for a possible landing, until flight conditions improved. The crew concluded that the navigation references available to them, both from on-board equipment and visually, were insufficient to maintain course.

They knew that this situation would soon become extremely dangerous. While they were at that time still over reasonably level terrain, they knew that they were less than half an hour away from a range of mountains standing between them and the refueling point.

They were faced with some difficult choices. There appeared to be no way to navigate the valleys ahead safely and they were not sure they could climb above the mountains. Even if they could do so, they were reluctant to attempt it because of the risk of exposing their aircraft to possible radar contact and premature discovery of the mission. Moreover, each mile they continued on course

took them farther from the NIMITZ, the only possible safe recovery site. (At that, they were doubtful whether they had enough fuel to permit them to recover on NIMITZ.)

On the other hand, they had no way of knowing the operational status of the other aircraft and therefore could not determine whether an abort decision by them would abort the overall mission or would be inconsequential. Further complicating the decision was the fact that their aircraft carried a third of the spare parts which had been sent on the mission and they could not know in advance whether this cargo might be needed.

Faced with their assessment of almost certain catastrophe if they attempted to penetrate the mountains ahead, they reluctantly aborted, reversed course, and found their way back to NIMITZ. Although no one knew it yet, the failure of their navigation instruments and subsequent abort would foreclose continuing the mission because of a third freak materiel failure, this one on helicopter number 2.

About two hours after takeoff, the crew received a cockpit indication of a failed second stage hydraulic system. (They would later discover that a crack had occurred in a jam nut, causing all the hydraulic fluid in the second stage system to be pumped overboard. Since the pump is cooled by its own hydraulic fluid, the dry pump soon burned out.) This is an extremely dangerous malfunction in the RH-53, particularly under conditions of heavy loading. If the demands on the first stage hydraulic system exceed its capability with a failed second stage, the flight controls will lock and a crash is virtually certain. Despite this continuous risk, along with the difficulties of navigation, visibility, and vertigo being experienced by everyone, the crew of number 2 stuck with the mission. They landed safely at Desert One, still hoping there might be some way to repair a malfunction whose seriousness they had not yet been able to verify.

Because of the delays and irregular flight paths flown by the helicopters, the first aircraft arrived about 50 minutes behind schedule and the last about one hour and 25 minutes late. Their order of landing was 3, 4, 7, 8, 1, and 2 and, as they arrived, each proceeded to its assigned C-130 to commence refueling. All had emerged from the dust cloud only a few miles prior to reaching Desert One and they were exhausted by the ordeal they had just been through. Nevertheless, they began preparations immediately for the next phase of the mission.

At Desert One: The C-130s had been on the ground (with engines left running as planned) for over an hour before the first helicopter arrived. Shortly after the first C-130 had landed with the combat control team aboard, an Iranian bus carrying 40-plus civilians blundered into the planned refueling area along the unpaved road. The bus was stopped and the passengers were detained (courteously, and without harm to any of them) outside the actual area of refueling operations. Later, a truck and a following sedan approached. When the truck was stopped, the driver ran to the following vehicle and fled the area.

With the landing and refueling areas secure, the C-130s and their accompanying rescue force positioned themselves to await the arrival of the helicopters.

Since the order of the formation had become scrambled in the dust cloud, the flight leader (now the helicopter force commander because the designated commander was aboard the aborted number 5) landed next to last. As soon as he had positioned himself and begun refueling operations, he began to assess the status of the other aircraft in the helicopter flight. He confirmed that number 6 had aborted, although at this point he had no way of knowing that number 5 had also turned back. While the refueling was under way, the rescue

force began to reposition aboard the helicopters for the onward flight to their forward location. Since six aircraft had landed, the minimum number required to complete the mission, the initial presumption was that the mission would continue as scheduled. The rescue force commander had gone aboard the helicopter flight leader's aircraft to verify the go status of the mission and was awaiting confirmation.

Meanwhile, the crew of helicopter number 2, which had landed just behind number 1 and had been positioned to begin taking on fuel from his C-130, had for the first time been able to visually assess the extent of the hydraulic problem. They visually verified that a crack had occurred and determined that the second stage hydraulic pump had failed. It was impossible to repair this malfunction at the refueling site since a hydraulic pump had not been foreseen as a possible failure item and a spare had not been included.

The co-pilot of the number 2 helicopter walked over to the flight leader's aircraft to report on the condition of his aircraft. Despite the disappointing implications of the decision, the helicopter force leader confirmed that this was an abort item and that he therefore had only five operational helicopters left at his command.

This fact was discussed with the C-130 force commander and the rescue force commander, and they revalidated the earlier planning assumption that the mission could not continue with fewer than six operational helicopters. After agreement on this point, they communicated by radio their status and their recommendation to abort the mission to the Joint Task Force Commander, who in turn relayed the situation and recommendation by secure radio to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for decision by the President. Within minutes, the Secretary of Defense had been consulted, concurred in the abort recommendation and contacted the President for the confirming order. The decision was made to abort the mission.

The plan at that point was to return the rescue force to the C-130s and have them recover to their launch base. The operational helicopters would finish their refueling and return to the NIMITZ. If possible, the partially disabled helicopter (number 6) would be moved away from the refueling area and destroyed. The bus passengers would be released unharmed. There was still a possibility that enough confusion had been generated on the part of the Iranians as to the identity of our force that another attempt might be made in the near future.

It was at this point that chance once again intervened in the mission, this time with tragic results. Since the formation breakup made it impossible to be certain how many helicopters would finally reach the refueling site until in fact they stopped arriving, each helicopter had taken up its assigned refueling position depicted on one of the C-130s as depicted in the diagram.

(position diagram to be provided)

In accordance with plan, all C-130s and all helicopters were refueling with their engines running except for the aborted number 2 which had terminated refueling and shut down its engines for the time being. Three helicopters (3, 4, and 8) had refueled from the northernmost of the three refueling C-130s, number 1 helicopter from the middle C-130, and number 2 (initially) and 7 from the C-130 on the south side of the road. All the operational helicopters had enough fuel to return to the NIMITZ except for number 4, which needed more to top off his tanks. His assigned C-130 could not give him any more without cutting into his own meager fuel reserve and endangering his recovery.

Therefore, the decision was made to reposition number 4 to the other C-130 north of the road (which had extra fuel since only one of his assigned helicopters had arrived). In order to provide room for number 4 to move, however, one of the flanking helicopters had to reposition. Number 3 was directed to clear and, as he applied lift, he produced a dense cloud of dust. He was observed to lift off slightly, begin to move to the left, then begin to drift back to the right. As he passed over the left wing of the C-130, he banked about 20 degrees to the right and his rotor blade struck the C-130. Fire broke out immediately and both aircraft were quickly engulfed in flames.

The C-130 was heavily loaded with people and munitions. Accessible personnel in both aircraft were evacuated in a quick and orderly display of professional discipline, without which the death toll could have been far higher. Unfortunately, five Air Force crew members perished in the cockpit of the C-130 and three Marines perished in the helicopter. Both helicopter pilots and several aboard the C-130 were burned.

The fire was too large to be extinguished and was far too intense to continue attempts to recover the bodies of the trapped crewmembers. Moreover, munitions began to cook off in the heat and fragments began striking helicopters--not only those in the immediate vicinity of the burning C-130, but those in other positions as well. After the collision, helicopter crews aboard numbers 4 and 8 immediately shut down engines and evacuated their aircraft. Number 1 aircraft nearby also shut down. At some point, number 1 was struck by a fragment which split a main fuel cell.

South of the road, (about 150 yards from the accident) number 2 had already shut down and number 7 was about to lift off when he received a command over the radio to land and shut down. (It had earlier been decided that if, for some reason, the helicopters could not depart the area and evidence of their presence would clearly remain behind, the crews were to evacuate the area aboard the C-130.) The other C-130s taxied as clear as possible from the burning and exploding wreckage.

Time was becoming a critical factor. A great deal of fuel had been consumed and transferred. The C-130 aircraft, which had been sitting on the ground for a matter of hours with engines running, were getting dangerously low on fuel for the return leg, especially since they would now have to take off much heavier than originally planned.

Crewmembers began to return to their helicopters in an attempt to retrieve the classified equipment and documents aboard their aircraft. This effort had to be called off. It was determined to be too dangerous, both for themselves (particularly in those aircraft close to the flaming wreckage) and potentially for the recovery of the entire force. All troops and crew members were ordered aboard the remaining C-130s immediately. They boarded

in a rapid but orderly fashion and the aircraft departed. The takeoffs of the two overloaded C-130s across this desert track provided another final exceptional feat of airmanship in a mission marked by tragedy, misfortune, and incredible courage.

Postscript

In the aftermath of this operation, several key questions remain which may never be answered to everyone's satisfaction.

- How did we get surprised by the weather?

The Air Weather Service has conducted an in-depth post-event analysis of the environmental forecasts provided for the mission. Data available to weather analysts after the mission began were included to gain possible insight into physical factors which caused the observed conditions to occur. The weather forecast of temperatures and surface winds for the city of Tehran verified accurately for the nights of the 24th and 25th of April 1980 respectively. The forecast for the C-130 route and for the refueling site verified completely. In fact, the weather forecasts for the entire Middle East region verified for all weather elements, with the exception of the last half of the helicopter route, where suspended dust severely reduced visibility, occasionally to zero. Why?

The Air Weather Service analysis of the nighttime satellite imagery shows that isolated thunderstorms did develop (as forecast) at the higher elevations along the ridge to the west of the helicopter route. One can speculate that the downrush of air from these thunderstorms could have been of sufficient magnitude to lift and spread fine, powdery dust into the air and along the route of the helicopters. These small-sized particulates could conceivably

have remained suspended in the air for a period of hours.

It is important to note that none of the available weather reporting stations spread across central Iran indicated the presence of large areas of suspended dust or severe restrictions to visibility. (There are no active reporting stations along the route of flight.) The conclusion: the occurrence was a very localized phenomenon; to forecast the occurrence of such an event, and its spatial and temporal extent with any degree of reliability, is beyond the current state of the art.

The other side of the weather issue is that no helicopter crews have ever experienced a weather phenomenon such as this over such great distance, and under such conditions, in the history of aviation. From an airmanship standpoint, the real surprise is not that two aircraft did not make it through, but that six did. The professional skill and courage and dedication of these crew members were of the highest order and they deserve all the gratitude and credit the nation can bestow.

- Could the three unrelated materiel failures have been foreseen and prevented?

We will never know with any certainty whether these problems could have been avoided by flying the aircraft more or flying them less before the mission. Or by inspecting them more or leaving them alone. Some will blame luck, others will point the finger at maintenance.

Throughout the five months preparation for this mission, including seven dress rehearsal exercises and many more sub-exercises under considerably less sophisticated maintenance conditions, comparable failure rates were almost unheard of. There were no trends pointing to potential failures of the sort experienced or indications that special scrutiny beyond careful pre-flight inspection should be focused on these areas.

The only thing that can be said with absolute certainty is that the best people, the best equipment, and the best care were provided to support this mission. In view of the subsequent failures of equipment, compounded by the unforecast (and perhaps unforecastable) weather, the best wasn't good enough on this particular night. The failure of the mission is bitter and the loss of life is tragic, but the individual and collective feats of professional skill, ingenuity, and courage should never be overlooked or denigrated. Our people did their duty in a way that merits the salute of a nation.

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: COMJTF OPLAN

TO:

1. Attached is an edited version of the Operations Plan (OPLAN) developed during planning for the attempted rescue of U.S. hostages from Iran. This edited version is the same in format and content as the original except for deletions made in the interest of security.
2. The OPLAN was constructed in somewhat general terms to accommodate changes that would occur with continued evolution of planning and training. Although the plan is dated 25 February 1980 (which was the last date of major revision), it does contain minor changes that occurred after that date based on updated intelligence information, developing techniques, changes in equipment, etc. Examples of these changes are: (1) updated command and control charts in Annex J, revised Tactical Command and Control Network diagrams in Annex K, and deletion in Annex C of planning options for other modes of refueling.

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EXEMPTED ON 29 NOV 92
REVIEWED BY DPO NMCC
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NOTED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

J-89

SUBJECT: COMJTF OPLAN

TO:

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
25 FEBRUARY 1980

SUBJECT: COMJTF OPLAN ~~(S)~~(U)
SEE DISTRIBUTION (Annex 2)

1. ~~(U)~~(S) Forwarded herewith is COMJTF OPLAN.
2. ~~(U)~~(S) This plan is effective upon receipt for planning and effective for execution upon command of the National Command Authorities through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. (U) Supporting plans are not required.
4. (U) This letter is downgraded to SECRET when separated from enclosure.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES B. VAUGHT
MG USA
COMMANDER, JTF

1 Encl

JTF OPLAN ~~(TS)~~(U)

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DATE FOR REVIEW IS 26 FEB 2000
REASON: 5200.1R, 301c6~~

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301
25 FEBRUARY 1980

COMJTF OPLAN (S)(U)
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (U)

1. (U)(TS) The long title of this plan is COMJTF OPLAN, Rescue of American Hostages. The short title is the same.
2. (U) This document is classified to protect specific information revealing operational plans of US Military forces. This plan will be disseminated on order of the JTF Commander and only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of this plan.
3. (U) The information contained in this document is disseminated on a "Special Handling Required -- Not Releasable to Foreign Nations" basis.
4. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
5. (U) Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without permission of this headquarters is prohibited.

RECORD OF CHANGES

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
26 February 1980

COMJTF OPLAN
PLAN SUMMARY (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. ~~(S)~~ This plan provides the concept of operations and forces required to launch a recovery force to rescue those hostages held in or near the United States Embassy (AMEMB), Tehran, Iran.
2. (U) CONDITIONS FOR EXECUTION.
 - a. (U) This plan will be executed only upon command of the National Command Authorities through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - b. ~~(S)~~ This summary provides decision-makers a precis of the major aspects of this plan. It is based on planning factors and estimates available at the time of preparation and should be updated with the most current information prior to execution.
3. (U) OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED.
 - a. ~~(S)~~ Forces Assigned.
 - (1) ~~(S)~~ 105 SFOD - Delta.
 - (2) (U) 7 MC-130 (4 PACOM; 3 CONUS).
 - (3) (U) 8 RH-53
 - (4) (U) MAC Airlift as required
 - (5) (U) JTF HQ
 - (6) (U) CTF 70 (Not assigned - support role only)

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(7) (U) ~~██████████~~ Rangers (-)

(8) (U) 3 EC-130E

(9) (U) 4 AC-130H

(10) (U) 18 KC-135 Support

*Note: Forces assigned are for the operation and are not indicative of total force used during training.

b. ~~(S)~~ ~~(Top)~~ Employment. ~~SFOB~~ Delta will be airlifted to the vicinity of Tehran, be moved by surface transportation to target area and enter the Embassy compound. Former hostages and Delta will be extracted by helicopter to a nearby airfield which will have been secured by US Rangers. There waiting MC-130's/C-141s will transport the entire force from the country. Tactical air, (AC-130s) will provide covering firepower for Embassy extraction and departure from the airfield. ~~██████████~~ operations will be employed where possible.

c. (U) ~~(Top)~~ Deployment. All assets will require movement from home station or forward training areas to their employment locations. Helicopters have been placed aboard the USS NIMITZ under pretext of supporting mine operations.

d. (U) Supporting Plans. Supporting plans are not required.

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4. (U) Assumptions:

- a. ~~(TS)~~ The ~~Government~~ permits unrestricted operation from ~~Airfield~~ and aircraft fuel will be available at ~~in quantities required.~~
- b. ~~(TS)~~ The ~~Government~~ will not interfere with refueling operations and overflight of its territory.
- c. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Tactical surprise is retained throughout the operation.
- d. (U) ~~(TS)~~ The hostages remain in the AMEMB compound.
- e. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Adverse weather conditions will not occur during the 36-38 hour rescue operation.

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5. (U) Operational Constraints:

- a. ~~(TS)~~ Deployment of C-130's, Delta, Ranger and KC-135's with attendant airlift support must be controlled to allow minimum disclosure of force buildup at ~~prior to mission employment.~~

b. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Due to positioning of aircrews and TF-70 location, the response time (with prudent expectation of noncompromise) from notification to employment is 9 days. Employment commences at approximately 1400Z on D-Day minus 1 day.

c. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Due to the lack of forward operating bases and distance involved, this operation is not feasible without air refueling the C-130 force and ground refueling the helos.

d. (U) ~~(TS)~~ The operation is infeasible without vehicle transportation support of Delta in ~~operation.~~

6. (U) TIME TO COMMENCE EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS. Upon direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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7. (U) ~~(TS)~~ OPSEC. If OPSEC fails and the element of surprise is lost prior to entering the compound, it may be prudent to discontinue the operation to prevent serious injury or death to the hostages and the rescue forces.

8. (U) ~~(TS)~~ COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. The JTF commander will be responsible for training the force and conducting the mission. COMJTF will retain command of the assigned JTF assets throughout the operation and is responsible to the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be supported by CINCPAC, the Services, CINCEUR, CINCREC, CINCMAC, CINCSAC, and CINCLANT.

9. (U) ~~(TS)~~ LOGISTIC APPRAISAL. The operation as described herein is logistically supportable.

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
26 February 1980

COMJTF OPLAN (TS)(U)

RESCUE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES FROM AMEMB, IRAN

REFERENCE: CJCS Verbal Order 12 November 1979

(Establishment of the JTF) (NOTAL)

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: See ANNEX A.

1. (U) SITUATION.

a. ^U(TS) General. On 4 November 1979, an Iranian mob took over AMEMB Tehran, Iran. The terrorists took all persons present hostage. In subsequent days non-US citizens, most blacks and women were released. Presently there are 53 persons still being held hostage. The students originally demanded the return of the Shah for release of the hostages. Coincident with their demands, the Iranian terrorists charged that the Embassy was a "nest of spies" and that some or all of the hostages would be put on trial. It is possible that if any of the hostages are tried and if any are killed, if release is to be indefinitely denied, or their safety is jeopardized, the Commander-in-Chief will order the Armed Forces to rescue the remaining) hostages.

b. ^(U)(TS) Enemy. ANNEX B provides specific details of intelligence about present Iranian capabilities. However, in general the following conditions are believed to exist:

(1) ^(U)(TS) Military - The Iranian Army and Air Force, while still under arms, appear to be lacking in organization, morale, support, and equipment. Inactivity has adversely affected their readiness posture.

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Although the Naval Forces also are not operating at full strength, they and the Air Force have the potential to do some damage to US Naval forces and to the rescue force if they launch a determined attack.

(2) ~~(U)~~ ~~(TS)~~ Police - Local police are still functioning and carrying out some activities. However, they have been relegated to mainly traffic control duties. Little resistance is expected from this group.

(3) ~~(U)~~ ~~(TS)~~ PASDARAN (Revolutionary Guards) - This group poses the strongest threat to the mission. Although loosely organized and not all trained, total numbers of personnel and weapons make them a dangerous force. This force does most of the peace keeping (law enforcement) in Tehran as well as setting up road blocks and providing guards around the AMEMB.

(4) ~~(U)~~ ~~(TS)~~ AOB - Aircraft operability is estimated at approximately [REDACTED] for F-5 aircraft and [REDACTED] or less for F-4 and F-14. However, overall pilot proficiency is considered low due to lack of flying activity since February 1979. Pilots are not trained in night combat [REDACTED]

Although Iran has the HAWK missile, and various types of anti-aircraft artillery, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (ready for launch time estimated at 1 hour minimum) and AAA is considered [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, most AAA is thought to be optically sighted, and poses little threat at night.

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(C) (U) (5) (TS) EOB - Although prevalent, Iranian radar is degraded over the Persian Gulf due to temperature inversions. Once behind the mountain range that fronts the gulf, terrain masking blocks radar signals. Flying over the Persian Gulf at [REDACTED] and over land at [REDACTED] until beyond the first mountain range, then [REDACTED] should defeat most radar intercepts until in the Tehran area.

(U) (6) (TS) Others - There is likelihood that other nations such as Russia and Libya, while not actively opposing the operation, could provide intelligence/for- warning to the Iranian Government which would jeopard- ize the the mission.

c. (U) Friendly. (1) (C) (TS) Government of [REDACTED] has been selected as the primary mission staging base. This plan assumes the [REDACTED] will honor its commitment of operational approval from their base.

(C) (2) (TS) Other Governments [REDACTED] et al) - This plan calls for overflight and refueling operation over the [REDACTED] land mass. Recovery of the rescue force and hostages following the rescue might occur in any of several countries surrounding Iran. Although routes over [REDACTED] have been designed to circumvent radar to the maximum extent, it must be supposed that some detection will occur and will require, at least, tacit approval and silence of the government, if not its full support. It is believed other governments will not return the hostages and rescue force to Iran if

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the sole mission of the force was rescue of the
hostages vice punitive actions, and the operation
does not cause indiscriminate damage/caualties.

(3) (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

(a) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Designates C-Day for Deployment

(b) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Approves D-Day H-Hour (desired time
window) for employment for planning. JTF Commander
has flexibility to delay if appropriate.

[REDACTED]
(6) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Department of State. Utilized as source of
information regarding those personnel held hostage
AMEMB, Tehran as available.

(7) (U) Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command
(CINCSAC).

(a) (U) Provides aerial tanker support as
required.

(b) (U) Provides other services as directed by
JCS.

(8) (u) Commander-in-Chief, Military Airlift Command
(CINCMAC).

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- E
- (a) (U) Provides airlift for training, deployment, and employment as directed by JCS. 1
 - (b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provides personnel and equipment for loading/off loading of equipment at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] staging bases as required. 2
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 - (c) (U) Provides MAC personnel to participate in training and operations as required. 6
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 - (d) (U) Provides weather support. 8
 - (e) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provides medical evacuation aircraft and personnel as required. 9
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 - (f) (U) Provides search and rescue support as required. 11
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 - (9) ^(U)~~(S)~~ (U) Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA). 13
 - (a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Passes operational control of 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta to COMJTF (ANNEX A) when directed. 14
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 - (b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Provides for administrative, logistical and communications support for JTF as required. 17
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 - (10) ^(U)~~(S)~~ (U) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Provides for administrative, logistical, and communications support of JTF as required. 19
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 - (11) ^(U)~~(S)~~ (U) Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF). Provides for administrative, logistical, and communications support of JTF as required. 22
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 - (12) ^(U)~~(S)~~ (U) Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). Provides for administrative, logistical and communications support of JTF as required. 25
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- (13) (U) Commander in Chief, US European Command. 1
(a) (U) (S) As a supporting commander, provides equip- 2
ment and personnel as well as administrative, 3
logistical and communications support as required. 4
(b) (U) (S) Coordinates airlift of recovered hostages 5
from recovery base(s) to US military medical 6
facilities in Europe, and subsequent movement to 7
CONUS. 8
(c) (U) (S) Conducts/directs base support at [REDACTED] 9
and [REDACTED] airfields in support of this plan. 10
(14) (U) (S) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC). 11
As a supporting commander, provides equipment and 12
personnel as well as administrative, logistical and 13
communication support to COMJTF as required. 14
(15) (U) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Readiness Command 15
(USREDCOM). 16
(a) (U) (TS) As a supporting commander, provides 17
equipment and personnel as well as administrative, 18
logistical and communication support to COMJTF as 19
required. 20
(b) (U) (TS) Pass operational control of designated 21
aircraft, air crew & JCSE resources to COMJTF when 22
directed by JCS. 23
(16) (U) (TS) Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command 24
(CINCLANT). As a supporting commander, provides equip- 25
ment and personnel as well as administrative, logisti- 26
cal and communication support to COMJTF as required. 27
Passes operational control of these assets to COMJTF 28
when directed by JCS. 29
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- d. (U) Assumptions. 1
- (1) ~~(TS)~~ The [REDACTED] Government permits operation 2
from [REDACTED] airfield without interference. Air- 3
field fuel will be available at [REDACTED] in quanti- 4
ties required. 5
- (2) ~~(TS)~~ The [REDACTED] Government permits opera- 6
tions from [REDACTED] Airfield without interference and 7
gives tacit approval or will not actively interfere 8
with refueling operations/overflight of their sov- 9
ereign territory. 10
- (3) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Tactical surprise is not lost by assembly 11
of the force at staging bases to the extent that the 12
AMEMB in Tehran is heavily reinforced. 13
- (4) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED] 14
2. ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ MISSION. JTF conducts operations to rescue 15
US personnel held hostage in the American Embassy Compound, 16
Tehran, Iran. 17
3. (U) EXECUTION. 18
- a. (U) Concept of Operations. See Annex C. 19
- b. (U) Tasks. 20
- (1) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Commander Ground Recovery Force (SFOD-D). 21
- (a) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Insures high state of combat readi- 22
ness of ground recovery force by realistic 23
planning and training. 24
- (b) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Insures ground recovery element is 25
prepared for immediate deployment on notice. 26
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- (c) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Monitors and assesses current intel- 1
ligence information for maximum exploitation. 2
- (d) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Keeps COMJTF informed on all matters 3
pertaining to the assault forces readiness and 4
training or any other matters that may impact 5
on mission accomplishment. 6
- (e) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Conducts assault of AMEMB compound, 7
and MFA frees hostages, and conducts helicopter 8
exfiltration from Tehran to Manzariyeh air- 9
field. 10
- (f) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Develops recovery force redeployment 11
and escape and evasion plans. 12
- (2) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Commander Security Force (Rangers). 13
- (a) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Insures high state of readiness of 14
security force by realistic planning and training. 15
- (b) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Insures ground security element is 16
prepared for immediate deployment upon notification. 17
- (c) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Monitors and assesses current intelligence 18
information for exploitation purposes. 19
- (d) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Keeps COMJTF advised of all matters 20
pertaining to the security forces readiness and 21
training or other matters that may impact on 22
mission accomplishment. 23
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- (e) (TS) Seizes Manzariyeh Airfield, and secures 1
airfield for MC-130/long range transports, heli- 2
copter and hostage recovery and hostage transfer. 3
(f) (U) (TS) Develops security force recovery plans. 4
(3) (U) (TS) Commander Air Force Forces (C-130s). 5
(a) (U) (TS) Insures high state of readiness of Air 6
Force personnel and equipment to accomplish JTF 7
mission. 8
(b) (U) (TS) Is prepared to deploy Air Force assets on 9
short notice to conduct infiltration of Iran in 10
accordance with ANNEX C this OPLAN. 11
(c) (U) (TS) Monitors current intelligence information 12
and assesses for mission impact/exploitation. 13
(d) (U) (TS) Keeps COMJTF apprised, on matters 14
pertaining to Air Force assets, that might impact 15
on mission accomplishment. 16
(e) (U) (TS) Relays medical status of passengers and 17
intended recovery base for positioning aeromed 18
assets. 19
(f) (U) (TS) Develops Air Force forces redeployment 20
plan. 21
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- (4) ^(U)(TS) Commander, Helicopter Force. 1
- (a) ^(U)(TS) Insures helicopter personnel are trained 2
and equipment in a high state of readiness to 3
accomplish the assigned mission. 4
- (b) ^(U)(TS) Insures helicopter crews are available for 5
short notice deployment/employment to conduct 6
infiltration of Iran in accordance with ANNEX C 7
this OPLAN. 8
- (c) ^(U)(TS) Keeps COMJTF informed on all matters 9
about his element's ability to perform their 10
assigned task. 11
- (d) ^(U)(TS) Develops helicopter force redeployment 12
plans. 13
- (5) ^(U)(TS) Commander, Joint Task Force - (COMJTF). 14
- (a) ^(U)(TS) Insures readiness of JTF Force and 15
reports this readiness to JCS. 16
- (b) ^(U)(TS) Following deployment, assumes command of 17
forces when passed by CSA, CSAF, USCINCEUR, 18
USCINCRD, CINCLANT and CINCPAC. 19
- (c) ^(U)(TS) Conducts or directs mission briefings. 20
- (d) ^(U)(TS) Directs and controls mission execution. 21
- (e) ^(U)(TS) Directs and controls search and rescue 22
efforts as required. 23
- (f) ^(U)(TS) Coordinates aeromedical evacuation require- 24
ments. 25
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- (g) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Conducts mission debriefings. 1
- (h) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Coordinates redeployment JTF elements. 2
to home station. 3
- (i) (U) Insures post mission followup actions are 4
taken. 5

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. 6

- (1) (U) This plan is effective for planning upon 7
receipt and execution when directed. 8
- (2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Weather delays will be announced by COMJTF. 9
- (3) ^(U)~~(S)~~ COMJTF will coordinate facilities and 10
support requirements at the designated staging base. 11
- (4) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Mission debrief of JTF forces will be 12
conducted at a joint debriefing as soon as practical 13
after recovery. 14
- (5) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Uniforms of personnel assigned to JTF will 15
be devoid of all distinctive badges and insignia 16
denoting unit type, specific unit, theater of assignment 17
or any other form of unit/service affiliation. 18
- (6) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Electrical transmission of messages will be 19
minimized. 20
- (7) (U) Commanders will recommend changes and/or alter- 21
natives to enhance mission accomplishment. 22

4. ^(U)~~(S)~~ ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT 23

- a. (U) Concept of Support. The critical operational 24
security aspect and extreme sensitivity of the JTF 25
mission, as well as the limited size of the operational 26
forces involved in accomplishing the mission, are the 27
basis for a support concept which minimizes normal staff 28
support arrangements. The JTF staff has identified 29
requirements for logistical and administrative support 30
and arranged. 31

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to meet these requirements using a variety of stratagems
to enhance security of the mission. Principally, the JTF
works directly with supporting agencies through special
service channels.

b. (U) Logistics. See ANNEX D.

c. (U) Personnel. See ANNEX E.

d. (U) Public Affairs. See ANNEX F.

e. (U) Environmental Services. See ANNEX H.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. (U) Command Relationships. See ANNEX J.

b. (U) Command Posts. The designations and locations of
headquarters involved in executing this plan are as

follows:

HEADQUARTERS

LOCATION

National Military Command Center Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

USCINCEUR Vaihingen, GE

CINCPAC Camp Smith, HI

USCINCRD MacDill AFB, FL

COMJTF

CONUS

(C) Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Overseas Headquarters

Forward Operating Base

Helicopter Launch Point (Afloat) USS NIMITZ

c. (U) Succession to Command

(1) (C) COMJTF assumes command of the forces from

(C) CSA, USCINCRD, CINCPAC and CINCMAC when those

forces arrive at their staging and launch bases

and USS NIMITZ.

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(2) (S) COMJTF executes the rescue mission from his command post at [REDACTED] or forward location as appropriate.

(3) (U) DEPCOMJTF will assume command upon incapacitation of COMJTF.

d. (U) Signal. See Annex K.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
MG USA
COMMANDER, JTF

ANNEXES:

- A. TASK ORGANIZATIONS
- B. INTELLIGENCE
- C. OPERATIONS
- D. LOGISTICS
- E. PERSONNEL
- F. PUBLIC AFFAIRS
- G. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
- H. COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS
- I. OPERATIONS SECURITY
- J. EXECUTION CHECKLIST
- K. DISTRIBUTION

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GUIDE FOR TYPING BUFFS AND GREEN

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

ANNEX A TO COMJTF OPLAN (S)
TASK ORGANIZATION (U)

Organization	Commander
Joint Task Force	MGEN Vaught
Army Component (JTF)	MGEN Vaught
Air Force Component (JTF)	Col Kyle
Navy/Marine Component (JTF)	Col Pitman
SUPPORT:	
Task Force	(S) COMJTF
[REDACTED]	CDR [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	CDR [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	CDR [REDACTED]
Military Airlift Command	CINCMAC
Strategic Air Command	CINCSAC
Joint Communications Support Element	CDR JCSE
Ranger Battalion	CDR [REDACTED]
1st Special Forces Operational	CDR Delta
Detachment - Delta	
Composite Navy/Marine Heavy	CDR Helo
Helicopter Squadron	

JAMES B. VAUGHT
MG USA
COMMANDER, JTF

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-3
DATE FOR REVIEW IS 26 FEBRUARY 2000
REASON: 5200.1R, 301c6

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

ANNEX B TO COMJTF-OPLAN
INTELLIGENCE

REFERENCE: See basic OPLAN

1. (U)(TS) MISSION, BACKGROUND, AND CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS:

a. (U)(TS) Mission: To collect, analyze, produce, and disseminate accurate and timely intelligence in support of operational forces assigned to rescue those hostages held in the American Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, Iran.

b. (TS) Background: Intelligence operations are structured and conducted to support the CJCS, COMJTF and his staff, and operational components of the rescue force. These components include elements of Special Forces Operational Detachment - Delta; 1st Battalion (Ranger), 1st Special Operations Wing (USAF); and Helicopter Element (Provisional) - a joint Marine Corps - Navy task organization.

(1)(U)(TS) The JTF was established by verbal order of the CJCS on 12 November 1979. Intelligence support and planning commenced immediately, utilizing the working spaces of the Special Operations Division, J-3. A Joint Planning Staff had been involved in preliminary assessment of the Iranian hostage situation since 7 November 1979, and members of this staff provided the cadre for the headquarters element.

CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-3
DATE FOR REVIEW IS 15 MAY 2000
REASON: 5200.1R, 301C6

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(2) (U) (TS) Initially, analytic and collection activities relied heavily on the in-being DIA Iran Task Force located in the National Military Intelligence Center. The Iran Task Force began producing a daily intelligence summary in Working Paper format on 5 November 1979. This summary, specifically designed for the use of the JCS J-3, was distributed through DIA (DB) channels. As the composition and concept of operations of the JTF took form, J-2 developed its own daily intelligence summary for use within the staff and by component consumers. Secure communications links - both voice and teletype - were employed to disseminate intelligence reports and products. The J-2 summary was based on an independent analysis of intelligence products and raw data provided by a variety of national assets.

(3) (TS)

[REDACTED] the JTF [REDACTED] JCSE opened [REDACTED] secure links to the Ranger, Fixed wing, and Helicopter elements. This net served to expand intelligence support to operational components and reduced the necessity for courier services. On 14 November 1979, JTF published its first intelligence summary specifically keyed to the operational mission.

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(5) (TS) In planning for intelligence support, the J-2 developed a broad list of required information and products. This list provided a framework for refinement and expansion over time and included increasingly specific data on the area of operations, including civilian population, political situation, regular and irregular enemy forces, areas of critical concern, terrain and weather, and information on the hostages and their captors. See paragraph 3 (Activities) below and Appendix 1 (EEI) to this Annex for substantive details.

(5) (TS) From the outset, JTF has used the DIA Iran Task Force and the DIA JCS Support Element (JSI) as primary points of contact for tasking within DOD and external liaison. Through this mechanism, a working relationship has been established with other intelligence agencies/organizations including

[REDACTED] These relationships have evolved into a pattern of direct support arrangements based on 'read-in' of a limited number of personnel external to the JTF staff.

(6) (TS) USAF/AFIS Soviet Awareness Task Force, Bolling AFB, VA, provided area background information on the Soviet Union and linguistic support in special situations.

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c. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Concept of Intelligence Operations: COMJTF manages all intelligence related activities through JTF J-2. Tasking, analysis, and dissemination are centralized. Collection and production are decentralized. COMJTF is supported by the full range of national intelligence assets available to the Department of Defense and cooperating Departments and Agencies of the United States Government.

2. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ SITUATION:

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ General Situation:

(1) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ On 4 November 1979 members of several Iranian militant groups swarmed onto the US Embassy compound in Tehran, took the Embassy employees hostage and stated they would hold the employees hostage until the USG returned the Shah to Iran for trial. The take-over was accomplished without bloodshed. Approximately 63 AMCITS and an undetermined number of Iranian and 3rd country citizens were initially held. Shortly after the take-over the Iranian personnel were released. On 19 November the militants began to release selected hostages, largely non-white AMCIT males, AMCIT females and 3rd country nationals. The remaining American hostages include two women and 48 males in the

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injunction of the World Court to release the hostages and return the Embassy to American control.

(2) (U) (TS) In addition, both the Government and the militants have periodically stated they plan to put the remaining hostages on trial for espionage. Although the label 'students' is used in the media and in this report when referring to the principal captors, the label is only partly correct. [The militant force includes a group of senior medical, engineering, and religious students belonging, at least in part, to a Muhahdeen faction which subscribes to a blend of Islam, Marxism and xenophobic nationalism. Several leftist instructors from Tehran Technical University, members of the Tudeh (Communist) party may have infiltrated or may influence these groups. In addition, the leadership of the collective group (which is called a committee) receives counsel on propaganda and security matters from PLO/Fedayeen advisors and doctrinal council from radical clerics.] The situation has now crystallized to the point that the Iranian Government as a political entity

embassy. The militants remain adamant in their demands for the return of the Shah and with the concurrence of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Govern-

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must bear full responsibility for the protracted and uncompromising nature of the Iranian position. The situation appears to be a political problem without an acceptable political solution for either the Government of Iran or the USG and the safety of the hostages is in jeopardy.

b(1)(PS) Characteristics of the Area: The Embassy compound is located in central Tehran (UTM 39S-WV-383518//Geographic 4230N/5125E). The compound area consists of 27 acres of flat terrain shaped in a rectangular pattern with the long axis oriented North/South. The compound is bounded on the South by Takht-E-Jamshid (now Taleghani) Blvd which is a major East/West thoroughfare; on the East by Roosevelt (now Mobarezan) Street a relatively busy North/South road; on the West by America Avenue and the North by Ardalan Street. The main building (Chancery) is on the south end of the compound and forms a base line reference point. The Chancery faces Takht-E-Jamshid Blvd. The compound can be divided into four general areas, grouped around two playing fields located in the center of the compound. The Chancery and Motor Pool area are to the South. The Warehouse and temporary apartments are to the North.

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<u>Exposure Weather</u>	FEB	MAR	APR	<u>1</u>
Khvoy, Iran (Northwest Mountains) (3,737 ft)				<u>2</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	68	79	86	<u>3</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	46	58	63	<u>4</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	27	35	42	<u>5</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	0	10	10	<u>6</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.7	1.3	3.3	<u>7</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>8</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	5	2	1	<u>9</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>10</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>11</u>
Shiraz, Iran (Southern Mountains) (ft)				<u>12</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	70	81	90	<u>13</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	55	65	76	<u>14</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	32	40	46	<u>15</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	17	25	29	<u>16</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.9	2.0	1.3	<u>17</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	4	4	1	<u>18</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	*	*	*	<u>19</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	*	1	1	<u>20</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	0	1	2	<u>21</u>
				<u>22</u>
				<u>23</u>
				<u>24</u>
				<u>25</u>
				<u>26</u>
				<u>27</u>
*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY				<u>28</u>
				<u>29</u>
				<u>30</u>
				<u>31</u>

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Exposure Weather	FEB	MAR	APR	<u>1</u>
Bushehr, Iran (Southern Coast (ft)				<u>2</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	85	105	106	<u>3</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	65	73	81	<u>4</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	53	59	67	<u>5</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	34	42	47	<u>6</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.6	0.8	0.4	<u>7</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	4	2	1	<u>8</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	<u>9</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	*	*	1	<u>10</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	1	1	1	<u>11</u>
Kermanshah, Iran (Northwest Mountains) (ft)				<u>12</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	75	77	85	<u>13</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	48	57	68	<u>14</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	25	31	38	<u>15</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	-13	12	14	<u>16</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.8	2.7	2.5	<u>17</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	5	5	4	<u>18</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	2	1	*	<u>19</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	1	1	<u>20</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	1	2	2	<u>21</u>
				<u>22</u>
				<u>23</u>
				<u>24</u>
				<u>25</u>
				<u>26</u>
*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY				<u>27</u>
				<u>28</u>
				<u>29</u>
				<u>30</u>
				<u>31</u>

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<u>Exposure Weather</u>	FEB	MAR	APR	<u>1</u>
Bandar Abbas, Iran (Southern Coast) (ft)				<u>2</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	86	93	102	<u>3</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	77	82	87	<u>4</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	61	66	72	<u>5</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	48	55	59	<u>6</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.2	0.5	0.3	<u>7</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>8</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	<u>9</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>10</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>11</u>
Abadan, Iran (Southern Coast) (ft)				<u>12</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	82	96	108	<u>13</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	68	77	90	<u>14</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	46	54	62	<u>15</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	+29	36	47	<u>16</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	0.6	0.7	0.5	<u>17</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	2	2	*	<u>18</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	0	0	0	<u>19</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	1	2	3	<u>20</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	7	8	7	<u>21</u>
				<u>22</u>
				<u>23</u>
				<u>24</u>
				<u>25</u>
				<u>26</u>
*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY				<u>27</u>
				<u>28</u>
				<u>29</u>
				<u>30</u>
				<u>31</u>

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Exposure Weather	FEB	MAR	APR	<u>1</u>
Hamaden, Iran (Northwest Mountains) (ft)				<u>2</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	55	70	81	<u>3</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	38	53	64	<u>4</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	19	33	41	<u>5</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	-8	12	25	<u>6</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.7	2.2	3.3	<u>7</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	3	4	4	<u>8</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	4	4	1	<u>9</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	*	1	4	<u>10</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	*	2	1	<u>11</u>
Jahrom, Iran (Southern Mountains) (ft)				<u>12</u>
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	82	86	95	<u>13</u>
MEAN MAXIMUM	67	72	83	<u>14</u>
MEAN MINIMUM	41	46	53	<u>15</u>
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	27	36	36	<u>16</u>
MEAN PRECIPITATION (INCHES)	1.4	1.2	1.0	<u>17</u>
# DAYS RAINFALL	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>18</u>
# DAYS SNOWFALL	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>19</u>
# DAYS THUNDERSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>20</u>
# DAYS DUSTSTORMS	N/A	N/A	N/A	<u>21</u>
				<u>22</u>
				<u>23</u>
				<u>24</u>
				<u>25</u>
				<u>26</u>
*LESS THAN 0.5 DAY				<u>27</u>
				<u>28</u>
				<u>29</u>
				<u>30</u>
				<u>31</u>

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BIRJAND

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0400	13	11	3
0700	14	15	4
1000	6	8	6
1300	6	6	3
1600	9	9	6
1900	8	10	5

KERMAN

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0100	9	7	5
0400	7	1	2
0700	9	3	2
1000	11	9	8
1300	14	13	8
1600	20	20	20
1900	13	18	19
2200	9	11	5

YAZD

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0400	2	2	3
0700	6	9	3
1000	2	6	9
1300	3	6	4
1600	2	3	8
1900	6	3	5
2200	0	2	7

BIRJAND

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0400	0	0	3
0700	9	4	0
1000	1	1	2
1600	0	3	2

KERMAN

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0100	4	0	0
0400	5	2	0
0700	3	2	0
1000	6	6	4
1600	3	0	0
2200	3	0	0

YAZD

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0400	0	0	2
0700	0	0	0
1000	0	1	0
1600	0	0	1
2200	0	0	0

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UNCLASSIFIED

ZAHEDAN

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0100	22	18	4
0400	16	16	11
0700	18	5	9
✓ 1000	11	10	11
✓ 1300	19	17	11
1600	18	20	18
1900	20	13	14
2200	10	19	9

TEHRAN/MEHRABAD

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0000	4	5	5
0300	5	4	2
0600	4	5	3
0900	10	10	8
1200	6	6	7
1500	4	5	4
1800	4	6	5
2100	3	6	6

BUSHEHR

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0300	4	0	3
0600	17	9	10
0900	12	13	9
1200	19	10	14
1800	21	10	12
2100	0	3	10
2200	0	2	7

ZAHEDAN

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0400	11	5	2
0700	7	2	1
1000	7	4	2
1600	6	9	5
2200	4	6	2

TEHRAN/MEHRABAD

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0300	1	0	0
0600	1	1	1
0900	2	2	2
1500	1	1	1
2100	1	0	0

BUSHEHR

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0300	0	0	0
0600	5	3	1
0900	3	3	1
1500	1	3	2
2100	0	0	0

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ABADAN

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0000	10	4	6
0300	12	4	7
0600	14	14	14
0900	31	15	11
1200	12	18	13
1500	12	20	15
1800	11	12	12
2100	8	6	7

HAMADAN

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0300	4	11	14
0900	22	17	8
1200	35	30	15
1500	23	12	12
1800	24	36	20
2100	7	4	7

KERMANSHAH

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0000	14	7	6
0300	12	8	4
0600	25	9	3
0900	20	8	5
1200	19	6	4
1500	14	7	6
1800	17	7	1
2100	9	6	6

ABADAN

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0300	2	0	2
0600	2	2	1
0900	4	4	4
1500	4	6	5
2100	2	2	1

HAMADAN

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0300	3	1	2
0900	19	7	1
1500	8	2	2
2100	1	1	0

KERMANSHAH

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0300	4	2	0
0600	9	0	1
0900	6	*	1
1500	3	*	1
2100	3	1	1

*Less Than 0.5%

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BANDAR ABBAS

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
1000	0	16	13
1600	6	21	16

SHIRAZ

% Freq Vsby < 6 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0400	6	4	0
0700	9	18	9
1000	9	13	15
1300	12	13	10
1600	6	7	13
1900	9	15	0
2200	6	2	4

BANDAR ABBAS

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
1000	0	3	3
1600	0	7	3

SHIRAZ

% Freq Vsby < 2 1/2 miles

	FEB	MAR	APR
0400	0	0	0
0700	2	0	0
1000	0	1	1
1600	2	0	1
2200	0	0	0

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TAB D TO APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
CLIMATIC BRIEF - HAZARDOUS WEATHER

1. Primary Weather Hazards. Winter storms with low clouds, icing, freezing temperatures, turbulence, and strong headwinds dominate the period from December through February when length of nighttime darkness is optimum. As spring months (March-May) pass, the storm track gradually moves northward into southern USSR and the available nighttime darkness decreases. Rising temperatures and density altitudes present critical problems to helicopter performance capabilities replacing concerns with icing, freezing temperatures, and other winter conditions outlined above.

2. Other Hazards.

a. Summary. Dust/sandstorms occur throughout the year.

Dust/sandstorms in Iran have a higher frequency and severity during the summer months in the desert region. The period from May-September brings the "Wind of 120 Days" to the eastern Iranian desert region accompanied by extremely dry air, duststorms, and violent gusty winds. These winds are strongest during the daytime and weaken or lull to a breeze at night. Wind speeds of 25 knots or greater are reported 5-15% of the time over most of Iran. Severe dust/sandstorms may last for several days.

b. General Background. Duststorms and sandstorms are common in large portions of Iran. The type of debris carried

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and the frequency of the storms depends partly on the nature
of the ground surface and partly on the strength of the surface
winds. Duststorms are common on the Khuzistan plain at the
head of the Persian Gulf, where the soil is silty. Summer
dust/haze over much of Iran occurs as a side-effect to dust-
storms in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, being carried by the
upper winds at levels up to about 15,000 feet. The desert and
semi-desert regions inland and along the southern coast are
subject to sandstorms, and winds on the lee side of saltencrus-
ted flats carry a high proportion of salt particles. During the
colder half of the year duststorms or sandstorms may rise over
a wide area as winter storms pass through the country provided
that the surface has dried sufficiently since the last rainfall.
Blowing dust or sand may also occur with strong winds asso-
ciated with thunderstorms if the surface conditions are
dry. During the warmer half of the year dust storms gener-
ally occur with an increase in the gustiness of prevailing
winds across the dry, parched terrain. During this period
their onset is more gradual than in the colder months, and
the dust and sand content of the air is usually greatest
during the hottest hours of the day. Because of strong
prevailing summer surface winds and relatively flat, sandy,
and barren expanses, the deserts of eastern Iran probably
experience the most severe and frequent sandstorms in Iran.

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c. <u>Climate Statistics.</u> Mean number of days with dust														1
for areas of concern.														2
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	POR	3
Zahedan	6	6	10	5	5	11	10	6	3	2	3	4	7-11	4
Kerman	8	6	9	9	11	10	13	11	8	4	2	4	3-7	5
Birjand	0	4	4	3	0	2	5	0	0	1	1	0	3	6
Yazd	4	2	7	4	8	4	6	3	3	1	1	1	3-5	7
Teheran	1	*	1	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	1	1	13-15	8
NOTE: * Less Than 0.5 Days														9
POR = Period of Record (Number of Years)														10

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

1. ^(U) ~~(S)~~ GENERAL: The international media periodically obtain and report in the open press information of significant intelligence interest. The international press corps often can obtain access to areas closed to US government agencies. The international press corps can frequently interview individuals who would not wish to provide information directly to the US government. Exploitation of such media reporting can provide valuable original information or corroboration of other intelligence sources.
2. ^(U) ~~(S)~~ TASKING: Point of contact who is familiar with JTF requirements and precedures at each of the following:
 - a. ^(U) ~~(S)~~ DIA: Provide reporting of significant information obtained from international press; provide FBIS reports; provide background data from open source publications, as required.
 - b. (C) ~~(S)~~ DOS/USMC: Provide reporting of significant information obtained from international press reports.
 - c. (TS) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]
 - d. ^(U) ~~(S)~~ NMCC: Provide video tapes of daily TV network news broadcast for analysis by the JTF.
 - e. ^(U) ~~(S)~~ TS: The JTF will acquire still photographs, as required, from selected video tapes of events in Iran significant intelligence interest.

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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

1. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ SITUATION:

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ The Iranian Armed Forces continue to experience a wide range of problems stemming from the collapse of the Imperial Government and the ongoing revolutionary turmoil in Iran. Low morale, suspicion of civilian authority, periodic and ongoing leadership purges, lack of spare parts and incipient insurgent movements among ethnic minorities all play a role in the diminished combat effectiveness of the Services.

b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ The seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran, heightened tensions along the Iraqi and Pakistani borders, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have provided some impetus to increasing the readiness status if not capabilities of some armed forces units. Despite the foregoing, Iran's Services and irregular forces - particularly the Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran) - retain the capacity for violent armed reaction to any foreign operations conducted within Iranian territory or contiguous waters or air space.

2. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ REGULAR FORCES:

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Ground Forces:

(1) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ The regular Army numbers approx 150,000, about half what it was prior to the revolution. The bulk is stationed along the borders with Iraq and the Soviet Union. The Army is well equipped but hindered by lack of maintenance and spare parts. Discipline and morale are low in some units, due to interference by the Revolutionary Guard.

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(f)
(2) (TS) Dispositions:

NORTHWEST

IRAQI BORDER

SOUTHWEST (Oil Fields)

NORTHEAST (USSR/Afghanistan)

SOUTHEAST (Pakistan/Afghanistan)

Units in the Northwest and Iraqi Border areas are occupied with suppressing the Kurds.

[REDACTED] In the Southwest there has been some guerrilla activity by ethnic Arabs, but this has not reached the dimensions of the Kurdish problem. Iraq has increased pressure in the West by a series of border incidents, [REDACTED]

(f)
b. (TS) Air Defense/Air Forces:

(f)
(1) (TS) Fighter Aircraft:

(a) (TS) The overall operational effectiveness of the Iranian Air Force has been seriously impaired by maintenance, supply, and training problems [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Iran has a total of approx 190 X F-4, 135 X F-5, and 77 X F-14 fighters deployed [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(S)

(b) (TS) F-14's are suffering for parts, maintenance and trained pilots; reportedly only 20 pilots had been through intercept training and only 3 had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified at the time of the revolution. Only 15 were fully trained weapon systems officers and they had only been through first-phase training (single missile on a single target).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in the past but several sources question the missiles' reliability.

(S) (c) Fighter Summary:

(2) (TS) Air Defense

(a) (TS) Soviet Border: Comprehensive coverage exists.

(b) (TS) Turkey and Iraq Border: Comprehensive coverage except for terrain masking at low altitudes (mountains).

C

[REDACTED] There are also 3 destroyers in the Iranian inventory. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These ships each carry 4 Standard surface to surface missiles with 1 reload capability. Maintenance may have reduced the missile capability. The Navy has 2 coastal minesweepers [REDACTED] and 6 RH-53D minesweeping helicopters [REDACTED] There is also one squadron each of SM-3D and AB-313 helicopters with anti-sub and anti-surface missions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Iranian Navy is not believed to have any mines or mine-laying capability.

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
SITUATION DATA ON SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS

1. (TS) NAIN ORIENTATION DATA

a. (TS) LOCATION: Nain Military is located approximately 20 NM (37KM) NE of Nain, 100 NM (185 KM) ENE of Esfahan, and 180 NM (330 KM) SE of Tehran. Geographic coordinates:

33 DEG 05 MIN 19 SEC North -- 053 DEG 24 MIN 28 SEC East
(Center of Runway).

b. (TS) MAP REFERENCE:

- (1) 1:1,000,000 - ONC G5
(2) 1:500,000 Tactical Pilotage Chart - G50
(3) 1:250,000 Joint Operations Graphic Series
1501, Sheet NI 40-9.

c. (TS) TARGET DESCRIPTION:

(1) (TS) Nain Military airfield (BE 0429-08807) is an air training facility with dummy SA-2/SA-3 sites and an electronic warfare training site.

(2) (TS) The main runway is asphalt, 5300 x 110 feet. It is oriented WNW-ESE with graded earth shoulders 90 feet on the NE side and 80 feet on the SW side. An unusable graded earth runway, 6000 x 150 feet, crosses the NW end of the main runway. The graded earth runway is oriented NNW-SSE and approximately two-thirds of its length lies on the NE side of the main runway.

(3) (TS) One turnaround apron is located at each end of the main runway. The radius of each apron is approximately 150 feet (including a portion of the runway). A 300 x 400 foot asphalt parking apron is located on the north side of the runway at the southeast end. A 500 x 150 foot asphalt helipad parking apron is linked to the

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300 x 400 parking apron by airport. 50 x 60 ft. taxiway. A gate or fence is located across this taxiway. A second asphalt helipad, approximately 65 feet in radius is located near the center of the compound.

(4) The compound is located on the east side of the main runway. Facilities in the compound include:

- (a) [REDACTED]
- (b) [REDACTED]
- (c) [REDACTED]
- (d) [REDACTED]
- (e) [REDACTED]
- (f) [REDACTED]
- (g) [REDACTED]
- (h) [REDACTED]
- (i) [REDACTED]
- (j) [REDACTED]

(5) The compound can be descriptively divided into 2 areas, a support area and the EW area.

(a) Support Area: [REDACTED]

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(b) (TS) EW Area: The electronic warfare simulation facility is in the northern part of the compound.

(6) (TS) Other Features:

(a) (TS) A dummy airfield, used as a bombing and strafing range is located approximately 2 NM (4 KM) NE of the airfield.

(b) (TS) The NE-SW highway is the main road through the area. A 3-mile alternate route bypasses the main road in the vicinity of the support area.

(c) (TS) A NNE-SSW natural-surface highway intersects the main road .75 NM (1.5 KM) south of the airfield.

(d) (TS) An incomplete rail line running N-S intersects the NE-SW highway approximately 1.5 NM (2.7 KM) SW of the airfield.]

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A d. (S) (PS) Topography: Field elevation is 3550 feet.

The terrain is flat and level within a 13NM (24KM) radius; trafficable to high axle vehicles. Numerous shallow washes dissect the area, locally restricting trafficability. Vegetation is very sparse and consists of only low shrubs. Natural features permit limited concealment.

[REDACTED], and other man-made features provide some concealment. [REDACTED]

e. Enemy Forces:

(1) Air [REDACTED]

(2) Air Defense: [REDACTED] have been observed in the area.

(3) Ground: An estimated [REDACTED] personnel work in the compound during the day, and [REDACTED]

2. (PS) SEM NAN NEW ORIENTATION DATA:

a. (PS) LOCATION: Semnan New Airfield is located approximately 20NM (37KM) [REDACTED] Semnan Town and approximately 120NM (220KM) east of Tehran. Geographic Coordinates:

34 DEG 24 MIN 00 SEC North 053 DEG 40 MIN 00 SEC East
(center of the runway).

b. MAP REFERENCES:

(1) 1:1,000,000 OMC G-5

(2) 1:500,000 Tactical Pilotage Chart [REDACTED]

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(3) 1:250,000 Joint Operations Graphic Series 1501, sheet NI 39-4

(4) Semnan New Photo Map Substitute

c. (TS) Target Description:

(1) (TS) Semnan New Airfield (B-20429-008805) is an 11,500 X 148 foot asphalt runway oriented WSW. Four 120 foot radius turn-off ramps are located along the southern edge of the runway.

(2) (TS) [REDACTED] located approximately 1NM (2KM) SE of the runway.

[REDACTED] Occasional activity has been noted in this area.

(3) (TS) [REDACTED] No more than 80 personnel are estimated to work in this area and at the [REDACTED]

(c) d. Topography: The immediate area is quite flat on the north side of the runway, with some local relief to the south. Drainage in the area runs from north to south, with a series of foothills and dissected terrain approximately 5NM (10KM) North of the airfield. Mountainous terrain begins approximately 20NM (40KM) northwest of the field and represents the southern slope of the [REDACTED] mountains.

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e. (TS) Enemy Forces:

(a) (TS) Air: [REDACTED]

(b) (TS) Air Defense: [REDACTED]

(c) (TS) Ground: [REDACTED]

3. (TS) MANZARIYEH ORIENTATION DATA:

a. (TS) LOCATION: Manzariyeh airfield is located approximately 5NM (9KM) NW of Manzariyeh, 20 NM (35KM) North of QOM, and 50NM (90KM) SSW of Tehran. Geographic Coordinates: 34 DEG 58 MIN 39 SEC North 50 DEG 48 MIN 12 SEC East (center of the runway).

b. (TS) Map References:

(1) 1:1,000,000 - ONC G-5

(2) 1:500,000 Tactical Pilotage Chart - G5D

(3) 1:250,000 Joint Operations Graphic Series 1501, Sheet NI 39-6

(4) Map Substitutes: Manzariyeh photo w/grid, approx scale 1:25,000 and Manzariyeh photo supplement

c. (TS) Air Field Description:

(1) (TS) Manzariyeh airfield (BE 0428-08812) is an air and ground training facility of the IIAF, which [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The main facility is the 10,850 x 154 foot asphalt runway. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are located on the southern side of the runway. Water may be available at the support buildings.

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(2) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Other Features:

(a) ^(S) ~~(TS)~~ Kushk-E-Nosrat airfield is a graded earth strip with a radio/weather station and a bombing/gunner's range. Kushk-E-Nosrat is located approximately 5 KM North of Manzariyeh airfield and is possibly linked by telephone to Manzariyeh.

(b) ^(S) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED] located approximately 1.7 KM North of the center of the runway at Manzariyeh airfield is in actuality a [REDACTED] at that location.

(c) ^(C) ~~(TS)~~ A construction support area is located approximately 1.8KM SE of the Eastern end of the runway at Manzariyeh airfield.

(d) ^(C) ~~(TS)~~ An ammunition storage depot is located approximately [REDACTED] Manzariyeh airfield.]

d. ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Topography:

(1) ^(C) ~~(TS)~~ Manzariyeh is on fairly flat but rough terrain with natural drainage. Area is trafficable off-road by high axle wheeled vehicles. Field elevation is [REDACTED] feet.

(2) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Vertical Obstructions:

(a) ^(C) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED] foot peak: 3 miles (5KM) WSW

(b) ^(C) ~~(TS)~~ [REDACTED] foot peak: 1.2 miles (2KM) West

e. ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Enemy Forces:

(1) ^(S) ~~(TS)~~ Air: [REDACTED] at Manzariyeh airfield]

(2) ^(S) ~~(TS)~~ Air Defense: [REDACTED]

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(S)
(3) (TS) Ground: Although 500 or more personnel have been estimated to be located throughout the area (including the ammunition depot, the construction support area, and the field of Kushk-E-Nasrat), there has been no [REDACTED] at Manzariyeh recently. This area is estimated to be used only during daylight hours. There are no [REDACTED] based within 50NM (90KM) of QOM/Manzariyeh ammunition depot. Personnel at the construction support site could react within 5-10 minutes, or less, but are not thought to represent a significant threat. There are an unknown number of revolutionary guards in the city of QOM, which is approximately 35KM from Manzariyeh. [REDACTED] Manzariyeh airfield on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] where this occurs. Their ability to react in time to interfere with the use of Manzariyeh is assessed as low.]

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APPENDIX 11 TO ANNEX B TO COMJTF OPLAN
MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY

1. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ The following maps will be used in planning by the
JTF

- a. GNC: 12
- b. JNC: Sheets 22, 23, 35
- c. ONC: Sheets G5, H6, H7
- d. TPC: Sheets G5A-D, H7A-D, H6B, G4B,C, G6A,D
- e. JOG: Series 1501/1501 Air, Sheets: NG-39, NG-40,
NG-41, NH-39, NH-40, NH-41, NI-38, NI-39, NI-40, NI-41,
NJ-38, NJ-39, NJ-40, sheets 1-16 in each case.

2. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ DMA will provide special MC&G products as required, to
include:

a. Photo products with one-time grid:

- (1) US Embassy Compound
- (2) Mehrabad complex
- (3) Nain EW Training Site
- (4) Manzariyeh Airfield
- (5) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- (6) Desert One
- (7) Garmsar and vicinity
- (8) Tehran approach maps

b. Iran road maps

c. Tehran street maps

d. E&E maps (ONC composites)

e. JOG NI-39-3/4 composite

f. Tehran city safehaven graphic

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ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (S)
OPERATIONS (U)

REFERENCE: See basic OPLAN

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. (U) Purpose. This Annex provides guidance for the conduct of rescue and rescue support operations. It will not normally be issued separately from the basic plan.

b. (U) Mission. See basic OPLAN.

c. (U) Alliance Plans. None

d. (U) Areas of Operation. The Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, and in particular the countries of Iran, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No operations will be conducted outside this area without prior approval of COMJTF and JCS.

2. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. (S) General. This concept requires JTF forces to conduct operations inside Iranian territory over a two night and one day period (excluding intelligence gathering). The operation will use U. S. Navy RH-53 helicopters from an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea and MC/EC-130s to conduct a clandestine ground refueling operation and rescue force (DELTA) transfer at a remote desert landing site in Iran. DELTA will be airlifted to the vicinity of Tehran to hide during daylight hours and conduct basic reconnaissance. The following night DELTA

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will enter the AMEMB compound, release the hostages and call the RH-53s for extraction. The helicopters will deliver former hostages and DELTA to an airfield, previously secured by a U. S. Army Ranger Security force, where waiting C-141 and MC-130 aircraft will lift the entire force to recovery in [REDACTED]. Protecting fire-power will be provided by AC-130 gunship during the extraction phase. Airborne refueling will be provided by KC-135s. USCINCEUR's appointed base commander at [REDACTED] during deployment, assault, recovery and redeployment/phasedown.

b. (U) Employment.

(1) (S) An intelligence element will infiltrate into the areas around Tehran and [REDACTED]

JTF ground and air components will marshal at intermediate staging and employment bases at [REDACTED]

The actual operation will then occur in three phases: (1) insertion, (2) hostage release, and (3) extraction.

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E (a) ~~Insertion~~. On D-1 (ZULU time) 93 DELTA, 14 truck drivers/monitors and four CCT members will be airlifted from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] where they will board three waiting MC-130 aircraft. Departure will be scheduled so that the aircraft cross the Iranian coastline during hours of darkness. The first MC-130 departs early enough to prepare two separate parallel landing zones in a predetermined ()

*remote desert site in southeastern Iran and set up blocking positions on the road to control vehicular traffic. The other two MC-130s leading three EC-130s converted to ground tanker aircraft will arrive at the landing site just prior to the scheduled helicopter landing time. Each EC-130 will carry 6,000 gallons of fuel. After the EC-130s have landed, two of the MC-130s will depart for [REDACTED] the third remaining to perform lead aircraft functions for the return flight after refueling is complete. KC-135 support will be on station over the Arabian Ocean for use if required.

E (1) Concurrently with the C-130 flights, eight RH-53s will depart a carrier in the Arabian Sea to marry up with the DELTA force at the desert landing site. After refueling from the EC-130s, the helicopters will load the DELTA personnel

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and fly to a hideout approximately 100KM from
Tehran. There, prior to sunrise, the heli-
copters will be camouflaged and defensive
positions established. DELTA force will board
trucks and proceed to a warehouse about 15KM
from Tehran. DELTA force will remain hidden
here during the day and make final preparations.
b. (TS) Hostage Release. That night (D Day - ZULU)
DELTA will move into the city via truck and in the
early morning hours (Tehran local time) enter the
compound and release the hostages. Hostage release
is expected to take no more than one hour. The
helicopters will depart their hiding area to arrive
at the soccer field across the street from the
embassy approximately 20 minutes after initiation
of the hostage release action. A minimum of four
RH-53s will be required to extract all U. S.
personnel from the embassy.

(1) Concurrent with the embassy infiltration, a
smaller group of approximately 10 people will
enter the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
building to secure the release of the three
individuals held there. A fifth helicopter will
land in an open area down the street from the
MFA building and extract that element.

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(c) ~~(S)~~ Extraction. Early evening of the second
day (D Day) three AC-130s and three MC-130s will
depart [REDACTED] aerial refuel over [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and plan to arrive at Manzariyeh Air Field,
50 KM south of Tehran, just prior to the DELTA
proposed over-the-wall time. (One AC-130 will
remain with the KC-135 tankers to allow a thirty
minute later arrival in operations area). Two
MC-130s will be loaded with Rangers and CCT person-
nel and the third with fuel for possible refueling
of helicopters. The Rangers will secure the air-
field and the CCT will set up lights and TACAN
for arrival of C-141s and helicopters.

(1) Two C-141s will depart [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to arrive at Manzariyeh after the MC-130s
have landed and prior to arrival of the first
helicopter.

(2) The two AC-130s will proceed on to Tehran
unless told to hold by the ground force commander.
One aircraft will proceed to overhead the
embassy/soccer field to provide support for
DELTA and the hostages while the second will
proceed to [REDACTED] to be in position
to discourage [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(3) (S) After extraction from the soccer field and MFA area, all RH-53s will deliver their passengers to Manzariyeh where they will trans-load to C-141 and MC-130 aircraft. The first C-141 will be staffed with an emergency medical team to handle the former hostages and wounded JTF personnel. The second C-141 will board the remainder of the DELTA and helicopter personnel. Rangers and CCT members will board MC-130s while AC-130s provide protecting cover as needed.

All aircraft will recover at [REDACTED] (unless emergency conditions necessitate landings in

[REDACTED] with both AC and MC-130s again air refueling over [REDACTED]

(4) (S) After arriving at [REDACTED] all DELTA, Rangers, helicopter personnel and former hostages will immediately be further airlifted to CONUS or Germany as the situation dictates. After a 24 hour rest period C-130 personnel will start redeployment actions.

c. (U) Deployment.

(1) (U) AC/EC/MC-130

(a) AC-130 aircraft will fly non-stop from Hurlburt to [REDACTED] air refueling enroute as required. For [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] initial flight from Hurlburt will be flight planned and filed to land at [REDACTED]

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(b) (TS) EC-130 aircraft plus one PACOM MC-130 will fly via [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After crew resting at [REDACTED] the aircraft will proceed to [REDACTED]

(c) (TS) TAC MC-130s will proceed to Rhein Main AF Germany with one aerial refueling then to [REDACTED] PACOM

MC-130s will go to [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] aerial refueling enroute. After crew resting at [REDACTED] the aircraft will proceed to [REDACTED]

(2) (U) SAC KC-135s will be used for AC/EC/MC-130 refueling support, as required.

(3) (U) MAC airlift aircraft will be used to deploy personnel and support equipment as required.

(a) (TS) DELTA. Depart to arrive [REDACTED] NLT D-Day minus 3. Further movement to [REDACTED] will occur D-Day minus 1.

(b) (U) RANGERS. Deploy to arrive [REDACTED] NLT D-Day minus 3.

(c) (TS) (U) RH-53 Personnel. Deploy to arrive aboard the carriers NLT 72 hours prior to launch with a preferred arrival of 5 days prior to launch.

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(d) ^(U)~~(S)~~ COMJTF Staff, JCSE, Weather Support, and intelligence support will deploy on command of COMJTF.

(e) ^(U)~~(S)~~ MAC support personnel, ALCE and CCT, should deploy to arrive in time to provide requisite support.

(4) ^(U)~~(S)~~ As much equipment as possible will be prepositioned to the maximum extent practicable to [REDACTED]

3. (U) Conduct of Operations:

a. (U) Readiness, Alert, and Marshaling.

(1) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Readiness. Elements of all forces will be in state of readiness that assures participants are familiar with their role in the mission. Readiness criteria will be determined by COMJTF.

(2) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Alert. Due to the fluid situation in Iran and the apparent autonomy of the captors, warning/alerting prior to deployment may be extremely short. All units should be capable of departing within 24 hours of notification. Secure telephone communications will be used to alert senior members of each element who should notify their personnel by the fastest and most secure means possible.

(3) (U) Marshaling. See TAB E to Appendix 1 to this Annex.

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E b. (TS) Air Operations. Employment air operations will
be coordinated and controlled by the designated air
commander at [REDACTED] Override control is always
possessed by COMJTF. See Appendix 1 to this Annex.

c. (U) (TS) Aerospace/Air Defense Operations. If within
range, air defense aircraft from the TF 70 could be
called upon for air defense of the recovery force.

Request for this support will be made by COMJTF, if the
need arises. Premature sighting of TF 70 air defense
aircraft by Iranian radar units could cause an unde-
sirable increase in the alert status of Iranian defenses.

d. (U) Amphibious Operations. Not applicable.

e. (U) (TS) Antisubmarine Operations. Not applicable.

f. (U) Counterinsurgency. Not applicable.

g. (U) Nuclear. Not applicable.

A h. (TS) Chemical Warfare. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Refer to Appendix 2 this Annex.

i. (U) (TS) Electronic Warfare. Due to the clandestine nature
of the operation, barrage type EW operations are not
contemplated. MC-130 and AC-130 aircraft should only use
onboard ECM equipment to protect the aircraft. Appendix
3 to this Annex.

j. (U) Psychological Operations. Appendix 4 to this
Annex.

k. (U) Unconventional Warfare. Not applicable.

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1. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Search and Rescue. Rescue operations will be at the discretion of and under command of COMJTF. Resources involved will be those assigned to JTF and, if within their capability, from resources of TF 70. Appendix 6 to this Annex.
- m. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Deception. See Appendix 7 this plan. (Published and distributed separately).
- n. (U) Escape and Evasion. See Appendix 13 this Annex.
4. (U) Operational Constraints. There are no additional constraints other than those enumerated in the basic plan.
5. (U) Limiting Factors. Launch decision based on weather conditions will be made by COMJTF.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA
Commander, JTF

Appendices:

- 1 - Air Operations
- 2 - Chemical Warfare
- 3 - EW Operations
- 4 - Psychological Operations
- 6 - Search and Rescue Operations
- 7 - Deception
- 8 - Rules of Engagement
- 12 - Emergency Procedures
- 13 - Escape and Evasion
- 14 - Downed Extraction Helicopter Recovery

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
AIR OPERATIONS (U)

REFERENCE: See Basic OPLAN.

1. (U) SITUATION.

a. (U) Enemy. See ANNEX B.

b. (U) Friendly.

(1) ^(U) ~~(S)~~ CTF-70. Support SAR and E&E operations, as required and within their capabilities.

(2) (U) Other. None designated.

c. (U) Assumptions.

(1) (U) Although weather does not have to meet normal VFR criteria, ceiling and visibility must permit visual navigation for helicopter operations and formation operation by transport aircraft.

(2) ^(U) ~~(S)~~ A minimum of five helicopters are required from the hide site for completion of the operation. A minimum of six helicopters must be mission capable departing the refueling site.

(3) ^(U) ~~(S)~~ Moon illumination must be sufficient to allow helicopter visual navigation with the use of night vision devices.

2. (U) EXECUTION.

a. (U) Concept of Operations. See basic ANNEX.

b. ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Concept of Air Operations. MC-130 and EC-130s airland assault and off runway landing zone in the desert of Southeast Iran with ground rescue party and fuel aboard. Helicopters launching from a carrier in the Arabian Sea will land at the desert site, refuel, on-load the rescue party and proceed to a hide site outside

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of Tehran. The helicopter and recovery force will hide	<u>1</u>
during the day and then on that night, after securing	<u>2</u>
release of the hostages, recover to another landing field-	<u>3</u>
near Tehran where waiting transport aircraft will airlift	<u>4</u>
all personnel to safety. Tanker support will be provided as	<u>5</u>
required. Tactical air support will be on-call for the	<u>6</u>
first night of operation and overhead during the second	<u>7</u>
night.	<u>8</u>
c. (U) C-130. Refer to Annex C.	<u>9</u>
d. (U) <u>MAC and SAC Support</u> . See Annex C.	<u>10</u>
e. (U) <u>Escape and Evasion</u> . See Appendix 13, ANNEX C this	<u>11</u>
OPLAN.	<u>12</u>
f. (U) <u>Electronic Warfare</u> . See basic ANNEX C.	<u>13</u>
4. (U) <u>ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS</u>	<u>14</u>
a. (U) <u>Administration</u> . See basic OPLAN, and ANNEX E.	<u>15</u>
b. (U) <u>Logistics</u> . See ANNEX D, this OPLAN.	<u>16</u>
5. (U) <u>COMMAND AND SIGNAL</u> .	<u>17</u>
a. (U) <u>Signal</u> . See ANNEX K, this OPLAN.	<u>18</u>
b. (U) <u>Command</u> . See ANNEX J, this OPLAN.	<u>19</u>
	<u>20</u>
TABS	<u>21</u>
A. Schedule Event Times - First Night Operation.	<u>22</u>
B. Route to Refueling Site.	<u>23</u>
C. Refueling/Marshaling Plan - Desert Landing Site.	<u>24</u>
D. Schedule Times - Recovery/Extract Operation.	<u>25</u>
E. Route to Extraction Airfield.	<u>26</u>
F. Extraction Airfield Aircraft Parking Plan.	<u>27</u>
	<u>28</u>
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TAB A TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO COMINT OPLAN
SCHEDULED EVENT TIME FIRST NIGHT OPERATION

1405	First MC-130 launch
1506	8 Helos Launch from Carrier
1510-1511	One MC-130/One EC-130 Launch
1520-1525	One MC-130/Two EC-130 Launch
1810	First MC-130 Lands Refuel Site
1855-1900	One MC-130/One EC-130 Lands
1905-1915	One MC-130/Two EC-130 Lands
1920	Two MC-130s Depart Refuel Site
1930	8 Helos Land Refuel Site
2010	8 Helos Depart Refuel Site
2015-2020	One MC-130/Three EC-130 Depart Refuel Site
2230	Helos Arrive Drop Off Point
2250	Helos Depart Drop Off Point
2305	Helos Arrive Hide Site
2315	Two MC-130 Recover at Launch Site
0005-0015	One MC-130/Three EC-130 Recover at Launch Site

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TAB A


This map shows the Persian Gulf region, including Iran, Afghanistan, and Oman. A thick, hatched line indicates a proposed shipping lane or boundary, running from the top left towards the bottom right. The map includes latitude and longitude markings, such as 35°N, 30°N, 60°E, and 2°E. Various locations are labeled, including Tehran, Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Karachi. The map also shows the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. A scale bar at the bottom indicates distances in miles and kilometers. The map is titled 'PERSIAN GULF' and 'ANNEX C TO CONCEPT PLAN'.

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REFUELING/REPAIRING PLAN - DESERT LANDING SITE

DESERT ONE LANDING/REFUELING



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
TAB D TO APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO COMINT OPLAN
SCHEDULE EVENT TIMES -RECOVERY/EXTRACT OPERATION

1435Z	Four MC-130s Launch [REDACTED]	
1503Z	Three AC-130s Launch [REDACTED]	E
1533Z	Two KC-135s Launch [REDACTED]	
1551Z	Three KC-135s Launch [REDACTED]	
1719Z	Air Refuel Four MC-130s	
1753Z	Air Refuel Three AC-130s	
1811Z	Two C-141s Launch [REDACTED]	
2077-2177Z	8 Helos Launch On DELTA Notification	A
2040Z	Two AC-130s Arrive Hold Point South of Tehran	
2045Z	Four MC-130s Land Manzariyeh	
2031Z	Two KC-135s Land [REDACTED]	A, E
2056Z	Two C-141s Land Manzariyeh	
2125Z	Three KC-135s Land [REDACTED]	
FOLLOWING TIMES ARE TENTATIVE BASED ON DELTA OVER-THE-WALL TIME OF 2100Z		
2130-2145Z	Helos Depart Tehran	
2200-2215Z	Helos Land Manzariyeh	
2210Z	Two C-141s Depart Manzariyeh	A
2215-2220Z	Four MC-130s Depart Manzariyeh	
2240Z	Two KC-135s Depart [REDACTED]	
2314Z	Three KC-135s Depart [REDACTED]	E
0100Z	Four MC-130s Air Refuel	
0134Z	Three AC-130s Air Refuel	
0320Z	Two C-141s Land [REDACTED]	
0425-0430Z	Four MC-130s Land [REDACTED]	
0459Z	Three AC-130s Land [REDACTED]	E
0510Z	Two KC-135s Land [REDACTED]	
0520Z	Three KC-135s Land [REDACTED]	

TAB D

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THE FIVE APPROPRIATE TO AIRCRAFT PARKING PLAN
RECOVERY AIRFIELD AIRCRAFT PARKING PLAN



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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN
CHEMICAL WARFARE (S)(U)

1. (U)(S) SITUATION.

a. (U)(S) Enemy. It is not likely that the Iranians have the capability to utilize chemical weapons (CW) in the objective area.

b. (S)(TS) Friendly. Friendly forces will possess the capability to [REDACTED]

2. (U)(S) MISSION. JTF conducts operations to secure the release of US hostages held captive in AMEMB, Tehran, Iran.

3. (U) EXECUTION.

a. (S)(TS) Concept of Operations. Delta Force will possess the capability to [REDACTED]

possess the capability to [REDACTED]

b. (S)(TS) Weapon Allocation. Delta Force and Rangers will be issued appropriate equipment prior to the mission.

c. (U) Coordinating instructions.

(1) (S)(TS) JTF will obtain SECDEF approval [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as required and authorized by the

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Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the concept of operations.

(2) (PS) COMJTF will delegate approval for use of [REDACTED] upon receipt of JCS C-Day alert order.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See basic OPLAN.

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. (U) Signal. See ANNEX K, this OPLAN.

b. (U) Command. See basic OPLAN.

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JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS (U)

1. (U)(S) SITUATION

a. (U)(S) Enemy. Between the early 1970s and up to the prerevolution days of 1978, the Iranian Services - especially the Air Force - were working to develop an all-encompassing EW force. By late 1978, the Services had amassed a significant amount of assets, but were still far short of acquiring the types and amounts envisioned by the Shah. Because of the diversity of equipment and the inherent complexities of Electronic Warfare, training, planning, and operations execution lagged far behind hardware deliveries. In terms of hardware in-country, the Iranian Services have a considerable EW combat force capability, as follows.

(1) (U)(S) Iranian Ground Forces

(a) (U)(S) EW Mission: To interrupt, deceive, or otherwise adversely effect the tactical communications of an opposing ground force.

(b) (U)(S) Assets: Approximately five moderately large EW combat units (100-150 men) equipped with an array of ground-based communications jammers acquired from several European firms. Properly maintained, manned, and trained, these units are effective against HF, VHF, and UHF frequencies.

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Except for HF the ranges of effective jamming are limited to 15-20 KM for VHF and line-of-sight for UHF. HF jamming, with proper atmospheric conditions can be effective for extended ranges -- up to several hundred KM.

(c) (U) (S) Estimated Combat Effectiveness. Combat readiness, or operational capabilities is estimated to be low or non-existent at this time. During the late seventies, discussions with ground forces EW personnel indicated significant problems in spare parts and maintenance support areas. Only the EW battery assigned to the Imperial Guard in Tehran was kept at a high degree of readiness. Even with this unit, the "readiness" may have been an illusion as the operators complained of numerous "holes" in the equipment and wide-spread cannibalization to maintain an operational capability. The combat potential, however small, is present; with good intelligence and prepositioning each unit is theoretically capable of seriously degrading, if not eliminating portions of tactical voice communications on HF, VHF, and UHF.

(2) (U) (S) Iranian Navy.

(a) (U) (S) EW Mission: Ship defense.

(b) (U) (S) Assets: The larger combat vessels of the Iranian Navy are equipped with normal USN-type

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ship defense EW weapons systems. The equipment includes receivers to alert and direct the active ECM: shipborne jammers, chaff dispensing rockets and target deception devices. In general, shipborne defense systems are directed at airborne (missiles or aircraft) weapons director frequencies and as such are not directly applicable to this operation.

B, C [redacted] It is assumed that all military voice and weapons direction (radar) frequencies can be monitored and to some degree DF'd. During ingress and egress over water comm-out, radar minimum procedures are mandatory.

(c) *(8)* Estimated Combat Effectiveness. *B.T* Except the Iranian Navy to be in a low to moderate degree of readiness due to logistics problems and lack of discipline. The primary threat posed by the Iranian Navy to this operations is one of early detection by visual, radar, or emission detection means. [redacted]

C [redacted] will provide the best means to avoid the vessels, stay outside of ship defense radar (very low altitudes, beyond line-of-sight) and thus reduce the chance of early detection of the ingress force.

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(3) (U) (S) Iranian Air Force: The EW mission in the Iranian Air Force involves three separate areas: electromagnetic reconnaissance, fighter target penetration, self defense and air defense. Each mission will be discussed separately below.

(a) (U) (S) EW Mission: (Electromagnetic reconnaissance): A mission of national defense level and status - under direct control of shah. The Electronic Reconnaissance GP was charged with monitoring, intercepting, collection, and analysis of all electromagnetic emissions transmitted (within 200 KM) or emanating outside of the borders of Iran.

(b) (U) (S) Assets: [REDACTED] which represents approximately two-thirds of planned program completion. By late 1978 the follow-on ground and airborne units had not been acquired, thus, the eastern 50% of Iran had little or no coverage by the Group's collection assets. However, they had developed full coverage of their borders with Iraq, southern Russia, and the Persian Gulf area as far south as Bandar-Abbas. The passive monitoring equipment was of the latest US design, capable of precise frequency read out and position fixing. Ground station range capability (80-100 KM) was supplemented or extended by use of the airborne asset, providing collection ranges up to 200-500 KM and reaction flexibility to any part of the country.

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(c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Estimated Combat Effectiveness: Because of the nature of the program (directly controlled by the shah,) it is unlikely that any significant capability remains. A system to retransmit collections from ground stations to Tehran was not complete. All maintenance supervision and training as well as critical component repair was accomplished by US contractor support. The Homafars trained to operate and maintain the system were of the best available yet represented a high proportion of the leadership in the uprising against the shah early in Jan 1979. The possibility of a maintenance structure remaining that could support the electronic reconnaissance mission is highly doubtful.

1. ^(U)~~(S)~~ EW Mission. (Fighter target self-defense). To support fighter penetration and self-protect measures against soviet-type target defense systems.

(a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Assets: With the exception of the F-RF-5s, the Iranian Air Force fighter force has a standard USAF or USN EW self-protect, target penetration package (Radar warning receivers; RWR and ECM; pod or internal jammers). The F-5s are not equipped with RWR or ECM pod capability.

(b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Estimated Combat Effectiveness: With the exception of the air-to-air intercept capabilities, the fighter force EW package poses no direct threat

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C to this operation. It is assumed that [REDACTED] will have full-up radar and air-to-air weapons for all-weather, day-night intercept capability. Monitoring the RWR and development of tactics to evade fighter interceptors is mandatory in the target area.

2 (U) (S) EW Mission (air defense): To intercept, identify, and destroy hostile airborne targets.

(a) (U) (S) Assets: Through 1978 the backbone of the air defense system was based upon fighter interceptor aircraft (F-4, F-5, F-14) for long range defense, and visually controlled 23MM and 30MM AAA batteries (ZSU/23-2, and Oerlicon) for point defense of high value installations. The I-HAWK program to supplement and improve point or area defenses was well under way but incomplete prior to the revolution. As of late 1978 three HAWK batteries were considered combat ready; Bushehr AB, Vahdati AB and Abadan. The additional batteries for Tehran, as well as the ones for Esfahan, Tabriz, and Bandar-Abbas were not operational.

(b) (U) (S) Estimated Combat Effectiveness: The EW implications for this operation in regard to Iranian air defense system involve how to defeat it, and penetrate to the target areas undetected.

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As with all the sophisticated weapons system
that were maintained largely through US contractor
support training of Hamafars, the air defense sys-
tem will have suffered major maintenance and oper-
ator support shortfalls since the revolution. It
is estimated that the older GCI/EW sites along the
Iraqi border and Persian Gulf have a limited oper-
ational capability. This coupled with suspected
growing telecommunications problems has in all
probability reduced their overall effectiveness to
to less than 30% during selected periods of operations.

b. (U) (S) Friendly: The EW assets assigned to friendly
forces will be limited to Radar Warning Receivers (RWR)
and active countermeasures equipment installed on MC/
AC-130s and USMC HH-53 RWR.

c. (U) (S) Assumptions: That the Iranian Services are equipped
with considerable electronic warfare assets that could
theoretically adversely effect all phases of this operation.
Further assume that the operational status of the equipment
is low (30 percent capability) and capability and readiness
of operator/maintenance personnel is low (30 percent).

2. (U) (S) MISSION: To aid and enhance mission success through
proper EW ingress, operations and egress procedures.

3. (U) (S) EXECUTION:

(U) (S) Concept Of Operations: Because of the nature of
the mission, this EW concept of operations is based on
detailed mission planning, night low level tactics and
absolute minimum electromagnetic emissions by all players.
In general low level ingress/egress (below 1500') and
judicious use of terrain masking will defeat GCI/EW radars.

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Aircrews must plan and fly missions based upon moderate potential of being under GCI/EW surveillance while closing to [REDACTED] of the Iranian border. If over water the lowest possible [REDACTED] ingress altitudes will aid possibility of non-detection. While closing on, or near large installations or cities, the probability of being under GCI/EW surveillance grows, and low level, terrain masking tactics become more critical.

The possibilities of being highlighted or tracked by I-HAWK batteries [REDACTED] is reasonably low, but successfully evading the HAWK is largely dependent on staying below GCI/EW and HAWK surveillance radar minimums. Whether or not the aircrew successfully evades radar detections is dependent on a number of variables: altitude flown existing terrain (flat vs. mountainous) and enemy radar status (maintenance) and operator proficiency. Good mission planning will take care of the first two variables and the estimated low proficiency level of the enemy operators/maintainers will take care of the last two. In case an air-crew is discovered (tracking radar) evasive tactics must be known precisely and executed instantly. Again the best tactics are to descend or obtain terrain masking. Evasive action should be automatic with no radio or other emissions required. Unless on egress after mission completion or where extreme measures must be taken, active ECM (jamming) should not be used -- it will serve only to highlight the aircraft and alert the enemy. Radar warning receivers (RWR) will be of limited benefit. Current US RWR are programmed to warn aircrews of imminent threat by Soviet type radars; almost without exception, all radars encountered

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will be of US origin and not perceived as a threat by RWR.
Possible fixes for these problems have been worked, but in
any case proper mission profiles are the best guarantee
to success.

b. ^(u) (S) Absolute comm-out and minimum radar emissions from
the aircraft are essential, if not mandatory criteria for
mission success.

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APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: a. See basic OPLAN. (U) (TS)	<u>1</u>
b. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1980	<u>2</u>
(JSCP FY80) Annex D (U), 13 Jun 79 (S)	<u>3</u>
c. Command Relationship Agreement Between	<u>4</u>
the Department of Defense and the United	<u>5</u>
States Information Agency (U) (1959),	<u>6</u>
(JCS SM-727-68, 4 Nov 68) (S)	<u>7</u>
d. Command Relationships Between [REDACTED]	<u>8</u>
[REDACTED] And the Armed Forces in Active Thea-	<u>9</u>
tters of War where American Forces are Engaged	<u>10</u>
(C) (JCS-SM-621-57, 27 Aug 57) (TS)	<u>11</u>
e. Memorandum of Understanding Between the	<u>12</u>
[REDACTED] and the Depart-	<u>13</u>
ment of Defense for Mutual Support in Contin-	<u>14</u>
gency Situations Short of General War (C)	<u>15</u>
(SM-13-67), 6 Jan 67 (S)	<u>16</u>
f. Cooperation Agreement Between the Department	<u>17</u>
of Defense and Board for International Broad-	<u>18</u>
casting (U) 4 Dec 77 (S)	<u>19</u>
g. Memorandum of Understanding Between United ,	<u>20</u>
States European Command and Radio Free Europe/	<u>21</u>
Radio Liberty, Inc.. (S), 31 Jul 78 (S)	<u>22</u>
h. USEUCOM Directive 55-1, Psychological Oper-	<u>23</u>
ations (U), 5 May 78 (S)	<u>24</u>
i. Basic Psychological Operations Study (BPS) -	<u>25</u>
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Iran (U) 27 Feb 78 (S)

1. ~~(S)~~ SITUATION.

a. (U) Enemy.

(1) ~~(S)~~ See Annex B to Basic Plan.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Psychological operations intelligence.

(a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Iranian civilian government, the military and large segments of the Iranian society are hostile to US.

(b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Anti-US sentiment is on the increase among the Iranian people, especially in major urban areas.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Anti-US sentiment is being actively fomented by the Ayatollah Khomeini's Revolutionary Council, Khomeini personally, and his supporters (religious elements, students of various political leanings, and Left opposition).

(d) ~~(S)~~ A major underlying theme of Soviet anti-US broadcasts (both Radio Moscow and clandestine radio, "the National Voice of Iran" from Baku, USSR) are: the legitimacy of Iranian demand for the extradition of the Shah; the impropriety, in terms of international law and practice, of taking US diplomatic staff hostage, the inviolability of the

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Iranian People's sovereignty and territory,
and non-interference in the Iranian internal
affairs.

(e) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Strong outburst of "public outcry"
against any type of US action in Iran with
respect to the US diplomatic personnel held
hostage will most likely come from:

1 ^(U)~~(S)~~ All sectors of the Iranian so-
ciety.

2 ^(U)~~(S)~~ Soviet and Soviet Bloc media
worldwide.

3 ^(U)~~(S)~~ Pro-Soviet Arab states.

4 ^(U)~~(S)~~ Majority of the "non-aligned
states" of Third World.

(f) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Possibility of Soviet open military
intrusion into Iran by involving the "Treaty
of Friendship" of 28 February 1922 exists,
but is not probable. If it does take place,
it will change the psychological environment,
and accordingly, PSYOP requirements.

b.(U) FRIENDLY

(1) (U) Responsibilities for PSYOP.

(a)(U) JCS/DOD

1 (U) During situations other than open
hostilities:

a (U) Plans and conducts military PSYOP

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in coordination with other US agencies. 1

b (U) Provides military PSYOP advice and 2
assistance to other US agencies, and al- 3
lies, 4
as required. 5

2 (U) During situations involving open 6
hostilities: 7

a (U) Conducts through its military ser- 8
vices coordinated overt and covert mil- 9
itary PSYOP in the area of hostilities. 10

b (U) Continues to provide military - 11
PSYOP to other US agencies and allies 12
as required. 13

3 (U) Provide intelligence support for 14
PSYOP. 15

(b)(U) US INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 16

AGENCY (USICA) 17


1 (U) Has primary responsibility for the 18
conduct of information programs in foreign 19
areas in the furtherance of US national 20
objectives. 21

2 (U) Conducts information programs during 22
situations short of open hostilities. 23

3 (U) In situations involving open hostil- 24
ities, supports JCS/DOD in the conduct of 25
military PSYOP under the terms of USIA 26
(USICA)/DOD CRA (Reference C) 27
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(2)(U) Policy Agreements Concerning Interagency Command and Support Responsibilities (See Reference to Appendix 4)

c.(U) Assumptions

(1)^(U)~~(S)~~ No major hostilities will take place in Iran in the course of or subsequent to this operation involving US forces

(2)^(U)~~(S)~~ US military PSYOP will be employed in support of operation.

(3)^(U)~~(S)~~ Iranian military and civilian leadership will be hostile as will be large segments of the Iranian people.

(4)^(U)~~(S)~~ US civilian resources and assets suitable for the conduct of PSYOP in support of this operation be available.

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2. ^(U)~~(S)~~ MISSION Conduct psychological operations in support of the recovery operation. 1
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3. ^(U)~~(S)~~ CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT 3
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- a. ^(U)~~(S)~~ General PSYOP in support of the recovery operation will be conducted by US military and civilian agencies. 5
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- b. ^(U)~~(S)~~ PSYOP will be conducted in three phases. 8
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- (1) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Phase One. Preparatory to Implementation of OPLAN. 10
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- (a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Plan for and be prepared to provide PSYOP support to operation. 12
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- (b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ US civilian agencies conduct normal normal information programs directed at audiences world-wide ingeneral and in Iran in particular per existing policy guidance. 14
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- (c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Conduct contingency planning to employ US military PSYOP in coordination with appropriate civilian agencies. 19
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- (2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Phase Two. Concurrent with the execution of OPLAN. 22
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- (a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Conduct military PSYOP to support US forces. 24
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- (b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Be prepared to implement Phase Three of this plan. 26
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(3) (U) Phase Three. The aftermath of Operation:	<u>1</u>
(a) (C) In coordination with US civilian	<u>2</u>
agencies, conduct PSYOP in the aftermath	<u>3</u>
of the execution of operation to explain	<u>4</u>
the causation of the action and current	<u>5</u>
US policy.	<u>6</u>
c. (U) Psychological Objectives. The following are the	<u>7</u>
objectives of PSYOP in support of operation.	<u>8</u>
(1) (U) During the implementation phase, contri-	<u>9</u>
bute toward the successful execution of the oper-	<u>10</u>
ation by:	<u>11</u>
(a) (U) Creating and supporting foreign	<u>12</u>
government and public (especially	<u>13</u>
Iranian) acceptance of US objectives	<u>14</u>
and actions within the scope of	<u>15</u>
the operation, and stimulate cooperation	<u>16</u>
with the United States effort.	<u>17</u>
(c) (U) Deterring Iranian internal oppos-	<u>18</u>
ition and foreign powers from interfering	<u>19</u>
with operation or any related US military	<u>20</u>
action.	<u>21</u>
(d) (U) Reassuring foreign, and especially	<u>22</u>
Iranian, audiences of the limited nature	<u>23</u>
of US action.	<u>24</u>
(e) (U) Countering foreign, propaganda	<u>25</u>
hostile to, US actions, and neutralize its	<u>26</u>
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impact on operation.	<u>1</u>
(f) ^(U) (S) Fixing the onus of responsi-	<u>2</u>
bility on the students/militant for	<u>3</u>
instigating hostilities.	<u>4</u>
(2) ^(U) (S) In the aftermath of operation:	<u>5</u>
(a) (U) Continue psyschological campaigns	<u>6</u>
and information programs to achieve	<u>7</u>
applicable objectives.	<u>8</u>
(b) ^(U) (S) Explain the legitimacy of and	<u>9</u>
provide cogent rationale for operation	<u>10</u>
and related US actions, whether sucessful	<u>11</u>
or not.	<u>12</u>
d. ^(U) (S) <u>Target Groups</u> . General guidance with respect	<u>13</u>
to target groups in Iran for situations short of and	<u>14</u>
during open hostilities are contained in reference (i)	<u>15</u>
<u>the Basic Psychological Study of Iran</u> . Additional target	<u>16</u>
groups in Iran and worldwide will be developed based	<u>17</u>
on general guidance from NCA.	<u>18</u>
e. (U) <u>Psychological Themes to be Stressed or Avoided</u> .	<u>19</u>
The following is general guidance on the type of themes	<u>20</u>
to be stressed or avoided. This list does not preclude	<u>21</u>
themes that may be developed as the situation requires.	<u>22</u>
(1) (U) Themes to be stressed.	<u>23</u>
(a) ^(U) (S) Appeal to Iranian national pride, religious	<u>24</u>
traditions, Moslem and national sense of fairness.	<u>25</u>
(b) ^(U) (S) Stress the significance of the inviol-	<u>26</u>
ability of diplomatic persons and extra-territori-	<u>27</u>
ality.	<u>28</u>
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<u>1</u> ^(U) (C) United Nation's Security Council	<u>1</u>
Resolutions.	<u>2</u>
<u>2</u> ^(U) (C) International law, customs and usage.	<u>3</u>
<u>3</u> ^(U) (C) World Court opinion.	<u>4</u>
<u>4</u> ^(U) (C) Percepts of Islam.	<u>5</u>
<u>5</u> ^(U) (C) Centuries-old Moslem tradition and	<u>6</u>
customs.	<u>7</u>
(c) ^(U) (C) Explain the need for US military action	<u>8</u>
as one:	<u>9</u>
<u>1</u> ^(U) (C) Forced on US by irresponsible elements in	<u>10</u>
Iran.	<u>11</u>
<u>2</u> ^(U) (C) Resulting from the adamant refusal of	<u>12</u>
the Khomeini government to come to a	<u>13</u>
negotiated settlement/compromise.	<u>14</u>
<u>2</u> ^(U) (C) Justified by international law, usage	<u>15</u>
and customs, and teachings of Islam (avenge	<u>16</u>
the wrong done to you).	<u>17</u>
(d) ^(U) (C) Put the onus of blame on elements	<u>18</u>
in the Iranian society who are inimical	<u>19</u>
to the Iranian national interest, and	<u>20</u>
suggest the role played by the "subversive"	<u>21</u>
elements (especially 'the Left) fomenting	<u>22</u>
the crisis which culminated in this	<u>23</u>
action.	<u>24</u>
(e) ^(U) (C) Reaffirm US friendship for the	<u>25</u>
Iranian people, concern for their welfare	<u>26</u>
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and security, and readiness to come to
their aid.

(2) (U) Themes to be avoided:

(a) (U) Political commitments or policy
pronouncements until specifically directed
by the NCA.



(b) (U) Any anti-religious themes or
those in any way disparaging Islam,
Moslem customs, and religious institu-
tions, leaders, and followers.

(c) (U) Predictions or threats beyond
the means of the issuing agency or the
US Government as a whole.

(d) (U) Those disparaging the Iranian
people as a group, the Iranian nation
or its history.

f. (U) Responsibilities and Tasks.

(1) (U) JCS

(a)  Propose to the NSC the establish-
ment of an ad hoc interim National PSYOP
Coordinating Group (NPCG) representing
DOD/JCS, USICA,  and State with
the following major tasks:

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- 1 ^(U)~~(S)~~ Coordinate interagency national PSYOP planning in support of operation. 1
2 ^(U)~~(S)~~ Develop and provide policy guidance to PSYOP planning and execution. 2
3 ^(U)~~(S)~~ Monitor the conduct of PSYOP in support of operation. 3
(b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ If NPCG is not established, be prepared to provide a substitute means for coordinating and transmitting guidance to responsible US Government agencies for the conduct of PSYOP in support of operation. 4
(c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Initiate the implementation of DOD/US agency agreements: 5
1 ^(U)~~(S)~~ DOD/USIA (Reference c) 6
2 ^(U)~~(S)~~ DOD/ CRA (Reference d) 7
(d) ^(U)~~(S)~~ If the situation requires, be prepared to initiate the conduct of military PSYOP in Iran. 8
(e) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Maintain current PSYOP estimate for OPLAN based on current intelligence and Basic and Special PSYOP studies (Reference i) for use by JCS/OSD and responsible US Government agencies. 9
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(2) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) USCINCEUR

(a) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) No military PSYOP task assigned with respect to operation unless directed otherwise by JCS.

(b) (S) Support PSYOP of ICA [REDACTED] as directed by JCS, in the conduct of operation.

(c) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Be prepared to initiate military strategic PSYOP, if directed by JCS.

(3) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) JTF.

(a) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Conduct military PSYOP tasks assigned as directed otherwise by JCS.

(b) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Support PSYOP [REDACTED] as directed by JCS in the conduct of operation.

g. (U) Policy Guidance.

h. ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Situations Short of Open Hostilities. In situations short of open hostilities, PSYOP policy guidance will be provided by NCA.

(1) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) During Open Hostilities. In situations involving open hostilities, policy guidance will be provided in accordance with existing applicable plans.

i. ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Coordination Instructions.

(1) ~~(S)~~ ^(U) Plans prepared in support of this PSYOP Plan will require that PSYOP policy guidance (PSYOP objectives, themes, and actions to be

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avoided) be disseminated further to elements
subordinate to USCINCEUR.

(2) (S) NCA will coordinate the PSYOP effort of
responsible US Government agencies participating in
this operation.

4. (U) Service Support.

a. (U) Personnel. TBD.

b. (U) Logistics. TBD.

5. (U) Command and Signal. Not applicable.

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APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN ~~(TS)~~ (U)
SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: (See Basic Plan)

Applicable Joint Directives/Verbal Taskings

AFR 28-4, USAF Mobility Planning

AFM 2-36, Search and Rescue Operations

AFM 28-42, Mobility for Military Aircraft Command
Forces ~~(S)~~ (U)

AFM 64-2, National Search and Rescue Service

AFM 64-3, Wartime Search and Rescue (SAR)

Procedures

MACR 28-2, MAC Mobility/Contingency Planning

Policies and Procedures

ARRS 3-1 ~~(S)~~ (U), Mission Employment Tactics

ARRS R 55-1, Rescue and Recovery Operations

ARRS R 67-1, Equipment for ARRS Forces

ARRS R 55-5, Helicopter Aircrew Operational

Procedures

ARRS M 55-130, HC-130H/P/N Aircrew Operational

Procedures

ARRS R 55-6, Search and Rescue/Weather

Reconnaissance Support Planning

ARRS 57 Series Regs, Standard Equipment Configuration

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MAC OPLAN 9499 ^(U) (S) - ARRS War Plan	<u>1</u>
MAC	<u>2</u>
ARRS Mobility and Deployment Plan (9446)	<u>3</u>
MAC MANFOR File, ARRS Packages, and	<u>4</u>
MAC LOGFOR File, ARRS Packages	<u>5</u>

1. (U) <u>Situations</u> : See Basic Plan	<u>7</u>
a. (U) <u>Enemy</u> . See basic plan and Annex.	<u>8</u>
b. ^(U) (S) <u>Friendly</u> . See basic plan. TF-70 will cover over	<u>9</u>
water and in country SAR (Approximately 150 NM unrefueled	<u>10</u>
radius from location of USS NIMITZ in Gulf of Oman)	<u>11</u>
c. (U) <u>Definitions</u> .	<u>12</u>
1. (U) Airborne Mission Commander: A designated repre-	<u>13</u>
sentative of the SAR mission coordinator who exercises	<u>14</u>
overall control of the mission activity.	<u>15</u>
2. Aircrew Recovery. The use of SAR equipment/personnel	<u>16</u>
to locate and recover aircrew personnel in a peacetime	<u>17</u>
or wartime environment.	<u>18</u>
3. Component SAR Controller. The designated SAR repre-	<u>19</u>
sentative of a component commander of a unified command	<u>20</u>
who is responsible in the name of his commander for the	<u>21</u>
control of component SAR forces committed to joint SAR	<u>22</u>
operations.	<u>23</u>
4. Removal Area. A designated area in hostile territory	<u>24</u>
from which personnel are evacuated.	<u>25</u>
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5. Rescue Combat Air Patrol. An aircraft patrol provided	<u>1</u>
over an objective area for the purpose of intercepting	<u>2</u>
and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their	<u>3</u>
target. (They protect the Search and Rescue Task Force	<u>4</u>
(SARTF) during a rescue and recovery mission).	<u>5</u>
6. Rescue Escort. Aircraft designated to provide pro-	<u>6</u>
tection for the rescue vehicles from possible hostile	<u>7</u>
action while en route to and from the incident scene and	<u>8</u>
during the recovery phase.	<u>9</u>
7. On Station. SAR facilities at a geographical position	<u>10</u>
for precautionary SAR assistance.	<u>11</u>
8. On-Scene Commander. A person designated to coordinate	<u>12</u>
the rescue efforts at the rescue site.	<u>13</u>
9. Precautionary SAR. The planning and positioning of	<u>14</u>
aircraft, ships, or ground facilities for providing SAR	<u>15</u>
assistance, if required.	<u>16</u>
10. Search and Rescue. The use of aircraft, surface	<u>17</u>
craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equip-	<u>18</u>
ment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on	<u>19</u>
land or at sea.	<u>20</u>
11. SAR Coordinator. The designated SAR representative	<u>21</u>
of the area commander, with overall responsibility and	<u>22</u>
authority for operation of the Joint Rescue Coordination	<u>23</u>
Center (JRCC), and for joint SAR operations within the	<u>24</u>
geographical area assigned.	<u>25</u>
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12. Search and Rescue Coordination Center. A primary SAR facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling SAR operations. It may be operated jointly or unilaterally. (The Search and Rescue Coordination Center (SRCC) differs from the JRCC in that it is normally subregional and uniservice).

13. SAR Mission Coordinator. A SAR controller selected by the SAR Coordinator to direct a specific mission.

14. Search and Rescue Task Force. Forces committed to a SAR operation to search for, locate and rescue personnel. They also include elements that protect the SAR Force from enemy interdiction.

d.(U) Assumptions.

1. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Permissive environment at forward operating location (FOL).

E 2. ^(C)~~(TS)~~ FOL is [REDACTED] however, if operational necessity dictates, FOL could be changed to any location including bare base, that can support C-5 operations.

3. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Less than permissive environment in country Iran.

4. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Night operations for optimum cover.

5. ^(U)~~(S)~~ No in-country aerial refueling (AR).

6. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Possibly no helo AR at all.

7. ^(U)~~(S)~~ SAR objective(s) may have to E & E up to 48 hours before recovery.

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2. (U) (TS) Mission. ARRS will provide dedicated HC-130/HH-53H aircraft and personnel to perform combat rescue, recovery, SAR mission coordination, airborne mission coordination, and aerial refueling for the HH-53H PAVE LOW III helicopters as required in support of the evacuation of the American hostages from Tehran. 1
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3. (U) (TS) Execution. 7
- a. (U) Concept of Operations. Refer to the basic plan for the overall concept of operations. 8
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- b. (TS) Concept of SAR Operations. 10
- (1) Deployment. Upon execution of this OPLAN, three HH-53 PAVE LOW III helicopters will be airlifted from Kirtland AFB by C-5 aircraft to [REDACTED] 11
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- One HH-53 and all support gear will go aboard the first C-5 with the other two helos aboard the second C-5. Both C-5s will depart Kirtland AFB so as to arrive [REDACTED] D+1 (approx 18 hours flying time). Helo aircrew, maintenance, support personnel, Rescue Coordination Center mobility teams and intermediate management personnel will deploy with the two C-5s. Two HC-130s will deploy from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] so as to arrive on D+1 (approx 10 hours flying time). All aircraft and personnel will be ready to deploy within 72 hours but can go on 12 hour notice with sufficient heads up (HH-53 can be prepared for shipment in 8 hours).

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- E (2) ~~(PS)~~ Employment. Upon arrival of C-5s at [REDACTED] 1
2 HH-53s will be built up and prepared for operational 2
missions (approx 12 hours). The third HH-53 will be 3
built up after the first 2 are complete. Once FMC, 4
ARRS combat rescue forces will conduct operations at 5
the direction of COMJTF. HH-53 PAVE LOW III and 6
HC-130 aircraft will stand alert until the evacuation 7
operation is complete. If a situation develops 8
requiring rescue/recovery of friendly forces, HH-53s 9
will fly night missions supported by the HC-130 acting 10
as Airborne Mission Commander and as refueler for the 11
helos. The Rescue Coordination Center will act as 12
overall mission controlled at the direction of COMJTF. 13
c. (U) Tasks of Subordinate Units. 14
(1) (U) HQ MAC will provide C-5 airlift as required to 15
support deployment/redeployment. 16
(2) (C) HQ ARRS: 17
(a) Will provide tasked resources and insure 18
coordination of deployment operations. 19
(b) Will provide technical SAR expertise to 20
COMJTF. 21
d. ~~(U)~~ Tasks of Friendly Forces. 22
(1) ARRS units supporting this OPLAN are 1550 ATW, 23
Kirtland AFB, NM, and [REDACTED] 24
e. (U) Coordinating Instructions. All ARRS forces 25
supporting this OPLAN are authorized coordination with 26
elements of the entire command. 27
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4. (U) Administration and Logistics. 1
- a. (U) Logistics. Friendly forces will supply all 2
necessary logistical support required to sustain a SAR 3
operation at a bare base for up to seven days. 4
- b. (U) Administration. See basic plan. 5
5. (U) Command and Control. 6
- a. (U) Command, administrative control, and technical 7
supervision of the tasked units are vested in the Com- 8
mander, ARRS, and will, upon plan implementation, be 9
exercised by the wing in which the aircraft or 10
personnel are geographically located. If required, an 11
intermediate management group will be deployed to the 12
theater of conflict to exercise direct command and 13
management of participating ARRS forces. 14
- b. (U) Operational control of assigned CONUS combat 15
rescue units is vested in the Commander, ARRS, and will, 16
upon plan implementation, be exercised by the wing in 17
which the aircraft or personnel are geographically 18
located. Upon arrival in the designated area of respon- 19
sibility, operational control will be vested in the 20
COMJTF and exercised through his air component commander. 21
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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)

(U) REFERENCES: Deployment/Airland Option Flow Chart dtd
11 Apr 1980 (TS) (U)

Employment/Airland Option Flow Chart dtd
11 Apr 1980 (TS) (U)

1. (U) (TS) SITUATION:

a. (U) (TS) General. The government of Iran and militant elements responsive to the religious leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, currently hold 53 US citizens as hostages in the American Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Tehran, Iran.

b. (U) (TS) Enemy. See Annex B, Intelligence. GOI forces and militant elements possess the capability to prevent OPLAN success by detection of OPLAN forces and intentions, increased security measures and/or direct engagement of OPLAN forces. Soviet/Bloc intelligence assets also possess the capability to detect OPLAN forces and intentions by only have a marginal capability to directly prevent the attainment of the OPLAN objectives. These latter elements can most readily obstruct OPLAN forces by informing GOI and the militants as to US intentions. Several third countries can detect OPLAN intentions and compromise execution. These include Israel, Pakistan, Oman and Egypt.

(1) (U) (TS) the US has publicly depicted a rescue attempt as impossible due to the physical limitations of distance and the location of the hostages. All

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observable indications at this time point to the conclusion that this perception is held by both Iranian and Soviet/Bloc authorities.

(2) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ The Soviet Union possesses the most comprehensive capability to detect US intentions throughout the planning, training, deployment and execution phases of the OPLAN. Iranian elements also have the capability to detect US intentions since there are significant numbers of unmonitored Iranian nationals in the United States and in the nations where OPLAN forces will be located. However, Soviet/Bloc intelligence assets are more extensive and capable of detecting the early phases of the OPLAN than are the Iranian resources. The Iranian assets are more likely to discover and check OPLAN forces during the execution phase.

(3) ^(S) ~~(TS)~~ Soviet/Bloc authorities have the capability to possess knowledge of US intentions and withhold action until the execution phase so as to achieve embarrassment to the United States. There is no indication at this time that such is the case. Iran has the same capability but [REDACTED] has confirmed the absence of a curfew and police checkpoints in Tehran. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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A c. (S) Friendly. The Special Operations Division, J-3
OJCS, has established a [REDACTED] team composed of three
Joint Staff officers and a representative from each
Service. TF70 has conducted tactical [REDACTED] maneuvers,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

d. (U) Assumptions. None.

A 2. (TS) MISSION: Enhance the potential for OPLAN success
by parallel actions of [REDACTED] in-
volving, as [REDACTED] as possible.

3. (U) EXECUTION:

A a. (TS) Concept of Operations. [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] will be accomplished on an as needed basis
rather than in concert with an inflexible plan. OPLAN
success is predicated on surprise and not on [REDACTED]
A continuous, close watch will be maintained on all
discernable threat capabilities so that appropriate
A [REDACTED] options may be exercised.
Options, keyed to each known threat, will be executed
on the command of the Joint Task Force Commander.

b. (U) Tasks.

A (1) (TS) Provide appropriate [REDACTED] for each OPLAN
element during deployment.

A (2) (TS) Conduct conditioning of threat intelligence
so as to depict OPLAN elements as [REDACTED]
to each OPLAN launch facility.

A (3) (TS) Provide appropriate options to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to areas at some distance from

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the OPLAN area during deployment and execution phases.

(4) ~~(S)~~ Provide appropriate options of tactical

A [REDACTED] during execution phase.

c. ~~(S)~~ Implementation.

A (1) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ OPLAN ELEMENT

~~(S)~~ DEPLOYMENT [REDACTED]

JTF HQ

SFOD DELTA

[REDACTED] Rangers

1st SOW

TF 70

RH-53 Crews

Persian Gulf Counter Mine

Measures Contingencies.

KC-135 Crews

~~(S)~~ Support of E3A Opns in [REDACTED]

C-141 Airlift Crews

Support of facility enhancement

for Rapid Deployment Forces.

C-141 Evacuation Crews

Support of facility enhancement

for Rapid Deployment Forces.

Medical Elements

Initially CONUS Exercise then

support of ARG "A", TF 70

and US forces in [REDACTED]

Communications Personnel ~~(S)~~ Support of E3A operations in [REDACTED]

(2) ~~(S)~~ Conditioning

~~(S)~~ LAUNCH FACILITY

CONDITIONING ACTION

Although USAF aircraft have not

filed flight plans for this

facility, it must be assumed

that at least Soviet intelligence

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LAUNCH FACILITY

(S) CONDITIONING ACTION

A, E

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A

is aware of US activity at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] communications links have been established from here [REDACTED] to Washington and TF-70. MC-130, C-130, and E3A various aircraft [REDACTED] have been established.

Currently, E3A and KC-135

[REDACTED] are being positioned.

A rarely used base by US aircraft,

[REDACTED] must experience a conditioning primarily for MC-130 and C-130 aircraft. The [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] with fleet support and ocean surveillance during the Soviet OKEAN 80 Exercise.

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A (3) Threat Intelligence

OPTION

Airlift

OBJECTIVES

Provide threat intelligence with an during force deployment. Depict

ACTIONS REQUIRED

File flight plans for two C-141 aircraft to with a stop over in Normal clearance requires seven days notice.

A Soviet I.O. Surveill-

JCS directs PACOM to to waters off the South Eastern Coast of

A Soviet Cmd and Intelli-

JCS directs EUCOM to take actions that will significantly

to OPLAN execution. Instructions specify that action are not to result in an

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A (4) Tactical

OPTION

A Helicopter launch

(5) OBJECTIVES

A/C launch of the RH-53

ACTIONS REQUIRED

None. TF-70 has method developed.

A SAR Execution

(5) In the event of Soviet or third JCS directs PACOM from TF-70 prior to launch site, temporarily surveillance. helicopter launch.

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Egress [redacted]
Tehran [redacted] an egress route to the JTF Cmdr directs AC-130 to make [redacted]
[redacted] after rescue lift off [redacted]

from Tehran.

[redacted] Action to be executed prior
to the planned departure of the
AC-130.

Egress [redacted]
Southern Iran [redacted] an egress route over the JCS direct PRCOM to [redacted]
Southern Coast of Iran. [redacted] during

rescue force egress from Tehran.

[redacted] in IAF intercept-
tor launch from [redacted] Upon indication OPLAN A/C are detected,
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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d. Phasing. [REDACTED] are largely insensitive to time phasing, however, if execution is delayed, it may be necessary to revise the [REDACTED] so as to make [REDACTED]. Both [REDACTED] are highly sensitive to timing. Optimum timing is according to the following chart:

Optimum Phasing

Airlift [REDACTED]	D-11 File flight plan for [REDACTED]
	D-4 1 C-141 arrives [REDACTED]
	D-3 1 C-141 arrives [REDACTED]
Soviet I.O Surveillance [REDACTED]	D-3 [REDACTED] Dpts for [REDACTED] Coast.
Soviet Cmd and Intelligence [REDACTED]	D-8 JCS Msg sent to EUCOM.
	D-3 EUCOM initiates action.
Helicopter Launch [REDACTED]	TF-70 discretion.
SAR Execution	D-8 JCS msg sent to PACOM authorizing action.
	Execution at TF-70 discretion.
Egress [REDACTED] Tehran	During or immediately following helicopter lift off from AMEMB.
Egress [REDACTED] Southern Iran	30 min after helicopter lift off from AMEMB.
[REDACTED]	On knowledge of IAF A/C launch probability at [REDACTED]

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e. <u>Coordinating Instructions.</u> All [REDACTED]	<u>1</u>
A [REDACTED] actions must have the approval of JTF commander.	<u>2</u>
All plans originating within the OJCS must be coordinated with	<u>3</u>
Special Plans Branch, SOD.	<u>4</u>
f. <u>Security.</u> All information and coordination must be	<u>5</u>
kept on a strict need to know basis. No public release	<u>6</u>
is authorized.	<u>7</u>
4. ^(U) <u>(TS) Administration and Logistics:</u>	<u>8</u>
a. Logistics, Annex D	<u>9</u>
b. Personnel, Annex E	<u>10</u>
d. Public Affairs, Annex G	<u>11</u>
5. ^(U) <u>(TS) Command and Control: Basic Plan</u>	<u>12</u>
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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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TAB A TO APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF-79 OPLAN (U)
CORRIDORS (U)

1. (U) ~~(PS)~~ GENERAL AREAS. National assets and the JTF have identified two general areas, referred to as the Western Area and the Eastern Area. The Eastern Area is a North-South strip running along a line from the coast near the Pakistani border northwest to a point near TABAS and then west-northwest to TEHRAN. The Western Area is a north-south strip running along a line running from Khark Island north to TEHRAN, extending east to a width of approximately 50 miles on the northern half of the area.

a. (U) Eastern Area.

(1) ~~(PS)~~ ^(U) Southern third (Coastline to level of Pakistan/Afghanistan border, approximately 30 degrees north). If forced down in this area, the objective will be to move east to the Pakistan/Iran border, cross and turn self in to Pakistani Police or Border Guards. Despite recent anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, intelligence indicates a favorable result if evaders reach Pakistani control. The KERMEN-BAM-ZAMEDAN ROAD, along the northern border of the southern third generally has

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little traffic. There is also a secondary road network on the eastern portion of this area which connects with Pakistan. The nomadic tribesmen called BALUCHI might provide support to evaders and can possibly be bartered with for survival items and transport.

(2) (U) Middle third (approximately 30 degrees N to vicinity TABAS, approximately 33 degrees N). Personnel will be faced principally with a desert survival problem. Movement should be at night to keep warm, conserve water, and for concealment. Objective is to move south and then east into Pakistan.

(3) (U) Northern third (Vicinity TABAS west-north-west to TEHRAN). This area is over extreme desert conditions. Decision must be made to go south and east to Pakistan or west to Turkey. Afghanistan, with a Marxist government, is not a good choice.

b. (U) Western Area.

(1) (U) Southern One-quarter (Coast to Zagros Mountains). This area is populated and there is a high risk of being picked up. Options are to move north and then west to Turkey or south

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across the Persian Gulf to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, or Oman. Third-country nationals or sympathetic Iranians in the oil or shipping industry might provide support.

(2) ^(U) (TS) Middle One-quarter (Zagros Mountains).

This area is extremely rugged terrain. There are several tribal groups in these mountains, any one of which might provide support to evaders. The objective will be to move north and west to Turkey, staying out of Iraq if possible. Along the western border of Iran, Kurds may be recognized by distinctive dress which includes pantaloons and fringed turbans or a distinctively shaped hat with brims on the front and back which fold up or down. Not all Kurds are dressed in this manner. Kurds may provide assistance to evaders.

(3) ^(U) (TS) Northern One-half (North of Zagros

Mountains). The primary objective is to move north and west to Turkey. The area northwest of TEHRAN is dissected with numerous intermittent streams and rather rugged terrain..

2. (U) PRINCIPAL ROADS.

a. ^(U) (TS) TEHRAN-QAZVIN-HAMADAN-KERMANS SHAH-IRAQ. In winter there is a likelihood of snow on the road,

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especially in the Hamadan area. Hamadan is an area to be avoided because of the large military forces and Khomeini supporters in the area. The road is generally good.

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- b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ TEHRAN-QAZVIN-ZANJAN-TABRIZ-TURKEY. This route is paved, but in the winter snow might prove to be a problem. Qazvin is a military center. The trip from Tehran may be made in one long day's travel. Leave the road at MAKU and move by foot northwest to the border. Smugglers may be encountered along the way which may be used to take you across the border.

3. (U) METHODS.

- a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Because of the long distances involved (e.g., over 400 road miles to Turkey from Tehran), principal consideration should be given to travelling by vehicle for as long as possible. Vehicles may be stolen, commandeered, or transportation bought. Decisions must be made at roadblocks or checkpoints as to run through them, turn around, or attempt to bluff one's way through.

- b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Whether on foot or on vehicle, principal movement should be made at night. Less traffic will be encountered on the roads and fewer people have the chance to see you even if walking.

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- (U)
c. (TS) It is safest to evade without seeking the assistance of any person. However, you may be forced to do so and certain rules apply. Approach older males if at all possible since they are less prone to take action against you and are more easily overcome should you have to resort to physical force. Make the contact at dusk or in the night so you will have a better chance of escape if that becomes necessary. If you are in a group, only one man should make contact while the remainder hide. The pointie-talkie and blood chit may be used to help you communicate or to seek assistance.
- (U)
d. (TS) Money is an international language, but one must be careful in its use. Showing a wad of bills may tempt the person to try and steal it from you. Furthermore, the person that can be bought may be prone to sell you out to someone else and be doubly rewarded. If possible, insist that the person allow you to accompany him at all times when you are using payment for transportation.
- (U)
e. (TS) Stowing aboard a train is not a particularly good option in Iran. The trains travel slowly and stop at many places. They are customarily searched frequently.

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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TAB B TO APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
EVASION AIDS (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. This TAB describes the usage of the evasion aids provided for individual use.
2. (U) POINTIE-TALKIE. (See Inclosure 1)
 - a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ This aid contains an English phrase or word to the left followed by a phonetic pronunciation in Persian and then a written Persian translation on the far right.
 - b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Because of a low literacy rate (about 33%) and natural apprehension/suspicion of official looking documents in Iran, the pointie-talkie must be used as follows:
 - (1) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Before contacting anyone, copy the Persian phrase or word you want to ask on a scrap piece of paper.
 - (2) (U) Attempt to pronounce the phrase first to the person. If that does not appear to work, then...
 - (3) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Show him the scrap piece of paper with Persian writing.
3. (U) BLOOD CHIT. (See Inclosure 2)
 - a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ This form of a blood chit is used because of the anti-American sentiment in Iran. It does not

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- use the American flag or a registration number as in
a normal blood chit.
- b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ The blood chit should be used as a last resort
in attempting to get help. The English translation
with phonetic Persian pronunciation is on a separate
sheet from the blood chit. Like the pointi-talkie,
attempt to say the words in Persian first.
- c. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ If that does not get results, show the Persian
writing to the person and get the document back for
future use.
4. MONEY.
- a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Use the smallest bill (200 Rial) possible to
pay for meals and a place to sleep. The cost of a
complete meal is about 100 to 200 Rials. A place to
sleep costs about 200 Rials. Do not show your
entire money packet and don't overpay.
- b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Use the larger bills (1000 Rial) for transporta-
tion and fuel. The larger bills can also be used to
pay smugglers to take you across the TURKEY-IRAN
border and should cost about 50,000 Rials.

Inclosures

- 1 - Pointi-Talkie
2 - Blood Chit

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1. Brother - Sister. I am a Moslem like you. I was an
engineer in Mecca to make the home of God then I came to
Iran. I was in Kerman when revolution took place.

BARADAR - KHAHAR - MAN MESLE SHOMA MOSALMAN HAS TAM.

MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA DAR MACCA BODAM. BE IRAN

AMADAM. DAR KERMAN BODAM KE ENGHELAB SHOD.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country,
but he brought me to Tehran. He deceived me. Now I am
alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI

OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHRAN AVARD. HALA TANHA VA

BE DONE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 kids, an old mother and father. They
are waiting for me. You may have kids. You have father
and mother and you know what I feel.

MAN ZAN. PANJ BACK CHE - MADAR VA PEDAR DARAM ANHA

MON TAZERE MAN HASTAND. SHOMA HAM BACH CHE - MADAR

VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranian and Moslem are famous for hospitality. For
the sake of God help me. I need your help.

SHOMA IRANI HA VA MOSALMAN HA BE MEHMAN MAVAZI

MAAROOF HAS TIED. BE KHA TERE KHODA BE MAN KOMAK

KONEED. MAN KOMAK MI KHAHAM.

HELP

KOMAK

COME HERE

BIYA ENJA

DON'T MOVE

TA KAN IJA KHOR

GET DOWN

BE KHAB

SIT DOWN

BEN SHEIN

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STAND UP	BOLAND SHOW	<u>1</u>
PUT DOWN	BEGZAR ZAMIN	<u>2</u>
OPEN	BAZ	<u>3</u>
CLOSE	BAS TE	<u>4</u>
RIFLE	TOFANG	<u>5</u>
PISTOL	HAF TEAR	<u>6</u>
KNIFE	CHA GHO	<u>7</u>
AMMUNITION	FE SHANG	<u>8</u>
HAND GRENADE	NARENJAK	<u>9</u>
MACHINE GUN	MO SAL SAL	<u>10</u>
WE ARE BROTHERS	NA BARADAR HAS TEAM	<u>11</u>
IMAM	EMAM	<u>12</u>
WHERE AM I	MAN KOJA HAS TAM	<u>13</u>
WHICH WAY IS	RAHE KOJAST	<u>14</u>
NORTH	SHOMAL	<u>15</u>
SOUTH	JO NOB	<u>16</u>
WEST	GHARB	<u>17</u>
EAST	SHARGH	<u>18</u>
ROAD	RAH	<u>19</u>
TRAIN	GHATAR	<u>20</u>
BUS	AUTOBOS	<u>21</u>
TAXI	TAXI	<u>22</u>
BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE	<u>23</u>
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOR CEAK LET	<u>24</u>
TRUCK (LORRY)	MACHINE BARY	<u>25</u>
WATER	AB	<u>26</u>
BREAD	NAN	<u>27</u>
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CLOTHES	LEBAS	<u>1</u>
BLANKET	PATO	<u>2</u>
SHOES	KAFSH	<u>3</u>
SOCKS	JORAB	<u>4</u>
HAT	KOLAH	<u>5</u>
COAT	COAT	<u>6</u>
PANTS	SHALVAR	<u>7</u>
OVERCOAT	PALTO	<u>8</u>
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TAB C TO APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
VISUAL SIGNAL/LANDING ZONE MARKINGS (U)

1. (U) VISUAL SIGNALS (GROUND TO AIR).

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ "T" PANEL. Display of panel indicates that an evader is present in an area and is in need of pick up. It will be used when an evader is in a relatively secure area and may be displayed on any day of the week.

(1) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Authenticator: The bottom of the stem of the "T" will point south. Any other display or incorrect pointing of the stem indicates compromise.

(2) (U) Positioning. Display in a secure location that has maximum contrast between the ground and the panel to increase visibility from the air. Each portion of the "T" should be a minimum of 8 feet long.

(3) ^(U)~~(TS)~~ Display times: One hour before last light to dark when security permits.

(4) (U) In event an aircraft is seen or heard, evader must decide whether to leave panels displayed. Evader must also decide to leave or remain in the area.

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2. (U) <u>VISUAL SIGNAL (AIR TO GROUND).</u>	<u>1</u>
(1) ^(U) (S) Rocking from side to side OR	<u>2</u>
(2) ^(U) (S) Green flashes with signal lamp OR	<u>3</u>
(3) ^(U) (S) Dropping survival bundle.	<u>4</u>
3. (U) <u>LANDING ZONE MARKINGS.</u>	<u>5</u>
a. (U) Helicopter landing zones (HLZ)	<u>6</u>
(1) ^(U) (S) Mark four corners of HLZ with panels (day)	<u>7</u>
or strobes (night). Extinguish strobes as soon	<u>8</u>
as helicopter is on ground.	<u>9</u>
(2) (U) Minimum dimensions for RH-53 HLZ are 120 feet	<u>10</u>
by 120 feet with no obstacles higher than 25 feet	<u>11</u>
within 100 feet of HLZ.	<u>12</u>
b. (U) Fixed wing LZ	<u>13</u>
(1) ^(U) (TS) Inverted "L" will designate LZ with a	<u>14</u>
minimum of 3 panels or strobes used in the	<u>15</u>
marking.	<u>16</u>
(2) ^(U) (TS) Panels will be at least 2 feet by 6 feet	<u>17</u>
with two placed at the bottom of the "L" designa-	<u>18</u>
ting both the width of the LZ and the touchdown	<u>19</u>
point. The third panel will be placed at the	<u>20</u>
far end of the LZ.	<u>21</u>
(3) ^(U) (TS) If only one strobe is available, it will be	<u>22</u>
placed on the bottom of the "L" at the touch	<u>23</u>
down point on the right side of the LZ facing	<u>24</u>
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the oncoming aircraft (same side as the marker	<u>1</u>
showing the end of the LZ).	<u>2</u>
(4) ^(U) (S) Minimum LZ size for a C-130 is 60 feet by	<u>3</u>
3500 feet.	<u>4</u>
(5) ^(U) (TS) For dawn pickup, set markings from just	<u>5</u>
before first light to one hour after first	<u>6</u>
light.	<u>7</u>
(6) ^(U) (TS) For dusk pick up, set markings from one	<u>8</u>
hour before last light to last light.	<u>9</u>
(7) ^(U) (TS) Markings should be removed in event danger	<u>10</u>
is sensed.	<u>11</u>
(8) ^(U) (TS) If ground to air communications are estab-	<u>12</u>
lished, different times for marking the LZ may	<u>13</u>
be established.	<u>14</u>
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TAB D. TO APPENDIX 13 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES (U)

1. ^(U)~~(S)~~ General. Due to the nature of the mission and forces involved, a number of different portable radios may be available to support any escape and evasion (E&E) should that become necessary.
2. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Concept of Operations.
 - a. Primary frequencies listed will be used at all times unless interference is positively encountered. If more than one radio in a given media is available to the evading element, the secondary frequency should be used simultaneously. SATCOM radios will only work assigned primary frequencies to avoid mutual interference.
 - b. Evading elements should attempt to make transmissions at 15, 30, 45 minutes past the hour in addition to on the hour. All frequencies will be continuously monitored.
 - c. SATCOM and HF radios are used over long distances to contact the recovery base. SATCOM is the most reliable and secure means of doing so. The Parkhill device should be used to secure the PT-25 in the SATCOM mode. HF should be used only when SATCOM radios are not available. UHF, VHF-AM and VHF-FM radios are used over line-of-sight distances and would be used to contact a SAR aircraft flying in your area.

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3. ^(U)~~(PS)~~ Contact Frequencies.

The following frequencies are assigned and will be monitored during any E&E operation.

<u>MEDIUM</u>	<u>RADIO</u>	<u>PRI</u>	<u>ALT</u>
SATCOM (AZ 144° EL 36°)	PSC-1	307.750 (up)	-
		254.150 (down)	-
	PT-25*	311.150 (up)	-
		257.550 (down)	-
UHF	PT-25*	305.7	341.4
	PRC-66	305.7	341.4
	PRC-90	243.0	282.8
VHF-AM	PT-25*	121.65	137.45
VHF-FM	PRC-77	41.0	32.1
	MX-360	To be provided	
	MX-350		
HF	PRC-74	17907 (USB)	8853 (USB)
	PRC-104	17907 (USB)	8853 (USB)

* The PT-25 because of design flexibility can be operated in any of three media indicated, depending on frequency, antenna, and selector settings.

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APPENDIX 14 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF OPLAN (S)
DOWNED EXTRACTION HELICOPTER RECOVERY (U)

(U) REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN

1. (U) (S) SITUATIONS: The basic plan provides details relating to the overall mission. This appendix deals only with that phase of the operation involving the period of time of extraction from the soccer stadium until landing at Manzar-iyeh Airfield.

a. (U) (S) Enemy. Refer to basic plan. In addition, it should be noted that the helicopter flight path will be on the south side of Tehran (where most of the devout moslems, poor, loyal to Khomeini are found) and lies along the main road between Tehran and Qom.

b. (U) (S) Friendly.

(1) (C) RH-53 helicopters and crews

(2) (U) (S) [REDACTED] Rangers

(3) (U) (S) SFOD-D

(4) (U) (S) AC-130

2. (U) (S) MISSION: To rescue passengers and crew of any helicopter that goes down between the extraction site in Tehran and Manzar-iyeh airfield.

a. (U) (S) If one of the first helicopters (one thru three) goes down enroute (non-densely populated area), the pilot will immediately broadcast his position and souls-on-board

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on the common emergency radio frequency. The nearest helicopter with few or no hostages on board (most likely numbers four thru six) will immediately state his call sign/number in the flight and intentions to recover. Other empty/near empty helicopters will reduce speed to stay in the vicinity in the event additional assistance is needed. In the event a lightly loaded aircraft goes down, again the nearest empty/near empty helo will go to the downed helos aid. In these situations, Delta and the crew (in that order) will assume protective positions around any hostages/injured until help arrives.

b. (U) In the event a helicopter goes down in a densely populated area, the following should occur. The pilot should immediately transmit via radio; position, souls-on-board and assistance required, i.e. airlift only or airlift and ground defense personnel required. The nearest helicopter(s) will immediately respond with their call sign/flight number and ETE. Any members of Delta and the helicopter crew who were on the downed helicopter will form a protective perimeter around the helicopter. Recovery helicopters will provide fire support from onboard weapons and will only put people on the ground (off the helicopter) as a last resort.

c. (U) In both of the above situations, all personnel from the downed helicopter should be ready to immediately transfer to arriving rescue helicopter(s). This should be accomplished by selecting a good helo landing zone area

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and having the entire group assemble in a clear area at least 100 feet from the downed helicopter. This will provide a point for the rescue helicopter to home on as well as keeping everyone together.

d. (U) (S) If radio contact can be maintained (emergency frequency 282.8 MHz), a call for AC-130 support will provide extra fire support and can be used as a radio relay/coordinating unit between helicopters and/or Ranger forces at Manzariyeh.

(U) e. (S) A minimum of one helicopter and crew and at least 15 Rangers at Manzariyeh should be identified as a backup emergency rescue force to provide assistance in the event it cannot be provided by helicopters already airborne.

(U) (S) The person providing air traffic control at Manzariyeh will determine the fuel state of each helicopter when he provides landing instructions. The aircraft with the most fuel will be designated as the stand-by rescue helicopter and the crew will remain with engines running until called upon to provide assistance or to terminate and embark an aircraft for evacuation. If the aircraft with the most fuel cannot perform this function due to battle damage or other mechanical problems, he will immediately notify the air traffic controller who will assign the mission to the aircraft with the next most fuel. Information for take off and location will be passed by the air traffic control personnel or person/entity designated by him.

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(2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ The Ranger force commander will designate members of his force to provide the rapid reaction response force. When told to do so those rangers will move by fastest means possible to the waiting helicopter and provide fire support for the rescue effort as needed.

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ANNEX D TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
LOGISTICS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN.

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. (U) Purpose. This annex provides the necessary logistic arrangements to support this OPLAN.

b. (U) Concept of Logistic Support. Initial logistics provisioning through normal service channels to the extent possible. Equipment maintenance is a responsibility of the providing service/command. Normal resupply is not planned, elements will draw common base operating support and common user land transportation from US units enroute or from host nation sources as appropriate. Emergency requirements which cannot be satisfied in objective areas will be forwarded to JTF J-4.

c. (U) Assumptions

(1) (TS) The [REDACTED] permits operation from [REDACTED] without interference. Aircraft fuel will be available at [REDACTED] in quantities required.

(2) (TS) The [REDACTED] gives tacit approval or will not actively interfere with refueling operations/overflight of their sovereign territory.

d. (U) Resource Availability. There are no anticipated demands for logistic resources which will exceed required resources for this operation.

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1. Brother - Sister. I am a Moslem like you. I was an engineer in Mecca the home of God then I came to Iran. I was working in Kerman when revolution took place.

BARADAR - KHAHAR - MAN MESLE SHOMA MOSALMAN HASTAM. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA DAR MACCA BUDAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR KERMAN BUDAM KE ENGHELAB SHOD.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehran. He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHRAN AVARD. HALA TANHA VA BE DUNE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 small children, an old mother and father. They are waiting for me. You may have children too. You have father and mother and you know how I feel.

MAN ZAN, VA PANJ BACH CHE KUCHAK MADAR VA PEDAR DARAM ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAND. SHOMA HAM BACHCHE¹ MADAR VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God help me. I need your help.

SHOMA IRANIHA VA MOSALMANHA BE MEHMAN NAVAZI MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA BE MAN KOMAK KONEED. I NEED YOUR HELP.

Translation of
Inclosure (2)



۱ - برادر - خواهر عزیز . من و شما مسلمان هستیم . من در مکه . خدا خدا
کار میکنم و مهندس ساختمان مکه بورم . ایرانی مردم و در میان کار میکنم
که انقلاب شد .

۲ - هر دو از من بول گفت که ما به خارج از کشور بر روی هوا کول زد و به
تهران آورد و الان در تهران سرگردان و بعدن غذا و جامه استم .

۳ - من زن و پنج بچه کوچک و پدر و مادر و برادر و خواهر من هستند . شما هم
بچه دلا اقل پدر و مادر دارید و حال ما می فهمید .

۴ - شما ایرانی ها و مسلمانان به مهمان نوازی و کمک کردن شهرت دارید بخاطر
خدا بنی کمک کنید من کمک شما نیاز دارم .

قرائت شما .

Inclosure (2)

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- e. (U) Planning Factors. Service factors were utilized in determining POL requirements. 1
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- f. (U) Responsibilities. 3
- (1) ~~(TS)~~ ^(U) CINCEUR. Provide facilities, base 4
operating support and common user land transportation 5
for JTF HQ Element at NAVCOMSTA [REDACTED] 6
and vicinity. Provide necessary fuel stocks to main- 7
tain fuel levels at [REDACTED] if necessary. 8
- (2) ~~(TS)~~ ^(U) CINPAC. Provides facilities, base operating 9
support, common user land transportation and fuel as 10
required. Assists JTF elements in obtaining supplies 11
and in transmitting emergency requirements to the 12
JTF J-4. 13
- (3) ~~(TS)~~ ^(U) CINCSAC. Provides base operating support, 14
refuel tanker and fuel as required to meet air refuel 15
requirements. 16
- (4) ~~(TS)~~ ^(U) CINCMAC. Provides airlift to include Medevac 17
aircraft requirements. 18
- (5) ~~(TS)~~ ^(U) CSA. Provides necessary medical personnel 19
and equipment. 20
2. (U) SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION 21
- a. (U) Distribution and Allocation. 22
- (1) ~~(TS)~~ ^(U) Main supply point for aircraft and refueling 23
and forward basing will be [REDACTED] 24
will be main supply point for fleet forces. 25
- (2) (TS) 2,861,000 lbs of JP4 is prepositioned at [REDACTED] 26
[REDACTED] 1500 gallons of diesel and mogas for daily 27
use also prepositioned. 28
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b. (U) Level of Supply.

(1) (TS) Class I. Operational rations will be available

throughout. Two hot meals and 1 "C" ration is planned

per day. DELTA and supporting helicopter crews deploy

into objective area with three meals operational rations per

person. They will also carry sufficient rations for

consumption enroute from CONUS to employment destination.

Rangers carry sufficient operational rations to sustain

unit enroute to [REDACTED] All aircrews, medical and

supporting personnel and that portion of HQ JTF deploying

to [REDACTED] carry three days operational rations.

(2) (TS) Class III. Prior arrangements with host nation

assures adequate quantity of fuels at [REDACTED]

CINCEUR be prepared to maintain level of stocks at [REDACTED]

(3) (TS) Class V. All deploy with sufficient Class V for
conduct of operation; no resupply planned.

3. (U) MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION:

a. (TS) CINCMAC will identify and insure availability of
required maintenance personnel, spares and other special
equipment to maintain C-141's, C-5, and SAR fleet at WADI

b. (TS) CINCSAC will identify and insure availability of
required maintenance personnel, spares, and other special

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APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
MEDICAL SERVICES (U)

1. (TS) General

a. Purpose. This Appendix provides guidance for medical support of US forces conducting operations detailed in the basic plan.

b. (U) (TS) Medical Forces. Medical augmentation teams assigned to support SFOD-D:

(1) Emergency Resuscitation Teams:

(a) Physican (surgeon or emergency medical physican), MC

(b) Anesthetist (anesthesiologist or nurse anesthesiologist)

(c) Physician's assisant

2. (U) Concept of Operations

a. (U) (TS) SFOD-D medical augmentation personnel deploy and provide medical support in several locations vicinity of target area American Embassy, Tehran.

(1) (U) (TS) Organic medical personnel deploy with assualt force, provide medical support in objective area.

(2) (U) (TS) Emergency resuscitation teams deploy to Wadi Kena and accompany transport aircraft into extraction airfield, treat and assist in medical evacuation.

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E equipment to maintain KC-135 fleet at [REDACTED] 1

c. (PS) CINCEUR provides necessary maintenance support to 2

E JTF elements at [REDACTED] as requested by JTF Commander. 3

d. (PS) CINCPAC provides necessary maintenance support to JTF 4

elements on board NIMITZ. 5

e. (PS) 1st SOW will identify and insure availability of 6

required maintenance personnel, spares, and other special 7

equipment to maintain AC/MC-130 fleet at [REDACTED] 8

4. (U) MEDICAL SERVICES: See Appendix 3 of Annex D. 9

5. (U) MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION: 10

a. (U) General. Deployments/redeployments will be coordinated 11

between HQ JTF and MAC. Requirements for additional transportation 12

will be forwarded to JTF J-4. 13

b. (PS) Mobility Support Force and Movement Feasibility Analysis. 14

There are available adequate lift resources for movement of 15

personnel and equipment. [REDACTED] airfield has reception 16

capability to receive type and number aircraft scheduled for 17

JTF. 18

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JAMES B. VAUGHT 21

Major General, USA 22

Commander, JTF 23

Appendix: 24

3- Medical Services 25

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(3) ~~(TS)~~ Medical operations officer with additional equipment and C-141 configured medevac aircraft will deploy ~~██████████~~ to prepare to receive and treat casualties upon extraction.

b. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ At objective area organic medical personnel will provide emergency medical care to hostages and force casualties and assist in loading wounded on aircraft for move to extraction site. At extraction site emergency resuscitation teams will treat seriously wounded and assist in transfer of wounded to extraction aircraft. Resuscitation teams upon arrival recovery bases will provide life saving surgical treatment to casualties evacuated to their locations. Casualties requiring hospitalization are transferred to USAF medevac configured C-141. Responsibility for casualties passes to CINCMAC for evacuation onboard USAF medevac aircraft.

3. (U) Tasks

a. ^(U)~~(TS)~~ US Army provides medical augmentation to support operations and assist in treatment of casualties aboard USAF aircraft.

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b. ~~(S)~~ (U) USAF provides dedicated medevac configured C-141's to deploy medical personnel and equipment. Provide evacuation for casualties from recovery base to medical treatment facilities. Provide hospitalization and treatment in USAF Hospital, [REDACTED]

4. (U) ~~(S)~~ Medical Supply. Medical equipment and supply for support or operation pre-positioned at Ft Bragg. Equipment and supplies will accompany medical augmentation teams.

a. (U) ~~(S)~~ CINCMAC provides medevac aircraft. Coordination directly with CSA (TSG). Responsibility for casualties passes to CINCMAC upon transfer to medical evacuation aircraft.

b. (U) See Annex F.

5. (U) ~~(S)~~ Transportation. Deployments/redeployments will be coordinated between HQ JTF and MAC. Requirements for additional transportation will be forwarded to JTF J-4.

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ANNEX E TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
PERSONNEL (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- a. (U) 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims (DA Pamphlet 27-1, AFP 110-20, MWIP 10-2). 1
- b. (U) Hague Conventions No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 2
- c. (U) Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 18 January 1969, Policy for Processing of Returned Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel. 3
- d. (U) Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 15 July 1972, Policy for Processing Returned Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel. 4
- e. (U) Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial (1969) (Revised). 5
- f. (U) DOD Instruction 1340.9, 12 November 1970, Report of Hostile Fire Pay. 6
- g. (U) JCS Pub 2, 1 October 1974, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 7
- h. (U) JCS Pub 3, Volume II, 31 August 1973, Joint Personnel/Manpower Policy and Guidance. 8
- i. (U) JCS Pub 6, Joint Reporting Structure. 9
- 1. (U) GENERAL. 10
- a. (U) Purpose. To provide policy guidance, state 11

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requirements, assign responsibilities, and establish
procedures to insure adequate personnel support for this
plan.

b. (U) Concept of Personnel Support. Personnel support
will be provided on a TDY basis from existing resources
by unified commands, Services, and agencies concerned.

2. (U) PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.

a. ^(U)~~(S)~~ General Guidance. The administration and disci-
pline of all personnel will continue as a primary respon-
sibility of parent Service and/or agency. Commander,
JTF will exercise only such control over the adminis-
tration and discipline of the component elements of his
command as is essential to the performance of his mis-
sion. Each component commander is responsible for the
internal administration of his command.

b. (U) Specific Guidance.

(1) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Reporting Procedures. Reporting procedures
will be established by each component/element based on
his requirements. Reporting will be phased to insure
timely support of the JTF mission with paramount
consideration given to security.

(2) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Replacement Policies. Once selected, person-
nel will be released from this task group only with
the express approval of COMJTF. Should an indi-
vidual be released for any reason after learning the
primary mission of the JTF, appropriate security
precautions will be taken to preclude compromise.

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(3) (U) US Citizen Civilian Personnel. Contracting for US civilian personnel will be in consonance with existing Department of Defense and Departments of Army and Air Force directives as appropriate.

(4) Enemy PW/CI/DET. See Section VIII, Chapter 2, Volume II, reference h.

(1) (U) It is envisioned that the JTF would not become involved in PW/CI/DET and/or other detained persons activities.

(2) (U) In the event that PW/CI/DET are taken during JTF operations, references a and b of this annex apply, and specific guidance from COMJTF will be provided.

(5) (U) Captured, Missing, and Detained US Military Personnel. See references, c, d, and Chapter 2, Volume II, reference h.

(6) (U) Morale and Welfare. The morale and welfare of the personnel of each Service are primarily the responsibility of the component commander of that Service. However, the morale and welfare of all personnel are the responsibility of COMJTF insofar as they affect the accomplishment of his mission.

(7) (U) Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting will be in accordance with established procedures of the Service concerned.

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(8) (U) Decorations and Awards. Awards of decorations and medals shall be in consonance with policies and regulations of the Armed Forces, or as prescribed by higher authority. COMJTF may recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to the respective Chiefs of Service, through command channels, awards to individuals assigned to his command.

(9) (U) Hostile Fire Pay. See reference f.

(10) (U) Travel Procedures. The provisions of Joint Travel Regulations shall apply to all travel associated with this operation provided security is not compromised.

(11) (U) Military Law, Discipline, and Order. See reference c.

3. (U) FINANCE AND DISBURSING.

a. (U) General Guidance. Commander, JTF will insure that provisions are made for the timely payment of all personnel assigned to his command.

b. (U) Specific Guidance.

(1) (U) Currency Controls. Existing theater directives governing currency controls shall apply.

(2) (U) Pay Functions.

(a) (U) Pay for military personnel will be in accordance with established procedures of the parent Service concerned.

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(b) (U) Pay of US civilians will be in accordance with provisions of the Classification Act of 1949, as amended.

4. (U) Legal. Legal Assistance. COMJTF will insure that legal assistance is available to all personnel through existing resources.

5. (U) POSTAL AND COURIER SERVICES.

a. (U) General Guidance. COMJTF will, through his component commanders, insure that all personnel are aware of the grave security implications associated with his operation. The need for absolute security with respect to personal mail will be stressed.

b. (U) Specific Guidance. Existing mail facilities and channels will be used for incoming and outgoing personal mail.

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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ANNEX F TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: A. DOD Directive 5122.5	<u>1</u>
B. DOD Directive 5230.9	<u>2</u>
C. JCS Policy Letter (SM-399-68), dated 18 June 1968	<u>3</u>
D. AR 360-5	<u>4</u>
E. AR 360-6	<u>5</u>
F. AR 381-2	<u>6</u>
G. AFR 111-17	<u>7</u>
H. AFR 190-6	<u>8</u>
I. AFR 190-8	<u>9</u>
J. AFR 190-9	<u>10</u>
K. AFR 190-12	<u>11</u>
L. AFR 190-18	<u>12</u>
M. AFR 190-23	<u>13</u>
N. AFR 200-9	<u>14</u>
O. AFR 200-12	<u>15</u>
P. OPNAVINST 03822.5A	<u>16</u>
Q. OPNAVINST 3040.2A	<u>17</u>
R. OPNAVINST 5720.6	<u>18</u>
1. ^(U) (TS) <u>SITUATION.</u>	<u>19</u>
a. (U) <u>General.</u> The purpose of this Annex is to furnish general procedures and guidance on information and public affairs.	<u>20</u> <u>21</u> <u>22</u> <u>23</u>
CLASSIFIED BY DIRECTOR, J-3	<u>24</u>
REVIEW ON 15 MAY 2000	<u>25</u>
REASON: 5200.1R, 301c6	<u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u> <u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u>

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b. (U) (S) <u>Friendly Situation</u> . See ANNEX C.	<u>1</u>
c. (U) (S) <u>Enemy Situation</u> . See ANNEX B.	<u>2</u>
d. (U) (S) <u>Assumptions</u> .	<u>3</u>
(1) (U) (TS) Any unauthorized disclosure of the operation could lead to inquiry by news media personnel.	<u>4</u>
(2) (U) (S) News media interest in all personnel will be intense upon completion of the operation.	<u>5</u>
(3) (U) (S) Access to all personnel upon completion of the operation cannot be delayed indefinitely, except for medical or security reasons, or when an individual elects not to meet with the press.	<u>6</u>
(4) (U) (S) The integrity, health, and legal rights of the individuals and their families must be safeguarded.	<u>7</u>
2. (U) (TS) <u>MISSION</u> . Develop plans to provide for the release of information pertinent to the recovery of AMEMB, Tehran, hostages. The information released should emphasize the humanitarian motivation of the mission and reveal the detailed planning to minimize loss of human life.	<u>8</u>
3. (U) (TS) <u>EXECUTION</u> .	<u>9</u>
a. (U) (TS) <u>Concept of Operations</u> . The security requirements and considerations for uniformity among the armed forces necessitate that the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs (ASD/PA), exercise overall responsibility and authority for Public Affairs in accordance with reference C. He will be responsible for the Public Affairs aspects of the operations to include deployment, employment, and	<u>10</u>
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other continuing coverage when this information is declared
releaseable by the Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF). All
contact between JTF personnel and newsmen, e.g., media
interviews, press conferences, public statements, answers
to queries, etc., will be coordinated and approved by
ASD/PA after approval or release of individuals from
control by the COMJTF. Particular care will be taken to
preclude divulging sensitive sources and methods.

b. (U) Tasks.

(1)(U)(S) ASD/PA has overall responsibility for Public
Affairs matters of all JTF and returned personnel.

With coordination of COMJTF, the ASD/PA will:

(a)(U)(S) Provide Public Affairs guidance concerning
all Joint Task Force personnel and processing of
returned personnel by the military services.

(b)(U)(S) Coordinate Public Affairs activities
relating to the operation with the Department of
State and other interested agencies of the U.S.
Government.

(c)(U)(S) Act as final approval authority
within the DOD for proposed public statements,
requests for interviews, press conferences, and
answers to media queries.

(2)(U)(S) SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF INFORMATION
(SAOI), SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE OFFICE OF INFORMA-
TION (SAFOI), AND SECRETARY OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF
INFORMATION (SNOI) AS REQUIRED WILL COMPLY WITH EGRESS
RECAP PROCEDURES.

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- c. ^(U)~~(S)~~ Coordinating Instructions. Time phased and/or contingency proposed news themes if required. (These instructions to be modified when advice from a Psychological/Political Advisor is available to the JTF):
- (1) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Employment.
- (a) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Success. The news release will emphasize the exact nature of the recovery operation.
- (b) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Partial Success. The news release will emphasize the general nature of the recovery operation.
- (c) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Aborted Operation. No news release advised, however, if the Iranians or other countries release news of the operations, the U.S. Government news release could emphasize the general nature of the operation providing no details of units involved.
- (d) ^(U)~~(S)~~ Cancelled. No news release advised.
4. (U) ACCREDITATION: Not applicable.
5. (U) FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP: Not applicable.
6. (U) ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES: News media representatives will not accompany the JTF until completion of the operation. ASD/PA representatives will meet the Medevac aircraft at the mid-point return refueling stop to provide advice and guidance to recovered hostages and JTF personnel.
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7. (U) ~~(S)~~ SECURITY: Correspondents will not have access to JTF personnel until approved by ASD/PA. However, all personnel will be cautioned that no correspondent is cleared for classified information and will refer all queries to COMJTF.

8. (U) AUDIO VISUAL: None authorized.

9. (U) ~~(S)~~ INTERNAL INFORMATION: Commanders will emphasize operation security in briefings and debriefings which will be conducted in four phases.

a. (U) Deployment. See ANNEX C.

b. (U) Employment. See ANNEX C.

c. (U) Redeployment. TBD.

d. (U) ~~(S)~~ Other. Any personnel involved with the planning or knowledge of the operation or specifics will remain committed to COMJTF until operation is completed or cancelled.

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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ANNEX J TO COMJTF OPLAN (S)(U)
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

REFERENCES: See JCS Pub 2

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. (U)(S) Purpose. This annex establishes relationships between commanders and agencies participating in this operation.

b. (U)(S) Scope. The command relationships established by this annex pertain for the period of this operation to include deployment, employment, and redeployment.

2. (U) COMMAND LINES.

a. (U)(S) Command arrangements prior to deployment are shown at Appendix 1.

b. (U)(S) Command arrangements when COMJTF assumes operational command are shown at Appendix 2. COMJTF is directly responsible to JCS for the conduct of this operation. COMJTF will:

(1) (U)(S) Act as a single point of contact for coordination with JCS and JTF and other external agencies supporting the operation.

(2) (U)(S) Coordinate air operations.

(3) (U)(S) Exercise operational control over all ground and air assets assigned to this operation.

c. (U)(S) COMJTF insures that resources are available and operationally ready for mission execution. COMJTF takes operational control of these resources upon their arrival at employment bases

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- d. (U) (S) COMJTF will exercise operational control/tactical control of all forces assigned or allocated to support the operations as outlined in the BASIC PLAN. 1
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- e. (U) (S) Control of forces employed under this plan will be centralized. 4
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- f. (U) (S) Flow of command during the phases of the operation from predeployment to return are shown at Appendices. 6
7
3. (U) SUPPORT AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIP 8
- Supporting Military Forces. As outlined in Appendix 1. 9
4. (U) (TS) PROCEDURES. COMJTF will maintain command of all operations and be approving authority for all changes to the procedures outlined in this plan. Tactical Unit Commanders will direct execution of sorties as directed by COMJTF. 10
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JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA
Commander, JTF

(U)
Appendices:


- 1 - Predeployment/Deployment 19
- 2 - Command Line: After Deployment 20
- 3 - Refueling Operation 21
- 4 - Hostage Rescue Phase 22
- 5 - Extraction Phase (Airfield) 23
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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX 3 TO COMJTF OPLAN
REDEPLOYMENT/DEPLOYMENT


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


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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX 5 TO COMJTF OPLAN
COMMAND LINES AFTER DEPLOYMENT




REFUELING OPERATIONS




*LOCATED AT ALT FORWARD
CP FOR THIS PHASE

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO COMJTF CPLANT
HOSTAGE RESCUE PHASE



APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX 3 TO COMJTF OPLAN
EXTRACTION PHASE (AIRFIELD)



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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
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ANNEX K TO COMJTF OPLAN (S)
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS (U)

REFERENCE: See basic OPLAN

1. (U) Situation

a. (S) Enemy: See Basic Plan.

b. (U) Friendly Forces: See Basic Plan.

2. (U) Mission: Install, operate, and maintain command
and control communications systems.

3. (U) Concept of Operation.

a. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Communications support systems will be austere
and limited to the minimum essential to accomplish this
mission. Transmissions and equipment emissions will be
held to a minimum consistent with flight safety and
mission execution.

b. (U) Unless otherwise indicated, stations having access
to command and control communications nets will main-
tain listening silence until contacted throughout the
operation.

c. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Command and Control Communications support for
the mission can be generally divided into four
sequential phases: Deployment, staging, employment
and redeployment as discussed in para. 4.

d. ~~(TS)~~ Weather and intelligence communication support
will be available to the JTF.

(1) Weather communications will be provided

E ~~via~~ via a full duplex teletype circuit to
Croughton, a Defense Meteorological Support Program
satellite terminal, and a receive-only EUROFAX
circuit.

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(2) Intelligence communications will be established between the JTF and intelligence collection agencies [REDACTED] (DIA).

(a) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(b) [REDACTED] Primary route will be via the DCS to [REDACTED]. The alternate route will be [REDACTED] to SOD via dedicated circuit, then via UHF SATCOM to JTF.

4. (U) Execution:

- a. (PS) Deployment: Communications by forward deploying JTF elements (CONUS to overseas) will adhere to normal MAC procedures. Required reports for the JTF will be forwarded to the JCS (SOD), Pentagon, until the JTF is operational at [REDACTED].
- b. (PS) Staging: Dedicated command and control communications will be activated between JTF elements at forward operating bases or launch locations and the JCS (SOD).

(1) Command Net ALFA. This net will be activated upon arrival of JTF at [REDACTED] and will remain active during the entire operation. Secure voice and record communications will be established between the JCS (SOD); JTF [REDACTED] and JTF Relay [REDACTED]. Primary media will be via DCS and SHF satellite. Alternate link between the JCS (SOD) and JTF will be via UHF TACSATCOM. Secondary link between JCS (SOD) and JTF relay will be via UHF TACSATCOM to [REDACTED]. JTF will be Net Control. (TAB A, Appendix 3 for diagram).

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(S)(U)
A (2) (TS) Command Net BRAVO. This net will be activated as directed to serve as a tactical mission net during the execution of the mission. Non-secure voice will be established via UHF satellite between JTF, SFOD-D, Helo Detachment, and Rangers. JTF will be net control. (TAB B, Appendix 3 for diagram).

AE (3) *(S)(C)* (TS) Command Net CHARLIE. This net will be activated upon arrival of JTF, JTF Relay, the aircraft carrier, SFOD-D, Ranger Element, Forward Operating Location (FOL) ~~REDACTED~~ C-130 elements, C-141 element, Helo Detachment. Command Net BRAVO and HF will be backup. JTF will be Net Control. This net will serve as the primary net during insertion and extraction phases of the mission. (TAB C, Appendix 3 for diagram).

(S)(U)
A (4) (TS) Command Net Delta. This net will be activated when required to serve as a tactical mission net (secondary) during any phase of the mission. Non-secure voice or code will be established via HF SSB between JTF, JTF Relay, SFOD-D, Helo Detachment, Spectre Element, C-130 elements, the aircraft carrier, Ranger Element, C-141 and Tanker elements. (TAB D, Appendix 3 for diagram).

c. (U) Employment:

(1) (U) Enroute.

- (U)*
(a) (TS) Ground-to-air communications between the JTF and airborne elements will be via UHF satellite systems if possible; otherwise, HF will serve as principal means of communications.

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX K TO COMJTF OPLAN (U)

TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORKS (U)

Four Tactical networks were established for command and control purposes. These networks are depicted in TABs A through D. Not included are the networks used within each of the various force elements for intra-unit functions.

TABS:

- A. Command Net Alpha
- B. Command Net Bravo (PSC-1)
- C. Command Net Charlie (WSC-3/PT-25)
- D. Command Net Delta (HF-SSB)

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(b) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Air-to-air communications between C-130 airborne elements will be by NESTOR secured UHF/AM where available. Nestor equipped aircraft will switch to clear UHF once helos arrive at the hideout site and once Talons and Spectres are 100 miles out of Manzariyeh. This will permit UHF communications with ground elements.

(2) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Static: Forward elements of the JTF when on the ground and static will use portable UHF satellite terminals as the primary means of communications. HF remains backup.

(a) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ PSC-1 TACSAT Net (Command Net BRAVO). This net will operate in the unsecure mode over the Indian Ocean Fleet SATCOM system.

(b) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ WSC-3/PT-25 TACSAT Net (Command Net CHARLIE). This net will operate over the Indian Ocean Fleet SATCOM, PARKHILL secure whenever possible.

(c) ^(U) ~~(TS)~~ Extraction: Communications between JTF and elements in the objective area will be by PSC-1 or WSC-3/PT-25 TACSAT systems with HF as a backup. Local communications between mission elements will be by unsecure UHF and/or VHF/FM radio systems.

Redeployment: Same as deployment communications described above. A secure voice and record communications WSC-3 terminal will be established at the on recovery base for communications with JTF.

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5. (U) Tasking.

A a. (U) SFOD-D will:

- A
- (1) (S) Install, operate and maintain (IOM) SFOD-D internal communications.
 - (2) (TS) (U) IOM SATCOM and HF communications to JTF.
 - (3) (TS) (U) Provide equipment and personnel as follows:
 - (a) (TS) (U) One PSC-1 radio, one Comm officer and one operator at JTF.
 - (b) (TS) (U) One PSC-1, five PT-25, one WSC-3, one KY-65, 6 PRC-74, and two operators to the helo element.
 - (c) (TS) (U) One PSC-1, one PT-25, one KY 65, one PRC-74 and one operator to the Manzariyeh Ranger element.
 - (d) (TS) (U) Two CW operators to the aircraft carrier.
 - (4) (TS) (U) IOM SATCOM, nonsecure UHF, VHF-FM and HF communication with extraction aircraft, rangers and helicopter forces.

b. (TS) (U) RH-53 helo element will:

- (1) (TS) (U) provide internal communications, to include establishment of an MX 350 security net.
- (2) (TS) (U) Operate in SATCOM, HF, UHF, VHF/AM and VHF/FM nets as indicated in the concept of operations above and in the CEOI.

A c. (TS) (U) [REDACTED] Rangers Bn will:

- (1) (TS) Provide internal communications.
- (2) (TS) Operate in SATCOM, HF, UHF, VHF/AM and VHF/FM nets as indicated in the concept of operations above and in the CEOI.

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d. (U) (TS) JCSE will:

- (1) (U) (TS) Provide SATCOM, TTY, and Parkhill communications at JTF and JTF Relay. Additional facilities as indicated in Appendix 1 will be provided.
- (2) (U) (TS) Provide one WSC-3, one KY-65 and operator to the C-141 element.
- (3) (U) (TS) Provide one WSC-3, one KY-65 and operator to the EC-130 element.
- (4) (U) (TS) Provide SATCOM, TTY, and Parkhill communications at SOD.
- (5) (U) (TS) Provide SATCOM, TTY, Parkhill communications at [REDACTED] mission recovery base.

e. (U) (TS) CNO will:

- (1) (U) (TS) Provide communications support and use of facilities at [REDACTED]
- (2) (U) (TS) Provide two 25 KHZ channels on the Indian Ocean FLTSAT satellite.
- (3) (U) (TS) Provide WSC-3, terminal equipment and operators aboard the aircraft carriers

F. (U) (TS) CSAF will provide one 25 KHZ channel on the AFSAT 23 degree west satellite and communications.

G. (U) (TS) CINCEUR will provide HF, TACSAT, technical control, communications center and other facilities as indicated in Appendix 1.

H. (U) (TS) CINCMAC will provide airlift as required.

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(S)
2. (S) Equipment Listing

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
a. SOD, Washington DC		
1 WSC-3 w/voice & TTY capabilities and spares	JCSE	
2 Parkhills w/wireline adapters	JCSE	
1 set TTY/KW-7 dial up terminal w/spares	JCSE	
b. [REDACTED]		
2 sets WSC-3 w/antennas, voice & TTY capability	JCSE	
1 AN/TYC-8A comm center	AFCC	
1, TWAC Weather comm FAC	AFCC	
1 DMSP Mark III Satellite Receiver	AWS	
2 60 KW generators, 2 1/2 ton truck mounted	JCSE	
1 TTC-22 Switchboard	AFCC	
1 Set TTY/KW-7 FDX terminal for HF to Nea Makri	JCSE	
1 set TTY/KW-7 dial-up terminals w/spares	JCSE	
1 KY-70 secure voice terminals w/spares	JCSE	
5 Parkhill secure voice devices	JCSE	
[REDACTED] terminal set	[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
1 TSC-85 SHF SAT terminal	USAREUR	
1 TSC-62 Tech control FAC	AFCC	
1 TSC-60 HF radio terminal	AFCC	
1 TGC-27 Comm center	AFCC	
1 AUTOSEVOCOM NBST	AFCC	
10 TA-312 Telephones w/cables	JCSE	
3 TA-341 Telephones w/cables	JCSE	
1 TSC-85 SHF SAT terminal	235 Sig Det	

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Eq~~ c. [REDACTED]
2 WSC-3 w/2 antennas JCSE
2 TTY/KW-7 sets for WSC-3 JCSE
1 TTY/KW-7 set for dial-up JCSE

~~Eq~~ 5 Parkhill secure voice devices JCSE
(2-WSC-3; 2 pt-pt to [REDACTED] 1 dial-up)

5 TA 312 telephone sets w/cables JCSE

3 TA 341 telephone sets w/cables JCSE

~~Eq~~ 1 FDX TTY/KW-7 set (Pt-Pt HF CKT to [REDACTED]) JCSE

1 [REDACTED]

(J-6) A(S) 2 4W AUTOVON lines (1 for TTY dial-up, DCA 1 mystic star)

~~Eq~~ AUTODIN, AUTOSEVOCOM and switchboard Access [REDACTED]

~~Eq~~ d. [REDACTED]
1 WSC-3 w/antenna JCSE
1 Parkhill secure voice device JCSE
Access to AUTOVON, AUTOSEVOCOM, USACC-SA
AUTODIN and commercial facilities

~~Eq~~ e. [REDACTED]
1 WSC-3 w/antenna JCSE
1 Parkhill secure voice device JCSE
1 Teletype, 75 baud, w/KW-7 JCSE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

- 1. (S) DCA will provide communications support as required.
- 2. (TS) NSA is requested to provide communications support as required.

U) Command and Signal:


- 1. (U) Command: See Basic Oplan.
- 2. (U) Signal: CEOI will be distributed separately.

pendices:
Other Communications Support.
Circuit and Equipment Listings.
Tactical Command and Control Networks.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE A TO APPENDIX A TO ANNEX A TO CONJUGATE
COMMAND NET ALPHA



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAIB A5

PLINK : 295.475
SUNLINE : 261.475

0 - Appendix : TO INMEX TO
FUNCTION GROUP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMAND NET BRAVO (PSC-1)

UPLINK: 298.150
DOWNLINK: 257.150

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UHF SATCOM



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMAND NET BRAND (PSC-1)

INTD


PLINK : 248.150
WUPLINK : 257.150

5G TO APPLICABLE TO INDEX K by CONSOLE OF 248
HMMND 135T BRNVO (PSC-1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(ONLY WHILE DELTA ON GROUND)

FLTSAT (IO)
(CHANS)




— — UHF SATCOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TABLE C TO APPENDIX A TO ANNEX A TO COMJTF OPLAN
 COMMAND NET CHARLIE (WSC-3/PT-25)

UPLINK: 309.450
 DOWNLINK: 268.450



~~SECRET~~


COMMAN - C. COMMAN - NET CHARLIE (WSC-3/PT-25)

1/10

AV: 1796
 UPLINK: 309.450
 DOWNLINK: 268.450

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~



-o- UHF SATCOM (WSC-3)

DCS

~~SECRET~~

AIRBORNE PLATFORMS

MOBILE/PORTABLE

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

L-10

Subject: Security Assessment

- The following is an assessment of the impacts of compromise of certain mission data/equipment, as augmented by initial U. S. press reporting, on three areas --- Future Rescue Mission Potential, International Political Ramifications and Congressional Presentations. These initial assessments derive from an estimate of the possible mission reconstruction potential of the Iranians, the results of which are outlined at Tab A. At Tab B is a concept of operations based upon an analysis by two officers unfamiliar with the operation who were provided copies of maps and documents assumed to be in Iranian hands and initials.

- FUTURE RESCUE MISSION POTENTIAL

- This assessment is provided in two parts. The first part relates to the possible conduct of a mission essentially the same as that originally planned and the second to possible alternative missions.

- SIMILAR MISSIONS

- Iranian reconstruction of the in-country portion of the secure plan will provide most of the information necessary to analyze key features of the plan. Aside from the loss of surprise, a key aspect of any rescue attempt, potential Iranian reactions to reduce the possibility of like missions include -

--- Render unuseable helo landing zones.

--- Increase local security at hostage locations, especially at night.

--- Increase availability of reinforcements.

--- Expand the restricted access perimeter about hostage locations, restrict vehicle approaches, possibly mine approaches.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW E9 12356

DUCTED ON 18 NOV 92 --- Increase alert of air defense assets to include ground based
NATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC air defense at fighter airfields, as well as at hostage
locations.

ECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO

WH ON OADR

ED FROM DIA JS --- Lesser actions would include analyses of potential staging
areas, registration/licensing of buildings such as warehouses,
improved radar coverage, intelligence collection against
potential staging bases and movements of certain assets eg.
helos.

The impact on our ability to conduct a similar mission depends to an extent on the preservation of surprise and to a large degree on the actions the Iranians take in response to our initial effort. They can, however, by focusing their corrective actions on [REDACTED], make the execution of a similarly planned mission very difficult, even if we could conduct the insertion undetected.

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- ALTERNATE MISSIONS

- All alternate missions have a single common aspect -- we must forcibly separate the hostages from the captors and spirit them away by one means or another. Again the difficulty of this aspect may depend most on Iranian ability to translate the lessons learned from the initial rescue attempt to new locations and circumstances

- A, B, C
- Each circumstance will likely be different and require a case-by-case analysis. While the initial attempt will likely make the Iranians sensitive to the potential of helicopters and likely landing zones, it may cause them to neglect other areas.

- In summary the impact on our ability to conduct similar or alternate rescue missions depends not on the data derived from the initial effort so much as it does on Iranian responses to their lessons learned. (The political constraints which may be imposed upon subsequent rescue operations may prove to be a greater impediment to future missions than Iranian actions)

- THE SOVIET DIMENSION

- Future missions, in particular the ability to achieve surprise, may be unflinched by Soviet enhanced monitoring of US activities and their willingness to share information with Iran.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS

- The international political ramifications stemming from the rescue attempt will likely depend on three considerations:
- How Iran exploits the data in its possession (which contains names of countries and in some cases specific locations within countries. This includes the potential for public statements of simple fact or accusatory charges.
 - How the particular country involved reacts to the Iranian claims in terms of its regional/alliance responsibilities and its relationship with the U.S.)
 - What action the U. S. takes to preempt Iranian statements, either unilaterally or in concert, or U. S. willingness to wait and react following Iranian statements.
- The potential impacts can affect both US short term interest in subsequent rescue attempts and the broader/longer term US security interests on both a regional and bilateral basis.

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- A backdrop to the reaction of certain countries will be the degree of US consultation prior to the rescue mission.

The following discusses the specific data in two categories.

Codewords for 24 April 1980 and the Brevity Code listings.

CODEWORD CARD - The card containing code words for 24 April 1980 provides the only reference to Iraq ("Iraqi"), India ("Indian"), France ("French"), Pakistan ("Pakistani"), and Soviet Union ("Soviet"). It contains reference to [REDACTED] but these are also in the brevity codes and will be discussed later.

- Iran may selectively accuse certain nations eg. Iraq, of being involved because of their appearance on this card or simply make a blanket accusation (less the Soviet Union).
- The US could wait and see if Iran makes any statement then react or it could selectively inform the nations that a daily Codeword card in common useage by US forces in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region which identifies likely military forces which may be encountered during daily operations was in possession of the rescue team.
- There would be no impact on near term rescue efforts by revealing this card.
- There could be worsening of bilateral relations and longer term problems stemming from potential Iranian accusations but these are not likely to be significant particularly if the US acts to preempt the Iranians.

BREVITY CODES - The brevity codes contain the greater potential for problems than the daily codewords. These will be discussed individually by country.

[REDACTED] The role of [REDACTED] in the rescue effort is not evident from the data in Iranian hands. They may conjecture that it may have been the destination after their rescue or the source of a potential medevac. The US could preempt any Iranian claim by briefing [REDACTED] but the lack of prior notification and assumption of support could be an issue. There is the potential for negative impact on current US [REDACTED] relations.)

[REDACTED] (Alt JTF) -- Iranians may well accuse [REDACTED] of an active role because of the JTF label. Despite the fact that that function was not performed, [REDACTED] the potential for [REDACTED] distress is evident. In this case, if the US reveals it used the site for radio relay in support of the rescue the [REDACTED] could conceivably insist that the base be only in support of NATO or probe deeper into the overall use of the station, in either case this has the potential for serious impact on broader US interests. There is also a potential for problems if the US treats [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] differently in this case and Iran cites both in public statements.)

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E (S) [REDACTED] -- The [REDACTED] know of our use, have reacted negatively and are having a direct impact on US broaden security interests in the region, not to mention any potential rescue attempt. In this case the Iranians did not have to act, but the [REDACTED] reaction is an indication of the potential political and national security impacts resulting from revelation of the countries involved.)

E (S) [REDACTED] -- There is no specific mention of a location [REDACTED] in the codes nor is there any indication what role, if any, [REDACTED] was to play in the rescue effort. Despite these facts, accusations from Iran concerning [REDACTED] role could cause a negative reaction from [REDACTED] toward the US, lead to restrictions on use of [REDACTED] or the demand for minor notification of any subsequent rescue attempt. Moslem pressure cannot be discounted but Shiite unrest may be a more immediate concern. This is another case where some interaction with the [REDACTED] may be better than reacting to an Iranian claim.)

E (S) [REDACTED] - Strong [REDACTED] support will lessen the impact of potential Iranian accusation, but may raise questions with [REDACTED] if overflight [REDACTED] appears to be part of the plan -- to date there is no evidence that the Iranians have tied [REDACTED] to the extraction phase.)

In summary, there are potential serious implications for US security interests from reactions to possible Iranian charges. While the US may find itself in a "darned if you do, darned if you don't" situation a comprehensive strategy for dealing (with each of the countries cited) will be necessary to avoid putting the US in a damage limiting reactive mode.

CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS

- The information in Tab A can be used in formulating a strategy for discussion with the Congress. The following objectives should guide development of briefings/testimony/response to questions:
 - Avoid discussion of data not available to the Iranians while at the same time ensuring that data which can reasonably be derived by the Iranians is not withheld from the Congress.
 - Minimize/avoid discussion of specific facilities used in support of the operation unless prior consultation takes place.
 - Emphasize that the operation was thoroughly planned, exercised and briefed to proper authorities.
- Given data available to the Iranians, (it would appear possible to discuss the concept of Operations beyond Desert #1 up to the

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32A07

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29A13

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point of departure] from Manzariyeh in general terms. Tab A provides an initial guide for developing the details of a presentation. Such discussion would be conceptual in nature and not include discussion of infiltration personnel/methods, indigenous support, assault plans, any details of supporting TACAIR strikes beyond intended use of AC130's, details of E&E provisions, use and status of Parkhill, C-141's, or details of procurement of the warehouse and vehicles.

- The detailed statement/backup can be prepared after agreement up the specific details to be included.

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29A13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHAT IRANIANS KNOW (CAN LEARN) FROM DOCUMENTS/EQUIPMENT
IN THEIR POSSESSION*

Major Aspects of Operations in Iran

All geographic locations -- hiding point, ground route into and in Tehran, warehouse, staging area, objectives (Embassy & MFA), primary and alternative LZ's, extraction bases (primary and alternate).

Duration of the Operation was over several days.

A reception committee was provided to escort assault team. Size of reception committee probably would not be known.

Approximate time of the assault -- After last guard watch ending at 2100Z -- helos would support extraction - at Delta's call.

Rangers were planned for use at the refueling point and the extraction airfield -- navigational aids were provided for at these points.

Communications would be secure and satellite communications would be utilized.

TACAIR was to be provided by various types of aircraft -- Fire support net singled out Spector (AC-130) -- Coordinates of key geographic locations were reported on the TACAIR -- Info Sheets indicating US willingness to use force in rescue effort.

E&E was a feature of the operation, with the port of JASK possibly involved -- desert safe haven identified, but location was not revealed.

E ~~Specific locations in other countries were identified --~~
~~_____~~

Specific countries, without locations, were identified, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, India, Pakistan, France, Soviet Union. These countries were named on the TACAIR information, Brevity codes and code words for 24 April knee pad cards.

A ~~Participants (SFOD, _____ SFOD-Delta, Rangers, CCT), aircraft types/roles/missions, movements, routes.~~

Location of potential Iranian air elements that could react were identified..

That the U. S. had the most confidence in the assault portion of the operation.

*Supplemented by initial press reports.

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32A05

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29A02

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WHAT IRANIANS KNOW (CAN LEARN) FROM DOCUMENTS/EQUIPMENT IN THEIR POSSESSIO

Major of the Aspects of Operations in Iran

All geographic locations -- hiding point, ground route into and in Tehran, warehouse, staging area, objectives (Embassy & MFA), primary and alternative LZ's, extracton bases (primary and alternate).

Duration of the Operation was over ^{2 or more} several days.

A reception committee was provided to escort assault team.

Approximate time of the assault -- After last guard watch ending at 2100Z -- helos would support extraction - at Delta's call.

Rangers were planned for use at the refueling point and the extraction airfield -- navigational aids were provided for at these points.

Communications would be secure and that satellite communications would be utilized.

TACAIR was to be provided by various types of aircraft -- Fire support net singled out Spector (AC-130) -- Coordinates of key geographic locations were reported on the TACAIR -- Info Sheets indicatng US willingness to use force in rescue effort.

E&E was a feature of the operation, with the port of JASK -- possibly involved -- desert safe haven identified, but location was not revealed.

Specific locations in other countries were identified

Specific countries, without locations, were identified, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, India, Pakistan, France, Soviet Union.

Participants (SFOD- SFOD-Delta, Rangers, CCT), aircraft types/roles/missions, movements, routes.

Location of potential Iranian air elements that could react were identified.

That the U. S. had the most confidence in the assault portion of the operation.

* *Supplemented by initial press reports.*

*MTA as target
ground with helicopters*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E

*not mentioned
- never mentioned*

7-1: TP1: E

PHASE I

PHASE II

PHASE III

PHASE IV

PHASE V

PHASE VI

PHASE VII

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- E&E**

CALL SIGNS AND CODE WORDS

FIRE SUPPORT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26B24

REACTION FORCE

Rangers that secured Manzariyeh? USMC units afloat?

PICK UP POINTS

All clearly marked map.

REAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY COMPROMISE

- E
1. ID of [REDACTED]
 2. ID and coordinates of warehouse (Staging area).
 3. JTF main - [REDACTED]
 4. Alt. JTF HQ - [REDACTED] (Country ? - maybe [REDACTED])
 5. ID of [REDACTED]
 6. ID of [REDACTED]
 7. Delta Reception Party - tied to warehouse - hide out area.
 8. Photo capability (USSR)

PREPARED BY:

LTC [REDACTED] DIA
LTC [REDACTED] Spt Div, J3

CONFIDENTIAL

26B25

FORCES

1. Reception Committee (Esquire-Code) Call Sign [REDACTED]
2. SFOD Delta (Bowshot)
 - Main Force - Call sign Whistler
3. SFOD [REDACTED] (Acute)
 - Call sign - [REDACTED]
4. Rangers - Manzariyeh - [REDACTED]
 - Call sign [REDACTED]
5. Desert Rangers. Call sign [REDACTED] (code word -
6. Combat Control Team - Desert Land [REDACTED]
7. Combat Control Team - Manzariyeh [REDACTED]
8. AIR CAP
 - NIMITZ
 - F-14 (Fast Eagle & Victory)
 - A-6 Ray Gun
 - A-7 Street Car
 - CORAL SEA
 - F-4 Snake & Ledge
 - A-6 Milestone
 - Air Cap Reference Points
9. AIR LIFT/AIR REFUEL
 - C-141 - Conclave (MEDEVAC?)
 - Some type MEDEVAC aircraft.
 - C-130 (Hammer)
 - KC-135 - Ironwork (tanker)
 - EC-130 - Fuel -
 - AC-130 - Dependent
 - EC-130 - (ABCCC) Cultivate - code
10. HELOS
 - RH-53 - Blue Beard
 - Blue Beard Alpha

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Voice A: ...is calling for General Jones and we've been given this extension. Is General Jones there please?

Jones: Yes, this is General Jones, Ma'am.

Voice A: Oh...General Jones, sir, just a moment for General (HODGES) (phonetic).

[HODGES]: Good morning.

Jones: Good morning (DUTCH) (phonetic).

[HODGES]: How's it going?

Jones: Very well.

[HODGES]: I've picked up nothing, and I've had a watch on the net down there. And what I did...I put them on a 24 hour delay which would make it concurrent with the (KEY) (phonetic) time. That would make them...your time tomorrow...launch out of Albuquerque at about 1500.

Jones: OK.

[HODGES]: Now I could either leave it like that, or I can extend it a little after that. We could take them wherever you want time...non stop...refuel them.

Jones: If you wait a little while after that, we may not...we may have the word that they wouldn't be needed in any event and you could just run the local exercise and not fly them all the way over and all the way back.

[HODGES]: Yeah. Well I'd just as soon do that, so if you don't think time is that critical I thought I'd give them another four hour delay.

Jones: Yeah.

[HODGES]: And then if we decide to do it and we need to expedite, we can look at refueling them. I could take them into Dover, then change crews, then refuel out of there and go wherever you want them.

Jones: OK well lets...lets...tentatively then...late tomorrow.

[HODGES]: Yeah.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 10 12356

CONDUCTED ON 18 Nov 92

REVIEWED BY DDO NMCC

☐ DECLASSIFIED ☐ SCHEDULED TO

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[REDACTED]

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Jones: ...we'll decide later as to (where?) they go.

[HODGES]: Yeah...and as you know of my HC-130s I've already got down in area. So I'll have the refueling capability...

Jones: Where are they?

[HODGES]: Pardon?

Jones: Where are they?

[HODGES]: [REDACTED]

Jones: How many.

[HODGES]: I think I've got four down there.

Jones: I didn't think we had that many.

[HODGES]: Maybe not, but that's...I've got...

Jones: I don't have them, but let me...let me check on it.

[HODGES]: Yeah...and I've got the big tanks on the 53s, so they've got about a 600 mile radius, so we could do a lot of action if we have 130s there.

Jones: Yeah...OK...all right...OK.

[HODGES]: But everything else...we got the missions off with that (electronic garble) and got the troops on into [REDACTED]

Jones: Yeah...we got that report...it worked very well. Evidently the transfer went well. Every report we've got is good.

[HODGES]: So...that part of its done.

Jones: Yeah...OK. You are doing great.

[HODGES]: So...our forces are in and ready and we'll just move whenever.

Jones: OK. Very good.

[HODGES]: OK sir, Thank you.

Jones: You bet. Goodbye.
[new call]

[REDACTED]

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Davis: Major General Davis.

Johnson: Ah sir...General Johnson here.

Davis: Yes, Jim, how are you?

Johnson: OK sir, Look, we've got a report that two choppers are down, and I'll...

Davis: Uh oh...

Johnson: ...I'll get you the coordinates in just a minute. The Chairman's interested...we believe, but we're not certain, but we're drawing a conclusion that one of them probably went down and the other ...according to the instructions they had...is going down to retrieve the crew. That's a conclusion at this point on our part. At 240 miles up on line in the country...I'll give you the coordinates here in just a minute. But the Chairman is interested in taking a look at possibly moving the LPH up to where we wanted to chopper in if we had to pick up the crews or something.

Davis: Yeah. OK.

Johnson: It's 20...it's 29-16 degrees north, 50 degrees 55 minutes east.

Davis: 50...50-55?

Johnson: Yes sir.

Davis: OK

Johnson: (words indistinct) just taking a look at it...at the possibility of maybe moving in that direction, or if it is within range.

Davis: Yeah. All right.

Johnson: ...what we have is very fragmentary. We definitely know there are two on the ground, and we don't know the reason.

Davis: Yeah, OK, well we'll get...we won't do anything with the task force yet, but I think the LPH is probable a couple hundred miles south. When I asked where the AGI was he said it was with our...308 miles from the Nimitz.

[REDACTED]

2808 Tape #1 Side One

OK...well...it sounds like one of them had problems and the other followed him down.

Johnson: Yes sir. That's what it sounds like.

Davis: Yeah...uh huh. OK. You want us to do anything right now?

Johnson: No...other than to just give us time to take a look at it and give us a call back and (words indistinct) what your analysis...is.

Davis: OK...ah...

Johnson: We'll keep you posted.

Davis: Let me give...let me reconfirm the location. 29-16 north, and 50-55 east?

Johnson: That's correct.

Davis: Yeah...OK...ah...the 50-55 doesn't look right.

Johnson: We're taking...we're taking...it's on the chart.

Davis: Yeah. OK.

Johnson: We're taking another look at it.

Davis: All right.

Johnson: It's on the chart...it's above...

Davis: Yeah...it looks like it's probably 59 instead of 50.

Johnson: Yeah...one of the problems...(words indistinct)...in here with the Chairman...we don't have a good map...OK...we've got a correction...it's 58-55.

Davis: 58-55. Yeah, Yeah. OK, OK, well we'll stand by. We'll be looking to this.

Johnson: OK sir, Thank you.

Davis: OK. Bye.

(new call)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

HANDLE VIA

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Jones: Hello.

Voice B: General Jones?

Jones: Yes sir, Uh huh.

Voice B: Yes sir, Just a moment for the Vice President. (pause)
Go ahead gentlemen.

Jones: Yes sir.

Mondale: Hi Dave. I'm here alone, are you worried about this latest stuff?

Jones: Well I am...I don't consider it as of now go/no go.

Mondale: Uh huh.


Jones: You talking about the two choppers down?

Mondale: Yeah. And the radio intercept.

Jones: Well the radio intercept as of now is one down on the coast. The follow on to that is that they have checked the airfield and the airfield reported that it only had one airplane. So we are going to continue to watch it.

Mondale: In..In other words that has apparently passed as a problem, huh?

Jones:


...helicopters and they've
been down quite a while...we haven't had a report and
they may be off...

Mondale: Yeah...

Jones: It's still quiet...

Mondale: There's nothing...

Jones: So there's nothing beyond that crossing the coast and we sort of expected something like this...

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Mondale: Yeah...

C Jones: (words indistinct)...so we're not as worried about the choppers.

Mondale: Yeah...

Jones: Now our speculation is on the choppers...is that we had a plan...and we haven't heard yet but a plan if one had trouble the other one would go down...

Mondale: Pick him up...

Jones: ...and either pick...if something was done on the ground and it wasn't any real problem they'd take off the both of them. If any problem with one they'd destroy the helicopter and take off. We have not received a report...but as of now...nothing except that original report. It is of concern, but not to the point of determining an abort.

Mondale: Yeah. But there's no traffic in the area, so it looks like they haven't alerted anybody.

Jones: That's correct.

Mondale: What about...your best bet is that one of them went down, the other went to pick him up, huh?

Jones: That was the plan. We have heard nothing to confirm that...

Mondale: Yeah...

Jones: ...but here's the plan...if one had trouble, the other one would land, and it would be extremely unusual for two to have trouble at the same time.

Mondale: Yeah...now...uh...that...it's about ten or eleven o'clock at night there now, huh?

Jones: It's 1115 in Tehran right now.

Mondale: And presumably our 130s are down now, aren't they?

Jones: Ah...the first 130 should be down by now. It was planned to be in there early to secure the ground.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HANDLE VIA
COMSEC SYSTEMS JOINTLY

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Mondale: Yeah.

Jones: The others would be coming in...(voice indistinct due to Mondale's breathing) let's see 19...(voice indistinct)...the others...the other 130s ought to be arriving now.

Mondale: Now are the choppers on the ground?

Jones: No, the choppers will be on the ground...wait a minute now...the MC...only the first MC-130 should be on the ground.

Mondale: Uh huh.

Jones: It was going in to prepare the landing site and the lights and everything.

Mondale: Uh huh.

Jones: The other 130s will be on the ground in less than 30 minutes. The helicopters will be on the ground in 45 minutes.

Mondale: When...when do you expect...in other words in about 45 minutes every one who's down should be down.

Jones: That's correct.

Mondale: When do you anticipate a report?

Jones: Oh... I should be getting a report any time now...on those two helicopters. I would anticipate a report on all, of them being down...little over an hour.

Mondale: Uh huh. OK. Thank you David.

Jones: And we'll be passing the word...

Mondale: You don't have to call me. I just got the report and wanted to know what's happening. Thank's David.

Jones: We'll see you. Bye.
(electronic click)

(new call)

Jones: (name indistinct) We got a problem. I don't know if you

HANDLE VIA
CONTROL SYSTEMS

2808 Tape #1 Side One

[REDACTED] know about it.

[REDACTED] I heard there was a fire at the refueling?

C [REDACTED]
Jones: Let me read you what happened. They landed at Desert (TRACK) and two vehicles were stopped on the road. A third vehicle escaped. The vehicles included a bus with 44 passengers. I assume that one didn't escape or they wouldn't have known there were 44 people aboard. No injuries. Gas truck on fire. That's all we have as of now.

C [REDACTED]
OK, We're...

C [REDACTED]
Jones: As of now we're...evidently...as of now all 130s are down. I assume the helicopters are down. We got one report from you all that it appears one helicopter is headed back for the carrier. So maybe of the two who landed maybe one was bad and the other one aborted to take the crew back.

C [REDACTED]
To get them back?

C [REDACTED]
Jones: Yeah, that appears to be what it is but this message from the JTF was...datetime group 241945Z which is 35 minutes ago...

C [REDACTED]
Right.

C [REDACTED]
Jones: The.. [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]
That's right, [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]
Jones: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Jones: OK...

Jones:

(words indistinct)

(words

indistinct).

OK. We misunderstood the message here. We thought it was fire involved in the refueling, an accident, and obviously that's not what it is at all.

Jones:

Well I'm not sure...but this is the message...it says gas truck on fire. I assume that means it's one of the vehicles coming by, but again communication and relay from there, if may be an error.

We'll let you know.

Jones:

...but we're...if everything is on schedule we're about to...

You're about to move.

Jones:

...about to launch north, and once they do that they're committed for the whole night.

That's right, all right sir.

Jones:

OK.

Jones:

Bye. (electronic click)

~~TOP SECRET~~

2808 Tape #1 Side One

(new call)

Jones: OK...(words indistinct)

Jones: This may be good in one way.

That'll help a lot.

Jones: ...get everybody concerned yet

That's right, let you know. Thank you. Bye.
(electronic click)

(new call)

Voice C: Yes sir. Just a moment for the President.

Jones: All right (pause).

Carter: Hello, Hello

Voice C: General Jones?

Jones: Yes,

Voice C: Yes sir, The president's on line. Go ahead gentlemen.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS SECURITY~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Carter: Hi David.

Jones: Yes sir, Mr. President. Much clearer.

Carter: David, my question was how close is the nearest settlement or town to Desert One.

Jones: We are...I don't know that information...I asked them for a full (plot out) (phonetic) on it. It appears in the rough map I have here it's quite a distance to the first town.

Carter: Yes, Quite a distance, OK. That was the question I tried to ask but couldn't get through.

Jones: OK. I've got the book map here and we're just trying...we want to know which way it's...the truck was going and information of that nature...and if the 41 people...where they may have been going, leaving home and going to a place like Teheran or something may be expected at home, whatever the...

Carter: Yes, And you don't have any report on the helicopter's location?

Jones: Well one report that they have passed the point of no return and the fuel to the carrier...the six have and that means they were only within 30 minutes out from the landing point, I should be getting a report at anytime on the helicopter in...and the refueling.

Carter: OK.

Jones: There's a small town about 15 miles through the roads here to the west...it is much further over to the northeast depending on which way the truck was going. It is still...it is quite a ways to (NAIENE) (phonetic) and (YAZDEH) (phonetic)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Carter: David, just as a matter of intent...do your recall why we decided to land just adjacent to a highway?

Jones: It's not a highway, sir, it's that little road...the only place we've been able to find, so for that we could land the 130s...and we looked and looked and looked and it's the only place we found. We looked at another one and hoped to land there, and...we just did not find any place to land. We have speculated that if we had some delay or something ~~_____~~ if we could find another place. But we had not found another place to land, and the alternatives were (NAIENE) (phonetic) to go ahead and seize the field, or to go to this place.

Carter: OK. If you have any further reports just send them to Dr. Brzezinski.

Jones: All right sir, I've been...Harold told me...All right, I'll do that. Harold told me to keep him informed. I have been as soon as I get information.

Carter: Oh yeah...I was just going to be leaving for a while, that's why I said that.

Jones: All right, sir,

Carter: And I'll check with Zbig. Thank you.

Jones: OK sir. Bye.

(electronic click)

(new call)

C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

[REDACTED] SENSITIVE

2808 Tape #1 Side One

C [REDACTED]
Jones: Are you getting the... [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Ah...Ah...I'll have to take a look and get back to you.
I've looked at it on the large map. My guess is...I'd
say.. [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Right.

C [REDACTED]
Jones: (words indistinct)...the next town is close to a
hundred miles...

[REDACTED] Right.

Jones: (words indistinct) [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]
Jones: (words indistinct) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Jones: [REDACTED]

Jones: Yeah, we got that.

[REDACTED] OK. And that's all I got.

C [REDACTED]
Jones: OK...(words indistinct)

[REDACTED]
They ought to be in the air by now, shouldn't they?
Looking at my timeline the helos ought to be on their
way.

2808 Tape #1 Side One

Jones: Yeah...(words indistinct) (words indistinct) (phonetic)

That's right.

C Jones: (words indistinct)

That right.

C Jones:

C Jones:

Yeah, Right.

C Jones: OK.

Be in touch, sir...sir

(electronic click)
(end side one)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ HANDLE VIA

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

Davis: Major General Davis.

Doubleday: General Davis, this is General Doubleday. Stand by one, please.

[DIKE] This is General (DIKE) (phonetic). General Jones is on the phone now to Wadi. We want to know if you have any additional information on helicopters...helos. What is your current status concerning the helos?

Davis: OK. The information... and we got that back from Captain [REDACTED] (phonetic)...it's our man up there. I queried the Nimitz right now if they have any information on any returning to the ship. I haven't got a reply yet.

[DIKE]: But you have no information on any returning to the ship yet.

Davis: NO. I sure haven't.

[DIKE]: OK. This is (BULL DIKE) (phonetic). I'll pass that to General (SHEPHERD) (phonetic)...

Davis: Wait a minute...we just got one in.

[DIKE]: You just got a helicopter on board, or you just got a report in?

Davis: No. Here's the report. According to Ref A BLUEBEARD 5 inbound. Currently 320 true. 84 nautical miles. Proceeding to recovery rendezvous at best speed. Vehicle has 2 hours fuel remaining. No problems anticipated in recovery.

[DIKE]: OK. Roger. Got it, OK, and nothing on any others, just the one aircraft?

Davis: No. I suspect they picked up that crew and headed back. But as soon as they get aboard we'll see what we can determine.

[DIKE]: OK. Stand by close to the phone. We'll be picking up again shortly.

Davis: Right. OK.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTROL~~
~~HANDLE VIA~~

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

[DIKE]: Thank you General Davis, Goodbye.

(electronic click)
(new call)

Davis: Davis.

G [H-]: This is [REDACTED] (phonetic).

Davis: Yeah, [REDACTED]

[H-]: Would you have any information on the number of crews on board? Were they coming in with only their crew, or did they pick up that second crew.

Davis: I've gone back right now with a query to ask them who's on board...

[H-]: OK...I'll hang with you for a little while and see if we can get that.

Davis: Yeah, OK. It may take a little while. We've got a dedicated circuit that goes to the Nimitz on teletype.

[H-]: Yeah. Roger. OK. I'm here in the little command center know and things are coming to a head. As quick as you can get that it would be very helpful.

Davis: Yeah. Ok. (pause)

[H-]: That's right, General Davis is here. OK. Roger.

Voice D: Drop 6220.

[DIKE]: This is General [DIKE] calling for General Davis.

Voice D: Ah sir, I think you have the wrong drop. Just a moment please.

Davis: We haven't got a query back from them,...they've got it. They're checking.

[DIKE]: OK. I will not bug you again. We've lost connectivity and I wanted to make sure we still had that open.

Davis: Right. I think...another flash override must have got it.

HANDLE VIA

CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

[DIKE]: OK. Thank you very much.

Davis: OK., Yeah, OK Bill.

[DIKE]: Thank you.

(electronic click)

[DIKE]: This is 2808.

[DIKE]: This is General [DIKE] again sir, General Jones is on the other phone to [REDACTED] and he will be with you in just one moment.

[REDACTED] All right.

[DIKE]: Just one second.

Voice E: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yes sir.

Voice E: [REDACTED]

Jones: Yeah, well let me give you the problem we got. We...the lost helicopter dropped out that we could afford, and we have aborted the mission.

[REDACTED] Ouch...You have aborted

Jones: Yeah. And so what we will be doing...we've got a couple of problems. One...we'll be coming out after daylight, out of the area and coming across the coast...

[REDACTED] Right.

Jones: And number two, we've got a helicopter mission. Not sure which one quite yet and where it is, but it's some place down in the first hour to hour and a half of flight from the helicopter. Forget that one. Over.

[REDACTED] All right, do you know where on the coast will come out? Is it coming back the same route?

[REDACTED]

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

Jones: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Right. [REDACTED]

C Jones: Yeah...and any altering of any sort of any place please let us know.

[REDACTED] Right. [REDACTED]

Jones: Thank you. Bye.
(electronic click)

Voice F: ...determine the status of the crew that would have been remaining from the downed helicopter. There was one helicopter coming back. We need to know if he has one crew or two on board.

Davis: I've done with two messages out there to them. They've receipted for them and said they're checking. They ought to be able to talk to them UHF because there's one report they're only 85 miles out. So I've got two guys down there now pressing them.

Voice F: OK. We're going to standby here because we're right in the midst of making the decision as to whether or not we're going to mount a SAR effort or not.

Davis: Right, OK. We'll go with another one. I'll send them another one.

Voice F: (laughs) OK. I just wanted you to know if that's the decision...we have to make some decisions about the SAR and the Chairman is standing by for that word. Thank you very much General.

Davis: Understand, Right.

(electronic click).
(new call)

Voice G: ...have the call extended to Admiral Long, please.

Voice H: OK. I'll have to go get him because he's not up there in the Command Center. He's in his office.

Voice G: All right, sir.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ HANDLE VIA

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

Voice H: I'll go have him come down here, or if the Chairman wants to talk to him he can call him in his office.

Voice G: All right sir. We'll (deliver it?) to his office. Thank you much.

Voice H: OK

(new call)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
Voice I: Stand by.

C
~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
Voice I: OK, Very good.

C
~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
Voice I: Thank you.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
Thank you.
(electronic click)
(new call)

Jones: Hello.

Davis: This is Major General Davis.

Jones: This is General Jones. Admiral Long there?

Davis: Yes sir. He's in his office now. I just received a message from the Nimitz. He says 5 helos with 7 crews returning to Nimitz. One helo with remaining crew

[REDACTED]

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

inbound to Nimitz at this time.

Jones: 5 helos with 7 crews enroute...

Davis: returning to Nimitz...

Jones: and a sixth helicopter...

Davis: One helo...yes sir one helo with remaining crew inbound to Nimitz at this time. So that's 6 helos and 8 crews.

Jones: I wonder where they got the information on the 5 and 7. We had not had that information. Over

Davis: No sir. I was querying. We had the information BLUEBEARD 5 that was inbound, and he was 84 miles out. And I was trying for General Doubleday and yourself, sir whether or not they had both crews on board and this confirms that. And I don't know where (CURTSY) got the idea that the other 5 with 7 was returning.

Jones: Yeah. We would like to get a confirmation on that because it's whether or not we've got to mount a rescue mission. We did not get through JTF any good information whether there were 5, 6, or 7...we knew there were at least 6 helicopters at Desert One. We did not know where there was a seventh crew and we did not have it from that source. I would like to be able to confirm it. We will work them but if you can work through (CURTSY) to see if we can absolutely confirm if there are 7 crews coming back on the 5 helicopters. Over.

Davis: All right sir. I sure will. Will get back to you as soon as possible.

Jones: OK. I think Admiral Long is coming in. I was just going to talk to him momentarily. You might stay on if you want to. Hello.

Voice J: Yes sir. It will probably take him 5...about 3 minutes to get here sir. Or he's in his office on that secure phone.

Jones: OK. I think they're trying to patch him in. The only thing I was going to tell him...

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONTROL STATE~~

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

Davis: All right.

Jones: Number one is the thing you passed on...we do have an abort. We do want to...number one try to figure out how to protect those choppers coming back without tipping our hands, because tipping our hands may have them launch or so forth. And keep our 135 up or KA-6s E-2C or whatever else to make sure those 5 choppers as they come by...they will be in the daytime.

Davis: Yes sir.

Jones: ...that if they will need any help...if we can get by without tipping everybody else we've been in there, we'd be a lot better off. But the protection of the choppers coming out would be the key issue. Over.

Davis: Yes sir. Understand.

Jones: And if we can confirm that there's 7 crews, then we've got all 8...we do not have a rescue mission, then we can pick up the press without having to worry about rescue...if all 5 head south OK with the 7 crews.

Davis: Yes sir, I'll go back with another FLASH to (CURTSY) and ask him to reconfirm that.

Jones: OK. And then you all work the problem of making sure that we've got some coverage of them as they come down, especially as they hit the daylight period. Over.

Davis: Yes sir. We'll work that with you.

Jones: And let us know what the plans are. Over.

Davis: Aye aye sir.

Jones: Thank you.

(new call)

Voice K: ...Admiral Long's on. Go ahead please. Is General Jones on?

Jones: Hey Bob?

Long: Yes sir.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

Jones: Can you hear me?

Long: Yeah, I can hear you. Everybody else drop off unless Davis wants to stay on.

Jones: But I guess you got the word we got an abort.

Long: Yes, I just received it.

Jones: And we want to keep it quiet for now, so don't spread it around, because we've got to figure out aftermath, what we do, whether we got a chance of doing something again. The biggest thing now is to get these 5 helicopters out. I just saw... Davis just reported in that there are 7 crews... (CURTSY) saying there are 7 crews aboard the 5 helicopters. If that is true...and the other one coming back that...then we've got all 8 and we don't have a rescue mission. The big thing then would be to make sure...that in daylight hour period... I was talking to Davis...we've got E-2s and got some coverage without revealing our hand too much and taking off and getting into a fight...but overriding thing would be the safety of those 5 choppers as they come out during daylight. Over.

Long: Right. I understand. I had previously asked to see what we could do to optimize our 135 overhead. Let me ask JK how successful we were on that. All right, we have gone to (CURTSY) and asked to see if he could arrange for additional fuel for that overload tanker. We haven't heard back. We will ensure that he is in a proper stage of alert to assist in getting those choppers on back aboard.

Jones: OK. And once they're out key hours, then towards daylight they should be in range where a KA-6 refueling gives some coverage. Over.

Long: That's correct, and he will have KA-6s available to support as necessary.

Jones: OK. Well...the other thing I'd ask today is confirm with (CURTSY) that there are 7 crews aboard those 5 helicopters. If that's the case we do not have a rescue requirement. If there are only 6...I knew there were 6...didn't know for sure if there were 6 or 7 at the desert point. If all 7 are coming

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

out, then no rescue...and just getting these 5 helicopters and the 130s out will be the key issue. If there are only 6 aboard 5 helicopters then we've gotta look for the helicopter and find the crew. Over.

Long: Right...and we just got a retransmission of the same message from (CURTSY) that says 5...5 helos with 7 crews returning to Nimitz. One helo with remaining crew inbound to Nimitz at this time, so we will...

Jones: OK...as soon as...

Long: ...we will have to clarify if he in fact has all 8 crews returning to Nimitz.

Jones: OK.

Long: And I'll get back to you on that.

Jones: OK...the other thing about it we would like from (CURTSY) is a debrief on that one crew that gets back early as to any report from him what happened enroute. Over.

Long: Right. Will do. Will do... Tell me... I assume the decision to abort was based on the incident at the refueling spot?

Jones: Negative. We would have proceeded. [REDACTED] We don't consider that incident to have been of any...that degree of seriousness. The reason is we needed 6 helicopters minimum out of the refuel point. The sixth one had a hydraulic leak. Having in the first part of the mission lost three out of eight the probability of losing one more was very high and less than 5 couldn't to it.

Long: Understand. I agree.

Jones: So it was helicopter abort as opposed to any other factor. This other thing may or may not have been a problem but it was all go until the helicopter broke. Over.

Long: OK. Well we'll go ahead...try to get those crews back aboard with a minimal amount of flapping and flailing and try to continue business as usual over

2808 Tape #1 Side Two

there with some increased alert posture.

C
Jones:

C
Long:

OK. I would say that at this time I do not see any reason for implementing the post mission rules of engagement.

Jones:

Well, I think... I don't think that's necessary now, but if you have to use that for your... I've got to get off now... but if you have to for... to protect those coming out, yes. We'll get back with you. I've gotta go.

Long:

OK

(END OF SIDE TWO)

(END 2808 TAPE #1)

L-15

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO WGS

CONDUCTED BY BMU 92

PERFORMED BY DDO NMCC

COMMITTEE TO RECOMMEND TO

REVIEW BY OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

2808 Tape #2 Side One

Voice A: Ah...right...holding...

Long: Long, speaking.

Voice A: Ah...just one moment sir. General Jones?

Jones: Bob...Hello Bob?

Long: Yes sir. Do you hear me?

Jones: Bob...do you hear me?

Long: Yes, I hear you fine, Dave. How me?

Jones: OK. I hear you fine. First, a matter of confusion. You reported that [CURTSY] said there would be 5 helicopters inbound with 7 crews. We get through JTF that they have talked to the lead helicopter crew and there were only 6 helicopter crews with the helicopters at Desert One. We had asked earlier for Davis to go back and confirm. We would certainly like to know where [CURTSY] got his information. Over.

Long: Ah...yeah...let me...let me give you this message that we just got here. Not too good news. We're transmitting it separately here. Info from helo refuelling site...let's see...let me have that letter message there...here it is right here. Report from...report from refuelling site indicates helicopter collided with C-130. C-130 on fire. Info received from BLUEBEARD 5 that 7 souls onboard. That's the first one that is coming back to Nimitz. Number of helos and crews returning from fueling site received from scene. Total of 6 helos scheduled to return Nimitz. Probably 5 now with accident reported. No info on personnel casualties if any. End of Message. You...did you receive that?

Jones: Yeah I received that, but he didn't report in there as to how many crews aboard. He said 7 souls on that one helicopter..

Long: All right...that's the first one...

Jones: ...but he didn't say how many total crews are coming back. It looks as though we have identified 7 crews so far.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side One

Long: All right. We have asked him once...this still does not confirm that all eight crews are really accounted for.

Jones: The report we get from Vaught is that they have one crew unaccounted for. And what I get from you is unknown. Earlier we got too from [CURTSY] a report that there was one more crew than we are sure of...that may have been picked up or something. But our report now is that there...through Vaught that there were 5 operational helicopters at Desert One. I did receive this report that a 53 ran into a 130 and the 130's on fire. We need to find out whether or not there were any casualties on either the 53 or the 130. If this is the case, then, we are down to 4 helicopters to come out of Desert One and with...if they're smart they'll only have one crew aboard each helicopter and bring the crews out on the 130s...but we still have...the biggest uncertainties are number one, where is the eighth helicopter crew and number two, are there any casualties as a result of the helicopter...helicopter running into the 130. Over.

Long: Yes, and I'll go ahead and go out to [CURTSY] now and see if we can go ahead and clear it up.

Jones: OK.

Long: We really need to know...we really need to know..we really need to account for all 8 helo crews...

Jones: That's right.

Long: ...where are they...where are they...

Jones: That's right, and we all...

Long: Second we...

Jones: Go ahead...

Long: And second we need to...we need to find out any information on casualties associated with...with the 130...ah...53 collision.

Jones: Vaught is trying to give me that. He said there is no reported casualties as of the time, but he didn't have any confirmation on the one...on the [words indistinct].

~~SECRET~~
~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~
~~OF SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side One

Long: Well I'll go...I'll go to [CURTSY] and find out if he has any further information on either of those two questions.

Jones: OK. And we'll try through our channel. NOW the other point I wanted to make...

Long: Yeah...

Jones: ...and this was from the President...I just talked with him...if we can avoid...without jeopardizing our own people, any casualties among the Iranians our chances of the hostages not being harmed are far greater. If there are any casualties among the Iranians of any type then that puts the hostages life in jeopardy. Therefore, I'd like to make sure CURTSY knows that coming out...that we ought to avoid if at all possible a fire fight with any Iranian aircraft or whatever. Obviously if it's the overriding issue...is to protect the helicopters...if they are [words indistinct]...but if it can be at all possible without endangering the helicopters not to engage any Iranians, it would up the probability that American hostages would not be hurt.

Long: Right. I understand. Matter of fact I have prepared...am preparing a message for him that addresses several of these points, and if you have time let me just tick off...

Jones: I don't have time...no.

Long: All right. All right.

Jones: But you understand what I'm trying to point out here.

Long: Yes I do.

Jones: OK.

Long: And I'll try to incorporate that in my message to [CURTSY].

Jones: OK. Fine. Thank you.

Long: Bye bye.

Jones: Bye.

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[electronic click] [new call]

Jones: General Jones.

Voice B: Yes sir. This is the White House operator. Just a moment for the President please.

Jones: OK. [pause]

Carter: David?

Jones: Yes sir. The news is not as good as I indicated to you a few minutes ago. A RH-53 getting...trying to get out of Desert One ran into a C-130. The only report we have is there's some burns and injuries to people...our people.

Carter: This was on the ground?

Jones: On the ground...as the report...on the ground there at Desert One. Still sketchy report. And some burns and injuries and people...we assume in the 130, but we haven't got whether it's in the 130 or the RH-53. They are taking them out and putting them on...[words indistinct]...on 130s and evacuate them to [redacted] We have no idea how many or how serious. We will try to get that as soon as we can.

Carter: Uh huh.

Jones: The other part about it is that...it appears the report we got from the carrier on the identification of 8 crews was not accurate. Talking with Vaught we have only been able to determine with certainty 7 of the crews from the helicopters. It's likely that one helicopter is down, probably they think with mechanical trouble someplace down in the southern part of Iran. We're doing everything we can to figure out the identification of it...figure out a rescue way, but it looks as though we do not have the eighth helicopter crew identified. They talked with the helicopter crews at the Desert One and they said there are six there. The seventh is returning to the carrier from having landed down below...they think the other one went down from mechanical trouble, which probably means they are on the ground and can be retrieved though.

Carter: Now can we detect them on the ground...can we find them

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~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINT~~
~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side One

on the ground?

Jones:

We should be able to if they landed OK...we should be able to with radios and the rest...to be able to find them. We're going to try every effort to see...to locate them, to include the helicopters that are coming back to the coast...

C [redacted] They should be able to pick them up, should be able to get them if everything goes OK. But we are expending all of our efforts towards two things. Getting the people out of Desert One, and two, to identify this eighth crew and get it rescued. I have talked to Admiral Long, who's talking to the carrier task force commander to do everything they can to avoid any casualties on Iranians, and only as a last resort to engage. In that regard, because of the endangering of our hostages. Still the report...and of course it's still sketchy until we get everybody figured out...that there were no Iranians that were killed or injured at Desert One, but we'll have to confirm that a little later.

Carter: Is everyone off the ground now at Desert One?

Jones: No, they are having to...it's been I guess 15 or 20 minutes since I talked to Vaught...they may be off the ground, but they were having to move everybody from that 130 to another 130, and helicopter and 130 people had to get off. I would expect them to be off fairly shortly. I asked him for a report as soon as they all get off and headed south. I will pass that word on.

Carter: OK. Thank you David.

Jones: Yes sir.

[electronic click] [new call]

Long: Long speaking.

Johnson: Ah sir, General Johnson here. The Chairman asked me to check, sir, if we had a confirmation on the one helicopter making it back to the Nimitz sir.

Long: We have not received a report yet that they...the first helo is back aboard Nimitz.

Johnson: All right sir. Thank you sir.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side One

Long: All right. Good bye.

Johnson: Good bye sir.

[electronic click] [new call]

Long: ...as of 2300Z

Johnson: Yes sir.

Long: Reference C-130/helo accident refers. All helos being destroyed/left. All crews coming out in C-130s with some casualties. Number unknown. That's paragraph one. Got that?

Johnson: Yes sir. That all...I understand they are destroying all helos?

Long: All helos being destroyed/left. It is they are being destroyed or left.

Johnson: Those that could not fly out. All right sir.

Long: General, I'm giving you what [CURTSY] saying. I don't know that.

Johnson: All right sir.

Long: All crews coming out in C-130 with some casualties. Numbers unknown. Paragraph two. No additional tankers available at [REDACTED]. Additional tanking must come from [REDACTED]. Two KC-135 on station. One boom rigged for C-130. One rigged basket for TACAIR with 28,000 pounds. Basket KC-135 can stay until 250530Z if recovered [REDACTED] (phonetic) [REDACTED] Paragraph 3. BLUEBEARD...BLUEBEARD 5 on board Nimitz. That's it.

Johnson: All right sir. Thank you sir.

Long: So the first helo is back aboard. And as soon as you tell the Chairman that, call me back. I've got another message for you.

Johnson: All right sir. Thank you, sir.

Long: Good bye.

[electronic click] [new call]

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side One

Johnson: General Johnson.

Voice C: Yes sir. Is General Jones there for the President?

Johnson: Yes sir...[word indistinct].

Voice C: Beg pardon?

Johnson: Yes, General Jones is here.

Voice C: Thank you.

Jones: Yes

Voice C: General Jones, one moment for the President, please sir.

Jones: Yes. Uh huh. [pause]

[indistinct voices in background]

Voice C: Go ahead, gentlemen.

Carter: Hello?

Jones: Yes sir, Mr President.

Carter: Heard anything else?

Jones: Yes sir. I just got a report from General Vaught. He's on the other phone now, but let me just give you a run down. He believes that all Americans who are alive are off the ground. That is his report.

Carter: All Americans who are what?

Jones: He said who are alive. There are some who evidently were fatalities there. Here is his report. He said it's unsure until they sort it out...what they have done is because of the problem of the helicopter and the departure of time...and the daylight flyout, they have decided to take everybody out in the 130s and to leave the helicopters there because of the risk of losing people.

Carter: OK. All right.

Jones: Their estimate is that one helicopter crew...the one

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

~~NO OTHER SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side One

that was involved in the accident...the crew...the missing...probably died in the accident.

Carter: Yes...I...

E Jones: Probably five, they think one got out, That the...in the EC-130...when the helicopter hit it up in that part, the pilot is believed missing and presumed dead. And some passengers ...the passengers most got out, but there may have been some trapped in there. And they haven't been able to make an exact accounting. They just went around and made sure that everyone they could get a hold of got aboard and get them out. They don't believe that anybody remained...except fatality...but the accounting is very very poor. As to right now they have to sort it out as to what...what the situation would be. The...if they all left now...it's about 2 and on half hours to coast with the.. with the MC-130s and [REDACTED] We are getting air MEDEVAC aircraft into [REDACTED]...the one out of [REDACTED] so that there will be the medical treatment there when they arrive. We...one helicopter is back on the carrier...the one that I reported earlier, and the eighth crew is still unaccounted for. We are doing everything we can to determine the rescue of it. Over.

Carter: I understand.

Jones: And we will try to get an accounting as soon as we can...on the accident and how many got out. It will be a little different with the 130s coming out...come out somewhat faster ...better...and fewer...so the risks of them being attacked probably less...less than having both helicopters and 130s coming out.

Carter: Yes, David. Thank you.

Jones: Yes sir.

[electronic click] [new call]

Davis: ...Therefore imperative that crew returning to Nimitz...BLUEBEARD 5 be debriefed as to what occurred enroute as soon as possible, and information passed to CINCPAC. Specific questions: Can all 8 helo crews be accounted for? Were there any personnel casualties in the helo/130 collision? Now, you've already answered

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~
~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side One

that with your information from General Vaught.

Johnson: All right sir. Hello sir?

Davis: Yes.

Johnson: OK sir. I [didn't?] get it.

Davis: OK...yes sir. The Admiral would like to talk to you Jim.

Johnson: OK. General Jones may be free in just a minute.

Long: Jim?

Johnson: Yes sir.

Long: You think General Jones is available?

Johnson: Yes sir, here he is sir.

Long: All right.

Jones: Hey Bob.

Long: Dave, I've given the latest message I've sent to [CURTSY] and I'll not read that to you again. Basically it gives him some guidance on ROE...

Jones: Well, let me give you what it's all about, and it's changed somewhat, so here's what's happened. Vaught just reported that he abandoned all the helicopters at Desert One. That when they had the accident...and it was getting late...and problems we've had with helicopters, the thought was that 5 of them to go all that way without any mechanical trouble and that wasn't all that great and it was the organization and everything...so they decided to abandon the helicopters and come out in the 130s. We believe everybody...he's reported that everybody alive there...is airborne and out of there. Ah...just a second. I've got to get on another phone. Let me have someone pass on this word from Vaught to you, and I'll talk to SECDEF and then I'll be back on with you.

Long: Dave, there's one thing I would like to talk to you as soon as I can, and that is, I think we are probably at the point that in balance we would be smart to pull the

2808 Tape #2 Side One

Mideast force out of there in order to avoid any incident and to do what the President wants to do. So think about that and get back to me, would you?

Johnson: Admiral Long, sir, this is General Johnson. General Jones had to go to another phone. I heard your last comment about the MIDEASTFOR. I'll pass that to him. Was there anything else sir?

Long: No, I would like to have him get back to me. My instinct is that...that we are not going to keep this event quiet too much longer. The best way for us to avoid any bloodshed with the Iranians would be to pull our Mideast force ships out of there so we would not be placed in a position of having to defend them. So...

Johnson: Yes sir.

Long: So...get back to me. The latest word that I have sent [CURTSY] I have given you. See no reason to necessarily invoke the post strike rules of engagement or withdraw Mideast force at this time. And...I'm about...I'd like to go to him now and modify that and tell him to withdraw the Mideast force.

Johnson: All right, sir. That includes the LaSalle sir?

Long: No, I'd leave the LaSalle in [REDACTED]

Johnson: All right sir.

Long: Now you had some additional information from the Chairman.

Johnson: Yes sir. Let's see...General Vaught came in sir. Much of it was pretty much what you had from Admiral [CURTSY] message other than we had some information on the missing that what he reported was that all of the Americans who were alive had been placed on C-130s and were being evacuated. That there was one...part of the crew of the RH-53 that crashed into the 130 was missing. That the pilot of one of the 130s appeared to be missing. And that possibly there were still some troops strapped into the back of the 130 that burned. There was a good deal of confusion and all of that was fairly tentative. They did confirm sir that they destroyed all of the helicopters that were there and placed everybody into the 130s.

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

~~NOT BEING SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side One

Johnson: Ah...yes...sir, I'd like to make...

[End Side One]

~~TOP SECRET~~

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

Long: OK.

Johnson: I'll get back to you soon, sir, as soon as I've had an opportunity to talk to the Chairman.

Long: All right. I think you know...we have daylight coming up here. I guess it's coming up about 3 o'clock...

Johnson: Three or three thirty...

Long: ...three thirty in the morning there, and I'd like to get these ships moving out of there.

Johnson: All right, sir. We'll get right back to you sir.

Long: OK. Thank you.

Johnson: Yes sir.

Voice D: Sir?

Long: Yes?

Voice D: I have the Chairman, sir.

Jones: Yes Bob? Go ahead Bob.

Long: Can you hear me?

Jones: Yes, I hear you loud and clear.

Long: I have sent [CURTSY] the following message. Rice Bowl mission has been aborted, as of now we see no reason to believe Iranian government is aware of mission. Therefore see no reason to unnecessarily invoke the post strike rules of engagement or withdraw the Mideast force at this time. Primary mission now is to provide all necessary assistance to get remaining forces out successfully. While this is paramount, any action should be attended to not tipping our hand as to what is or has taken place. If need to invoke post strike rules of engagement to ensure protection for aircraft return, you are authorized to do so. If at all possible avoid casualties to Iranians in order to avoid jeopardizing American hostages. Imperative crew returning to Nimitz of BLUEBEARD 5 be debriefed as soon as possible as to what occurred enroute and info passed to CINCPAC. Other specific questions: Can all 8 helo

[REDACTED]

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

crews be accounted for? Were there any personnel casualties in the helo/130 collision. Of course we've received some further word on those...on the latter part. Now with regard to the first paragraph. Sitting here thinking about the value of OPSEC at this time, the probability that the Iranian government is going to be informed sooner or later here, and also the President's desire to minimize any casualties with the Iranians, it seems to me it would be prudent at this time to order the Mideast force ...other than the [REDACTED] ...other than LaSalle in [REDACTED] out of the Gulf. And I would like to get your permission to do that.

Jones: OK. I think...go ahead and pull it on out. I assume you can do it. They're all at sea, except the LaSalle, and it shouldn't be any problem. Right?

Long: Yes. It will probably take all during daylight to get them out of there. It's about 2...over 200 miles to the Straits, so the closer we get them to Task Force 70 the better is going to be 70s ability to protect them.

Jones: OK...

Long: But I think we ought to move them.

Jones: OK. You're authorized to move them. We will work to make no announcements. Keep the whole thing quiet. What we are trying to do is not to say anything, not to tip our hand in any way, shape, or form. Particularly until we get our people out, who are coming out in the 130s, we find that missing helicopter crew and get it out, [REDACTED]

C So we're trying to keep it down. I would assume that some time tomorrow at a minimum people will see those helicopters left there which were not destroyed and there will be...but that's probably a few hours away. But I concur with your actions. Over.

Long: All right. Now one thing you said...do you have definitive information that one helicopter crew is missing?

Jones: We don't have definitive information...well yes we do. Let me give you this. The helicopter commander...I assume it's Pitman, but I'm not sure...I didn't get the name...at Desert One said only 6 crews arrived Desert

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

C
One. One crew has been reported back at the Nimitz. Therefore there is one crew missing. It was reported down a little over an hour after take off from the carrier. We need to put all of our efforts now to recovery of that crew. We're working the problem here. We've got some RH-53s loaded on C-5s. The...and they would move east. It would be awhile before they could get there obviously. The...and we're exercising here the other rescue side. But we'll have to work with you on use of that RH-53, H-3, and particularly where that helicopter crew is located.

Long: OK. I read you. Go ahead.

Jones: One of the first clues we might get is from that helicopter crew that is now back on the carrier. He ought to be able to tell whether or not that helicopter...the one that's missing...had left the group before he had some report about where or what the trouble was. Over.

Long: OK. And I have gone to [CURTSY] and as I've told you, I told him it's imperative that that crew returning to Nimitz...BLUEBEARD 5...be debriefed as soon as possible.

Jones: OK. Let us know as soon as you get a debrief.

Long: All right. What I thought I'd tell [CURTSY] on the Mideast force withdrawal and that is he doesn't need to go into the reasons for...on the...on the...on the evacuation. I would indicate that he can tell them that there has been some operation that could provoke reaction from the Iranians.

Jones: OK.

Long: All right Dave. Thank you.

Jones: Give us the word when you get it. Thank you.

Long: All right. Bye.

[new call]

CONTROL SYSTEMS MONITOR

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

C
Jones:

OK. Well let me give you an update. I don't know how much you have.

Thank you.

E
Jones:

They have abandoned all helicopters at Desert One. All of the aircraft that are going to take off are off. The accident resulted in some fatalities most likely. They're still trying to count. It looks like the helicopter crew and the pilot of one of the 130s and possible somebody in the back end. They are supposedly...according to the report from Vaught...they're all enroute back to [REDACTED] We still have unaccounted for one helicopter crew. That sometime within the first hour to hour and a half after departure from the carrier it went down. We've had no word on it since. At first...

Voice E: We thought they'd been picked up and were going back to the Nimitz.

Jones: We...one crew got back to the Nimitz. There were some reports in the meantime at a while that all 8 had been accounted for. As of now here is what, one crew is back on the Nimitz. The helicopter commander at the site where they had the accident said there were six crews at Desert One. That identifies seven crews.

Right.

Jones:

The eighth crew location is unidentified. There can always be a glitch of some sort...and they could be someplace...but as of now we are sending these down. We have asked Long for as quick of debrief of the helicopter crew that's back to given any report as to whether or not he heard of any problem with this helicopter...to give any identification.

Yeah.

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

Jones: We need your full support on this one right now as to what we can do about finding the location, and when finding we'll have multiple ways of extracting. Over.

All right sir. I understood..if I understood you correctly earlier, the helos themselves have all been left behind at Desert One.

Jones: Yes.

And so...what I'm watching to come out there...and I've gotten a garble, I'm very glad I called you, because we

Jones: We were going to bring all the helos out, but when they had the accident...and all the confusion and the fact the helos would be over Iran at a considerable length of time in the daytime and all of those factors...the questionable reliability of the helicopter since 3 out of 8 went down going in...the chances of 5 coming out...and then after the accident all 4 coming out weren't all that great...and at that point a few helicopters left...the key was get the people out, so we made a decision on the ground to abandon. So we've 130s coming out now...to [redacted]...they probably can get out without any great problem. The carrier is going to watch with an E-2...[words indistinct]

Jones: [redacted]

But we'll try to get a confirmation.

[words indistinct]...All right sir. Do we know anything on the nature of the accident itself?

Jones: No, it's just that the helicopter ran into the cockpit area of the 130.

Damn.

Jones: Awfully dark out there. Don't have any idea. May never know.

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

Right.

C Jones:

The other thing about it is we want to keep the visibility as low as possible. We want to have as few people know it...particularly Iranians...until they discover something, because we've got to get those 130s out, which will transpire in a couple of hours...but we got that one helicopter crew unaccounted for we need to rescue and then we got a bunch of people...
...in Tehran...

Jones:

We'll continue to do it.

Jones:

OK.

Thank you.

Jones:

Bye.

[new call]

Voice E: ...for the President sir.

Jones: OK. [pause] Yes sir.

Carter: Hi David.

Jones: The update is that all of the 5 130s are enroute out. The last one should cross the coast in an hour and about 5 minutes.

Carter: About 8:10 our time.

E Jones: Yes sir. Landing in two hours and 40 minutes... something around just before 10:00 our time down at [redacted] The first airplanes should be on the ground sometime before that. They came out early.

Carter: So the last one should be on the ground about 10 o'clock?

Jones: Should be by 10 o'clock, yes sir. Five coming out. The best...and again they'll have to count everything

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

L-15

up...but they believe there were 4 crew members of the RH-53 lost in the accident, one pilot of the 130, and one other in the rear for a total of 6 fairly confirmed. There may be others who are missing from that group. We have aero MEDEVAC airplanes...we had at [REDACTED] one positioned for the next day...and a C-9 special with whole blood coming out of Germany to go into [REDACTED] to meet. [REDACTED]

Carter: How would we go about that David?

Jones: [REDACTED]

Carter: Now David one thing we don't want to do is compound the problem by having a major pitched air battle over Iran.

Jones: Yes sir. I had told that to...

Carter: We need to think this through if we know where that crew is on the ground, how to go about getting them out.

Jones: Yes sir. Well when we find it I'll talk with you or with Harold and we'll make sure we've got a well organized plan to get in and to get it out. I told Harold one thing we wanted to do the better choice we have of [REDACTED] which we're [REDACTED]

L-15

HANDLE VIA

CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

[REDACTED] and also to get this helicopter crew picked up. [REDACTED]

C
Carter: That's unbelievable, isn't it?

Jones: Yes sir.

Carter: Someone just walked through the office watching TV. They're apparently having massive riots on the street over there in Tehran because of other altercations, and they said the streets in Tehran looked almost like they did when the Shah fell.

Jones: I hadn't heard that. [REDACTED]

C
Carter: David let's leave it this way. I'm not going to say anything or do anything until we clear it with you. And before you all firm up any part of air intrusion into Iran again make sure you have the clearance from me and Harold.

Jones: Yes sir.

Carter: Because I'm going to ask Harold to stay here with me.

Jones: Well...we will and I've got...we're working the aftermath problem but we can. All my colleagues have been here and...one thing that I have authorized CINCPAC to do is to have the ships that are in the...and we had planned to do this after the operation revealed...ships in the Persian Gulf that are at sea to move on down out so that...

Carter: Yes.

E
Jones: It will take awhile...but the LaSalle is in port and would stay in port in [REDACTED]...it can't sail now for quite awhile and we think it's safe in port...but the others to come on down and try to avoid any confrontation. [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L-15

HANDLE VIA

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS ONLY~~

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

(S) B-5
[REDACTED]
Carter: I wouldn't worry about that. If we send a gun ship in there, there would probably be more complications.

D
Jones: *B-5*

Carter:

Jones: *B-5*

Carter: Let's do not do it, because if they're hundreds of Iranians all over those helicopters looking at them as a curiosity...you know we're going to wind up with a bunch of Iranian casualties.

Jones: I agree.

Carter: So let's do not do that.

Jones: We're working our best...I recommend not and we will not.

Carter: OK. We'll charge them for the helicopter later.

Jones: All right sir.

Carter: OK David. Thank you.

Jones: That's all I have.

Carter: David?

Jones: Yes sir?

Carter: One other thing...we've got a problem and a fairly substantial time delay in getting any part of message to GHOTBZADEH and BANI-SADR...and what we'd like to do as soon as you all...you might want to think of this independent of us...we've got to go through the Swiss and things have to be translated into French and so forth...and so we've got at least a couple of hours delay in getting him a message. And I need to let him know as soon as possible that we had planned a rescue operation...we had canceled it when we had a collision between...an accident involving our own aircraft. So

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

far as we know there are no Iranian casualties and that we...that all Americans have been withdrawn. We don't want to have them think we're invading Iran and have them all of a sudden go on a bloodbath against Americans over there.

Jones: Uh huh. Yes I think though they will...it will take them quite awhile if they don't see the 130s coming out or anything like that...to get out to those helicopters and then look at them and identify them as Americans...and not...they were all painted...and to get inside them...there are things we had to abandon...we're not sure what they're...abandoned in there...but I think there will be a considerable time period before they're really aware of it. I think we'll have a few hours...

Carter: Yes.

Jones: ...and so we are working that and we will be alert to that.

Carter: Let me know...let me know immediately when you hear anything about...
C David it's better for you to call...we're all here in my little black office...it's Signal 176...and then just tell me to pick up the secure phone, if you want to call me.

Jones: OK. Signal 176 and then ask you to pick up secure.

Carter: Yeah. One other thing David. Do you have anyway yet to know yet what American bodies were left in there?

Jones: No we do not. We...they had report of one body, but it was confused if whether the body was taken out. The intent would have been to bring the bodies out.

Carter: I know. I understand they were completely burned.

Jones: They said they were missing...I think there may be one body coming and the other 5 missing, but that is clearly not determined as yet.

Carter: OK. I'll be sitting here by the phone.

Jones: Yes sir. Thank you.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~HANDLE WITH CARE~~
~~CONTROL SYSTEMS UNIT~~

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

[electronic click]

[new call]

Jones:

...the other one we got back through [CURTSY] which we're still not sure of indicated that 7 were coming back from Desert One and one had already arrived back at the Nimitz. We will assume for now there is a crew down. The main thing is to get...we'll ask when the 130s come out.

We don't want though any egress or penetration of Iranian territory with a search mission until we sort things out a little better...is the crew down, where is it down, some debriefing and that, and figure out our rescue operation. Over.

Long:

All right. I understand. I'm now satisfied there was only one crew aboard the helo that has returned to Nimitz.

Jones:

Yeah.

Long:

We have...we are trying to find out through both your office as well as [CURTSY] how many crews are actually in the 130s. And we have accepted the SAR mission and we are going to [CURTSY] to tell him to give us plans...do not execute at this time...but give us plans for a search plan considering egress and no egress. Now we're pretty well convinced here...or I am...

Jones:

OK. I agree. Maybe if they can hide out by dark comes again that RH-53 that's got all the overnight capability...the night capability might do it. Maybe the 130s coming out can get some indication on beepers. And also when the crews land we ought to be able to get some indication of when that helicopter dropped out. If it just flat dropped out of the sky it most likely crashed. If he aborted because of maintenance trouble he should have told somebody he was going down with

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

some degree of precision as to where.

Long: Right, and we have asked for any information on this helicopter crew from [CURTSY]. We have not received that back yet. We're still working that trying to sort out. There still is a question in my mind whether we are, in fact, still missing a halo crew.

E Jones: Well, it is in our mind, and we're assuming we are. Obviously we won't egress until we're sure. But we want to do things. We've directed MAC to move the special RH-53s out of Kirtland to head east on an exercise [words indistinct] but they'll be going east so that if they're for some reason needed we'll have them. That's strictly a back up for the carrier and its operation. We've also got a Fulton capability over there. You should take into consideration all of the various methods. There are two Fulton recovery aircraft at [REDACTED] which can snatch at night. The helicopters probably better because of the difficulty of the snatch. But we'll leave it with you and provide you with all the necessary information and resources. Over.

Long: OK. We'll have to ... I'll have to get checked out on the capabilities of the snatch aircraft. I was sort of the impression that operationally...unless it was preplanned on the ground that is not of any value to us. But I'll check it out.

Jones: You can drop it. It's not simple, but you can drop it and the guy reads it over and gets it all set up and up...and that's been done lots of times before. It's a lot better if the guy knows about it ahead of time. Obviously it's not as good in any way, shape or form as a helicopter if you can safely get a helicopter in and out. But it's a possibility.

E Long: Ok. Let me read you a message that I've just sent [CURTSY]. CJTF 79 has advised CJTF that all surviving U.S. personnel, less possibly one helicopter crew, are airborne in C-130 aircraft returning to [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. Our efforts should now be centered on recovering remaining U.S. forces from Iranian territory. You are authorized to advise Mideast force units that an incident not specified has occurred that could lead to hostile action by Iranian forces. OPSEC considerations remain high. MDF withdrawal less LaSalle is to begin

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

E immediately. This action will serve to minimize chances of encounters with Iranian forces while enabling protection of Mideast forces by other JTF 551 units. LaSalle is to remain in port [REDACTED] until further notice. If you get positive indication that Iranian forces are aware of evacuation attempt, then you are authorized to invoke post strike ROE. The foregoing has been coordinated with Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Jones:

OK. I think there's two things. One, they might be confused as to where the eighth helicopter crew is. I don't want them to have any thought that we left them at Desert One. Tell them the last of our knowledge and not confirmed is that they went down some place well short of the refueling point. [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED] I don't want them to get...hardly notice right now that they've already been alerted. Tell them we will alert them the minute we get any indication. Over.

Long:

Well I have...I have previously left him just a half hour ago and have already told him that quote as of now...

Jones:

Hold it...hold it Bob...

Long:

Yeah...

[REDACTED]:

Admiral Long?

Long:

Yes?

[REDACTED] sir. The Chairman had a call coming in from General Vaught asked me to pick up the phone. I thought I'd relate to you the thought about location. The downed location was in...the first indication we had that a helo was down...the approximate coordinates are 29-16 and 58-55 east. We've had nothing better since that time to indicate any better fix than that, although we're not very sure.

[End Side Two]

[End 2808 Tape #2]

2808 Tape #2 Side Two

L-16

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #3 Side One

[REDACTED] ...that we'd have of where it might have gone down.

Long: OK.

[REDACTED] And we didn't want...General Jones probably wanted...as you read the message and was listening to it there might be...might be an indicator here that there was a crew left...some crews left up at Desert...Desert One, But you know...

Long: All right. I tell you...the business about clarifying the last position of the eighth helo crew, we will incorporate that in a separate message. I don't know if you monitored the message I just read the chairman about...

[REDACTED] Yes sir, I did.

Long: OK. Also I was about to tell the chairman that half an hour ago I told [CURTSY] that as of now we see no reason to believe the Iranian government is aware of mission, therefore see no reason to unnecessarily invoke the post strike rules of engagement or...

[REDACTED] You think...excuse me, sir, I didn't hear you. We've got a couple of other conversations. A half an hour ago you told [CURTSY] sir?

Long: I told [CURTSY] about a half hour ago that quote as of now we see no reason to believe the Iranian government is aware of mission, therefore see no reason to unnecessarily invoke the post strike rules of engagement or withdraw the Middle East Force at this time. So I don't think it's necessary again to tell him that, that's one of the things the Chairman was commenting on on this message.

[REDACTED] OK sir, I'll tell him that you already said this a half hour ago, and you are not going to invoke the past strike rules of engagement.

Long: That's right ...and that's why I said in my paragraph four it you get positive indications that Iranian forces are aware of...aware of evacuation attempt then you are authorized to invoke the post strike ROE...

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 18 MAR 97

REVIEWED BY ADD NMCC

DECLASSIFIED TO

VIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #3 Side One

[REDACTED] All right sir, I understand.

Long: All right?

[REDACTED] I have it. I'll be sure General Jones gets that word.

Long: All right...I think that's about as well as we can do for him now. I don't want to...I'm very sensitive...to avoid any incident with the Iranians, but at the same time we certainly don't want to lose, say a destroyer going through the Straits of Hormuz.

[REDACTED]: Right. Yes sir. I understand.

Long: All right...

[REDACTED] All right sir.

Long: Thank you, Good by.

[REDACTED] We'll get back to you if we have any more.

Long: All right. Good by:

[new call]

[Howdy?] (phonetic)

Jones: You got anything for us at all?

[REDACTED]

Jones: Who told you that?

[REDACTED]

Jones: Well, I just talked with Vaught at Alfa...

[REDACTED] Right.

Jones: ...and he said they...it may well be. Initially they said they'd checked [ahead?]. ...they weren't...in his

~~TOP SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL~~

2808 Tape #3 Side One

comments he wasn't quite as positive as you were...

Yes sir.

C Jones: ...he said it may well be...[word indistinct]

Jones: Now...what they gave me was that they think there were four...there were...did not get out of the helo...a pilot who did not get out of the 130 and some, but not many, in the back of the 130 that didn't get out.

C Jones: OK.

I understand two of the aircraft are back.

1 Jones: Two are down. Three are...well...coast out in approximately another 25 minutes.

Oh super.

E Jones: And will be on the ground...all of them on the ground in [redacted] in about [redacted]...now in [redacted]...As of now they've got plenty of fuel to go back, they've got MEDEVAC down there...We are pulling the Mideast Force ships out of the Persian Gulf except the LaSalle in port...the...that shouldn't tip them or anything. They are already at sea and they just sail...start sailing down and do it in on OPSEC way, but that's in case something happens. They don't need to be in harm's way. Over.

Yes.

E Jones: That's the recommendation of Long.

2808 Tape #3 Side One

[REDACTED] Ah...Bob Long.

Jones: Yeah.

[REDACTED] All right sir. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Can I call you back? [speaking to Jones]...

Jones: I do not. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All right, sir. [REDACTED]

Jones: Well there's...they're [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Well I will leave all up, sir, until I hear from you.

Jones: OK. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Aye sir. Thank you very much.

Jones: OK, well we'll wait for your call.

[REDACTED] Thank you sir. By.

Jones: By.

[new call]

Voice A: ...sir, you wanted to speak to the President?

Jones: Yes, and he said call him on Signal 176 and to tell him to pick up on secure.

Voice A: Yes sir, just a moment.

Jones: Can you do that?

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #3 Side One

Voice A: Yes sir, we can.

Jones: OK. [pause] Ah...Two C-130s have arrived at [REDACTED]

Carter: Uh huh.

Jones: ...and the three...the same kind...will coast out about 15 minutes from now and landing about [REDACTED] from now...the last ones. We got a medical evacuation airplane that should be landing ahead of it...still uncertain as to number of...the...people that were casualties at Desert One. That's just...they won't know until they get on the ground at [REDACTED] and count up everybody. We now believe...and it's highly likely...we keep getting confusing reports...but it's highly likely that that eighth helicopter crew is on the 130. They just haven't been able to confirm it...it's been on again, off again...through one channel we get a confirmation, through the other channel an uncertainty...but when they land in [REDACTED], shortly thereafter we should know. So I would say better than 50-50 that the eighth crew...so we won't have a rescue mission to perform, but that's still uncertain.

Carter: Well, if that materializes that will be the first good news that we've had tonight.

Jones: Yes sir.

Carter: Any disturbance in Iran yet?

Jones: [REDACTED]

Carter: I cannot understand that.

Jones: Nothing at all.

Carter: David, can you explain to me now...we're getting down to the point where I'm going to have to start notifying...you know...members of Congress...and even telling the American people. It's getting to...it's not crucial, it's getting more and more urgent. How long do you all need in order to take care of things in Tehran?

Jones: We're not sure. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #3 Side One

[REDACTED] if I can get to him...hold just a second...

Carter: I'll hold.

Jones: The belief here is [REDACTED]

Carter: It is?

Jones: ...and get together and figure out what's the best... [REDACTED]

Carter: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Carter: Uh huh. [REDACTED]

Jones: Yes sir, [REDACTED]

Carter: Uh huh. OK. Well, as you know, before they could possibly make elaborate plans or get together and so forth, the story is going to be out because I'm sure there's traffic going past Desert One...you know with flaming airplanes and helicopters parked all over the damn desert. And it is only a matter of time before the alarm is sounded, even if we don't pick up radio broadcasts.

Jones: Yes sir. I would expect that sometime in the next couple of hours, someone will drive by, go to a

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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[REDACTED]
Carter: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Carter: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Carter: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Carter: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Carter: How... [REDACTED]

Jones: It has been pretty good...it's not continuous...let me make a... [REDACTED]

Carter: Can we just tell [REDACTED] already told them that?

Jones: [REDACTED]

Carter: That's good.

Jones: But...

Carter: That's what we want.

Jones: But whether or not trying to [REDACTED]

2808 Tape #3 Side One

...but as to the timing of that we would have to...it would take a little while...

Carter: Yeah.

Jones:

Carter: Sure, I got you. OK, well I'll be here if you need me.

Jones: There's one thing I would suggest be considered as to what to tell the

Carter: Yes, Cy and Warren are working on that.

Jones: What we'd planned to do is attempt to transfer the people...particularly with the burned one injured...but transfer the people and get them to...so they're not on the ground down there...to get back to better care...and to get them out of...but it's likely to be some...some discovery there.

Carter: OK. There's two things...just to summarize...the obvious. There's two things I need to know about. One is that eighth helicopter..the crew.

Jones: Yes sir. And we will do that. One thing we want to work on is to try not to blow the whole operation in the sense of our various teams and capabilities because if we ever need this force again it makes it much more difficult if everybody has full information in it, so obviously some things will come out but these...

Carter: OK

Jones: ...specifically can be the better.

Carter: You take care of the Defense Department man, I'll try to take care of my advisors over here. OK?

Jones: All right sir.

Carter: Thank you David.

[electronic click]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

2808 Tape #3 Side One

[End Side One]

2808 Tape #3 Side Two

Voice B: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NO, We have not.

Voice B: [REDACTED] Thank you very much. I'll tell the
Chairman.

[REDACTED] Right. Thank you.

Voice B: By.

[electronic click] [new call]

[REDACTED]: [REDACTED] here.

[REDACTED] Yes sir.

[REDACTED]: Do you have a debrief from your helo crew, [REDACTED] Back
aboard the...

[REDACTED] We have...we have asked for that in a message that
Admiral Long sent and we have not received anything
from them yet.

[REDACTED]: OK. As soon as you do get back to the Chairman as soon
as you can.

[REDACTED]: Yes. Certainly will.

[REDACTED]: OK. Thank you. Appreciate it.

[REDACTED] Do you have any more information?

[REDACTED]: We do not. No. We're still in contact with [REDACTED]
but haven't got anything more on it.

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Yeah. OK.

: , can you tell us as soon as you can where he went down, or give us any better...if they have any better feel on where that other helicopter might have gone? And...whether he was...what his problem was...do you have any idea about it?

Yes, I understand. You know our original thought was that guy had followed the other one down. And obviously he didn't because he had only the one crew, and I think it turns out that this guy probably got lost.

I see. All right, OK. Give us anything you can as soon as you can. Thanks much.

Right, OK. You bet.

[new call]

Voice C: Yes sir, I have Secretary Brown wishing to speak with you.

Jones: OK.

Voice C: Go ahead please gentlemen.

Brown: Dave?

Jones: Yes sir.

Brown:

think the President will then make a decision as to when to make a statement. I think it might come quite late tonight, and in the form of a release. We don't want to have Bani Sadr make the first statement and hype things up over there. And therefore we should keep listening and see when the net comes up over there with information. But I wanted to inform you of that.

Jones: OK.

Brown: Now, when will we know for sure whether the...all eight helicopter crews are safe? I'm sorry, the remaining seven. One was killed, I guess.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #3 Side Two

Jones: Well...yeah...

Brown: Some of them...some of them were killed.

Jones: The ETA for the last...

Brown: ...the last...is 10 o'clock...

Jones: is about 2:40...

Brown: and we will not know...is that right?

Jones: ...0240 which is about another 40...45 minutes, but then they've got to get on the ground and we've got to debrief everybody and all that sort of stuff...

Brown: ...and we won't know until when?

Jones: I don't see how we will know for sure.

Brown: There's no way to communicate directly with the aircraft?

Jones: Well, we asked them to try to give us the best information...

Brown: OK.

Jones: [GAST] (phonetic) is down there, going to meet the airplane and trying to sort out...first is the seventh crew...and secondly...

Brown: How many...casualties...

Jones: How many casualties...missing...and all that sort of stuff. And I would assume...if they land in 45 minutes...it's going to take at least another 30-40 minutes...

Brown: OK...

Jones: ...to sort things out, so we will...

Brown: so it'll be about 10 o'clock...

Jones: I would guess probably about 10 o'clock...or...

Brown: ...probably a little later...

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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C Jones: ...probably a little later than that...yeah...OK...well we'll...we'll let you know and the President was interested in two things in particular...the seventh crew... [REDACTED]

Brown: Right...

Jones: And we're keeping a close eye on that...

Brown: [REDACTED]

C Jones: ...anything on that...

Brown: [REDACTED]

Jones: Yes sir, that's right...all of our 130s are out...

Brown: OK...you mean over the coast...they're past the coast..

Jones: ...all past the coast for quite awhile...

Brown: OK..

Jones: They're coming out...if there had been something reported we would expect...

Brown: Right...so they won't find out that way...

Jones: Probably not...

Brown: But you've got these 40 people...40 odd Iranians to whom something curious has happened...maybe they think it was a UFO...[chuckles]

Jones: Yeah, well...some of the things we're looking at in the aftermath here...one is...and I mentioned it to the President... our concern is that...at least we say...

Brown: About Delta...he made that clear...he made that clear....

C Jones: ...the question...where to bring Delta...where Delta would like to come [REDACTED]


~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~
2808 Tape #3 Side Two

Brown: 

Jones: ...except...yeah...but...I think that's a determination we can make when they start arriving...

Brown: That's right.

Jones: The question is...any of these forces to be left over there...because of their unique capabilities.

Brown: You mean the choppers?

Jones: No...

Brown: There's only one left. Are we going to try this again?

Jones: No...we had looked at that and...there's so much reconstitution...

Brown: That's right. It's clearly nothing that can be done in a predictable time, even if it were politically feasible to do it again.

Jones: There's a bunch of helicopters coming in the Eisenhower...you'd have to find another Desert One...

Brown: But which forces are you talking about?

Jones: Whether or not we keep the gunships or whether or not we keep the Delta and Ranger's forward...in that if there are problems..

Brown: I...think...

Jones: We think it unlikely we can keep it forward...

Brown: Oh yeah...we can decide that a little later...my inclination is to pull it all back because it would take us long enough to do anything...so that there's no virtue in keeping it there. Now if you're thinking about additional special operations elsewhere...I think again we're going to have to rethink the whole thing. And that will take long enough, so you might as well bring them back.

Jones: Yeah. The only thing I would say is to keep them forward if you're considering...which is unlikely now...mining or something of that...

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HANDLE VIA

~~CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~

2808 Tape #3 Side Two


Brown: We're not considering that, at least not very...not so soon...but you couldn't get these back. (~

Jones: Yet again...but the visibility of it. I'm inclined to agree...

Brown: All right.

Jones: ...that we go ahead and start moving them back tomorrow if that's OK.

Brown:



Jones: I agree.

Brown: OK. Here's the Vice President.

Mondale: David, I just wanted some information. If you're busy in an operational sense just call me back.

Jones: No, I'm not busy right now. If I get a hot call or something...[words indistinct]

Mondale: Yeah, sure. As I understand it our planes have now cleared Iranian territory.

Jones: That is correct. We still have an uncertainty as to one of the helicopter crews.

Mondale: Uh huh. But everyone that was at Desert One got in the 130s...has left and has cleared Iranian territory.

Jones: Yes sir. We had an unfortunate accident at Desert One, where a helicopter ran into a 130 and they both caught fire, and it appears that all but one crew member on the helicopter is a fatality and a small number...maybe the pilot and one or two... we're not sure...in the

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2808 Tape #3 Side Two

back on the 130 from that accident and until they get back and sort it out we won't be sure. But a small number...caused by an accident there as they were getting ready to leave.

Mondale: What do you estimate? Six dead?

Jones: Well...that's so uncertain right now. I would say that's...that's about what we know about, but there may be some others missing or dead from that accident.

Mondale: Yeah...ah...what about the helicopter crew that we've had trouble finding?

Jones: Well, we think it's aboard the 130, but we're not sure. It was confusion as to...out of Desert One we got a report that there were only 6 crews there. Then a report...no, there were seven crews, and that one got picked up. We have one crew, the eighth one, that had landed and then went back to the Nimitz.

Mondale: Uh huh.

Jones: Arrived Nimitz about an hour or so ago. He reported that his indication is that there were seven, and one had been picked up. We won't know for sure...and I would say better than 50-50 that this seventh helicopter crew is aboard the 130s, but certainly not a high assurance. It should land...the 130 should land at [REDACTED] in about 40 minutes and then they're going to... General Gast is going to meet...check everybody as they get off and see who's missing and...one of the first things we do is whether that helicopter crew is there. If it's not, then we've got to...a rescue...problem of trying to find it without penetrating... [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]...get some indication of where it is...the radio beacons...we'd earlier had the indication of a beacon...but that could be spurious. We got quite a few of those.

Mondale: If, in fact, the crew is aboard, presumably the craft had to land because it was stricken...another chopper picked them up and took them on to Desert One, huh?

Jones: That's what the feeling is, the most probable thing now...but still not a certainty.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #3 Side Two

Mondale: Uh huh.

Jones: When they had the accident and the delay and the time that they had [words indistinct due to Mondale's breathing] they decided all to come in the 130s...supposed to fly helicopters...

Mondale: They just left them behind...did they blow them up?

Jones: No...for a number of reasons. One is they didn't have time...it was the primary reason. And I would guess another reason...at least if I had a 130 problem and had to go back...

Mondale: You...you might need them. Yeah.

Jones: What it looks like now in the post mortem is that everything would have worked well...we lost from a reliability standpoint...three of our eight helicopters...and a determination had been made that if we lose more than 2 of the 8 before we leave Desert One...the probability of losing one more was very high...and therefore the mission couldn't be accomplished...so that...so for want of the nail was three of eight helicopters [voice smothered over by Mondale's breathing]...the mission.

Mondale: And we'd flown these helicopters all over the country successfully, hadn't we?

Jones: Well, we have...those had been on the Nimitz since last December or so but they've been flying off the Nimitz, and the crews went out about a week ahead of time and did some flying on these helicopters. But they were different ones than we had in the states because we shipped those out many many months ago. We've been working on them and been flying them out there and ...but it's just one of those things...the reliability impacted on the mission...

Mondale: We just got two bad breaks, that's all.

Jones: It looks as though that...there's no tip off from that desert landing as yet, and we're surprised, but these vehicles ...and the vehicle that drove through evidently didn't report anything.

Mondale: It's hard to believe, isn't it.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2808 Tape #3 Side Two

Jones: Well if I were a person over there and I wasn't sure if you put your head above water you'd get your head chopped off ...that if I were some poor guy out in the country I'm not sure I just wouldn't drive home...you don't know who's there and what it's all about, and that sort of thing.

Mondale: Yeah.

Jones: So, I...we thought maybe there was a good chance he wouldn't report. Now, the bus load of 41 people...we don't know if this bus was still OK and that they are heading to town or that they are...the bus was disabled and they're waiting for the next vehicle to come by or what. There were more vehicles than we thought. We knew there were vehicles coming down that road. We had expected that on a Thursday night...a holiday..weekend there would be fewer road...vehicles in the middle of the night. We did have the expectation there would be some and the roadblock was set up for stopping of the vehicles. ~~TOP SECRET~~ we'd have been up in the hideout now, and everything was total green at that way...bedded down, and things were going. But the reliability...once we aborted, when you do that sort of thing...confusion increases and the unfortunate accident.

Mondale: I suppose people get so damned distressed and disappointed that they sometimes lose their efficiency too, don't they?

Jones: We may never know, but we'll try to find out what happened...

Mondale: Sure.

Jones: ...helicopter running into that 130 out there. It looked as though...if we accept the uncertainty of that helicopter...which we think now is probably aboard that 130, we could have gotten all our people out. We don't have any indication of any casualties among the Iranians right now...

Mondale: Uh huh. OK, thank you very much David.

Jones: You're welcome, sir.

Mondale: Right, Bye

2808 Tape #3 Side Two

[electronic click] [new call]

C

Jones:

Jones:

Now...you mean

Yes

Jones:

C

Jones:

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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Jones:

The only possibility is we haven't confirmed 100 percent that we've got all helicopter crews accounted for.

Well, I need to hold until I know that.

Jones:

Better hold.

Yeah.

Jones:

All the aircraft are on the ground, been on the ground for 10 minutes. They are debriefing now. We should have a feel pretty soon

All right.

Jones:

...but for other things to do. All right.

Jones:

I'm going to call over to the White House now... [words indistinct]...

...One of the unknowns until we get debrief is that 44 people on that bus...and there were women and children and so forth...as to whether or not the bus was disabled and they're sitting out in the desert with a bunch of

~~TOP SECRET~~

2808 Tape #3 Side Two

helicopters...or if they've driven into town. I would assume that some car has come by now, either that or they only drive on that road in the middle of the night...and he's probably stopped them, picked them up, and taken them into some place.

Jones:

All right, sir. Thanks very much.

Jones:

Thank you.

Bye.

[electronic click] [new call]

Jones: Yes, is he in the President...in the same area?

Voice D: Ah...yes sir, they are. As to the best of my knowledge I haven't heard from him since last you spoke to the Secretary.

Jones: OK, well why don't you ring in there. I'll speak either to the President or Secretary Brown. If the President answers I'll speak to him. Otherwise, Secretary Brown.

Voice D: OK, just a moment sir.

Jones: Hello?

Voice D: Yes sir, I'm still waiting.

Jones: Are you picking up that one I called before...something 76 or whatever it was.

Voice D: Ah...sir? No sir, we're calling the usher's office now to bring one of them to the phone.

Jones: Oh...just a second...he did ask me to pick up Signal 176.

Voice D: Ah...yes sir, that's procedure, but the President and

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his party are in the Cabinet Room right now...

Jones: Oh. OK

Voice D: ...so we're having the usher get Dr Brown.

Jones: Yes Mr President?

Brown: No, it's Harold Brown.

Jones: Dave Jones. I've got little to report except that the 5 aircraft are on the ground and Initial debriefing has started. We do not have the report yet one way or the other on all the helicopter crews or anything. It should have that within a few minutes.

Brown: And now it's down there.

Jones:

Brown: OK.

Jones: But that's all. I should be back to you quite shortly on.

Brown: On the debrief.

Jones: ...on the debrief.

Brown: That's what...half an hour or less.

Jones: It should be, yeah.

Brown: OK.

Jones: They want to go through, but I said first get word to me on...the helicopter crew and then later on who's missing and that sort of thing.

Brown: OK.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #3 Side Two

Jones: OK.

[electronic click] [new call]

Davis: General Davis.

Johnson: Sir, just a minute for General Jones.

Davis: Yes sir.

Jones: This is General Jones. I wonder if they couldn't just get to that helicopter pilot out there and get something from him because...

Davis: [words indistinct]

[end side #2]

[end 2808 Tape #3]

~~TOP SECRET~~

L-17

2808 Tape #4 Side One

[Side One is completely blank]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
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☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

Jones: ...any information on the ...on the ...extra crew that went down.

Voice A: Yes sir.

Jones: And then anything else...but without delay on that... but then anything else as to what problems he had and what problems others had and all that sort of stuff.

Voice A: Yes sir. I understand.

E Jones: All 130s on the ground [REDACTED] now. What we will probably want to do is once we determine we've got all the helicopter crews out...if that is so...and that is so...and that is probable from the reports...but...do it...

Voice A: Yes sir.

Jones: ...is...get the recommendation from you all as to what we do with the fleet alert backing off. We don't...we'll drop back to...the normal time on other options for now, as opposed to staying at the immediately ready to launch type thing.

Voice A: Yeah...this is on the 24-hour leash [words inaudible] for any other options.

Jones: Yeah, we'll put you back on the 24 rather than sitting there with immediate launch as soon as we find out we don't have a rescue mission, and let you move down the Gulf a little bit... considering whatever you want to leave closer while Mideast Force is coming out...but...

Voice A: Yes sir.

Jones: ...we'll relieve you from immediate tasking requirement...as soon as we determine we do not have a rescue mission to mount.

Voice A: Yes sir. I understand, and I know that these...that plan for cover of the Mideast Force ships.

Jones: Yeah, but keep the cover as non-provocative...and...as we are talking to Admiral Long...as non-provocative as at all possible [REDACTED]

C [REDACTED]...and it ought to be quite a while before they

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

know what's going on...and before they can go through it. So in the likelihood of anything against us is extremely low and we don't want to provoke something needlessly.

Voice A: Yes sir. That was our assessment too, that...say those bus people get phone calls in, at least that's a wild tale they'll probably have to send somebody from the government down there to verify and it's likely to be some time.

Jones: Yeah. OK. When you say give cover, what kind of cover are you talking about?

Voice A: Well, in his Mideast plan...withdrawal plan, he had CAPs that he could put up there.

Jones: You think that's really necessary? I wouldn't put anything up now. I wouldn't put up any at all.

Voice A: Yes sir.

Jones:

...it becomes quite of concern then I would say we might put up a CAP, but I wouldn't put it up now.

Voice A: All right, sir.

Jones: Can you get that to the ...to Admiral Long?

Voice A: Yes sir, we can. He's still in his office and I just left to come back up here.

Jones: OK. All right, well we will be waiting for that debrief on the helicopters.

Voice A: All right sir. I'll give...him right away.

[electronic click] [new call]

Brown: Dave?

Jones: Yes.

Brown: Can you verify for me that essentially a complete OPLAN

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

was left on one of the helicopters?

Jones: It did...I was going to let you know it was more than that plan. Evidently the whole thing, including the ...all of the communications details and so forth were left on the helicopter.

Brown: I see...

Jones: And I'm looking over it now and it is...I'm pretty sure what I'm looking at except it's a board and...they can reconstruct the whole thing...

Brown: Uh huh...

Jones: ...from one end to another...

Brown: ...including the hideout, the garage...

Jones: Well...we don't...the hideout...yes, we expect that. Whether or not the warehouse is undetermined, but most likely...The...it's got a hundred code words in it...every base location.

Brown: Uh huh...

Jones: ...and you can just about reconstruct the mission from what was left aboard.

Brown: Well, you know, we'll post mortem this later, but it sure seems stupid to me that they didn't destroy it or take it off.

Jones: I agree, and...standing instructions are taken...but evidently in those last few minutes...

Brown: They panicked...I think, well they got very excited...

Jones: They got excited when it was dark...and the 130's about ready to leave and evidently from everything we get is the maps and the communications, the OPSORDER, the key list...we changed the key list, but looking at this right now...what we're working on here

...as to the protection of our people in Tehran...

Brown: That's what worries me...yeah...

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Jones: And the concern is...we don't know whether or not they've marked the warehouse. This does not refer to the warehouse...it refers, though to a Delta reception team and it gives the frequency in which to contact.

C So from the standpoint of the people away from the warehouse, he doesn't think that...[voice lost by Voice B interruption]

Brown: Well, except it will point to Tehran and people in Tehran.

Jones: Oh yeah, that broader still...it will...and whether or not I would guess that they probably have the warehouse marked because...these pictures of it...because it is always the business after you drop them off and they go into the warehouse, you've got to be ready to gain...and in order to go in you have...

Brown: You have to be able to identify it...

Jones: target identification.

Brown: Yeah...yeah...yeah...OK...

Jones: So...I have no

C report yet from the...

Brown: helicopter crews...

Jones: helicopter crews. A couple of other things... John has been reworking on this message to the CINCs...

Brown: Yeah, I've got...I've got a reworked version. You know if you could send someone over here to get it I'd give it to him. We've decided not to send the other...we don't have to send the other messages in that folder, I don't think. I've reworked the first paragraph to be in accord with the President's statement. Why don't you send somebody over here and I'll give it to him.

Jones: OK. I'll get somebody over to the White House for now.

Brown: And...check with...have John check...if he disagrees...we think here that we don't have to send any of the others.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

Jones: Yeah, we agree.

Brown: OK.

Jones: All right. You're in the Cabinet Room?

Brown: Ah...I can be reached there, yeah. Actually at the moment sitting at the President's desk, but I'm in the Cabinet Room.

Jones: OK.

Brown: Thank you.

Jones: Bye.

[electronic click] [new call]

...my own guess is that it's one slight positive benefit is that finding things there in operable condition...charts and so forth...is likely to cause the Iranians to spend some time examining just what they've got

Jones: Yeah. Once they get somebody there...

That's right...

Jones: ...getting somebody there...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jones: The...yeah...[inaudible] the CEOI...[inaudible]...you can reconstruct the whole mission...

Jones: ...gives communications frequencies...[inaudible]...
locations...it's got...it's got some critically
sensitive things...

Jones: Yeah. [redacted] [words]
inaudible

Jones: We're not sure on the warehouse, but I'm assuming that at least there were target pictures of the warehouse so that they could go pick up people at the warehouse and things like that...[words inaudible]...have target folders...we're trying to get data from the helicopter crew that landed on the Nimitz just to get a better feel, but it looks like key lists, CEOI, and the map folders and all the rest of it...they're going to be able to totally reconstruct it.

Jones: Yeah. We had considered it was out for lots of reasons. This really makes it out.

Jones: OK. Well, we'll be here when you hear anything.

Jones: Thank you.

Jones: Bye.

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~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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Jones: ...now. Hello.

Voice B: Yes sir?

Jones: Secretary Brown.

Voice B: Ah...no sir, I was going to get General Jones, then get Secretary Brown.

Jones: This is General Jones.

Voice B: All right sir. Just a moment.

Jones: Thank you... [pause]

Voice B: Go ahead, please.

Jones: Hello?

Brown: Yes Dave.

Jones: Got a report from Vaught. First, we have accounted for all air crews...all the helicopter crews...

Brown: All right.

Jones: ...three perished in the accident at...

Brown: Three members...

Jones: ...three members of the helicopter...

Brown: ...the helicopter...

Jones: ...the aircraft commander survived...

Brown: I see, there are four on...there were four on...

Jones: ...four...

Brown: Right...

Jones: Five crew members on the 130 perished...

Brown: Just a second...five C-130 crew members...

Jones: ...perished at the scene...

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

Brown: All right.

Jones: ...for a total of 8 people lost.

Brown: No Deltas.

Jones: No Deltas...there were three personnel burned...

Brown: Right...

Jones: ...two with some second degree, one lesser...

Brown: Uh huh.

Jones: ...and there were others that got...bruises and cuts and a few minor breaks....

Brown: All right.

Jones: They are all enroute now to [REDACTED]

Brown: And nobody's left at [REDACTED]

Jones: Nobody's left...well, nobody of...

Brown: Nobody of this group, yes...

Jones: Well, I wouldn't guarantee there wasn't one guy or something, but two airplanes left 45 and 20 minutes ago for [REDACTED]. The doctor who has been with the people says we won't have to send anybody to [REDACTED]. And the C-9 will pick them up and take them on in to Europe.

Brown: From [REDACTED]...

Jones: From [REDACTED], yeah. That portion is pretty good right now. They do not have the names for us...I've asked them for the names so we can verify and do the normal casualty notification...and we won't notify anybody before we talk with you all. In fact it will be many hours before we can really guarantee it...so we're not going to try to do that.

Brown: Names unknown...as yet...names uncertain.

Jones: We probably could go get names. We have not tried to because I'm not wanting to bandy any around...because we think it's helicopter number 3 and we could go to

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

that list and so forth. They say they're...they are convinced from the debrief that there are no Americans left from the scene other than those who perished in the accident.

Brown: OK.

Jones: And all strike people survived...and...the...so...now, as far as compromise is concerned, there is some uncertainty. I have reviewed the whole CEOI and it is very very comprehensive. But we have indication that the only helicopter that had the whole thing is the one back on Nimitz.

Brown: [laughs]

Jones: Colonel Pitman, who was the commander, was aboard that helicopter.

Brown: He's the marine colonel, isn't he?

Jones: Yeah. And he was aboard that helicopter. And he reports that the others did not have the complete CEOI.

Brown: I see...what's...?

Jones: Ah...Communications Electronics Operations Information.

Brown: Ah...OK.

Jones: ...Operating Instructions...Communications [words inaudible] I'm not sure what they had, and Pitman said the others...we're getting more from him. Probably, though, maps and things of that nature, and what they needed for communications. The CEOI has [redacted], and all the rest.

Brown: The others do not?

Jones: Well, I can't guarantee they don't have...

Brown: OK...all right...we don't know yet.

Jones: ...that, they think it's more fragmentary...what the others have.

Brown: I see.

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

Jones: But no guarantees. We're trying to get from Pitman and the people who briefed at the Nimitz exactly what was aboard each helicopter. But there is a fair chance it isn't compromised as much on the CEOI. Other things such as maps and routes and all that sort of stuff. There's one indication from Vaught, and I haven't been able to talk to who [words inaudible]. [redacted] just hung up the phone. That this morning Bob thinks we're still coming, because about 20 minutes ago we got a message saying "everything is green green green here keep coming." [laughs]

Brown: [laughs] All right... so they haven't been able to get to him.

Jones: Well, they thought they had, but [redacted] but Vaught is saying that it appears to be an old message, appears to be a new one. But that's the type of thing to sort out.

Brown: OK, but that's an argument for trying to delay any announcement, but I don't see how we can delay it past tomorrow morning.

Jones: No, I don't see [redacted]

Brown: Yes.

Jones: [redacted]

Brown: Yes.

Jones: But

Brown: OK.

Jones: ...the... let's see, I think that's...

Brown: All right. What we should move, we should return the AC... the specialized equipment... AC-130s and soon, we concluded.

Jones: Yeah... OK.

Brown: You don't disagree with that, do you?

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

Jones: No I don't. The...what they would prefer, and I think there will be a little trouble with this, they would prefer to imply that the Rangers were the ones involved rather than Delta.

Brown: Well maybe we could hold that.

E Jones: The only problem is, except for a couple of Rangers or whatever went with that group, they all are sitting fat, dumb and happy at [REDACTED]

Brown: All right. One thing that we should...we should emphasize...and it's in the President's message...I'll get a copy and bring it back with me when I come. I think I'll probably stay at the Pentagon tonight...is we're distinguishing between preparation and an actual assault on the compound. We're saying this never got beyond the preparation stage. The decision would have been made later on the basis of conditions but equipment malfunction caused the President to cancel.

Jones: Yeah.

Brown: [REDACTED] the message.

Jones: OK. I think that's better than saying the accident [REDACTED] it.

Brown: No no...we mention the accident...but we say equipment malfunction did it, and then there was an accident during extraction.

Jones: Yeah, I think that's the right way to do it. Let me look at my notes here. I don't see anything else.

Brown: We probably will have to do a backgrounder for the press tomorrow sometime, but we'll worry about that when the time comes. And the President needs to be filled in before he meets with the Congress sometime tomorrow morning on what he needs to keep secret about the Delta team, [REDACTED] and so forth.

Jones: OK.

Brown: Good.

Jones: We'll think it through, but I think some of it's going

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to be.

Brown: Tough.

Jones: Tough, and is he going to meet with them in the morning?

Brown: Probably in the morning. Probably in the morning. We're now talking about an announcement that may be as late as in the morning.

Jones: Yeah. OK.

Brown: OK.

Jones: Fine.

Brown: Anything else?

Jones: No. And no doubt is that have anything until you get back.

Brown: Will have you buzz when I get back.

Jones: OK.

Brown: Yeah. Thanks for Dave.

Jones: Mission C. Black. New one.

Jones: Are you ready?

Voice D: I'll tell you. How, sir?

Jones: Fine. Let me give the report. First, they confirm at [redacted] that all helicopter crews are accounted for. There was some casualties, of course, but they have been able to account for all the seven crews, plus the eighth one which is aboard the Nimble. So there is no need for a SAR mission and that requirement is canceled.

Voice D: OK. Roger.

Jones: With regard to the fleet we... I had told [redacted] as soon as we determine that the SAR mission is not necessary you can go back to your MODLOC position. We are not

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

holding you for that immediate launch of the other option. So you go to your...so the normal 24-39 and we'll sort out later just what future requirement. Over.

Voice D: All right. I assume from that the decision has been made at this time not to execute any punitive option. Is that correct?

Jones: That is correct...not to do it now for...it would be thoughtfully considered and no thought of doing it now in any way, shape, or form. Over.

Voice D: All right. Would you like to...like to keep the fleet there on a 24 hour window in order to do it sometime downstream?

Jones: Yeah. I think until we sort it out tomorrow and that we keep it on the 24 hour window. But you think it'd be good to go ahead and draw it back a little bit now and you've got to of course get the middle that force out there and when it's talked to...

best not to have a CAP and best not to reveal our hand in any way, shape, or form, and come out normal and do it, but I'm sort of releasing the requirement for you to be ready for that immediate launch of punitive and go back to what we were doing before. Over.

Voice D: OK. We're having a little communication problem with SS. But as soon as we get up this is what I intend to send. We're going to give him an update on the grave which we greatly appreciate and I'm very thankful and we'll put that in at the beginning. Then I'm saying CJCS aware Mideast Force withdrawal. His opinion is that it will be sometime before Iranian government will be aware of RICE BOWL operation, and even so believes probability of hostile reaction to be very low. CJCS has indicated that he would prefer not to position CAP for supporting MIDEASTFOR withdrawal at this time unless you, I or Washington have some indication of impending Iranian hostile reaction. Accordingly, you are requested not to position CAP in support of Mideast Force units withdrawing unless there are indications of possible Iranian hostile reaction. Obviously this does not preclude heightened deck readiness. Then I intend to tell him about the...no requirement to execute a punitive option at this time.

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and to revert to 24 hour window. And then I want to end up with paragraph that says I want to stress again the need for strict OPSEC regarding RICE BOWL. I anticipate that Washington will provide to all concerned detailed guidance on any public releases or other announcements concerning RICE BOWL mission. I just want to make sure that they are reminded that although this thing is over, we need to be very careful that we do not start talking. And that's what I intend to send him, Dave.

Jones: Yeah. All right. That's fine. Let me add one thing that we need to get right away and it's hard. Maybe you're having comms problems, but much better out of that helicopter. We understand Pitman was aboard the fourth helicopter, the one that got back to the Nimitz. We are very concerned about compromise of information we need to know from them. From Pitman and from those who briefed the helicopter crew that was aboard the other helicopter. We understand that Pitman had a knife set and brought it back with him. We do not know what was aboard the others. I have looked at the transcript on the communications side and it really reveals the on-air mission and all the minutiae involved and could be a great problem. Danger to our people in Lahaina and create other problems for us. So we need to make sure we can get on that. Over.

Voice B: OK. I understand. I will go ahead and add that to the message and as soon as we get restore our comms we'll get it to them. Over.

Jones: OK. And feed it back to us. If we got to make another phone call.

Voice B: All right. Bye-bye.

Jones: Thank you.

[electronic click] [new call]

Jones: Hello?

Voice E: Secretary Brown is trying to reach you.

Jones: OK.

Voice E: Just a moment. Secretary Brown?

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

Brown: Yes.

Voice E: Go ahead please, sir. The General is on.

Brown: Dave?

Jones: Yes.

Brown: A number of things...

Jones: OK. I just got a note passed to me... I'll get it...

Brown: Yeah.

Jones:

Brown: OK. OK.

Jones: I don't have anything but that and I haven't talked to

Brown:

Jones:

Brown: Says

Jones:

Brown: Yes.

Jones:

Brown: Yeah, son.

Jones: I have nothing further than that. It's just coming in.

Brown: All right. Good.

Jones: So, I'll get it while we're talking here. Here's the message. Just a second.

Brown: OK.

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Jones: At about... yeah, that's it.

Brown: OK. What about... do we know any more about the 44 people?

Jones: Ah... we haven't got anything on the 44 people yet.

Brown: ...but they... no Iranians were killed, is that right?

Jones: Our people report that no Iranians were killed,...

Brown: Yes OK. I was going to ask about the bus and the car that got away.

Jones: Nobody's evaluated yet... just there.

Brown: OK.

Jones: Yeah... try to see what.

Brown: How many... were all the bodies of the dead left?

Jones: Ah... that's the report. There were no bodies... we don't have 100 percent confirmation... they said they were... they perished on the scene... that's what they said.

Brown: Right. Right. Probably. And did the 130 burn or not? Do you know?

Jones: Well... how much it burned we don't know.

Brown: Some...

Jones: ...burned because the 5 crew members were killed in it and there were burns to other people...

Brown: Right.

Jones: ...in the 130.

Brown: Right. Right.

Jones: So... how much...

Brown: Did more than one of the choppers have the data left on

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #4 Side Two

it?

Jones: OK...just a minute...I got interrupted. Vaught is trying to get me right now. If you want...

Brown: Shall I...

[End Side Two]

[End 2808 Tape #4]

~~TOP SECRET~~

L-18

~~TOP SECRET~~

2808 Tape #5 Side One

2808, Colonel [REDACTED] (phonetic)

Ah sir, he's talking to General Vaught at the present time.

Yes sir, he just finished getting a copy of that particular message and reading it to Doctor Brown.

All right.

Do you want him to call you back, sir, as soon as he's finished?

Yeah...I guess we'd probably better. I wanted to make sure he knew it and knew some of the level at which it was working.

All right sir.

Ah.

I have General Shutler or General Johnson here if you'd care to speak to either one.

Yeah, let me speak to Phil....General Shutler....

Yes sir. Stand by.

Thank you.

Shutler:

Yes.

Shutler: General Shutler here.

CLASSIFICATION REPORT 10-1235
CONTINUED ON 18 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE OF DDO NMCC
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

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Shutler: OK.

Shutler: [REDACTED] Thank you.

[REDACTED] Right.

Shutler: I'll tell the boss.

[REDACTED] Right. Thank you. Goodbye.

[electronic click] [new call]

[REDACTED] I called you and then talked to Phil while you were on the other phone. You apparently called me.

[REDACTED]

C

Jones: [REDACTED]

Jones: I doubt it.

Jones: I had gotten an earlier note here so I passed it on to Harold Brown. I'll give him this. I've got to call him on something else.

[REDACTED] Fine.

Jones: OK. Thank you.

[REDACTED] I guess there's not much more out of the debriefs. I

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #5 Side One

understand three...[pause]...thank you...

Jones: Three what?

I understand three killed is the final count?

Jones: Ah...no, they're reporting eight.

Ah the hell...we've got a garble on it.

Jones: Three on the RH-53 and five in the M...

...in the aircraft...

Jones: ...in the EC-130.

Right.

Jones: That's what they're reporting as of now. We're keeping that very close hold.

Understood.

Jones: OK.

I'll [inaudible] to you. Bye.

[electronic click] [new call]

Jones: at...ah...

Brown:

Jones:

Brown: Yeah. All right. Thinks no casualties...no Iranian casualties.

Jones: That was an earlier report, but he wants to confirm.

Brown: All right. Bus disabled...

Jones: That he believes disabled...but again...

Brown: Right. But...you know, there's enough traffic by there some of the passengers may have been picked up.

Jones: Yeah.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

2808 Tape #5 Side One

Brown: [REDACTED]

C Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: [REDACTED]

Jones: No we don't.

Brown: OK. But things are beginning to cook, that's clear.

Jones: Yeah.

Brown: All right. How about the car that got away? Do we know anything about that?

C Jones: No, except it headed southeast and [REDACTED]

Brown: Yeah, it's 12 hours almost.

Jones: ...many many hours.

Brown: Yeah. Eight or nine hours. OK. I don't think I had anything more.

Jones: You had some things you wanted to give me.

Brown: No, I think I just did. I think the one I wanted to give you was to ask you whether this CEOI just applied to the helicopter that got back. You say yes, but you're not sure what's on the other ones. And you're not sure stuff was left on more than one, is that right?

Jones: Well we're sure that stuff was left...

Brown: On all of them.

Jones: On all of them...enough of them to where...I can't

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #5 Side One

guarantee one crew didn't take it out, but they got out in a hurry when the fire started in the area...

Brown: OK.

Jones: ...and left most of their stuff aboard.

Brown: Right.

Jones: We're not sure what else is around that's...damaging. That whole CEOI is damaging...

Brown: Yeah, I just looked through it. It's pretty complete.

Jones: But we have had trouble getting info back from the Nimitz on this, but we're trying that as hard as we can. They will be the best source of information on what was aboard. The people when they land at [REDACTED] will have a better feel as to what was left.

Brown: OK. Thank you David.

Jones: I think John wants to talk to you about the message to the CINCs. You coming back over?

Brown: Yes, I'll be over. I'm not sure just when but I'll be back over.

Jones: Yeah, I don't think there's any big rush to it. All of the...all the CINCs but NORAD and SOUTHCOM know we've had one and aborted, so it isn't...

Brown: You might not have to send anything.

Jones: Well, I think we ought to have something because it goes to the services and goes to everybody saying....

Brown: All right, but....

Jones: No hurry....

Brown:we're not going to send it until we send to a lot of other people.

Jones: OK. Good.

Brown: OK.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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[electronic click] [new call]

C [REDACTED]

Jones: Yeah, I think that's...

[REDACTED] And we'll hold to that until...once it's going to go public, if there's going to be an announcement here it would be helpful to know that. [REDACTED]

C Jones: OK. I'm not sure...I think that the public comment is going to be made in the morning, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] May accelerate that level?

Jones: ...may accelerate, but I think they were going to wait until morning to make...hopefully to make the announcement.

[REDACTED] All right.

Jones: But...we'll be alert to that.

[REDACTED] All right sir.

Jones: Thank you.

[REDACTED] Thank you. Bye.

[electronic click] [new call]

C [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
2808 Tape #5 Side One

Jones: OK. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yeah, [REDACTED]

C Jones: I'd better get through, because we... [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

C Jones: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yes sir. [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] That's right. [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

C [REDACTED] I'll be back in ten.... [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] That's right. [REDACTED]

2808 Tape #5 Side One

Jones: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Could easily have been that, [REDACTED]

Jones: OK. All right. [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Yeah.

Jones: ...because there weren't...the helicopters weren't there according to timing. [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Right.

Jones: And, we'll just wait and see, but they...

Jones: OK. Well, I'll pass it on to Harold Brown. OK. Thank you.

[REDACTED] Bye.

[new call]

Jones: General Jones.

Voice A: Yes sir. Stand by for Secretary Brown. [pause]

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #5 Side One

Secretary Brown?

Brown: Yeah.

Voice A: Go ahead sir.

Brown: Yes David.

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: Yes.

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: Yeah.

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: I see. I see.

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: I see.

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: Yes.

Jones: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Brown: Uh huh.

C Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: Yes.

C Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: [REDACTED]

Jones: No.

Brown: Or you did see him.

C Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: [REDACTED]

Jones: Well [REDACTED]

Brown: Right. OK.

C Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: All right.

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: But Dave, I don't think that detail matters.

Jones: Well that's right, but the key is....

C Brown: [REDACTED] We are now
planning a 2 o'clock announcement unless this
snowballs, in which case it will have to be earlier.
Does that make sense to you?

[REDACTED]

2808 Tape #5 Side One

Jones: I think so. Is it a public announcement, or....

Brown: It will be a public announcement.

Jones: OK. I....

Brown: Released in the President's name.

Jones: All right. Now....OK, that sounds reasonable. CEOI... we're fairly sure only one was taken and it was returned, and that the crews made some extracts of key parts that they needed, so it should be much more restricted.

Brown: I see.

Jones: It looks as though that there was some [REDACTED]

Brown: OK. All right.

Jones: OK.

Brown: All right. I'm coming back now, I think.

Jones: OK.

Brown: Good. Thanks.

[electronic click] [new call]

Voice B: ...Command Center. I'm setting up the call from the Chairman to the SECDEF.

Jones: Yeah, this is General Jones.

Voice B: Yes sir. One moment sir. [pause]

Voice C: Secretary Brown's office.

Jones: This is General Jones. May I speak to him?

Voice C: Sir, he's talking to the Vice President right now.

Jones: OK. Well, how about buzzing me when he gets free.

Voice C: What is your drop, sir?

Jones: 2808.

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Voice C: All right sir.

Jones: But I should talk to him in the next 10-15 minutes or so.

Voice C: All right sir.

Jones: Thank you.

Voice C: You're welcome, sir.

[electronic click] [new call]

Jones: Hello?

Voice C: Sir? Secretary Brown...[inaudible]

Jones: Hello?

Brown: Ah Dave.

Jones: One quick thing. John discussed a little bit the President's statement...

Brown: Yes.

Jones: He said something about regrets the tragic loss of eight guys...

Brown: Yeah.

Jones: We do not have the casualty expert right here, but our semi-experts say that because there are no bodies recovered, then initially we will have to declare them missing....

Brown: All right.

Jones: And later....we have a board and we don't have to recover the bodies in order to be dead. I wouldn't say they're missing...and just missing because that would give hope....

Brown: Missing presumed dead...believed dead....

Jones: ...believed dead or were reported dead....

Brown: I'm afraid it's too late. The announcement's already

~~TOP SECRET~~

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been made. But when the President speaks at 7 he may be able to retrieve it.

Jones: Uh huh. OK. But...we'll have better feel by then as to...

Brown: But he has to say...look [laughs]...I think you're right, but this is not a time which the President can deal with the niceties of casualty boards.

Jones: I agree...but it's not the casualty board problem I'm concerned about. It's the fact tomorrow...in the casualty system...

Brown: Yes.

Jones: They...they're announced as missing.

Brown: Yeah.

Jones: ...and the President says they're dead. And I just don't want him to be caught in an inconsistency.

Brown: OK.

Jones: So we should know by that time, and I know it's too late for this other, but...

Brown: All right.

Jones: ...when he talks.

Brown: Well, he wants to know the names too, by then.

Jones: Yes. We have the names of the three marines...the three enlisted...

Brown: All right.

Jones: Don't have the Air Force yet, but they should be before long.

Brown: All right.

Jones: Are...is State going to call hostage families?
[inaudible]

Brown: We ought to call...we ought to call the military ones...

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Jones: And just so to tell them about what's in the release...

Brown: I think so...

Jones: I think I'll have the service chiefs do that.

Brown: I think that's a good idea. I think that's the right way to do it. And we should say the same thing State is saying to their people.

Jones: OK. All right. Well, I'll have somebody get a hold of them. On the talking to Long rather than keeping all those ships bottled right up there, sitting on alert. I told him to go back to the normal 24-19 MODLOC thing.

Brown:

Jones:

Brown: Laughing. When we were talking about why we shouldn't... whether we should announce quickly.

Jones:

Brown:

Jones: Yeah.

Brown: OK. All right. Thank you.

[electronic click] [new call]

Voice D: General [inaudible].

[DIKE]: Sir, this is Bill [DIKE] (phonetic). Major General [DIKE], J-31, calling from the Pentagon.

Voice D: Yes...yes.

[DIKE]: Can you provide us any additional information in the

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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high speed track that the Nimitz picked up?

Voice D: Yes...I just read...hold on just a second, I got another message here that deletes the threat...hold on just a second...sir, the Omani patrol boat...stand by...

[DIKE]: Right. [pause]

Voice D: OK. This is a...out of 551. I'll read it, and it says high speed contact reported in Reference A ID'd as Omani patrol boat. Cancel request for post strike rules of engagement.

[DIKE]: Roger. Understand. That's good news.

Voice D: Yes. It sure is.

[DIKE]: OK. Thank you sir.

Voice D: You're welcome.

[DIKE]: Bye.

[electronic click] [new call]

Johnson: what we have is particularly [inaudible]...the first two choppers...we have a pretty good handle on the one that went down with hydraulic fluid. Do you all have anything that's fairly positive on what happened on the first two choppers? We're hearing that one of them got lost in a desert storm.

Long: No...we've...about an hour ago after your message went out to [CURTSY] (phonetic) and requested them to provide via this circuit all information available on the mechanical or other problems which caused the RH-53s to land prematurely along the track, particularly BLUEBEARD 5. Info needed by Chairman JCS soonest. We will relay. We haven't got a...it's been on the wire for a little over an hour, and we haven't got anything from him yet.

Johnson: OK. I think what he's got...he's got a [inaudible]...he's got a meeting with the President I think just before 7. He's trying to get confirmation. All [inaudible] reporting is two aircraft had mechanical problems went down. Of course now it appears there's

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

2808 Tape #5 Side One

at least somebody around here is getting some indication one of them may have gotten caught in a sand storm at low altitude and became disoriented.

Long: Yeah, now one of the messages we had... we can dig it back out... but that, you know, when everything was flying fast and furious that two of them supposedly landed due to visibility, but I think that's probably tenuous information. What I'll do is get back on the circuit here and refer to this one, and indicate that we've got to have what information is available... thereby... at least the next 20 minutes in order for the Chairman to have it by 7.

Johnson: Right. Any... anything they've got. He's particularly interested in when a helicopter... you know when the first ship went down did the other land to try to help it get caught in a sand storm or determine if there's really two helicopters that had mechanical problems or if one just got disoriented.

Long: OK. We'll see if we can drag them up there and get it so he'll have it in time for his 7 o'clock.

Johnson: OK. OK sir. I'll be here.

Long: OK. All right.

[electronic click] [new call]

Long: 241702 vicinity 28-26 58-30 east. Suspect second aircraft landed to support first. No further comms with these aircraft. Then paragraph two, at 241800Z advise that two additional aircraft landed because of reduced visibility vicinity 29-57 north 57-37 east. At 241946 report received that these aircraft again airborne enroute rendezvous. Now it seems those second two are probably the ones that picked up the crew of the downed plane. In the first instance one of those planes was probably the one that went down, and the second one was probably BLUEBEARD 5 and... based on the earlier debrief of Pitman that they had no contact with any of the helos.

Johnson: OK. That... indicate that two mission... two mission landed because of mechanical problems. They suspected the second aircraft was... was going in to retrieve, but

2808 Tape #5 Side Two

along- as weather related as result of blowing sand and reduced visibility. Both aircraft proceeded to refusal point. Paragraph 4. SHUCKBEARD never landed in country. About 2430Z loss of altitude and directional gyro plus severe pitch/co-pitch vertigo. WRR continued along track on made good, severe course and several 1000 ft. turns.

Johnson: OK, can you give me the date again, from on a 14th

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1961-1962 1963-1964

1. The first step is to identify the problem. This involves understanding the current situation and the goals that need to be achieved.

SECRET

10-10-68

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DATE: 05/04/2014

[illegible][illegible]

SECRET

1950-1951

CRS-2808-Tape 354

TOP SECRET
2808 Tape #5 Side One

I believe we've got BLUEBEARD saying he lost all contact... didn't make the fuel site.

Long: Yeah, so I think what [CURTSY] (phonetic) had there was that it probably had one mechanical... he went down, but it wasn't BLUEBEARD that went in with him, it was those other two that landed later, which they claim according to visibility. But it seems they may have gone in and picked up the crew. But according to what Pitman said in this second message that I read is that he just didn't have any contact with anybody going in there.

Johnson: OK. What is the time... what is the Zulu time you had on... on the first one going in with mechanical problems?

Long: Now... the first one was 1907... 241907 and then the second one was in response to our request for a debrief of the crew, and we had to flag them that about two times... that was 242345. So that was after Pitman was back aboard and paragraph two... crew of BLUEBEARD debriefed. They lost all contact with other helos while inbound.

Johnson: OK.

Long: ...didn't make.

Johnson: What this indicates then, that BLUEBEARD never had mechanical problems. He lost contact with the flight, flew around, and eventually returned to the Nimitz.

Long: That's what it appears to me, and of course we queried him again, and I sent another one Flash right after I talked to you twice saying we had to have that information whatever they had ASAP, for the Chairman for the 7 o'clock. We still may get something from that. If we do, I'll get you back, but...

Johnson: OK. Roger. We still need anything which would help explain exactly what happened.

Long: Right. It seems that... and I guess you've gone to the others to see... obviously somebody that ended up at the refueling site picked up that other crew of the downed... downed airplane.

Johnson: Right. We're trying... we've been working trying to get

2808 Tape #5 Side One

information also out of the Task Force

Long: Yes. Right. OK, well I've got the feeling based on this one that BLUEBEARD didn't know anything that was going on, lost all contact and headed back to the ship finally.

Johnson: Roger. OK sir. If you get anything else

Long: If I get anything else, I'll call you.

Johnson: All right sir. Thank you.

Long: OK sir.

[electronic click] new call

Long: OK. I've got some garbles in this one. They are getting another service, but this is the latest thing we just got from CURTIS. [phonetic] [unclear] the response for K-1, which is that we were quarantined for a while. First help down, we stayed down. We were down about 249/302. [unclear] picked up crew and continued leaving. [unclear] approximately 25-30 north 58-59 east.

Johnson: [unclear]

Long: Problem BLUEBEARD 5 believed to have been minor. [unclear] with attitude gyro/light control instruments. All aircraft virtually [unclear] at this point. In other words, they were in instrument conditions. Next paragraph B.

Johnson: the attitude minor difficulty with the attitude gyro

Long: Gyro/light control instruments. [Pause] Paragraph B

[End Side One]

2808 Tape #5 Side Two

Long: ... as weather related as result of blowing sand and reduced visibility. Both aircraft proceeded to refuel point. Paragraph C BLUEBEARD never landed in country. About 2430Z loss of altitude and directional gyro plus severe pilot/co-pilot vertigo due to instrument conditions decision made to reverse course and return to Nimitz.

Johnson: OK can you give it to me again. Loss of altitude.

Long: ... altitude and directional gyro plus severe instrument conditions decision made to reverse course and return to Nimitz.

Johnson: OK OK OK

Long: ... decision made to reverse course and return to Nimitz.

Johnson: OK OK

Long: ... decision made to reverse course and return to Nimitz.

Johnson: OK OK OK

Long: ... decision made to reverse course and return to Nimitz.

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Long: ... decision made to reverse course and return to Nimitz.

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Long: ... decision made to reverse course and return to Nimitz.

Johnson: OK OK OK

Long: ... decision made to reverse course and return to Nimitz.

End 2808 Tape #5

L-19

WHITE HOUSE TAPE #1

SIDE ONE

Voice A: (distant) Colonel?

Voice B: Hello.

Voice A: Yes sir...ah...Secretary Brown has left Doctor Brzezinski's office...we're going to try to (test) (words indistinct) for you.

Voice B: OK...ah...we'll hold on...
(loud click)

Voice A: I'm sorry sir?

Voice C: (in background, very faint; words indistinct)
Yes... (words indistinct)...recommend...

Voice D: All right, gentlemen, go.

Voice E: You on?

Voice D: Yeah, I hope...Everybody else offline?

Voice F: Yeah. OK, go ahead sir.

Jones: Got a JTF message...and this is the total we have as of now. JTF advises that two helicopters are on the ground...but not at the scheduled location...

Brown: All right.

Jones: ...somewhere between ingress and refueling point.

Brown: Right.

Jones: 1714 Zulu...

Brown: Yes

Jones: ...which is about 25 minutes ago...we're not sure that...that the time is... that's when it went down or what...but that's the time at the end. We have nothing further on this. Our speculation is...that... ah...

Brown: ...mechanical trouble?

TOP SECRET

Jones: ...one had mechanical trouble, and the procedure was for the second one to land to pick up the crew.

Brown: Yeah.

Jones: Ah... that's pure speculation right now.

Brown: Yeah.

Jones: Ah...we have another report that...ah... we don't think is a...a real problem, but it's regard to observation...ah...

Brown: Iranian what?

Jones:

Brown:

Jones: Ah.

Brown: ...or an Iranian what?

Jones:

Brown: OK

Jones:

Brown: Yeah.

Jones:

[REDACTED]

Brown: Yeah...

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: [REDACTED]

Jones: [REDACTED]

Brown: OK... (words indistinct)... in the helicopters... (words indistinct)... try and destroy it.

Jones: Well, that's what the... ah... they'll make the... ah... determine... that was the plan... destroy it... and then... ah... the other helicopter will pick up the people and go north. The go-no go was six across the... ah... seven across the area and six going... we have no decision other than to continue by the Task Force Commander as of now.

Brown: Right... (asks one word question, word indistinct)

Jones: Ah... you going to be in the Cabinet Room?

Brown: I'm still there. Yeah, I'm going back there (words indistinct)

Jones: You're going back where?

Brown: I'm going back to the cabinet.

Jones: OK. Well, if I get anything further on this I'll... I'll give you a call.

Voice (words indistinct)

G:

Jones: OK. Out. (electronic click) (new call)... Jones.

Voice

H: General Jones? Just a moment for the President please.

Carter: (in background) Keep it quiet. (electronic noise)
Keep it quiet... Hello?

Jones: Yes sir, Dave Jones.

Carter: Can you hear me?

[REDACTED]

Jones: Yes sir... (pause) I can hear you, yes Mr. President.

Carter: Did you give your (word indistinct)?

Jones: OK, I just reported to Harold. What... ah... and I don't know whether he's called you on it but... we... ah... our 130's are on the ground at... as reported... all of them have been on the ground for quite a while at the desert landing (part?). The helicopters were close on the last report but we do not have a report on the six helicopters on the ground, but they should be on the ground refueling. The one disturbing thing that... ah... I just gave to Harold a little while... that... two... when they landed... the two vehicles were stopped on the road... but a third vehicle escaped... that the vehicles included a bus with 16 passengers which... and that there were no injuries but a gas truck on fire.

[REDACTED] just talked with General Vaught and he said that everything was... ah... that his indication was still recommending... and actions to continue to goal... we are still trying to get more information on the vehicle that escaped... what type, what direction, but we do not have a good report... we would expect in another hour we would have a much better summary.

Carter: David did (words indistinct) behind schedule.

Jones: Ah... we're not sure... we're a little behind schedule but the reporting has been late. The 130's landed about on time... We have had difficulty communicating with the helicopters... a little behind... but not sure how much because of the reporting from the helicopter... we should soon have a good fix on the timing as they launch from Desert One... a good report from the MC-130s as to helicopter timing.

Carter: David, ah, there.

Jones: Pardon?

Carter: If we have a real problem... air cover... provided?

Jones: We have a tanker down over... ah... the carrier, and... that can provide air planes to go up into the area. We do not have... ah... in the night up there and because of the... ah... we'd tip our hand... we do not have air cover up there... but we can send air cover up.

Carter: OK... David.

Voice 1: Uh huh.

Jones: We will. It should clear up within the next hour.

Carter: (voice electronically garbled)

Jones: You are garbled, Mr. President.

Carter: (voice electronically garbled)

Jones: Ah, I'm sorry you were very confused. I think I'm not sure what you said. I thought I heard the word "air". The indications are that the helicopter is in the area. We do not have the report on it. We do have one report that a helicopter is going back to the base and every indication is one of the helicopters that aborted that is coming back to the base. Evidently, and we are again speculating that one has trouble. The second one landed, picked up the crew of the first, and heading back to the base but that is yet unconfirmed. Over.

Carter: (voice electronically garbled)

Jones: I'm sorry, Mr. President, you are completely garbled. I can replace the call. Over.

Carter: (voice electronically garbled)

Jones: I will replace the call because I cannot understand.

Carter: (voice electronically garbled)

Voice J: ...garbled to the President

Jones: I do not read you.

Carter: (voice electronically garbled)

Jones: I'll put a new call in. (electronically garbled)

(Remainder of Side 1 was blank) (Side 2 blank)